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The Mediterranean in the English Empire of Trade, 1660-1748 
Abstract 
  
 This dissertation reintegrates the Mediterranean into the history of the 
development of the early modern British Empire. During the seventeenth century, the 
Mediterranean emerged as a distinct political, legal and commercial space within the 
wider currents of English expansion. The political and legal regimes of the sea shaped the 
evolution of the English presence there and the rulers of the Ottoman Empire, the North 
African regencies, and Italian states such as Tuscany and Genoa limited the expansion of 
English sovereignty. As a result, the sea offers a different perspective on the history of 
English expansion than that found in imperial histories set in the Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans. The development of the English presence in the Mediterranean highlights the 
relative weakness of the early modern English state and the extent to which other polities 
limited the expansion of its sovereign authority. 
 However, this dissertation also aims to move beyond an imperial historiography 
that distinguishes the wider development of English trade and navigation from the growth 
of English empire. Through the latter half of the seventeenth century and first half of the 
eighteenth, the Crown's claims to jurisdiction over its subjects and their ships projected 
English authority into the Mediterranean. This dissertation examines how the English 
state extended its authority within a pluralistic maritime environment that lay largely 
beyond the reach of its claims to empire. By studying the jurisdictional contests that arose 
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when the Crown’s claims to authority over its subjects and their ships collided with the 
sovereignty of Mediterranean polities, it shows how the intersection of diverse sovereign 
and legal authorities defined the organization of English trade and navigation. Moreover, 
as the English state extended its authority overseas during the early modern period, it 
called into question the location of sovereignty and jurisdictional authority in 
Mediterranean waters as well as in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. English expansion in 
the Mediterranean and the political evolution of the sea were part of a global process 
whereby states and empires sought to establish their authority over oceanic space and 
networks of trade. 
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Notes on Style 
 
 In the early modern Mediterranean, English merchants and officials used both 
“old style” and “new style” forms of dating. Although English correspondents regularly 
listed both dates on their letters or otherwise specified which form they were using, it is 
not always possible to confirm whether a particular document is dated new style or old 
style. For the sake of consistency, I give all dates as they appear in sources, but the year 
is considered to begin on 1 January. I specify whether particular documents are dated old 
or new style when chronology would otherwise become confused. 
 Also for the sake of consistency, I switch from using the terms “England” and 
“English” to “Britain” and “British” when referring to events that took place after the Act 
of Union of 1707. When referring to events and processes that spanned the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, I use the term “English” to reflect the fact that English 
merchants and officials far outnumbered their Scottish counterparts in the Mediterranean.   
  I have followed the original spelling and capitalization in quotations from 
English-language sources, but I have silently expanded all abbreviations. The original 
spelling and capitalization of French, Italian and other foreign language quotations 
translated in the text are given in the footnotes. Translations are my own, unless 
otherwise noted.   
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Introduction 
 
England in the Mediterranean, 1660-1748 
 
  
 The Mediterranean Sea and the world that centered upon it are conspicuously 
absent from histories that recount the global expansion of English trade and empire 
during the early modern period.1 Yet, during these years, the Mediterranean was a center 
of English commercial and naval activity. Mediterranean ports were the destination of 
many of the first tentative voyages that expanded England’s economic and maritime 
horizons in the sixteenth century and English merchants established a formidable 
presence there over the course of the following century. By the 1660's, the value of 
English commerce to the Mediterranean and southern Europe accounted for nearly half of 
England’s overseas trade.2 The sea was also strategically vital to England’s development 
as a European power and the occupation first of Tangier and then of Gibraltar and 
Minorca testified to the contemporary belief that England required a permanent naval and 
military presence in the Mediterranean to support its military and naval campaigns. Yet 
neither the Mediterranean nor the English presence there fit a narrative of English 
imperial expansion oriented around the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Instead, the inability 
                                                
1 This dissertation uses the terms “English expansion” and “English Empire” to reflect the particular 
national character of trade and navigation from the British Isles to the early modern Mediterranean. 
Scottish participation helped to create a notably British empire in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans following 
the Act of Union of 1707; however, Scottish trade and Scottish merchants and administrators remained 
largely absent from the Mediterranean through much of the eighteenth century. For the sake of consistency, 
the dissertation switches to the adjective “British” when referring to events that followed the Act of Union 
in order to best reflect the composite nature of the polity and state after that date. On the particularly 
English character of Mediterranean trade, see below, chap. 5. 
2 See the tables on mid-seventeenth-century English overseas trade in Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis, English 
Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Italy, trans. Stephen Parkin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 128 and Sari Hornstein, The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674-1688 (Aldershot: 
Scolar Press, 1991), 37-49. 
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of the Crown to develop or sustain a significant colonial empire in the Mediterranean 
helps to explain its absence from traditional accounts of English imperial expansion. 
 The Mediterranean emerged over the course of the seventeenth century as a 
distinct political, commercial and legal space within the global currents of English trade 
and navigation. While the English Crown and its corporate surrogates elsewhere 
established their sovereign and jurisdictional authority over colonial settlements and 
fortified trading posts, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire, the North African regencies and 
Italian states such as Florence and Genoa limited the expansion of English sovereignty. 
As a result, the evolution of the English presence in the Mediterranean diverged from that 
of England’s wider imperial expansion. During the early modern period, first the 
Portuguese and then the Dutch and English created maritime empires in the Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans that centered on territorial enclaves and the control of sea routes and 
corridors of trade.3 Forts secured the European presence along American, African and 
Asian coastlines and served as nodes in growing networks of oceanic trade.4 In Africa 
and Asia, indigenous polities and sovereigns generally restricted the territorial expansion 
of these empires and trading companies extended their authority over trade while 
                                                
3 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper offer an excellent 
overview of the structure and history of Europe’s maritime empires in Burbank and Cooper, Empires in 
World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 
chap. 6, “Oceanic Economies and Colonial Societies: Europe, Asia, and the Americas.” On the 
development of the Portuguese and Dutch Empires in the Indian Ocean, see also Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 
The Political Economy of Commerce: Southern India, 1500-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990); idem, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History 
(London: Longman, 1990); Om Prakash, European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
4 Geoffey Parker emphasizes the importance of fortified ports and strongholds for Europe’s maritime 
empires in Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 4, “The ‘Military Revolution’ Abroad.” 
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acknowledging and depending upon the sovereignty of local rulers. Nevertheless, 
European states and companies gradually extended their authority throughout the Atlantic 
and Indian Ocean worlds and forged powerful empires that would increasingly dominate 
growing portions of these regions. 
 The Mediterranean falls largely outside histories centered on the expansion of 
English empire. Through the first part of the seventeenth century, the character of the  
trade of the English East India Company largely resembled that of English trade in the  
Mediterranean. Around both the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, English merchants 
lived and worked in foreign ports where they had to adapt to local customs and accept 
indigenous authority.5 By the latter half of the seventeenth century, however, the East 
India Company’s trade increasingly centered on a network of forts and ports that lay 
under its authority.6 In contrast, England failed to establish a comparable imperial or 
sovereign presence in the Mediterranean. During this same period, the English abandoned 
Tangier in the face of Moroccan opposition. Expectations that Tangier or, subsequently, 
Gibraltar and Minorca would become centers of trade under English control proved 
illusory as trade continued to center on foreign ports where English merchant 
communities fell under the legal authority of foreign sovereigns. Moreover, even the 
growing power of the English navy proved to be only partially effective in safeguarding 
navigation from attack by the Muslim and Christian corsairs who infested the 
                                                
5 Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
6 Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the 
British Empire in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). The Company transfered its western 
presidency, the headquarters for the Company’s operations in western Asia, from the Mughal port of Surat 
to its own growing city of Bombay in 1687, ibid, 73.  
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Mediterranean. Nowhere was English weakness as evident as it was in the Mediterranean, 
where the English state struggled to establish a territorial footprint and thousands of 
English sailors wound up as slaves and captives in the North African regencies and 
Morocco.7    
 The Mediterranean offers a different perspective on the form and geography of 
English expansion than that found in imperial histories set in the Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans. While England’s commercial and political expansion reshaped the Atlantic and 
Indian Ocean worlds, its impact in the Mediterranean was more limited. For this very 
reason, though, the Mediterranean serves as a model for understanding English expansion 
within the context of oceanic regions where diverse polities exercised legal and sovereign 
power. The history of the English presence in the Mediterranean is a history of the limits 
of English power in the early modern world. It is also, however, a history that illustrates 
how the English state extended its jurisdiction and authority beyond the reach of its 
claims to sovereignty and empire. English maritime and commercial expansion lay as 
much in foreign ports and expansive grey areas where different forms of English and 
indigenous authority overlapped as it did within settlement colonies and fortified trading 
ports. The history of England’s Mediterranean expansion reveals how the English state 
extended its authority into a region where its sovereign and imperial presence was 
limited. 
 From the latter half of the seventeenth century, the English Crown took a growing 
role in the protection and regulation of Mediterranean trade and, in the process, integrated 
                                                
7 Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850 (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 
chap. 2, “The Crescent and the Sea.” 
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the sea into the global expansion of English state authority. Over the course of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, English sovereignty and jurisdiction increasingly 
extended beyond the bounds of the British Isles. Within this process, England's settler 
colonies and plantations marked neither the limits nor the extent of the extraterritorial 
expansion of English state authority. Indeed, the history of English expansion in the 
Mediterranean illustrates that the development of the English Empire was only part of a 
much broader expansion of English authority. As the Crown aimed to secure and protect 
English trade and navigation it worked to establish its jurisdiction over ships and subjects 
overseas. It dispatched fleets to combat the North African regencies, negotiated treaties 
that secured the safety of English vessels and regulated navigation in an effort to ensure 
that the terms of these treaties were followed. It sought to protect subjects from supposed 
abuses of foreign justice and to establish the authority of consuls and diplomats over 
communities of merchants in foreign ports. It also worked to uphold the jurisdiction of 
the High Court of Admiralty over crimes committed on board English vessels and over 
prizes taken by English ships. These claims to jurisdiction projected the authority of the 
English state into the Mediterranean. Yet, as the expanding jurisdictional claims of the 
English Crown and courts intersected and clashed with those of Mediterranean states, the 
resulting jurisdictional conflicts defined and limited the growing presence of the English 
state in the Mediterranean basin.  
 This study of the impact of English expansion on the political and legal 
organization of the Mediterranean further promises to help close the historiographical gap 
between England’s European and imperial histories. A focus on imperial history has 
obscured the relationship between England's growth as a European power and its global 
  6 
! !
expansion by reaffirming the separation of Europe from the wider world. Such histories 
traditionally distinguished the rise of a state system in Europe marked by the 
territorialization of land and oceanic space from the expansion of imperial and colonial 
regimes that rested upon layered and poorly defined claims of sovereignty.8  Meanwhile, 
the recent ascendancy of empire within British studies has also come at the cost of the 
European dimension of British history. The “new” British and imperial histories that have 
emphasized the importance of empire in the political and cultural development of Britain 
have, ironically, affirmed the insularity of British history: if Britain was a nation defined 
by empire, then its European context was of little consequence.9 As a result, Europe and 
empire have become rival poles in the historiography of early modern Britain as scholars 
debate the relative importance of each for shaping British history.10 
                                                
8 For instance, Edward Keene seeks to show how Grotian ideas about sovereignty operated within both 
European and global contexts, but reaffirms the division between a Westphalian Europe of sovereign states 
and an extra-European environment of empires and colonies: Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: 
Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). This 
distinction also seems to be implicit in Charles Maier's analysis of different kinds of territorial and imperial 
frontiers in Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006).  
9 J. G. A. Pocock offered his seminal call for a new British history in “British History: A Plea for a New 
Subject,” Journal of Modern History, 47, no. 4 (December1975): 601-624 and “The Limits and Divisions 
of British History,” American Historical Review, 87, no. 2 (April 1982): 311-336. For an analysis, see 
David Armitage, "Greater Britain: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," The American Historical 
Review 104, no. 2 (April 1999): 427-445. For an overview of the current state of British Atlantic history, 
see the essays in David Armitage and Michael Braddick’s The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). For a programmatic statement of the new British imperial history, 
see Kathleen Wilson, "Introduction: histories, empire, modernities," in A New Imperial History, ed. 
Kathleen Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1-26. 
10 The tension between England's imperial and European contexts is particularly evident in recent works 
that have explored the European dimension of British history. For examples of these works, see Steven 
Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century 
English Political Instability in European Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Tony 
Claydon, Europe and the Making of England, 1660-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Brendan Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-1783 
(London: Allen Lane, 2007); Stephen Conway, Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe in the Eighteenth 
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 The intersection of Britain’s European and imperial histories in the Mediterranean 
challenges this dichotomy. The British Empire and the settlements that constituted it were 
the most visible products of the global patterns of trade and migration that carried the 
English, and later the British, around the world. Scholars have accordingly approached 
the history of English expansion with the aim of explaining the origins and development 
of England's colonial empire. This conflation of expansion and empire has obscured the 
institutional diversity that underlay the global extension of English trade and political 
authority. Empires that historians once demarcated by the extent of colonial settlement 
and conquest now look increasingly like webs of overlapping commercial networks and 
imagined communities of diverse corporate bodies.11 Both states and empires were 
“composite” entities whose constituent kingdoms, colonies and corporate bodies bridged 
the supposedly Westphalian system of Europe and the looser political structures of the 
wider world.12 In similar fashion, the growth of English trade and navigation in the 
Mediterranean raised jurisdictional and legal questions in near-European waters that 
paralleled those that arose in the Indian Ocean and around the Atlantic. Did jurisdiction 
follow the subject and ship or did it arise from the sovereignty that states claimed over 
territory and seas? The overseas extension of European sovereignty and the evolution of 
                                                
Century: Similarities, Connections, Identities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Jonathan Scott’s 
When the Waves Ruled Britannia: Geography and Political Identities, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011) examines England’s emergence as a maritime power within Europe to reintegrate 
the European and imperial dimensions of British history. 
11 For this perspective on Europe's early modern empires, see Benton, A Search for Sovereignty and Stern, 
The Company-State. 
12 On these points see, J. H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” Past and Present, no. 137 
(November 1992): 48–71, and John Robertson, The Case for the Englightenment: Scotland and Naples, 
1680-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 4, “The Predicament of 'Kingdoms 
Governed as Provinces.” See also Philip J. Stern, “‘A Politie of Civill & Military Power’: Political Thought 
and the late Seventeenth-Century Foundations of the East India Company-State,” Journal of British Studies 
47, no. 2 (April 2008): 257-261. 
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the maritime and territorial boundaries of the state were part of a global process whereby 
early modern polities sought to resolve these questions and to establish their authority 
over oceanic space and networks of trade.13   
  
I. The Mediterranean in an Age of Expansion 
 “In the great Age of Exploration the Mediterranean is the sea that has been left 
behind.”14 A firmly established historical narrative rests upon the assumption that during 
the seventeenth century the balance of power in Europe shifted decisively to the states of 
northwestern Europe, thereby reducing southern Europe and the Mediterranean to the 
status of historical backwaters. However, it is increasingly evident that the Mediterranean 
remained a vibrant commercial and maritime region through the early modern period. It 
also remained a center of commercial and political competition. Rather than being left 
behind by the historical currents of the early modern world, the Mediterranean was 
integral to the political and economic processes that characterized this period. 
 The decline of the Mediterranean world in the face of Europe's imperial 
expansion has long been central to its historiography. From this perspective, Fernand 
Braudel’s vibrant Mediterranean, which dominated sixteenth-century Europe, was a sea 
                                                
13 The most thorough study in English on the evolution of early modern conceptions of maritime 
territoriality and oceanic sovereignty remains Fulton, Sovereignty of the Sea, pt. 2, chap. 1, “The Historical 
Evolution of the Territorial Sea,” and chap. 2, “General Adoption of the Three-Mile Limit.” David 
Armitage's analysis of debates on the “British Seas' is one of the few works to link intra-European debates 
about maritime dominion to the global expansion of global imperial sovereignty, Armitage, The Ideological 
Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap 4, “The empire of the 
seas, 1576-1689.” 
14 Molly Greene, Catholic Pirates, Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Mediterranean (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 231. 
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on the brink of precipitous decline.15 Although the Mediterranean economy was resilient 
in the face of Portuguese attempts to restrict the flow of spices to the Red Sea and of 
Spanish conquests in the Americas, it was slowly strangled by the continued rise of the 
Atlantic economies and the triumph of Dutch and English shipping.16 The Dutch, who 
succeeded where the Portuguese had failed, finally diverted the trade in spices around the 
Cape of Good Hope and thereby undermined the commercial centrality and importance of 
the Ottoman Empire.17 Meanwhile, English and Dutch ships, carrying the textiles that 
displaced Italian and Ottoman manufactures, entered the Mediterranean in a “Northern 
invasion” that destroyed indigenous shipping and turned the region into a periphery of the 
militarily and economically dominant states of northern Europe.
18
  According to this 
narrative, the rise of English and Dutch empires of trade founded upon the commerce of 
                                                
15 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. by Sian 
Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Braudel variously dated the onset of irreversible decline to 
1620, 1650, and 1680. However, the body of his work often suggests a different chronology, pointing to the 
presence of signs of decline from the late sixteenth century. 
16 On the survival of the Venetian spice trade, see Frederic C. Lane, “The Mediterranean Spice Trade: 
Further Evidence of its Revival in the Sixteenth Century,” The American Historical Review, 45, no. 3 
(April 1940): 581-590.  Meanwhile, Genoese influence in Habsburg finance ensured that Italy continued to 
play a role in the Atlantic economy through the sixteenth century, see Braudel, The Mediterranean and the 
Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 1:228-229. On effects of the rise of English and Dutch 
shipping on the Venetian Empire, see Alberto Teneti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 1580-1615, trans. 
Janet and Brian Pullan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), passim., and 
Frederick Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 386-
388. 
17 This view found its most influential expression in Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the 
Seventeenth Century: the East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
18 Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 2:606, 621-642. 
Immanuel Wallerstein speaks of the transition of northern Italy from the core of the European world-
economy to a semiperiphery, being replaced at the center by northwestern Europe, The Modern World-
System, vol. 1, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth 
Century,  (New York: Academic Press, 1974), 216-221. See also idem., “The Ottoman Empire and the 
Capitalist World-Economy: Some Questions for Research,” in Review, 2, no. 3 (Winter 1979): 392-397. 
For the effects of English piracy on Venetian shipping, see Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of 
Venice, trans Janet and Brian Pullan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). 
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the Atlantic and Indian Oceans reduced the Mediterranean to the historiographical dead 
end it would supposedly remain until Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt.19  
  The Mediterranean has not, however, always been absent from analysis of British 
history. At the start of the twentieth century, the Mediterranean loomed large in the 
consciousness of Britain's imperial and naval histories. Naval bases at Gibraltar and 
Malta and primacy in Egypt secured Britain's strategic position within Europe and its 
lines of communication with its Indian empire.20 In the decade prior to the First World 
War, great power rivalry further brought the Mediterranean to attention as European 
empires extended their spheres of influence in Morocco and North Africa. In 1904, the 
naval historian Sir Julian Corbett projected the strategic situation of his own days onto 
the seventeenth century to argue that the development of English naval and diplomatic 
strategy in the Mediterranean was central to Britain's emergence as a European power.21  
Likewise, E. M. G. Routh presented the history of the English settlement at Tangier as a 
                                                
19 On the emergence of the Mediterranean as a zone of imperial competition at the end of the eighteenth 
century, see C.A. Bayly The Imperial Meridian: the British Empire and the World, 1780-1830 (London: 
Longman, 1989); Maya Jasanoff, The Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750-
1850 (New York: Knopf, 2005); Robert Holland, Blue-Water Empire: The British in the Mediterranean 
since 1800 (London: Allen Lane, 2012). A few scholars have demonstrated the importance of the 
Mediterranean for the development of early modern English shipping and the growth of the Atlantic 
economy, see Ralph Davis, “England and the Mediterranean, 1570-1670,” in Essays in the Economic and 
Social History of Tudor and Stuart England, ed. F.J. Fisher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1961), 117-137; idem., The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries, (London: Macmillan, 1962); Richard T.  Rapp, “The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade 
Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution,” The Journal of Economic 
History 35, no. 3 (September 1975): 499-525; Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement: 
Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984). 
20 For summaries of the history of the British Empire in the Mediterranean, see David Abulafia, The Great 
Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean (London: Allen Lane, 2011), Part 4, chaps. 5-9 and Part 5, 
chaps. 1-7; Holland, Blue-Water Empire. 
21 Julian S. Corbett, England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Naval 
Power within the Straits, 1603-1713 (Londond: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904).  Conversely, Walter 
Frewen Lord emphasized the absence of a coherent strategy in England’s relationship to the Mediterranean 
in Lord, England and France in the Mediterranean, 1660-1830 (London: S. Low, Marston, 1901) 
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step towards an African empire that the English failed to follow up for another two 
centuries.22 Despite the anachronistic quality of conclusions that better reflected the 
conditions of the early twentieth century rather than those of the seventeenth, both Routh 
and Corbett were more ready to appreciate the Mediterranean's early modern significance 
than many subsequent historians. The break-up of the British Empire and the subsequent 
rise of Atlantic history have obscured the Mediterranean dimension of British history that 
was evident to an earlier generation of historians. It is only in the past decade that 
historians have begun to expand on early twentieth-century research on the origins and 
development of England’s diplomatic and commercial relationship with the Ottoman 
Empire.23  
                                                
22 E.M.G. Routh, Tangier: England’s Lost Atlantic Outpost (London: J. Murray, 1912). 
23 Historical scholarship on England’s diplomatic and commercial relationship with the Ottoman Empire 
largely dates from the first half of the twentieth century and has only been supplemented and supplanted by 
new research in the past decade: J. Theodore Bent, “The English in the Levant,” The English Historical 
Review 5, no. 20 (October 1890): 654-664.; Edwin Pears, “The Spanish Armada and the Ottoman Porte,” 
The English Historical Review 8, no. 31 (July 1893), 439-466; Mortimer Epstein, The Early History of the 
Levant Trade (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1908); G. F. Abbott, Under the Turk in Constantinople 
(London: Macmillan, 1920); H.G. Rawlinson, “The Embassy of William Harborne to Constantinople, 
1583-1588,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th ser., 5 (1922): 1-27; Albert Lindsay 
Rowland, England and Turkey: The Rise of Diplomatic and Commercial Relations (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1925); Gwilym Ambrose, “English Traders at Aleppo (1658-1756),” The 
Economic History Review 3, no. 2 (October 1931): 246-267; Alfred C. Wood, A History of the Levant 
Company (London, Oxford University Press, 1935); Arthur Leon Horniker, “William Harborne and the 
Beginning of Anglo-Turkish Diplomatic and Commercial Relations,” The Journal of Modern History 14, 
no. 3 (September 1942): 289-316; idem., “Anglo-French Rivalry in the Levant from 1583 to 1612,” The 
Journal of Modern History 18, no. 4 (December 1946): 289-305; T. S. Willan, “Some Aspects of English 
Trade with the Levant in the Sixteenth Century,” The English Historical Review 70, no. 276 (July 1955): 
399-410; Ralph Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square: English Traders in the Levant in the Eighteenth 
Century (London: Macmillan, 1967).  For more recent studies on Anglo-Ottoman interactions, see Susan 
Skilliter, William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey, 1578-1582 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977) and, subsequently, Daniel Goffman, Britons in the Ottoman Empire, 1642-1660 (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1998); Alastair Hamilton, Alexander H. De Groot, and Maurits H. van den Boogert, 
eds., Friends and Rivals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant from the Seventeenth 
to the Early Nineteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Lisa Jardine, “Gloriana Rules the Waves: or, the 
Advantage of being Excommunicated (and a Woman),” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th 
ser., 14 (2004): 209-222; James Mather, Pashas: Traders and Travellers in the Islamic World (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2009). 
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 Changing perspectives on the origins and development of the British Empire have 
brought the Mediterranean back into prominence among its historians. The 
reincorporation of this sea into British history began with literary scholars who expanded 
upon a long-standing interest in the portrayal of Muslims and North Africans in 
Elizabethan drama to analyze how these depictions reflected understandings of cultural 
and racial difference in early modern England.24 Within this post-colonial approach, the 
cultural construction of extra-European societies is as much a part of empire-building as 
territorial conquest.25 Since it was in the Mediterranean that the English had their most 
sustained engagement with the Muslim world until the late eighteenth century, it was 
there that the English formed conceptions of the “Turk” and of the “Moor” that later 
helped to legitimize colonial and imperial expansion.26 Yet, this emphasis on the literary 
depiction of Muslims distorts the nature and scope of seventeenth-century England’s 
military and commercial success.27 Literary scholars who treat the Mediterranean as an 
“allegory for empire" both minimize the actual role of the Mediterranean within 
                                                
24
 For an example of early scholarship on cultural depictions of the Islamic world in sixteenth-century 
England, see Samuel Chew, The Crescent and the Rose: Islam and England during the Renaissance (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1937). 
25 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 
26  Jack D’Amico, The Moor in English Renaissance Drama (Tampa: University of South Florida Press, 
1991); Ania Loomba, Shakespeare, Race, and Colonialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Emily 
C. Bartels, Spectacles of Strangeness: Imperialism, Alienation and Marlowe (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1993); Nabil Matar, Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Daniel Vitkus, Turning Turk: English Theater and the 
Multicultural Mediterranean, 1570-1630 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Jonathan Burton, Traffic 
and Turning: Islam and English Drama, 1579-1624 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005); Gerald 
MacLean, The Rise of Oriental Travel: English Visitors to the Ottoman Empire, 1580-1720 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); idem., Looking East:  English Writings and the Ottoman Empire before 1800 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); MacLean and Nabil Matar, eds., Britain and the Islamic World 
1558-1713 (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2011). 
27  For instance, see Nabil Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589-1689 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
2005), chap.  5, “From Tangier to Algiers.” 
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England’s growing empire of trade and confuse colonial aspirations with the effective 
expression of imperial dominance.28  
 The Mediterranean was a vital training-ground for English merchants, travelers, 
and officials, who learned to interact with foreign and non-European cultures in the ports 
and waters of the sea.29 Commercial experience acquired in the Mediterranean shaped 
expectations for American colonization and particularly influenced the settlement of 
Jamestown.30 The relative weakness of English presence in the Mediterranean was also 
not exceptional within a narrative of imperial expansion but rather indicative of the 
tenuousness of that expansion.31 Well into the eighteenth century, polities that were far 
stronger than the early modern English state ringed the Mediterranean. In this respect, the 
commercial and political conditions of the sea actually mirrored those that prevailed in 
the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, where rival empires and indigenous powers posed 
a real threat to England’s fledgling empire. 
 As a result of the growth of Europe’s Atlantic and Indian Ocean trade the relative 
importance of the Mediterranean declined over the course of the seventeenth and 
                                                
28 Goran V. Stanivukovic, “Introduction: Beyond the Olive Trees: Remapping the Mediterranean World in 
Early Modern English Writings,” in Remapping the Mediterranean World in Early Modern English 
Writings, ed. Goran V. Stanivukovic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1-20. For a critique of post-
colonial approaches to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature, see David Armitage, “Literature and 
Empire,” The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol 1, The Origins of Empire, ed. Nicholas Canny 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 99-123. 
29 Games, The Web of Empire, chap. 2, “The Mediterranean Origins of the British Empire.” 
30  Pompa Banerjee, “The White Othello: Turkey and Virginia in John Smith’s True Travels,” in 
Envisioning an English Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World, ed. Robert 
Appelbaum & John Wood Sweet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 150-151; Karen 
Ordahl Kupperman, The Jamestown Project (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of the Harvard University 
Press, 2007), 37-42. 
31 Colley, Captives, passim. 
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eighteenth centuries. Yet the Mediterranean economy displayed enduring vitality as 
markets and port cities grew with the changing currents of global trade.32 Old 
Mediterranean powers like Genoa and Venice fought stubbornly to maintain their 
commercial and political prominence.33 But the entry of Northern European merchants 
and ships into Mediterranean also encouraged the rise of new trading centers. Rulers 
sought to capitalize on the changing patterns of trade in the Mediterranean; Ottoman 
officials at Smyrna and the grand dukes of Tuscany at Livorno fostered the creation of 
port-cities that attracted the newcomers to the Mediterranean and drew together networks 
of regional and global commerce.34 The networks of global trade continued to pass 
through the sea's urban centers and integrated it more closely with the Atlantic and Indian 
Ocean worlds.35  
 Around the early modern world, the seventeenth century was a period during 
which the political and legal organization of trade and navigation was extremely 
uncertain. This was as much the case in the Mediterranean as it was elsewhere. Following 
the battle of Lepanto in 1571, the Ottomans and Spanish Habsburgs largely ceased their 
                                                
32 Ottoman historians, in particular, have argued for the resilience of the Ottoman economy and of 
Levantine trade through the eighteenth century. André Raymond, Artisans et Commerçants au Caire au 
XVIIIe Siècle (Damas: Institut Français de Damas, 1973); Ariel Salzmann, “An Ancien Regime Revisited: 
Privatization and Political Economy in the 18th century Ottoman Empire,” Politics & Society, 21, no. 4 
(December 1993): 393-423; Jane Hathaway, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: the Rise of the 
Qazdaglis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Suraiya Faroqhi, “Crisis and Change, 1590-
1699,” in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, vol. 2, 1600-1914, ed. Halil 
Inalcik and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), passim. 
33 On Genoa’s efforts to adapt to the changing political balance of the Mediterranean, see Thomas Allison 
Kirk, Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in an Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559-1684 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). 
34 For the comparison of the two cities, see Molly Greene, “Resurgent Islam, 1500-1700,” in The 
Mediterranean in History, ed. David Abulafia (Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Museum, 2003), 219-250. 
35 Francesca Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-
Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009). 
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campaigns for control of the Mediterranean to concentrate on their respective Central 
Asian and American frontiers and on increasingly serious internal challenges.36 The 
retreat of these imperial hegemons left the sea open to the English and Dutch vessels that 
entered it in growing numbers and to North African and Christian corsairs who now 
sailed freely across it. These corsairs and the maritime insecurity they created helped to 
define the character of the early modern Mediterranean and brought the Mediterranean 
squarely into the seventeenth-century “Age of Piracy.” Around the early modern world, 
the growth of maritime commerce and the limited ability of states to police sea routes or 
secure navigation led to a surge in maritime violence. In the Atlantic, pirates and 
privateers arose at the margins of imperial competition as the English, Dutch and French 
preyed on Spanish trade. In the Mediterranean, it was religious conflict that framed and 
legitimized the activities of corsairs. Nevertheless, it was the absence of any clearly 
dominant power and the coexistence of a variety of competing states and polities that 
underlay the rise of insecurity within both these maritime environments. 
   
 II.  The Mediterranean in the English Empire of Trade 
  As historians of the Mediterranean have brought that sea back into narratives of 
global history, historians of Britain and the British Empire have begun to bring the 
Mediterranean back into imperial history. It is now becoming clear that the 
Mediterranean world occupied a critical place in the early modern expansion of English 
commerce and navigation. Although the rise of northern European economies ultimately 
                                                
36 On Ottoman and Habsburg competition in the sixteenth-century Mediterranean, see Andrew Hess, The 
Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978). 
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contributed to the relative decline of many of the polities surrounding the Mediterranean, 
the cities and ports surrounding the Mediterranean were among the largest and richest 
markets for English merchants through the seventeenth century. The Mediterranean still 
accounted for a quarter of English trade at the end of the century. This proportion 
declined over the course of the eighteenth century but nevertheless illustrates the 
importance of the sea within England’s development as a commercial power.37 Indeed, 
for much of the seventeenth century, the scale and value of the trade of the Levant 
Company, which regulated English trade to the Ottoman Empire, exceeded that of the 
East India Company. In 1669, for example, the value of English trade to the Levant was 
£466,703 while the total value of the imports and exports of the East India trade 
amounted to about £439,869.38 These figures may actually understate the contemporary 
significance of trade to the Mediterranean and southern Europe. This trade rested largely 
on the export of manufactures and woolen goods and thus directly supported English 
workers and the English balance of trade.39 The merchant and commercial thinker, John 
Cary, expressed common opinions when he wrote that the East India trade was 
detrimental to England since it brought Indian manufactures into competition with those 
of England while asserting that “the Spanish, Turky, and Portugal Trades are very 
advantageous, as they vend great Quantities of our Product and Manufactures, and 
                                                
37 Sari Hornstein provides an effective summary of the evolution of the structure of English trade during the 
latter half of the seventeenth century in Hornstein, The Restoration Navy, 33-36. 
38 These figures are derived from those calculated by Robert Brenner in Brenner, Merchants and 
Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550-1653 (London 
and New York, NY, 2003), 29. 
39 On the composition of England’s Mediterranean trade, see Pagano de Divitiis, English Merchants in 
Seventeenth-Century Italy, 153-181; Hornstein, The Restoration Navy, 36-42.  
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furnish us with Materials to be wrought up here, and disperse our Commodities to other 
places where we could not so conveniently send them our selves.”40 
 The value of Mediterranean trade both points to the importance of the sea within 
England’s commercial expansion and helps to explain English efforts to secure a 
territorial foothold near or within it. The acquisition of the former Portuguese colony of 
Tangier on the North African Coast in 1661 and the subsequent conquest of Gibraltar and 
Minorca fifty years later brought England’s growing overseas empire into the 
Mediterranean world. These expensively garrisoned colonies and the fleets cruising off 
them represented a far greater commitment of state resources than were allotted to the 
American colonies until well into the eighteenth century. Indeed, the Mediterranean was 
probably the overseas region where the English state was most present through the 
seventeenth century. English fleets were a near permanent presence around the sea and 
the growth of consular and ambassadorial networks testified to the Crown's commitment 
to support England's commercial and diplomatic interests. 
 Nevertheless, by the early eighteenth century the dramatic growth of England's 
Atlantic economy and of the East India Company had eclipsed England's Mediterranean 
trade and French competition had begun to marginalize the English merchant community 
in the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, failure and disappointment marked the history of 
England's Mediterranean empire. The settlement of Tangier was the most intensive and 
expensive colonial project of the Restoration state, yet the project ended in total failure 
when the English destroyed and abandoned the town two decades after taking possession 
                                                
40 John Cary, An Essay on the State of England in Relation to its Trade, its Poor, and its Taxes, for 
Carrying on the Present War against France (Bristol, 1695), 130. 
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of it. Minorca was lost at the beginning of the Seven Years' War and would be 
surrendered two more times and finally ceded back to Spain early in the nineteenth 
century.41 Gibraltar’s symbolic and sentimental significance as the “rock of empire” has 
also obscured its initially marginal utility as either a naval base or trading center. Even in 
the eighteenth century Gibraltar attracted vocal patriotic pride. Nevertheless, its value as 
a diplomatic bargaining chip far outstripped either its strategic or commercial 
importance.42 England’s early modern Mediterranean empire was thus a tenuous entity 
that testified to the importance of the sea for English trade and strategy but contributed 
relatively little to either.  
 As a result of the limits of English territorial sovereignty around the 
Mediterranean, English merchants overwhelmingly resided in ports and cities that fell 
under the authority of foreign sovereigns. In this respect, the histories of the English 
Levant Company and of its corporate offshoot, the East India Company, further testify to 
the different trajectories that marked the evolution of English trade in the Mediterranean 
and the Indian Ocean. In the latter half of the seventeenth century, the East India 
Company emerged as an imperial power in its own right as its trade increasingly centered 
on a network of plantations and colonies that stretched from the south Atlantic to the 
Indonesian archipelago.43 The Levant Company, on the other hand, was a more purely 
                                                
41 On the history of the British occupation of Minorca, see Desmond Gregory, Minorca, the Illusory Prize: 
A History of the British Occupations of Minorca between 1708 and 1802 (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 1990). 
42 On the variety of eighteenth-century views of Gibraltar, see Stetson Conn, Gibraltar in British 
Diplomacy in the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), chap. 11, "The Value of 
Gibraltar;" Holland, Blue-Water Empire, 9. 
43 Stern, The Company-State, passim. 
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commercial body; although it paid the salary of England’s ambassador to the Ottoman 
Empire its political role deteriorated over the course of the seventeenth century. Unlike 
the East India Company it possessed neither colonies nor forts and it did not wage wars 
or negotiate treaties on its own authority. Instead, its members enjoyed a monopoly on 
English trade to the Ottoman Empire but they fell largely under Ottoman legal authority 
while in the Levant and were in no position to dictate either the terms of trade or the 
conditions of their residency in the eastern Mediterranean. The position of the Levant 
Company in the Ottoman Empire was indicative of the general character of English trade 
to the Mediterranean. Neither the English state nor English merchants were able to dictate 
the terms of trade in the Mediterranean or impose their will consistently on their 
Mediterranean counterparts. In contrast to the expansion of English empire in the Atlantic 
and Indian Oceans, accommodation largely defined England's presence in the early 
modern Mediterranean.44  
 The limits to the expansion of English sovereignty into the early Mediterranean 
are, however, only part of the story of England’s place in the trading world of that sea. 
Through the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, the form of what became the 
British Empire remained highly uncertain. Colonies failed almost as regularly and no 
more predictably than they succeeded.45 As a result, the shape of empire was quite 
literally in constant flux. Conceptions of the empire as a trans-Atlantic political 
community grew up alongside different visions of the relationship between England and 
                                                
44 Games, Web of Empire, esp. chap. 2, “The Mediterranean Origins of the British Empire;” Mather, 
Pashas, passim. 
45 Games, Web of Empire, esp. chap. 6, “Madagascar, 1635-1650.” 
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its overseas expansion. Some commentators saw the Mediterranean and England's 
possessions within that sea as integral to a wider maritime and commercial empire. The 
pamphleteer Thomas Gordon thus asserted the “Importance of Gibraltar to the British 
Empire” in a work describing the benefits of the site and the politician Henry Maxwell 
later offered recommendations to improve Gibraltar and Minorca so as “to build a much 
greater British Empire in the Islands of the Mediterranean.” For Maxwell, Gibraltar and 
Minorca were part of a wider British Empire built upon “Large and Fruitful Islands” and 
the “Command of the Seas.” 46 For others, though, territorial empire, even of such an 
insular variety, was subordinate to wider questions of commercial competition.47  In the 
words of Joseph Addison, “Trade, without enlarging the British Territories, has given us 
a kind additional Empire.”48 This empire of trade contained Britain’s plantations but 
extended well beyond them. Only in the second quarter of the eighteenth century would 
ideas of colonial and commercial empire fully come together within a conception of the 
British Empire as a trans-Atlantic political community that was “Protestant, commercial, 
maritime and free.”49  
                                                
46 [Thomas Gordon], Considerations Offered upon the Approaching Peace and upon the Importance of 
Gibraltar to the British Empire, being the Second Part of the Independent Whig (London, 1720); Henry 
Maxwell, Proposals to Render the Possession of Minorca, and Gibraltar, More useful to the Commerce of 
Britain, as well as to her Power by Sea, and Land, and to take away the Expence of their Maintainence 
(n.p., 1723), 13, 17. 
47 For an analysis of the political dimension of early-modern commercial competition, see Istvan Hont, 
Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge,  
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), chap. 2, “Free Trade and the Economic Limits to 
National Politics: Neo-Machiavellian Political Economy Reconsidered.” 
48 [Joseph Addison], The Spectator, no. 69 (May 19, 1711). 
49 Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, chap. 7, “Empire and Ideology in the 
Walpolean Era.” 
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 The growth of Britain's colonial empire was thus only part of a much broader 
expansion of commerce, navigation, and movement. “Britain's global presence was 
greater and more dispersed than its imperial presences, and one of the reasons for this 
was that the British maritime world was always larger and more extended than Britain’s 
imperial dominion.”50 Britain’s development as a naval and commercial power was 
central to but not always coterminous with the evolution of its empire.51 Navigation laws 
and corporate governance established an extraterritorial framework of laws and 
institutions that regulated the activity of English merchants both at sea and in foreign 
ports.52 The study of English expansion thus cannot be limited to the study of colonial 
possessions and the networks of communication and commerce that linked them.  
Instead, it must also ask how and how far English state authority extended beyond its 
imperial dominions to match the reach of its global maritime world. In this vein a century 
ago, Sir Julian Corbett equated maritime power with imperial dominion when he credited 
William III with the strategic insight that the Mediterranean was the key to the balance of 
power in Europe and described him as the one who “saw how by that means the British 
frontier could be carried unassailably up to the tenderest border of the old Mediterranean 
States which had been wont to give the law to Europe and to count the nations of the 
                                                
50 David Cannadine, “Introduction,” in Empire, the Sea and Global History: Britain's Maritime World, c. 
1760-1840, ed. Cannadine (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 4. 
51 Patrick K. O’Brien, “Inseparable Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal State, and the Expansion of 
Empire, 1688-1815,” The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century, ed. P. J. 
Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 53-77.  On the relationship between Britain’s 
development as a naval power and its imperial expansion, see N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the 
Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (London and New York, 2004), passim. 
52 Thomas Leng, “Commercial Conflict and Regulation in the Discourse of Trade in Seventeenth-Century 
England,” The Historical Journal 48, no. 4 (December 2005): 933-954. 
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North Sea too distant for serious calculation.”53  Corbett provided no critical analysis to 
explain what constituted the “British frontier” in the Mediterranean; nevertheless, his 
evocative description of Britain’s naval and military expansion foreshadowed more 
recent analyses of the political and legal status of ships in the early modern world.   
 The development of the English presence in the Mediterranean highlights the 
degree to which the growth of English trade and navigation carried with it the 
extraterritorial expansion of state authority. Ships functioned as “islands of law” that 
carried state authority across oceanic bodies. The global expansion of the English state 
thus rested not only with the establishment of sovereignty over American and 
subsequently South Asian territory, but also with the extension of the jurisdictional 
authority of the state over subjects and ships as they traveled across oceans and into 
foreign harbors. In a sea where England's colonial presence was tenuous and limited, 
ships became critical sites for defining the extent of English legal authority. In the 
Mediterranean, as in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, ships carried the authority of the 
British state into maritime arenas that were already bounded by law. If ships in the early 
modern world were “vectors of Crown law thrusting into ocean space,” they were also, 
and for the same reason, contested spaces.54   
 Both the growth of English jurisdictional authority in the Mediterranean and the 
limits placed on the expansion of English sovereignty in that sea were typical of parallel 
processes at work in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Around the Indian Ocean, the 
                                                
53 Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, 2: 313. 
54 Both the classification of ships as “islands of law” and the evocative description of their role in the 
transmission of state legal authority come in Lauren Benton, “The Legal Spaces of Empire,” 704.   
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Portuguese and, subsequently, the English and the Dutch, entered an oceanic environment 
with a developed legal and commercial culture.55 European trade dramatically altered 
both the political economy and legal regimes of that sea, but sovereigns around the Indian 
Ocean continued to influence the legal and commercial organization of oceanic trade. In 
both the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, the expansion of British navigation and empire 
helped to supplant Iberian claims to stewardship over oceanic space with corridors of 
imperial regulation.56 Similar patterns of jurisdictional competition defined the 
construction of empires and the expansion of state sovereignty in the Mediterranean and 
other oceans.57 The growth of English trade and naval power incorporated the 
Mediterranean into patterns of jurisdictional competition that defined the extent of 
English sovereign and legal authority. In this respect, the development of the English 
presence in the Mediterranean was integral to the greater institutional and legal 
“polyphony” of English expansion.58 
 
                                                
55 C. H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies (16th, 17th 
and 18th Centuries) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). For a survey of the political economy of the Indian 
Ocean at the time of the Portuguese arrival in that sea, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Career and Legend 
of Vasco da Gama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 94-112. 
56 Philip Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
chap. 3, “Ocean Space and Merchant Capitalism;” Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, chap. 3, “Sovereignty 
at Sea: Jurisdiction, Piracy, and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism.” 
57 Within the historiography of English expansion, research on jurisdictional competition focuses on either  
intra-imperial disputes or on the rivalry between common law courts and their civil law rivals, as in 
Elizabeth Mancke, “Chartered Enterprises and the Evolution of the British Atlantic World,” in The 
Creation of the British Atlantic World, ed. Elizabeth Mancke and Carole Shammas (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 237-262 and Kelly de Luca, “Beyond the Sea: Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction and English Law, c. 1575- c. 1640” (PhD Diss., Columbia University, 2008). 
58 Christopher Tomlins, “The Legal Cartography of Colonization, the Legal Polyphony of Settlement: 
English Intrusions on the American Mainland in the Seventeenth Century,” Law and Social Inquiry 26, no. 
2 (Spring 2001): 315-72. 
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III. The Legal Geography of the Early Modern Mediterranean    
 Conceptions of the Mediterranean as a distinct world dominate studies of its 
geography and of its place within the history of the early modern world. Historians of the 
Mediterranean have generally followed Braudel in seeking to locate and to demonstrate 
the sea’s “enduring unity and distinctiveness.” Climate, ecology, and cultural and 
commercial connections linked the peoples living around the sea and united them within 
a shared environment.59 As a result, Mediterranean historiography emphasizes 
environmental and economic histories of the sea as opposed to political and national 
histories occurring in the sea.60 It also tends to remain inward looking. Historians of the 
Mediterranean have focused more on evaluating how Atlantic powers disrupted the sea 
than with studying how the legal and political organization of the sea developed through 
the early modern period.61 An emphasis on the essential unity of the Mediterranean also 
marginalizes the history of the boundaries that people and polities have attempted to draw 
across it. The evolution of the conflicting lines of sovereignty and jurisdiction that ran 
through the Mediterranean incorporated the sea into a wider history whereby states 
sought to extend their authority over oceans and the trade that flowed across them. 
Nevertheless, both particular legal traditions and political conditions distinguished the sea 
from the wider oceanic environments into which English vessels sailed. 
                                                
59 This is the underlying theme of Braudel’s The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of 
Philip II. 
60 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 1; Rethinking the Mediterranean, ed. W. V. Harris (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004); Faruk Tabak, The Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550-1870: A 
Geohistorical Approach (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). 
61 For a critique of this historiographical tradition, see Molly Greene, “Beyond the Northern Invasion: The 
Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century,” Past & Present 174 (February 2002): 42-71. 
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  The legal and sovereign organization of the seventeenth-century Mediterranean 
had its roots in that sea's ancient history. For the Romans, the Mediterranean was both 
mare nostrum and res nullius, an inner sea which they dominated but whose waters were 
not subject to appropriation. It was also a distinct legal space, as when the emperor 
Antoninus Pius pronounced in the second century, “I am lord of the world, but the law of 
the sea must be judged by the sea law of the Rhodians when our law does not conflict 
with it.”62 Medieval glossators on Roman law later clarified the relationship between 
imperial authority and oceanic space when they affirmed the impossibility of dominium 
over the sea but asserted that the emperor indeed had jurisdiction over it and further made 
allowances for exclusive use of portions of the sea.63 In the fourteenth century, jurists 
who argued that the imperial sovereignty codified by Justinian had devolved to Europe's 
emerging cities and states extended their arguments into oceanic space.64 Bartolus of 
Sassoferato and his student Baldus of Ubaldis argued that princes held jurisdiction over 
the seas extending from their coasts to distances of, respectively, one hundred or sixty 
                                                
62 Quoted in Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 
1550-c. 1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 203, n. 68. Andrea Addobatti, “Acque territoriali: 
modelli dottrinari e mediazoni diplomatiche tra medioevo ed età moderna,” in Frontiere di terra, frontiere 
di mare: la Toscana moderna nello spazio mediterraneo, ed. Elena Fasano Guarini and Paola Volpini 
(Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2008), 177-178. See also Percy Thomas Fenn, “Justinian and the Freedom of the 
Sea,” American Journal of International Law 19, no. 4 (1925): 716-727. 
63 Andrea Addobatti, “Acque territoriali,” 177. 
64 On the political and ideological context within which Bartolus and Baldus wrote about maritime 
sovereignty, see Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1, The Renaissance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 9-12. 
  26 
! !
miles. These Italian jurists established a distinct legal tradition regarding state authority 
over coastal waters in the western Mediterranean.65 
 The extension of state sovereignty over the waters of the medieval and early 
modern Mediterranean shattered the theoretical legal and political unity of the Roman 
Mediterranean. In fact, that unity had long before faded away with the dissolution of the 
western empire and the Islamic conquests in North Africa and the Levant.   
Consequently, the Mediterranean became a frontier between Christian and Muslim 
polities for which holy war was a basic ideological tenet. The fracturing of sovereign 
authority over the waters of the sea among the various polities that surrounded it divided 
its waters still further. As a result, no single state or empire controlled the patterns or 
terms of trade in the Mediterranean and different polities and empires exercised varying 
degrees of control over the sea. The princes of Monaco and dukes of Savoy collected 
duties from ships passing their shores and Italian princes claimed jurisdiction over prizes 
brought into their ports and crimes committed on board ships in harbor. In the Levant, the 
Ottoman Empire remained the dominant power. The legal geography of the 
Mediterranean was a complicated matrix of overlapping and intersecting sovereign 
authorities.  
  Spheres of political influence and jurisdictional authority, as well as cultural and 
religious differences, divided the Mediterranean into a variety of regional seas.  English 
jurists testified to the political division of Mediterranean waters when they described the 
sovereign claims that the Venetians, Genoese and Tuscans made, respectively, over the 
                                                
65 Michel Bottin, “Frontières et limites maritimes au xvie siècle,” in La Frontière des origines à nos jours, 
ed. Maïté Lafourcade (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1998), 27-41. 
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Adriatic, the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian Seas.66  Early modern maps of the Mediterranean 
showed that basin as an accumulation of gulfs, bays and regional seas.  For example, a 
1685 map by William Berry split the Mediterranean into “West” and “East” Seas and 
further divided it according to its gulfs and coastal seas.67 Suggestively, Berry described 
the Adriatic as the Gulf of Venice and further labeled stretches of coastal water according 
to the lands or states which they bordered. Although his references to the Sea of Tuscany 
and to the Sea of Genoa thus seem to have been primarily geographic, they nevertheless 
evoke the jurisdictional and sovereign authority that these states had historically claimed 
over their coastal waters and, to varying degrees, continued to exercise. Ships and 
merchants thus crossed a variety of often-unclear political, legal and cultural 
boundaries.68  Yet, it is equally significant that Berry and other cartographers saw these 
gulfs, bays and inland waters as part of a single Mediterranean sea.69 In this respect they 
echoed widespread conceptions of the Mediterranean as a unified sea that encompassed 
the political and cultural divisions that cut across it.  
 
 
                                                
66 John Selden, Of the Dominion, or, Owernship of the Sea, trans. Marchamont Nedham (London, 1652), 
99-106; Alexander Justice, A General Treatise of the Dominion and Laws of the Sea (London, 1705), 90-
109. 
67 William Berry, “Mediterranean Sea divided into its Principall parts or seas” (London, 1685).  This map 
was based on one created by the French cartographer Nicolas Sanson, “Mer Mediterranée divisée en ses 
Principales Partes, ou Mers.”  I have not yet been able to date Sanson’s original map.  On early modern 
French mapping of the Mediterranean, see Christopher Drew Armstrong, “Travel and Experience in the 
Mediterranean of Louis XV,” in Rethinking the Mediterranean, 242-253. 
68 Molly Greene succinctly describes this situation in “The Ottomans in the Mediterranean,” in The Early 
Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire, ed. Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univesity Press, 2007), 112. 
69 Armstrong, “Travel and Experience in the Mediterranean,” 242-243, 252. 
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 Commercial connections and the movement of ships and people around the sea 
linked the Mediterranean as a single maritime region. Merchant networks, particularly 
those of the Sephardic diaspora but including those formed by other communities,  
spanned the European, African and Levantine shores of the Mediterranean.70 Common 
maritime traditions also bridged the sea’s uncertain cultural frontiers. Christian and 
Muslim powers observed similar regulations regarding the treatment of neutral vessels at 
sea and the conduct of ships belonging to belligerents in neutral harbors. Both the 
religious and the legal frontiers of the Mediterranean were permeable as illustrated by the 
merchants who crossed political and cultural boundaries in search of legal redress for the 
actions of corsairs. In the face of the growing naval power of England and France, 
Mediterranean polities asserted, defended and expanded jurisdictional and sovereign 
claims over their littoral and coastal waters in similar ways. 
 The English merchants, sailors, and diplomats who arrived in the sea after the 
close of the sixteenth century entered a distinct commercial, cultural and maritime world. 
During the early years of the English entry into the Mediterranean, merchants and 
mariners integrated themselves fully into the Mediterranean world. Merchants converted 
to Catholicism, became subjects to Mediterranean princes and took up permanent 
residence in Mediterranean port-cities. Ships' masters and mariners similarly took service 
in the navies of Italian princes and of the rulers of the North African regencies, 
particularly after James I sought to suppress English piracy and privateering early in the 
                                                
70 The networks of Sephardic merchants that crossed the Mediterranean and linked it to the wider world are 
recovered in Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers, chap. 2, “Livorno and the Western Sephardic 
Diaspora.” 
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seventeenth century.71 Although the initial entry of English ships and merchants into the 
Mediterranean disrupted the commercial patterns of the sea, it took place largely outside 
the direction or aegis of the English Crown.  
 Over the course of the seventeenth century, the English established a notable, if 
uneven, presence around the Mediterranean as merchants congregated in factory 
communities in Mediterranean ports. Some of these national communities, especially 
those at the thriving entrepôts of Livorno and Smyrna, included upwards of thirty 
merchants; indeed, more than sixty merchants and factors composed the factory at 
Smyrna at times during its heyday in the third quarter of the seventeenth century.72 
Conversely, the factories at Genoa and Naples included only a handful of merchants at 
that time.73 The English merchant communities in North Africa were also generally 
small. More important than these factories were the consuls responsible for managing 
diplomatic relations with the North African regencies and negotiating the release of 
English slaves.74 Moreover the character of these communities varied widely. In the 
eighteenth century, for example, the “British” factories at Cadiz and Genoa were 
                                                
71 Barbara Donati, Tra Inquisizione e Granducato. Storie di inglesi nella Livorno del primo seicento  
(Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2010). 
72 Sonia Anderson An English Consul in Turkey: Paul Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667-1678 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989), 66. 
73 Edoardo Grendi, “Gli inglesi a Genova (Secoli XVII-XVIII),” Quaderni Storici 39, no. 1 (2004): 248-9. 
74 For a survey of English relations with the North African regencies, see Godfrey Fisher, Barbary Legend: 
War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415-1830 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957). 
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composed largely of Irish Catholic and naturalized French and Swiss Protestants, 
respectively.75  
 The organization of English trade to the Mediterranean also broadly reflected 
some of the key cultural and political divisions that challenged the unity of the sea. The 
monopoly of the Levant Company on English trade to the Ottoman Empire essentially 
bifurcated England's Mediterranean commerce between a zone of regulated commerce in 
the Levant and open trade in the western Mediterranean. The regulatory authority of the 
Levant Company stemmed both from the inability and unwillingness of the English state 
to bear the cost of maintaining diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire and the 
belief that corporate regulation and representation was necessary to secure trade to the 
supposedly despotic Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the conditions and organization of 
English trade around the Mediterranean were broadly similar. The Levant Company 
provided a regulatory umbrella under which its members traded to the Ottoman Empire, 
but those merchants traded privately and largely managed their own affairs.  
 It was from the latter half of the seventeenth century that the growing power of 
the English state changed the character of England's Mediterranean presence. During this 
period the growth of English trade in the Mediterranean encouraged the state to take an 
increasingly significant role in the protection and regulation of navigation and commerce 
in that sea. Naval protection for English shipping and the increasingly global reach of 
English commerce gave that nation’s merchants a substantial advantage over their 
                                                
75 Jean O. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1940), 140; Grendi, “Gli inglesi a Genova," 248-9. 
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Mediterranean counterparts.76 As the English Crown sought to secure its subjects and 
their ships from attack, it extended its authority over English navigation. Meanwhile, 
diplomatic and consular networks grew with the strategic significance of the sea and 
helped to reshape the political frameworks within which merchants operated. These 
officials also stood at the center of efforts to impose a greater degree of state control over 
the loosely defined communities of English merchants in Mediterranean ports and over 
the English ships that sailed between them. These officers represented communities of 
merchants and the English Crown in foreign ports and cities, but they were themselves 
also the overseas embodiments of that state and they extended the authority of the Crown 
to its overseas subjects.77 The legal authority of these representatives over English 
subjects varied around the Mediterranean; however, their presence in Mediterranean ports 
testified to the expansion of the English state around the sea. 
 The expansion of the English state ultimately brought one more source of legal 
and political authority into an already crowded maritime environment. Contests between 
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Crown over English ships and subjects and the 
sovereignty that Mediterranean polities claimed over their ports and littoral waters 
highlighted pervasive ambiguities as to the organization and distribution of political 
authority both in the Mediterranean and in the wider world.78 Even so, the limits of 
                                                
76 Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis, “Il porto di Livorno fra Inghilterra e Oriente,” Nuovi studi livornesi 1 
(1993): 43-87; eadem, English Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Italy, passim. 
77 For this conception of early modern state officials, see Michael J. Braddick, State Formation in Early 
Modern England, c. 1550-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 1, “The 
Embodiment of the State.” 
78 Few works have explored the political or ideological frameworks within which English merchants 
operated in Mediterrranean ports. The exception is Grendi, “Gli inglesi a Genova,” passim.  
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English sovereignty in the Mediterranean set it apart from both the Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans. Yet, it is precisely because England's imperial presence in the early modern 
Mediterranean was minimal that the sea offers a useful perspective on England's overseas 
expansion during that period. The history of England's early modern Mediterranean 
presence illustrates how the expansion of English state and legal authority took place 
within a pluralistic oceanic environment. It equally reveals how far the extraterritorial 
expansion of English jurisdiction carried the authority of the state beyond the bounds of 
the growing British Empire. 
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Chapter 1 
 
“Situated in the Midst of the Trading World”: 
Tangier, the Mediterranean and the Restoration Empire, 1660-1684 
 
 
...what a glory it is for the king of Great 
Britain to have such a fort, & firme 
footing in the eyes of all the Levantine 
Southern world, so neer the Pillers of 
Hercules, & the mouth of the 
mediterranean, a place fitt for great 
Designes.1 
  
  
 The occupation of Tangier was one of the most ambitious and intensive overseas 
projects of the seventeenth-century English state.2 Between 1661 and 1684, Charles II 
and his ministers invested more in Tangier than in any other English colony and poured 
some two million pounds into developing a harbor that promised control over the inner 
sea and the security of an English port linking the burgeoning Atlantic economy to its 
Iberian and Mediterranean markets.3 The enormous expenditure of money and manpower 
                                                
1 James Howell, “A short Discours of the Late Forren Acquests which England holds, Viz of Dunkirk in 
Flanders; Tangier in Barbary, Boombay in the East Indies, Jamayca in the West Indies, Demonstrating by 
cleere politicall Reasons, How much they may conduce to the Honor, Security, & Advantage of this 
Nation. In answer to some pamphletts which have bin obtruded to the world both at Home & Abroad, to the 
contrary,” March 1662, The National Archives (TNA) SP 29/52, f. 263r. I follow Paul Seaward in crediting 
the “short Discours” to the prolific pamphleteer James Howell, see Seaward’s “A Restoration Publicist: 
James Howell and the Earl of Clarendon, 1661-6,” Historical Research 61, no. 1 (Feb. 1988): 127-128.  
2 The abandonment of Tangier in 1684 has long caused historians to neglect the colony and its significance 
for the development of the British Empire.  Recent histories of Britain's seventeenth-century overseas 
expansion have, however, shown a renewed interest in Tangier and have begun to reintegrate the colony 
into the wider early modern British Empire, see Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 
1600-1850 (New York: Anchor Books, 2004); Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans 
in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 293-299. 
3 In comparison, the cost of the military establishment in the American colonies in 1679 has been put at 
£12,816, between a sixth and a fourth of the nominal annual cost of the Tangier, which was initially set at 
£70,000 and then reduced to £55,000 in 1668.  On the cost of Tangier, see George Louis Beer, The Old 
Colonial System, 1660-1754, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912), 1: 115; E. M. G. 
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that the Crown put into Tangier testified to the importance of the Mediterranean for 
England's commercial and maritime expansion.4 During the decades of the English 
occupation of Tangier, England’s Mediterranean commerce flourished as the merchants 
of the Levant Company enjoyed their greatest prosperity and as their trade to the Ottoman 
Empire thrived. Meanwhile, the royal navy was preoccupied by a series of wars against 
the North African regencies, through which the Crown sought to secure English 
navigation from attack or interference by Muslim corsairs. The settlement of Tangier 
promised to project the power of England's restored monarchy into the Mediterranean 
and to secure English trade and navigation around that sea. 
 The colonization of Tangier also highlights a critical period for understanding the 
evolution of the British Empire. Conceptions of the empire as a transatlantic political 
community were still in their infancy at this time and the commercial and imperial 
preeminence of the East India Company was still largely unimagined.5 Although Tangier 
                                                
Routh's Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661-1684 (London: J. Murray, 1912), 36-37, 115-116; 
Colley, Captives, 25-30.  
4 James Mather, Pashas: Traders and Travellers in the Islamic world (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2009), 129-130; Sari Hornstein, The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674-1688: A Study in 
the Peacetime use of Sea Power (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1991). 
5 It was only the early 1680's that the success of the East-India Company appeared to threaten the century-
old patterns of Mediterranean trade and turned it into a direct competitor with the Levant Company, as 
shipments of silk from Bengal provided a cheap alternative to the Persian silks that Levant merchants 
shipped to England from Ottoman ports.  Both the Genoese consul, Carlo Ottone, and the Florentine 
resident, Francesco Terriesi, reported in the early 1680's that the arrival of Bengal silks threatened to 
destroy the Levant Company, see Ottone to Senate, London, 2 Febuary/23 January 1682, Archivio di Stato 
di Genova (ASG ) Archivio Segreto, Lettere Consoli 1/2630, mazzo 3 and Terriesi to Francesco 
Panciatechi, London, 3/13 September 1683, Archivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF) Mediceo del Principato 
4212; for the staggering growth of the East India Company's trade in these years, see K. N. Chaudhuri, The 
Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), 81-82, esp. fig. 3. The pamphlet war that broke out between the two companies 
revolved around the desire of Levant merchants to trade directly to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, see 
The Allegations of the Turkey Company and Others against the East India Company, Relating to the 
Management of that Trade (n.p., 1681). Dire predictions of the fate of the Levant Company in the face of 
cheap East Indian goods proved far-fetched.  However, while the Levant trade remained prestigious and 
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seems out of place in the evolution of an empire oriented around England’s American 
colonies, an array of merchants, ministers and foreign observers thought of the colony as 
integral to a seaborne empire that incorporated “acquisitions” in the Americas, “ports” in 
the Indies, and “important fortresses in Africa.”6 The North African colony fulfilled a 
long-standing ambition among English admirals to acquire a port near or within the 
Mediterranean that would allow England to maintain a permanent naval presence in that 
sea.7 Yet the settlement of Tangier also raised pressing questions for the organization of 
English trade and empire. By proclaiming Tangier a free port, the Crown adopted a 
mercantile policy that departed from the legally defined national and corporate trades that 
increasingly linked England to its overseas possessions. The Navigation Acts reserved 
England’s colonial commerce for English merchants and ships, but the colonization of 
Tangier rested on a different approach to the political economy of empire. The history of 
Tangier thus highlighted the emergence of institutional and ideological boundaries that 
divorced that colony and the Mediterranean more broadly from England's wider 
expansion.  
 The ideological foundations of the occupation of Tangier contributed to the 
colony's ultimate failure and isolated it within the evolution of an English empire based 
                                                
profitable, by the early eighteenth century it was clear that the Indian Ocean trade had far more potential, 
see Ralph Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square: English Traders in the Levant in the Eighteenth Century 
(London: Macmillan, 1967), 60-64, 72-74, 223-224; Sonia Anderson An English Consul in Turkey: Paul 
Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667-1678 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 85.   
6 For this description of the English maritime empire, see Pietro Mocenigo's dispatch to Senate of Venice of 
9 June 1671, in Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs in the Archivs of  
Venice, vol. 37, 1671-1672, ed. Allen B. Hinds (London: Longman, Green, 1939), 55. 
7 Rafael Valladares Ramirez, “Inglaterra, Tanger y el 'Estrecho Compartido,' los Inicios del Asentamiento 
Ingles en el Mediterraneo Occidental durante la Guerra Hispano-Portuguesa (1641-1661),” Hispania 51, 
no. 179 (1991): 965-991; Nabil Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589-1689 (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 2005), 42-43. 
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on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The ideas about trade and empire that inspired the 
acquisition of Tangier and its development as a Crown colony, commercial center and 
naval harbor linked it to the wider development of the English empire. However, the 
imperial vision that underlay Tangier proved equally ill suited to the changing form of 
that empire and to North African politics. The Navigation Acts created an exclusive 
trading zone that defined the English Atlantic economy, but they also separated Tangier 
from that emerging colonial system. Meanwhile, throughout the Mediterranean, centuries 
of religiously inspired war shaped the ideological dynamics of state formation and 
competition. Christian settlements on the northern coast of Africa like Tangier were 
inimical to the Islamic states of the Mediterranean and thus particularly vulnerable to the 
revitalized Muslim polities that emerged or resurfaced in the later seventeenth century as 
major powers in the Mediterranean basin.8 The English settlement of Tangier rested upon 
ideological conceptions of trade and empire that asserted the primacy of the state for 
English activity in the Mediterranean.Yet the Crown's jealousy of its sovereignty over 
Tangier would also preclude it from reaching any accommodation with a resurgent 
Moroccan empire, leading to the city's eventual abandonment. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
8 For the relationship between the ideology of holy war and state formation in Morocco, see Johan de 
Bakker, Slaves, Arms and Holy War: Moroccan Policy vis-à-vis the Dutch Republic during the 
Establishment of the ʻAlawī Dynasty, 1660-1727 (Amsterdam: s.n. 1991); Amira K. Bennison, Jihad and its 
Interpretations in Pre-Colonial Morocco: State-Society Relations during the French Conquest of Algeria 
(London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 15-33; J. A. O. C. Brown, “Anglo-Moroccan Relations 
and the Embassy of Ahmad Qardanash, 1706-1708,” Historical Journal 51, no. 3 (September 2008), 605.  
Besides Tangier, several Spanish and Portuguese possessions remained perched on the African coast, 
including the cities of Oran and Ceuta, Bakker, Slaves, Arms, and Holy War, 5-6. 
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I.  Tangier in England's Maritime Empire  
 
 In 1661, Charles II's marriage to Catherine de Braganza of Portugal brought with 
it Tangier, Bombay and great hopes for the restored monarchy’s global future. For the 
Portuguese, two poor and vulnerable communities surrounded by enemies were a small 
price for English support in their war against Spain.9 However, for the Earl of Clarendon 
and his fellow advocates of the marriage alliance between England and Portugal, these 
two colonies, “situated very usefully for trade,” defined the Crown's imperial ambitions 
as potential commercial centers that would allow England to overcome the advantage the 
Dutch had secured in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.10 Direct royal administration 
of Bombay proved fleeting. In contrast, the apparent strategic and commercial potential 
of a harbor at the Strait of Gibraltar led the English state into one of its most ambitious 
overseas projects of the seventeenth century.  
 English expectations for the development of Tangier and Bombay point to a 
common imperial vision that linked the early histories of these two new possessions.   
Within this vision, the colonization of Tangier represented a Mediterranean dimension to 
the global expansion of English empire.11 In early 1662, the propagandist James Howell 
                                                
9 G.L. Belcher, “Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1661,” Journal of British Studies 15, no. 1 
(Autumn 1975): 67-88; Ronald Hutton, Charles II: King of England, Scotland and Ireland (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 1989), pp. 157-160; John Miller, Charles II (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1991), chap. 4, “'Dunkirk and a Barren Queen'.” 
10 Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, The Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon (Oxford, 1759), 2:152.  On 
Dutch commercial dominance in the mid-seventeenth century, see Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Primacy of 
Trade, 1585-1740 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 200-207, 269-279. 
11 The older histories that remain the key references for the settlement of Tangier tended not to trace the 
connections between Tangier and England's global empire, instead concentrating on the colony itself, as in 
Routh's Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, which remains the only full length study of the English 
occupation of Tangier, or focusing on the city's role for English naval history in the Mediterranean, as in 
Walter Frewen Lord's England and France in the Mediterranean, 1660-1830 (London: S. Low, Marston, 
1901) and especially Julian Corbett's England in the Mediterranean: a Study of the Rise and Influence of 
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defended the acquisition of Tangier and Bombay as parts of a set of global acquisitions 
that favored English trade and navigation and glorified their possessor, extending “his 
Fame as well as his power making Him most redoubtable farr & neer.” For Howell, 
England's new possessions of Bombay, Jamaica, Tangier and Dunkirk fulfilled the classic 
strategic and economic roles of colonies, providing employment for the country's surplus 
population while promising to support England's global navigation, fostering trade and 
industry and tending “to the universall Good of all peeple which is the chiefest Designe 
& Desire of his Maiesty by being to that end at such extraordinary expences by Sea & 
Land.”12  
 Howell's account of the advantages of Tangier not only envisioned the city as the 
key to control over the Strait of Gibraltar, “where the greatest trade of the world is 
beaten,” but also put the city squarely within a larger conception of English commerce 
and empire. Howell lauded the benefits that would follow from having “a port of our 
owne” to supply English ships sailing into the Mediterranean, from which English fleets 
could sail against both the North African regencies and European enemies. In the early-
1670’s Tangier's engineer Hugh Cholmley described Tangier as sitting “in the midst of 
the trading world, upon an Inlet into a Sea that goes near three thousand miles in length, 
                                                
British Power within the Straits, 1603-1713 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904).  The only 
historian to consider Tangier in a fully Atlantic context is Stephen Saunders Webb, for whom Tangier was 
the training ground for the governor-generals that he saw as the primary drivers of the seventeenth-century 
English Empire; Webb presented his wider thesis in The Governors-General (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1979) but only expanded on Tangier's role in 1676: The End of American 
Independence (New York: Knopf, 1984), 151-154, 203-4 and especially Lord Churchill's Coup: the Anglo-
American Empire and the Glorious Revolution Reconsidered (New York: Knopf, 1995), 18-25.  For 
general criticisms of Webb's thesis, see Richard R. Johnson, “Imperial Webb: The Thesis of Garrison 
Government in Early America Considered,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 43, no. 3 (Jul., 
1986): 408-430. 
12 Howell, “A short Discours,” TNA SP 29/52, f. 263v-264r.  
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& washes the most noble & most polished Countrys of Europe Asia & Africa” and yet at 
such a distance from England that it provided the only port for English ships passing into 
the Mediterranean that was not “precarious, & depending on the will of forain Princes.”13 
Howell similarly saw Bombay as a port that would sustain English navigation and serve 
as a stepping stone for the conquest “of all those coasts of India, and of Ormus” that 
would “redound much to the renoun of his Majesty.”14 The instructions issued to 
England's new governors at both Tangier and Bombay directed them to establish the 
cities as commercial centers that would attract both “Our subjects and strangers to restore 
and trade there.”15  
  Howell imagined an English empire rooted in the expansion of royal authority 
and based on strategically located possessions that would allow England to dominate 
their respective oceanic spheres. While visions of royal empire proved equally illusory at 
Bombay and Tangier, the contrasting outcomes of those failures of Crown rule make the 
comparison of these two colonies all the more compelling. Bombay was turned over to 
the East India Company in 1667, under whose management it would become a seat of 
British empire in the Indian Ocean during the eighteenth century. Conversely, efforts in 
1661 to create a Morocco Company to trade along North Africa's Atlantic coast failed 
and Tangier remained under royal control. Behind these diverging trajectories were 
                                                
13 Hugh Cholmley, “Several discourses concerning the interest of Tangier,” British Library (BL) MS 
Lansdowne 192, f. 85v-86r.  Cholmley's “Several discourses” is undated, but its narrative of the history of 
Tangier extends to early 1672.  For the difficulties the English encountered using Italian ports, see Carlo 
Cipolla, Il burocrate e il marinaio: La <Sanità> toscana e le tribolazioni degli inglesi a Livorno nel XVII 
secolo (Bologna: il Mulino, 1989). 
14 Howell, “A short Discours,” TNA SP 29/52, f. 259v. 
15 William Foster, Tbe English Factories in India, vol. 11, 1661-64 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), 128 
and “Instructions for the Earle of Peterborough, Generall of our Army Designed for Tanger in Africa,” 
TNA CO 279/1, f. 29r-v. 
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common questions regarding the political economy of overseas trade and the relationship 
between state and corporate authority. Trading companies were not merely commercial 
organizations but rather political entities that exhibited sovereign characteristics within 
their jurisdictions.16 As state-like bodies, companies were designed to protect and 
regulate trade where local political conditions appeared to render merchants vulnerable to 
oppression or competition but where the Crown could not exercise effective authority. 
Ideological arguments that contrasted the political and commercial conditions of the 
Mediterranean and Indian Oceans thus underlay the divergent histories of Bombay and 
Tangier. 
  Proposals to create a company to trade along the Moroccan coast set off a debate 
as to whether this company or Tangier should dominate English trade to Morocco. In 
August 1661, and as preparations began to dispatch an expedition to occupy Tangier, 
Robert Starr, the English consul at the Moroccan port of Salé, petitioned Charles II for 
patents granting exclusive trading rights on Africa's Atlantic Coast from Cape Blanco in 
the south of Morocco to Salé in the north of that country. Starr explained that as a result 
of his long engagement with them, “the people of that country” were willing to yield up 
into his “sole posission & power” an island and a castle off the Moroccan coast that 
would serve as a safe harbor for English ships sailing into the Mediterranean or Atlantic 
and Indian Ocean, and further requested a garrison of one hundred men, arms and 
provisions, cannon and £1500 annually out of the customs revenue in order to defray 
                                                
16 Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the 
British Empire in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), passim. 
  42 
! !
expenses.17 Starr's petition was referred to the Lords and Commissioners for Foreign 
Plantations and gained the support of powerful backers. On September 11, 1661 a patent 
was granted to the Duke of York and a group of prominent merchants and courtiers 
incorporating them as the Morocco Company along the lines Starr had originally 
proposed.18   
Although patented, the Morocco Company never came to fruition; instead, the 
patentees appear to have shifted their attention onto the Company of Royal Adventurers 
trading to Africa, under whose jurisdiction the Atlantic coast of Morocco would fall in its 
revised charter of January 1663.19 However, it is probable that the company was doomed 
by the vocal opposition it evoked among officials and merchants involved in the 
settlement of Tangier. For E. M. G. Routh, the only historian to note the proposed 
Morocco Company and the debate that surrounded it, the rejection of corporate trade 
deprived Tangier of a proven means to develop trade in an insecure environment and thus 
of an imperial future comparable to that enjoyed by Bombay under the East India 
Company. Routh’s verdict offers a telling counterfactual in so far as it suggests that 
institutional organization and not geographic location explains the different fates of 
                                                
17 Petition of Robert Starr, 13 August 1661, TNA SP 71/13, f. 107r.   
18 British Library(BL) Sloane MS 3509, f. 4r, “the docket for the Marocco Company endeavoured to be 
raysed against the wishes of His Lordship.” The docket largely mirrors Starr's request, but lists the grantees 
as “his Highness Royall, Lord Willoughby of Parham, Col. William Legg, Thomas Cullinge, Alexander 
Bence, Robert Starr, John Lewis, Philipp Payne of London, Marchants” and explicitly incorporates them as 
the Morocco Company for 31 years and with “ all such clauses & authorities as have beene heretofore 
graunted in Charters of the like nature.”  
19 George Frederick Zook, The Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa (Lancaster: Press of the 
New Era Printing Co., 1919), 13. For the succession of English companies trading to Africa, see K. G. 
Davies, The Royal African Company (London and New York: Longmans, Green, 1957), 38-46. 
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Tangier and Bombay.20 Yet, opposition to the Morocco Company foreshadowed the 
problems that would later emerge from the brief coexistence of corporate monopoly and a 
royal colony in the Indian Ocean. Company domination was no less contested in Bombay 
than it was in Morocco and, in March 1667, Bombay’s governor Sir Gervase Lucas 
denounced the independent sovereignty the East India Company appeared to enjoy in the 
Indian Ocean. Lucas complained that the Company's resistance to a port outside its 
control stifled his efforts to develop the trade of Bombay and advised, “so long as Your 
Majestie continues that Company, your affaire[s] in these parts will never answer your 
great designe and noble intention of advancing trade.”21 The former company factor 
Henry Gates, who became deeply involved with the struggling settlement, wrote in 1665, 
“unlesse His Majesty doeth absolutly enorder the Company Presidency and factorys 
removeall to this place [Bombay], and force the trade hither by keepeing some frigats 
heere in India, a trade will scarse bee settled as it should bee.”22 The fierce reaction 
provoked by the patenting of the Morocco Company revealed ideological considerations 
that underlined Charles II's subsequent decision to cede Bombay to the East India 
Company.   
 The officials and merchants who wrote against the Morocco Company feared it 
would compete with Tangier for Moroccan trade and forestall expectations that England's 
new possession would become an entrepôt for the commerce of North Africa and the 
Mediterranean. Nathaniel Luke, secretary to Tangier’s first governor, the Earl of 
                                                
20 Routh, Tangier, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661-1684, 20.   
21 Quoted in William Foster, The English Factories in India, vol. 12, 1665-1667 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1927), 287-288.   
22 Quoted in ibid., 70 . 
  44 
! !
Peterborough, warned in late 1661 that a company in the “hands of particular men” who 
had no interest in the success of a city lying outside the limits of their monopoly, would 
rather aim “to carry the trade to the Moores then to give his Majesties & their nation the 
advantage thereof.”23 As Thomas Povey, the treasurer for Tangier and member of the 
English Council of Trade, similarly reminded his readers, English expectations for the 
city’s future depended on its transformation into “a free port, & the Scale of the English 
trade” that would attract foreign trade, undersell neighboring ports and draw the 
Moroccans into a mutually beneficial commercial relationship with the English. If the 
Morocco Company sought to trade directly with Moroccan ports, it would convince the 
Moroccans that “Tanger shall onely remaine as an enemi’s Garrison,” and encourage 
them to oppose violently an English settlement lacking the trade that alone could “drawe 
them into any kind of amity.”24  
Critically, neither these memorials of Tangier’s officials nor those offered by two 
separate groups of merchants trading to Morocco made a blanket argument against 
corporations. Thomas Povey himself had been deeply engaged in schemes to create a 
company trading to the Caribbean in the late 1650's and joined the patentees of the 
                                                
23 “Mr. Luke’s Reasons against the Erection of a Morocco Company,” BL MS Harleian (Harl.) 1595, f. 
13v-14r.  This memorial is undated, but a copy in Nathaniel Luke's copybook appears following a 
document dated 12 September 1661, BL Sloane MS 1956, f. 45r-v. It is not entirely certain if this piece was 
written by Nathaniel Luke or his brother, John Luke. However, Nathaniel Luke is the more likely author 
since he had been appointed consul to the ports of Morocco by Cromwell in 1657 and was serving as 
Peterborough's secretary when the memorial was written, Helen Andrews Kaufman, “Introduction,” in 
Tangier at High Tide: The Journal of John Luke, 1670-1673, by John Luke (Geneva: E Droz., 1958), 13-
14. 
24 Thomas Povey, “Reasons against the same [Morocco Company],” BL MS Harl. 1595, f. 14v. Povey's 
undated memorial appears between documents dated 21 September and 30 September 1661 in Luke's 
copybook, BL Sloane MS 1956, f. 50v-51v. 
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Morocco Company as a shareholder in the Company of the Royal Adventurers.25  
Instead, opponents of the Morocco Company more narrowly questioned whether that 
corporation was necessary or appropriate for Morocco’s political conditions. In this 
sense, Povey’s earlier vocal support for a joint-stock West India Company suggests why 
he viewed the Morocco Company with scepticism. Disgusted by the unwillingness and 
inability of the English council of state to support adequately its conquest of Jamaica in 
1655, Povey advocated the creation of a company to carry on Cromwell's war against 
Spain on private funds, marshalling private capital towards purportedly public ends.26 
The pamphleteer “Philopatris,” who may have been the East-India Company director and 
political theorist Sir Josiah Child, explained in 1681 that joint-stock companies were 
political bodies designed to govern trade where the state could not: “there is a necessity 
of a Joynt Stock in all Foreign Trade, where the Trade must be maintained by Force and 
Forts on the Land, and where the His Majesty cannot conveniently maintain an Amity 
and Correspondence by Ambassadors, and not elsewhere.”27 According to Philopatris, 
companies were vital for the protection of trade in the Indian Ocean, where political 
conditions were unstable and beyond the reach of the English state, but unnecessary 
wherever the state itself could safeguard trade.  
                                                
25 Povey's subscription for stock among the Royal Adventurers is recorded in the company's minute book, 
TNA Treasury 70/75, f. 13r. 
26 Povey to Edward D'Oyley, BL Additional (Add.) MS 11411, f. 21r-v.  The letter is undated but probably 
from the fall of 1659.  The papers surrounding the proposal for a West India Company are found in BL MS 
Egerton (Eg.) 2395.   
27 Philopatris, A Treatise wherein is Demonstrated, I. That the East-India Trade is the most National of all 
Foreign Trades (London, 1681), 5.  For a discussion of the political context surrounding this pamphlet and 
of its authorship, see Philip J. Stern, “‘A Politie of Civill & Military Power’: Political Thought and the late 
Seventeenth-Century Foundations of the East India Company-State,” Journal of British Studies 47, no. 2 
(April 2008): 270-274. 
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Although Philopatris responded to ideological debates that differed in key 
respects from that which grew up around the Morocco Company, the pamphleteer's 
arguments about the relationship between corporate trade and state authority helps to 
explain why Povey and others opposed the Morocco Company. Philopatris wrote to 
defend the East India Company against accusations launched by the Levant Company 
that it had inappropriately monopolized England's trade to the Indian Ocean, a dispute 
which called into question whether joint-stock or regulated companies were the more 
effective means to organize England’s overseas trade.28 This later contest between 
regulated and joint-stock companies did not factor into debates over the Morocco 
Company. Although the Morocco Company was probably conceived as a joint stock, 
opponents of the company did not make an issue of its institutional organization and 
instead warned that any form of corporate monopoly would prove to be incompatible 
with the creation of a free port at Tangier.29 Even so, Philopatris’s attack on the Levant 
Company showed how the Crown’s diplomatic and military presence in the 
Mediterranean negated the need for corporate trade in that sea. Philopatris denied that the 
Levant Company served any useful purpose precisely because the king’s warships could 
                                                
28 Joint-stock companies operated as unified, centrally-directed corporate bodies, while the members of 
regulated companies traded individually, within guidelines stipulated by the company.  The best discussion 
of the ideological ramifications of the rivalry between the Levant and East India Companies may be found 
in Stern, The Company State, 54-55. On the commercial collision of the Levant and East-India companies 
more generally, see A. C. Wood, A history of the Levant Company (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1935), 102-105; K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading world of Asia and the English East India Company, 219, 
225-226, 345-346; Mather, Pashas, 202-206. 
29 Although there is no mention of the form of the company, its membership suggests that it would have 
been a joint-stock, as does a letter from Nicolas de Clerville to Colbert, in which he records that ‘une 
compagnie de marchands anglosi faict presentement un fond de cinq cens mil livres pour faire un port à 
Tanger’, “Mémoire de Nicolas de Clerville a Colbert,” [avant le 26 février] 162, in H. de Castries, P. de 
Cenival and P. Cossé Brissac, eds., Les sources inédites de l’histoire du Maroc, Deuxième série, Dynastie 
filalienne; archives et bibliothèques de France (Paris: Éditions Ernest Leroux, 1922), 1: 30. 
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sail from Tangier to obtain justice for injuries suffered by English merchants in the 
Ottoman Empire.30 In this respect, the opponents of the Morocco Company anticipated 
Philopatris’s later arguments. Corporate trade was unnecessary on the Moroccan coast, 
since the Crown intended to make Tangier the cornerstone of the expansion of its power 
and prestige.31     
Philopatris’s arguments succinctly expressed widespread views regarding the 
corporate organization of overseas trade. For example, in 1667, the opponents of the 
short-lived Canary Company argued that a joint-stock structure was unnecessary for trade 
to the Canary Islands, where, unlike in the Indian Ocean, there was no need for forts and 
garrisons.32 Similarly, the opening of a royal proclamation of 1674 that reaffirmed the 
monopoly of the Royal African Company explained “that traffique with Infidels and 
Barbarous Nations not in amity with Us, and who are not beholding by any League or 
Treaty” could only be carried out from forts and factories maintained by a joint-stock 
company.33 Conversely, corporate trade was a threat to Crown rule and diplomacy on the 
Moroccan coast. As Thomas Povey pointed out, if the Morocco Company were to have 
“power to erect forts & command them, & to manage trade by their owne authority,” it 
                                                
30 Philopatris, A Treatise wherein is Demonstrated, 36.  
31 Philopatris, A Treatise wherein is Demonstrated, 37.  
32 Caroline A. J. Skeel, “The Canary Company,” The English Historical Review 31, no. 124 (October 
1916): 542. 
33 By the King.  A Proclamation.  Whereas it is found by Experience, That Traffique with Infideals and 
Barbarous Nations not in Amity with us... (London, 1674). 
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would be in contradiction to the patents the king had already granted his Governor-
General and would prevent him from fulfilling his commission.34 
While corporate trade threatened royal authority, its opponents argued that it also 
appeared inappropriate for the political environment of Morocco. As Povey succinctly 
advised, Tangier was “to be secured to His Majesty either by force or trade.” The Crown 
had consequently sought to make Tangier a trading city that could draw Moroccans into 
amicable commercial relations; the competition of company trading posts would leave 
Tangier a 'constant settled charge to his Majesty' and convince its neighbors that hostile 
designs underlay its occupation.35 Like Philopatris, the opponents of the Morocco 
Company also assumed that joint-stock companies were designed to deploy force to 
protect and advance their trade, but they advised that if the Company used its allowance 
of military supplies and customs revenue to establish coastal forts, it would only further 
provoke Moroccan hostility. In this vein, the memorial of one of two groups of merchants 
writing against the Morocco Company argued that if the English could advantage 
themselves of Tangier's location to limit trade along the Moroccan coast to their new 
port, they could make Tangier into the “the head & fountaine of trade, & the safety & 
protection of the English marchants.” However, the merchants further warned that, “to 
erect & build new forts & castles in other places (if it were possible) is the only way to 
create & stirr up jealousies & provoke the people of that Country to believe, that the 
English nation intends to enslave them & make a conquest of their countrey.”36 
                                                
34 Thomas Povey, “Reasons against the same [Morocco Company],” BL MS Harl 1595, f. 15v-16r. 
35 Ibid. f. 14v-15r. 
36 “The Marchant’s Reasons against the Moroco Company,” ibid., f. 17r.  For a comparison with the 
political significance of forts for the East India Company, see Ian Bruce Watson, “Fortifications and the 
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Moreover, the “antient traders to Barbary without the straights” warned that the creation 
of forts was “not feasable, without a national engagement, the Country being populous, 
that people warlyke, & plentifully furnished with all manner of offensive Arms, horses & 
ammunition,” and would merely convince the Moroccans that the English aimed at 
territorial conquest.37  
Povey’s sharp dichotomy between “force” and “trade” more broadly echoed a 
distinction that seventeenth-century English writers regularly drew between empires 
based on conquest and those based on trade.38 As James Howell had affirmed when he 
lauded Charles II's new foreign possessions: 
Though the Acquestes aforesayd be a considerable addition to the Honor, 
grandeur, & interests of his Majestie, yet it is not that, or further Extent of 
Territories which He aymes at, as much, as at Enlargement of Trade with the 
security thereof & consequently the Common Good of his marchants & Sea-
adventuring. 39  
  
Two years later in 1664, the ever-flexible Howell appealed to this reasoning to defend the 
sale of Dunkirk to France, a transaction that offended ministers and the public who saw 
the city as a check on French privateering and a bridgehead for future wars on the 
continent. Howell wrote that there were two kinds of “Forren Possessions,” those “got by 
the discovery of the Marchant” which become centers of trade and commodity production 
                                                
'Idea' of Force in Early English East India Company Relations with India,” Past & Present, no. 88 (August 
1980): 70-87. 
37 “The humble reasons of all the marchants that have beene the antient traders to Barbary without the 
straights,” BL MS Harl 1595, f. 18v-19r. 
38 See especially David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 138-145 and Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade, International Competition and the 
Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 
chap. 2, “Free Trade and the Economic Limits to National Politics: Neo-Machiavellian Political Economy 
Reconsidered,” 185-266, passim. 
39 “A short Discours of the Late Forren Acquests which England holds,” TNA CO 29/52, f. 272r. 
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and those without commercial benefit but “meerely maintained by Praesidial Forces or 
Garison.” While Dunkirk seemed of the later variety and promised only expenses and 
political jealousies, the American colonies were examples of the former and “ther are 
great hopes that in Afric Tanger will prove so, with other extraordinary advantages 
besides.”40 Cholmley opposed the retention of Dunkirk on parallel grounds, arguing that 
“as to the inlet that such a place may be unto Conquests upon the Continent, it will be 
found that England was never so much exhausted, as when our Ancestors raised so many 
trophies to their victories in France, all which as been since lost with more happiness, I 
think to an Englishman, then it was ever gained.” For Cholmley, territorial acquisition 
was a burden compared to the power obtained by commercial might, as demonstrated by 
the relative fates of Spain and Holland.41 
 It would be simplistic, though, to argue that the debate over the Morocco 
Company reflected fundamentally different approaches to political economy based on the 
explicit opposition of pacific trade and the commercial aggression of trading companies. 
The nearly simultaneous rejection of Crown rule in the Indian Ocean and of corporate 
trade along the Moroccan coast instead points to widespread ideas that trade had to be 
organized differently in response to diverse political and economic environments.42  
Contrasting recommendations for Tangier's development overwhelmingly depended on a 
                                                
40 James Howell, A Discours of Dunkirk, with some Reflexes upon the Late Surrender thereof...  (London, 
1664), 4-5.  
41 “A discourse of Tangier,” BL MS Lansdowne 192, f. 85r. 
42 Compare Steven Pincus's recent arguments regarding later seventeenth-century political economy in 
1688: The First Modern Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), chap. 12, “Revolution in 
Political Economy,” 366-399, with Thomas Leng's characterization of mercantilist thought,  “Commercial 
conflict and regulation in the discourse of trade in seventeenth-century England,” Historical Journal 48, no. 
4 (December 2005), 933-956. 
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generally unified conception of England's empire as maritime and commercial. Starr’s 
proposal offered a vision for the development of trade to Morocco that did not 
substantially differ from that of Tangier’s proponents, as both imagined fortified ports 
linking England's global networks of trade to Morocco and the Mediterranean. Similarly, 
although the East India Company jealousy guarded its monopoly on trade to and from 
England, it approached the trading world of the Indian Ocean in a different fashion and 
established its ports as cities open to indigenous merchants and to the private trade of its 
own factors.43 Upon the East India Company's accession to Bombay, its factors suggested 
the city be turned into a free port in order to attract Indian merchants, citing the success 
of the Italian ports of Livorno and Genoa to illustrate the value of low duties and 
commercial openness for the development of port cities.44   
The use of force was nevertheless implicit even in a self-consciously maritime 
empire: at issue was how it was to be used and with whom lay the authority to wield it. 
Tangier’s governors repeatedly emphasized their efforts to induce the Moroccans to 
peace by establishing mutually beneficial trading relationships and just as frequently 
affirmed that their territorial aspirations extended no farther than the surrounding fields 
that would provide sustenance for the garrison and room for outworks to safeguard it.45 
They were equally convinced that only naval power and frigates cruising before 
                                                
43 Child, A Treatise wherein is Demonstrated, 17-18 and Philip J. Stern, The Company-State, 85-87. 
44 Foster, The English Factories in India, vol. 12, 1668-1669 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), 211, quoted 
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Moroccan ports would restrain Muslim corsairs and induce Moroccans to come to 
Tangier to trade.46 On the other hand, suggestions that Tangier would be a foundation for 
conquests in North Africa were rejected in favor of the commercial and maritime 
aspirations for the city. During the summer of 1661, the Lords Commissioners for 
Tangier denied the request of the Lord Peterborough, Tangier's first governor, for a large 
body of cavalry, on the basis that they intended “not to make a warr with the Moores” but 
to cement a peace with them through trade.47 Tangier's governors and officials hoped to 
expand the colony, but they generally sought only to control enough land to make 
Tangier self-sustaining, rather than aiming for wider territorial conquests.48 The reaction 
of the Earl of Sandwich, to the merchant James Wilson's plans for a territorial empire 
expanding outward from Tangier highlighted the maritime vision that dominated English 
expectation for the city. Writing in late 1661, Wilson emphasized Tangier's strategic and 
commercial importance before continuing that he did not “thinke his majestie will content 
him selfe with one Port but rather endevor to people all the coast to the East as far as 
                                                
46 See “Description of Tangier,” TNA CO 279/33, f. 136r (anonymous and undated, this document is 
probably the report on Tangier that Peterborough was ordered to draw up when he was replaced by the Earl 
of Teviot in 1663, see “Instructions for the Earl of Tiviott,” TNA CO 279/2, f. 24r-v); Journal entry of the 
Earl of Sandwich, 4 September 1668, Mapperton House, Journal of the First Earl of Sandwich, vol. 8, 520, 
526; Lord Belasyse to the Lords Commissioners for Tangier, BL Sloane MS 3509, f. 104r; Henry Sheeres 
to Colonel Palmes Faireborne, Tangier, 5 December 1678, Bodleian Library (Bodl.) MS Rawl 342, p. 379. 
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Triply to the south as far Saphy.”49 Commanding the expedition that took possession of 
Tangier, Sandwich cautioned in response to Wilson's projections:  
the designes proposed, mee thinkes are Ill considered, for, to propose the 
possessing Africa from Gamboa to Tripoly is a vast thing, and one that sees what 
charge & trouble a Towne is possest that is given and delivered up, will Conceive 
a great deale more difficulty to posses Townes we must fight for, and not vary 
certain to prevaile neither.50  
 
 Sandwich by no means rejected the use of force to increase and project English 
power; instead, he distinguished sharply between England's interest to develop its 
maritime power and dreams of territorial empire. He thus intended to concentrate upon 
the improvement of Tangier itself which would “keepe all europe in Awe,” and to 
accomplish the goal of creating a magazine and free port that could draw off the trade not 
only of other cities of North Africa but also established ports like Livorno.51 He further 
urged that after securing Tangier the English should aim to conquer Ceuta from the 
Spanish in order to gain complete control of the Strait, such that once the “Kings 
Soveraignty maintaynes the Seas, you might put what Conditions you Please upon all the 
World, that passe through the Straights.” From these opening steps, the English could 
then seek “to gaine both ways, upon the Coast of Barbary, the places that are seated upon 
                                                
49 James Wilson, Lisbon, 5 October 1661, BL Sloane MS 3509,  f. 11r.  It is unclear what point Wilson had 
in mind as the southern limit of his proposed empire.  He described 'Saphy' as being 'on our Plantations 
now in gamboa', but it seems likely he was referring to the Moroccan city of Safi, ibid., f. 12r. See also 
Alison Games's discussion of Wilson's proposal in The Web of Empire, 295-296.   
50 “A coppie of a discourse of Barbary sent his Royal highness by my Lord sandwich,” 1662, BL Sloane 
MS 3509, f. 25r.  
51 Ibid. f. 25v 
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the Rivers, and are places of traffique, still preserving peace with the Main Land, soe 
necessary for Tanger.”52   
Sandwich's hope that Tangier would serve as the foundation of a maritime empire 
dominating the Mediterranean exemplified widespread expectations that control of the 
city might be only the first step towards domination of the Mediterranean. Admiral John 
Lawson warned in 1661 that Tangier was a place of such importance that if the Dutch 
should get hold of the city they would be able “keep the place against all the World, and 
give the law to all the trade of the Mediterranean,” a verdict that, according the 
Clarendon, left Charles II “very much affected.”53 Shortly thereafter, Giovanni Luca 
Durazzo, Genoa's ambassador to the newly restored monarchy, reported that England's 
commitment to Tangier echoed Henry's VIII's ambition to develop his naval power in 
order to “open and close the ocean at the strait of Calais,” a goal Charles II now aimed at 
“with more reason” through control of the Straits of Gibraltar.54 Howell meanwhile 
thought that Tangier provided a harbor from which a fleet could control the Strait of 
Gibraltar, and “give law to all who pass or repasse that way.”55 Cholmley likewise 
                                                
52 Ibid, f. 27r. 
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the Dominion of the Narrow Seas (the faires flower in the Crown of England) haveing ports on both sides,” 
f. 266r. 
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recalled that Tangier's English proponents dreamed of establishing a toll over traffic 
through the Strait of Gibraltar.56 
It was French engineer Nicolas de Clerville who put into its full ideological 
perspective the prospect that the acquisition of Tangier might be only a first step towards 
establishing English sovereignty over the Strait. He warned that if rumors that the English 
planned to seize the Alhucemas Islands were correct, it would be “a thing prejudicial to 
all the princes who have States on the Mediterranean sea” and a means by which “these 
new comers would presume to make for themselves always some grander presumption of 
the right to their pretended monarchy of the sea, which ambition will seem much more 
ridiculous when they will not have an inch of land or of coast.”  Territorial possessions, 
however, would allow them “to sustain as well as to color their unjust pretentions.”57 
Clerville thus feared that further English acquisitions within the Mediterranean would 
give England a legal basis to claim sovereignty over the mouth of the Mediterranean, in a 
manner parallel to that which it claimed sovereignty over the ill-defined “British Seas.”58 
                                                
56 Cholmley, “Several discourses concerning the interest of Tangier,” BL MS Landsdowne 192, f. 12r.  
57 Louis XIV wrote to his ambassador in London, the Comte d'Estrades in early 1662 to advise him, “j'ai 
sujet d'apréhender, en conciliant ces deux avis, que les Anglois ne veuillent s'emparer de ces Postes- là, 
pour avoir un port à donner la main à Tanger, tenir mieux les deux embouchures du Détroit de Gibraltar, & 
peut-être enfin y établir un péage, à l'exemple du Roi de Dannemarc sur celui du Sundt,” see Lettres, 
mémoires et negociations: de monsieur d'Estrades...(London [i.e. The Hague], 1743), 1:246; Corbett, 
England in the Mediterranean, 2: 324-325.  Clerville advised that France's diplomatic representatives in 
England do everything possible to stop these English plans “comme une chose prejudiciable à tous les 
princes qui ont des Estats sur la Mediterranée, et comme un moyen par lequel ces nouveaux venus 
presumeroient de se faire tousjours quelque plus grande presomption de droict à leur pretendue royauté de 
la mar, dont l'ambition samblera bien plus ridicule quand ils n'y auront pas un poulce de terre ny de coste, 
que quand ils s'y seront avancés par un establisement, si petit qu'il soit, et qu'ils y auront un port ou rade, 
par lequel ils pourront soustenir aussy bien que colorer leurs injustes pretensions,” Memoire de Nicolas de 
Clerville, [avant le 26 février] 1662, in Les sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc, 1: 27.  
58 For juridical arguments regarding state sovereignty over coastal waters, their origins and their intellectual 
and imperial significance, see Thomas Wemyss Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (Edinburgh: W. 
Blackwood, 1911); Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, chap.  4, “The Empire of the 
Seas, 1576-1689.”  
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Writing to Colbert, Clerville expanded on this point when he warned that if the English 
gained control of additional footholds in the Mediterranean “they would not only by this 
means establish a new right to their claims to the empire of the Mediterranean as well as 
of the Ocean,” but would also be able to establish a toll at Tangier by virtue of controlling 
both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar.59 This toll might fall on traffic passing Tangier or 
upon the trade to the Levant, but in either case it posed a threat to France, first putting the 
French king to the shame of being seen as tributary to the English and secondly 
threatening his subjects' commerce in the Levant, already outpaced by English 
competitors.60 Uniquely, Clerville explicitly saw Tangier as a base from which England 
could make a formal claim to sovereignty and empire over the mouth of the 
Mediterranean.  
The prospect that possession of Tangier would allow England to exercise 
sovereignty over the mouth of the Mediterranean proved misplaced. Rumors that English 
ministers and naval officers thought to seize the Alhucemas Islands seem in fact to have 
rested not with English plans, but on the activities of a knight of Malta then in London 
who was looking for state backing for the occupation of an uninhabited island on the 
coast of Africa.61 As Henry Rumbold, the former English consul at Cadiz later pointed 
                                                
59 “...il a esté representé à Sa Majesté que, s'il faisoient, ainsy qu'ils le peuvent faire et que leur interest le 
comporte, ils pourroient non seulement se faire par ce moyen un nouveau droict à leurs pretentions de 
l'empire de la mer Mediterranée aussy bien que de l'Océan, mais aussy pourroient-ils se rendre tellement les 
maistres des deux emboucheures du destroict de Gilbratar qu'avec les forces qu'ils ont à la mer ilz 
pourroient etablir un péage à Tanger, à la manière de celuy qui se paye dans le Sundt à Copenghagen,” 
Mémoire de Nicolas de Clerville a Colbert, [avant le 26 février 1662], in Les sources inédites de l'histoire 
du Maroc, 1: 29-30. 
60 ibid., 1: 30. 
61 Durazzo reported that a “Cavagliere di Malta- Italiano molto esercitato nella navigatione del 
mediterreaneo” sought to interest him in his project to take possession of “un Isola dishabitata sopra Le 
Coste d'Africa in tale opportunità di seno, e di sito, dove con picciole trincee si sarebbe potuto stabilire 
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out, it was naive to think that England could control access to the Mediterranean when 
Spain at its military height had failed to obtain that same objective.62 At the mercy of 
winds, fog and aggressive tides, no sailing fleet could realistically expect to control the 
Strait.63 Hugh Cholmley similarly recalled cautious voices that warned, “exacting tribute 
upon trading vessels was a thing of so universal a consequence as not to be maintained by 
the power of a single nation.”64 In a sea where competing empires and states collided, 
domination over the Strait of Gibraltar represented an unsustainable extension of English 
sovereignty.65  
                                                
porto sicure contro le tempeste, e difesa inespugnabile contro à Corsari,” ASG Archivio Segreto, Relazioni 
dei Ministri 1/2717, 51. Clerville reported that he had been informed by the Comte d'Estrades that an Italian 
knight named Muti proposed in late 1661that England occupy the Alhucemas islands, see the “Mémoire de 
Nicolas de Clerville” [avant le 26 février] 1662, in Les sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc, 1: 26-27. 
Henri de Castries suggests that this is Ferdinand-Cosme Muti, a knight of Malta and it certainly seems 
probable that Muti is the same knight with whom Durazzo met. A letter from Louis XIV to d'Estrades states 
that Clerville had suggested that Muti travelled to England to present his project after it was rejected in 
France, Louis XIV to le Comte d'Estrades, 26 February 1662, in Lettres, mémoires et negociations de 
Monsieur le Comte d'Estrades..., 1: 246. 
62 Bodl. MS Carte 69, f. 388r. This anonymous and undated memorial offers a lengthy, informed and bitter 
critique of the anonymous A Discourse Touching Tangier and was written in response to a letter from a 
“Wm. S” of Hamburg date August 2, 1680. The author’s reference to his services to the Spanish navy 
during the Interregnum confirm that he is Henry Rumbold, who further mentioned in a petition to James II 
that he had written a response to A Discourse Touching Tangier and presented it to the king’s ministers.  
See Horace Rumbold, “Notes on the History of the Family of Rumbold in the Seventeenth Century,” 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6(1892): 162, n. 2.  The author of A Discourse Touching 
Tangier was the engineer Sir Henry Sheeres. Jonathan Scott confirms Sheeres’s authorship of the pamphlet 
in When the Waves Ruled Britannia: Geography and Political Identities, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 111, n. 88. 
63 See also George Hills, Rock of Contention: A History of Gibraltar (London: Robert Hall & Company, 
1974), 207-208. 
64 Hugh Cholmley, “Several discourses concerning the interest of Tangier,” BL MS Lansdowne 192, f. 85r.  
Nevertheless, Pietro Mocenigo reported in 1668 that there was talk in London of enforcing a duty on all 
ships passing through the Strait of Gibraltar, see his dispatch to the Venetian Senate of 7 September 1668, 
in Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, vol. 35, 
1666-1668, ed. Allen B. Hinds (London: Longman, Green, 1935), 264. 
65 William Petty would later balance his argument for England's expansive dominion over the British Seas 
by writing, “If the King of france, The King of Spayne, & Duke of Tuscany, could arrive to the like power 
[to protect all shipping] in the Mediterranean from the Straights mouth to Malta, That the same bee allowed 
him also” and continuing to allow for Venetian and Ottoman dominion over the eastern Mediterranean, see 
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At a time when the conception of the British Empire as a transatlantic political 
community was still in its infancy, descriptions of England's overseas empire centered 
not on an emergent imperial polity but on a maritime empire marked by its commercial 
and naval power.66 As the only English port near the Mediterranean, Tangier appeared 
vital for the protection of English navigation in that sea as naval wars against the North 
African regencies established the near permanent presence of royal fleets there.67 
Tangier's advocates further linked the city's naval role to its wider place within a trading 
empire. As the engineer, Sir Henry Sheeres, was later to ask, defending Tangier and its 
role in English commercial and maritime strategy, “What is it has rendered England so 
formidable, so rich, and so renown’d a Kingdom; but the strength of our Navyes, and 
Universality of our Commerce?” Continuing to describe the “Machin” of commerce upon 
which England’s power rested, Sheeres further asked his readers, “because there are 
many various Wheels and Motions therein, why should not Tanger be esteem’d among 
the principal of those movements, which keep this vast Engin going?”68 Tangier’s 
strategic location thus made it appear central to the development of England’s maritime 
and commercial empire. 
                                                
“Dominion of the Seas,” in The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished Writings of Sir William Petty, ed. 
Marquis of Lansdowne (London: Constable & Company, 1927), 1: 237. 
66 See Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, passim. See also David Davies, “The Birth 
of the Imperial Navy? Aspects of Maritime Strategy, c. 1650-90,” in Parameters of British Naval Power, 
1650-1850, ed. Michael Duffy (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1992), 24. In 1691 Henry Sheeres 
composed the detailed outline of a set of naval essays, the last of which proposed “a Scheme & Modell of a 
Maritime Monarchy” that would give England not only “a Dominion of the Narrow Seas, but to the wide 
Ocean,” Bodl. MS Rawl. D 147, f. 67r. 
67 Howell, “A short Discours,” TNA SP 29/52, f. 262r.  
68 [Sir Henry Sheeres], A Discourse Touching Tanger: In a Letter to a Person of Quality (London, 1680), 
10-11 
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II.  Tangier and the Navigation Acts 
  
 How Tangier was to fit within the “vast Engin” described by Sheeres proved a 
contentious question. Clearly, the city’s development depended on its ability to attract 
trade and a trading community: as the Secretary of State, Sir Edward Nicholas, wrote the 
Earl of Peterborough, “it must be trade & Comerce that must improve the interest of that 
important Place.”69 While some hoped that the city would allow England to control 
navigation through the Strait of Gibraltar, there were wider expectations that Tangier 
would become a center for trade into the Mediterranean and a new entrepôt for “the 
commerce of the Indies.”70 Howell's account of Tangier advised that if a mole could be 
constructed to improve the harbor, Tangier might prove not only “a fort, & a place of 
fastness but also for a Mart or Mercantile towne for Comerces.”71 The English consul in 
Lisbon, Thomas Maynard echoed a widespread view when he wrote, “Tangere is Situate 
as convenient for trade as any place in the world” and could become both a magazine for 
trade to the Levant and a port to attract Spain's trade from the West Indies.72 
 However, prospects that Tangier would serve as a nexus for trade between the 
Mediterranean and Atlantic Ocean exposed emerging legal and institutional boundaries 
                                                
69 Edward Nicholas to the Earl of Peterborough, Whitehall, 17 May 1662, TNA SP 44/1, 51. 
70 Giovanni Cornaro to Doge and Senate, March 15, 1662 in Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts 
Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, vol. 33, 1661-1664, ed. Allen B. Hinds (London: 
Longman, Green, 1935), 119. The English consul in Lisbon, Thomas Maynard, similarly thought that 
“Tangere is Situate as convenient for trade as any place in the world” and could become both a magazine 
for trade to the Levant and a port to attract Spain's trade from the West Indies, Thomas Maynard, Lisbon, 
8/18 December 1661, TNA SP 89/5, f. 73r. 
71 Howell, “A short Discours,” TNA SP 29/52, f. 263r.  
72 Thomas Maynard, Lisbon, 8/18 December 1661, TNA SP 89/5, f. 73r. 
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that redefined maritime space around the world. The author of A Description of Tangier 
praised Tangier as a site capable of securing England's “Indian commerce” and 
dominating access to the Mediterranean, as well as a potential free port “to which all 
Nations on this side the Line may be glad to have addressed themselves.”73 For this 
author “the Line” differentiated Europe and the Mediterranean from the wider world, 
even as his account of Tangier's advantages portrayed it as a city ideally positioned to 
link the diverse strands of English and world trade.74 By the mid-seventeenth century, the 
weight of European diplomacy and treaties had begun to be intermittently felt in North 
America and the Caribbean. However, as state-building bridged some of the institutional 
and political divisions between Europe and America, commercial legislation began to 
define a distinct colonial economy. The author's delineation of European and Atlantic 
trade thus echoed the mercantile divisions created by the Navigation Acts after 1651 and 
raised the broader question of how and where Tangier was to fit into England's trading 
empire.  
 England's previous colonial experiences shaped expectations and plans for the 
development of Tangier.75 James Wilson thought the occupation of Tangier heralded a 
process of plantation and conquest that would create an African empire radiating outward 
                                                
73 A Description of Tangier, The Country and People adjoyning with an Account of the Person and 
Governance of Gayland, the present Usurper of the Kingdome of Fez; And a short Narrative of the 
Proceedings of the English in those Parts (London, 1664), 7. 
74 On the “lines of amity” in the British Atlantic, see Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An 
Exploration of Communication and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 10, “Send 
Peace and War beyond the Line, 1667-1739,” passim and Eliga H. Gould, “Zones of Law, Zones of 
Violence: The Legal Geography of the British Atlantic, circa 1772,” The William and Mary Quarterly 60, 
no. 3 (July 2003): 471-510. 
75 Alison Games, The Web of Empire, 289-299. 
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from Tangier and yielding England “more then either east or west indies.”76 Less grandly, 
Hugh Cholmley accounted for Tangier's uncertain beginnings when he advised that 
Tangier was “much out of Order for want of Civill government yet no more then is usuall 
to all plantations in their beginning.”77 Arguments that garrison government stifled 
Tangier's commercial development echoed complaints that the preservation of martial 
law in Jamaica long after the island's conquest stymied its colonization and 
development.78  
Such explicit comparisons between Tangier and England's wider empire were 
actually rare. Rather than reflecting English experience around the Atlantic or Indian 
Oceans, English thinking about Tangier and its development overwhelmingly revolved 
around models that oriented the city towards the trading world of the Mediterranean. The 
author of a set of recommendations for the improvement of Tangier from the mid-1660's 
thus echoed Cholmley when he called for the creation of a civil government at Tangier, 
but looked to Livorno, Genoa and the cities of Flanders to demonstrate the importance of 
civilian government and justice for the economic development of towns.79  
                                                
76 James Wilson, Lisbon, 5 October 1661, BL Sloane MS 3509, f. 12r. 
77 Cholmely to Bathurst and Upton, 4 March 1665, NYRO ZCG V 1/1/1, 46.  Cholmley later recommended 
“reducing as much as may bee the Souldier into the Cittizan,” while the merchant John Bland advised 
Samuel Pepys in 1666 that Tangier was “never likely to come to anything while the soldiers govern all and 
doth not encourage trade,” “Proposalls made by Sir Hugh Cholmley concerning Tangier,” TNA CO 279/8 
and The Diary of Samuel Pepys, vol. 7, 1666, ed. Robert Latham and William Matthews (London: G. Bell 
and Sons, 1972), 109. 
78 On calls for civil government in Jamaica falling its conquest, compare the arguments of Stephen 
Saunders Webb, The Governors-General, 196 and Carla Gardina Pestana, “Mutinies on Anglo-Jamaica, 
1656-60,” in Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective, ed. Jane Hathaway 
(Westport: Praeger, 2001), 72-77. 
79 “Memorialls for the Improvement of Tanger,” TNA CO 279/33, f. 140r.  This memorial is undated and 
unsigned, but was written before Tangier received its charter and may be the work of John Bland, since its 
recommendations closely resemble those made by Bland when he became mayor of Tangier in 1668. 
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The development of Tangier as a free port further highlighted the Crown's 
commitment to creating a city that would become a center for trade passing into the 
Mediterranean. Free ports occupied an important place in seventeenth-century economic 
thinking and were central to the political economy of the early modern Mediterranean 
where rulers responded to the sea's fiercely competitive commercial environment by 
attracting foreign merchants and shipping through a combination of low duties and 
favorable trading conditions.80 For example, the instructions issued to the Earl of 
Peterborough as the first governor-general of Tangier emphasized that the transformation 
of the city into a trading hub and free port lay at the center of the Crown's wider 
aspirations for its new possession. After explaining that he had put himself “to this great 
charge for making this addition to our Dominions” in order “to gaine to our subjects the 
trade of Barbary & enlarge our Dominions in that sea & advance thereby the Honor of 
our Crowne & the Generall comerce & weale of our subjects,” Charles II ordered 
Peterborough to announce that “no dutys Customs, or other taxes whatever” would be 
laid on goods imported or exported from Tangier, the city remaining a free port for five 
years. Peterborough was further directed to consider what means would most effectively 
                                                
80 Paul Masson, Les ports francs: d'autrefois et d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1904) and Louis 
Dermigny, Escales, échelles et ports francs, chap. 5, “Échelles et ‘Nation’,” 446-520, passim.  For the free 
port of Livorno, see Lucia Frattarelli Fischer, 'Livorno città nuova: 1574-1609', Società e Storia 46 (1989): 
873-893; eadem., “Livorno, 1676” in La Toscana nell'età di Cosimo III, ed. Franco Angiolini, Vieri 
Becagli, and Marcello Verga (Florence: EDIFIR, 1993), 45-66.  The only study to compare Tangier to 
other Mediterranean free ports is Thomas Allison Kirk's, Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in an Early 
Modern Maritime Republic, 1559-1684 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 193-196. For 
free ports in English economic thinking, see Thomas Leng's “Commercial Conflict and Regulation,” 942, 
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induce “our subjects and strangers to reside and trade” there.81 The Crown intended 
Tangier to be an open city that would attract foreign merchants and their trade. 
The English thus sought to create a cosmopolitan trading center that more closely 
resembled the East-India Company's new cities of Bombay and Madras than it did 
Atlantic colonies like Jamaica or Virginia. However, rule over a free port and free city 
presented a unique set of challenges. The charter granted to Tangier in 1668 affirmed that 
it would be a “free-city,” whose corporation included all the city's Christian residents; 
foreigners were admitted to Tangier's common council and to official positions, though 
not without controversy.82 The nomination of the Genoese Carlo Antonio Soltrani to 
Tangier's first common council was greeted by a “general cry” of “Noe Soltranye, noe 
Stranger,” from the inhabitants and freemen of the city. Asked why they rejected his 
nomination, the voters answered, “they were free to choose whoome they thought fitt and 
would have none butt English Men in the Common Councell.”83 The Earl of Sandwich, 
then in Tangier to deliver the city its new charter, noted that this reaction caused some 
unease among the foreigners living at Tangier, who were as much freemen of the city as 
the English but were now deprived a voice in city government. Sandwich hoped that the 
creation of a civil government at Tangier and the admission of strangers to it would 
attract merchants and inhabitants to the city and thus urged the city's officials to 
                                                
81 “Instructions for the Earle of Peterborough, Generall of our Army Designed for Tanger in Africa,” TNA 
CO 279/1, f. 29r-v.  
82 A copy of the charter granted to the city of Tangier is contained in the entry book of the city's Court of 
Records and Sessions, TNA CO 279/45.  
83 See the register of the proceedings of the Corporation, 21 August 1668, TNA CO 279/39, f. 2r. 
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overcome their impasse. A compromise was then reached whereby Soltrani would be the 
first man nominated to the common council in the next year.84  
Although the controversy over the nomination of Soltrani to Tangier's common 
council shows that the English struggled to govern the diverse population of Tangier, its 
resolution testifies to the intention of Charles II and his ministers to create a city that 
would succeed in the commercial environment of the Mediterranean. In the wake of a 
clash between Tangier's mayor and lieutenant-governor late in 1668 over their relative 
authority to govern the city, Tangier’s new governor, the Earl of Middleton, was issued 
instructions that emphasized that the king had incorporated the city, “as the most likely 
Meanes to advance our Free-Port, diminishe our Charge, and invite Inhabitants and 
Comerce thither: Which were the Only Ends aimed at by us, in possessing that Place, and 
making a mould there.”85 By the mid 1670's, the numbers of foreigners within Tangier 
rivaled or exceeded the city's civilian English population. In 1676, as comptroller of the 
king's revenue at Tangier, John Bland made a survey of Tangier's inhabitants. Among the 
130 “strangers” living in Tangier, Bland listed 4 Dutch, 45 French, 6 Portuguese, 17 
Italians, 51 Jews and 5 “Moores.” Conversely, there were 129 “Cittizens.”86 The 
substantial Catholic contingent within Tangier's garrison and civilian population, as well 
                                                
84 See the 27 August and 28 August 1668 journal entries of the Earl of Sandwich, Mapperton House, 
Journal of the first Earl of Sandwich, vol. 8, 475-477. Sandwich described Soltrani as a “rich & a witty 
man,” and he also served as the Genoese consul at Tangier, 26 August 1668 journal entry, Mapperton 
House, Journal of the first Earl of Sandwich, vol. 8, 446 and letter of Soltrani to the Genoese government, 
Tangier, 20 November 1669, ASG Giunta del Traffico 4.  
85 “Additional Instructions which may bee given to the Earle of Middleton,” August 1669, TNA CO 
279/12. 
86 Since Tangier's charter allowed non-English inhabitants to become freemen of the city, the precise 
breakdown of Tangier's population is unclear; however, strangers made up at least sizeable portion of 
Tangier's civilian population, “An Abstract of the State of the Citty and Garrison of Tanger,” 30 December 
1676, TNA CO 279/19. 
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as its Jewish residents, ensured a measure of religious toleration within the city.87 
Uniquely, Tangier was also granted a court merchant comparable to French and Italian 
tribunals that operated according to the law merchant. As an anonymous Spanish account 
of the city emphasized, “neither the city of London, with its great emporium of 
merchandise, nor any other city in the British dominions” possessed such an institution.88  
Since courts merchant had disappeared in an England dominated by the common law, the 
creation of the court at Tangier testified not only to the Crown's commercial aspirations 
for the city, but also to its intention to integrate the city into the culture and political 
economy of the Mediterranean.89 
By opening Tangier to foreign merchants and exempting goods bought and sold in 
the city from customs and most duties, the Crown drew on the example of Mediterranean 
free ports and especially the success of Livorno, which had become one of the chief 
trading ports of the Mediterranean under the patronage of the grand dukes of Tuscany. In 
the seventeenth century, Livorno emerged as the focal point of English trade in the 
Mediterranean as it became a distribution centre where exports of manufactured and 
colonial products could be offloaded and reshipped and where return cargoes of Italian 
and Levantine goods could be procured.90 Although English observers accented Livorno's 
                                                
87 William Bulman, “Constantine's Enlightenment: Culture and Religious Politics in the Early British 
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favorable customs regime, the relative protection from the Inquisition that the Grand 
Dukes extended to foreign merchants highlighted the commercial and civic openness that 
the English sought to recreate at Tangier.91 Wilson and Sandwich both imagined Tangier 
replacing Livorno as an entrepôt for Mediterranean trade, while George Downing advised 
Clarendon that if the king were to make Tangier “as Legorn a place for all nations to lay 
up their goods in upon very little or no custome. . . it may grow a very wonderfull & 
considerable place.”92 The example of Livorno was especially attractive to English 
officials as it illustrated that an open and inviting port could flourish even without a 
hinterland. In 1670, Hugh Cholmley advised William Coventry that following his 
discussions with Tangier's merchants, he was increasingly optimistic that the city could 
be made “a place of Trade,” noting that “it is not the Continent of Italie makes Ligorne 
flowrish, by takeing off the Commodities that are brought thether, ten parts for one being 
transported unto other places.” Instead, the dukes of Tuscany had used offers of low rents 
and excellent port facilities to draw merchants and trade to their free port, knowing that 
“it was a Conflux of people that much enrich the towne.”93 For the length of its 
possession of Tangier, the Crown similarly sought to create a regulatory and political 
                                                
91 For a recent summary of the importance of religious toleration and commercial privileges to the 
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environment there that would attract foreign merchants and the trade that would follow 
with them. 
Free ports had formed a central element of the commercial proposals advanced by 
merchants and the commercially minded under the Commonwealth, but they were also a 
departure from the conceptions of the political economy of trade that increasingly 
dominated English mercantile thinking in that they rested upon an open approach to trade 
even as England otherwise restricted and regulated its commerce along national lines.94 
Thus, although Tangier, as a port open to foreign trade, became a model for those in the 
American colonies who called for the repeal of the Navigation Acts, its place within 
England's wider colonial empire proved problematic.95 A report on proposals to 
reestablish the former “composition port” at Dover from the Commissioners of the 
Customs pointed out that Mediterranean free ports responded to particular mercantile and 
political conditions that were starkly distinct from England's actual interest. The 
Commissioners noted that England had no need of free ports “according to such 
                                                
94 Enthusiasm for free ports initially coexisted with proposals to restrict colonial trade to English ships; 
however, support for free ports faded following the passage of the Navigation Act of 1651.  The Act of 
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settlements as are in Ligorne & Genoa” for whereas they belonged “to petty States that 
gaine Trade from one another to serve the Countries,” England already enjoyed an 
abundance of commodities to fuel its commerce. Consequently, while the policies of the 
Italian free ports aimed at attracting foreign merchants and shipping, England had no 
need to “decoy it hither upon other Terms his Majestie being the greatest King of Waters 
in Europe.”96  In 1695, the writer Francis Brewster later echoed this opinion, arguing that 
the success of Livorno had given free ports an excessively positive reputation for, 
although creating one might be “ a good Expedient” for states that “hath neither Natural 
or Artificial Provision for Trade and Navigation, yet it may be prejudicial to a Nation that 
hath both.”97 Indeed, the original establishment of the free port at Tangier specifically 
excluded ships coming from English colonies and from beyond the Cape of Good Hope, 
maintaining the distinct separation between European and colonial trade laid down by the 
Navigation Laws.98 
Consequently, when reports circulated that ships were sailing directly to Tangier 
from the American plantations under passes from the governor of Jamaica, the Privy 
Council voiced its concern as to both the potential of this practice to deprive the Crown 
of customs revenue and the larger impact it might have on English trade.99 In January 
                                                
96 Commissioners of the Customs, 5 February 1661, Longleat House: Henry Coventry Papers, vol. 103, f. 
30r. 
97 Francis Brewster, Essays on Trade and Navigation (London, 1695), 29. 
98 A Proclamation Declaring His Majesties Pleasure to Settle and Establish a Free Port at His city of 
Tangier in Africa, (London, November 16, 1662).   
99 Journal entry of the Earl of Sandwich, 26 August 1668, Mapperton House, Journal of the first earl of 
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1669, the farmers of the customs where called before the Privy Council’s Committee of 
Trade to offer their opinion on opening trade between Tangier and the American 
colonies. They argued that such trade violated the Navigation Acts and in the process 
offered a cogent interpretation of the economic logic of England's Navigation Laws. The 
farmers emphasized that these laws explicitly aimed to tie the plantations more closely to 
England by employing English shipping, providing a vent for English manufactures and, 
above all, “makeing this kingdome a Staple not onely of the Comodities of those 
Plantations but of the Comodities of other Countries for Supplying them, it being the 
usage of other Nations to keep their Plantations trade to themselves.” Conversely, it 
would be easy for any person living in Tangier “to colour the Shipps and Goods of 
Strangers and by that means and the easy and cheap accesse to the port as aforesaid draw 
the Trade from England and Englishmen.”100 
 Conversely, Tangier's mayor, the merchant John Bland, envisioned Tangier as an 
integrated component of England's wider commercial empire that bridged the trading 
worlds of the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Although Bland owned plantations in Virginia 
and had written in 1661 in defence of free trade for the colonies, he appears to have 
viewed Tangier not as a legal loophole to send colonial goods directly to Mediterranean 
markets, but rather as an integrated component of England’s wider commercial empire 
                                                
revenues, letters of 6, 10/20, and 17/27 September 1667, TNA SP 98/8.  See also CO 279/10, which 
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that bridged the trading worlds of the Atlantic and Mediterranean.101 Bland thus argued 
that Tangier was “as a parte, & an oute Porte of England, Governed by the same lawes, & 
Councills, suplyed with the same treasure and wholly dependant upon, and subservient to 
the trade, navigation, and strength, of England.”102 Customs on colonial goods could be 
collected at Tangier and the goods reshipped to their Mediterranean markets at lower 
cost, not only ensuring Tangier's success, but promoting England's dominance of trade in 
the Mediterranean.103   
 Bland and his fellow supporters of Tangier's trade with England's plantations 
carried these arguments before the Council of Trade, to which the question of Tangier’s 
participation in colonial trade had been referred by the Privy Council. They delivered a 
lengthy memorial to the Council that refuted the arguments of the farmers of the customs 
and argued that Tangier could be “bee reputed no other but a Plantation of ours” and thus 
permitted to trade with the other, American colonies. 104 The authors stated that Tangier 
was “a free port as well as an English Plantation” and further asked “how shall its 
Neighbors bee invited to bring Aught to them if they can have nothing thence to carry 
back,” pointing out the town could hardly succeed as a free port unless it could use 
                                                
101 The Humble Remonstrance of John Blande of London Merchant, on behalfe of the Inhabitants and 
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colonial goods to attract foreign merchants.105 Moreover, the defenders of this trade 
responded to the customs' farmers’ accusations that it would harm English trade and 
revenues by emphasizing its national character, since it was “a Trade att our own Nations, 
English with English, Plantation with Plantation.”106 Would trade be improved or people 
encouraged to settle at Tangier if “all Our English Plantations or Tanger should bee 
counted Aliens and forreigners?” Instead, the security of English merchants and shipping 
from North African corsairs depended on Tangier’s maintenance and upon Tangier thus 
hung the fate of English commerce, “the chiefest Bulk of Our English Trade depending 
on the Traffick negotiated in the Mediteranian both in reference to the disposing of Our 
Europian and American goods and bringing Returnes thereof thense so usefull for our 
own manufactorie.”107 According to advocates of trade between Tangier and the 
American colonies, both Tangier’s development and the growth of English trade in the 
Mediterranean thus hinged on integrating the North African colony into England’s 
Atlantic economy. 
Despite the case made by Bland and his associates, the Council of Trade “utterly 
rejected” their proposal to open Tangier to the plantation trade.108 Officials involved in 
the government of Tangier continued to recommend a direct trade between the city and 
                                                
105 Ibid. f. 659v 
106 Ibid. f. 658r.  
107 Ibid. f. 658v. 
108 Journal entry of the Earl of Sandwich, 20 January 1668/9, Mapperton House, Journal of the first earl of 
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England’s other colonies, as when Hugh Cholmley suggested in 1670 that Tangier be 
opened to trade with the Atlantic plantations in order to “bring a Markett hether.”109 In 
1675, though, the Council of Trade and Plantations affirmed that within the context of the 
Navigation Acts, Tangier was not to be “deemed Plantation of His Majesty in Asia, 
Africa, or America.”110 As a matter of economic policy, the Crown's approach to the 
development of Tangier did not contradict its management of colonial trade. As Roger 
Coke observed, “Even the Act of Navigation with reason prohibits the Trade of our 
Plantations to Forreigners, because thereby, though it would enrich them by how much 
more their Trade would become great, yet this would be so much to the loss of the 
Nation: and permits a free Trade to Tangier, because it may enrich the place, and make it 
more frequented.”111  
 The legal separation of Tangier from England's Atlantic Empire reflected 
different approaches to the organization of trade that divided the trading world of the 
Mediterranean from the increasingly exclusive zones of colonial trade in the Atlantic 
Ocean. The effect of this separation was not only to deprive Tangier of its predicted role 
as a nexus of global trade but also to accentuate a process whereby legal and commercial 
regulations defined the oceanic boundaries that marked England's imperial development. 
The division of Tangier from England's wider trading empire thus reflects the rise of the 
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“ocean regionalism” that has recently been dated to the end of the seventeenth century. 
At that time, the different ways in which the English state and East India Company 
responded to a global upsurge of piracy established their jurisdictional authority 
respectively in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and thus contributed to the emergence of 
distinct legal regimes in those seas.112 The case of Tangier revealed how different trading 
regimes equally separated the Mediterranean and Atlantic. The free ports and open trade 
policies of Mediterranean states contrasted markedly with the restrictions that European 
empires placed on the trade of their colonies. The exclusion of Tangier from trade with 
England's wider empire illustrated how commercial legislation ultimately divided English 
commerce into Mediterranean and Atlantic spheres. 
 
III.  Tangier and the Moroccan Empire 
 
 Although Tangier's status as a free port marginalized it within England's 
burgeoning commercial empire, the colony's political and strategic situation nevertheless 
closely resembled that of other English fortresses and ports around both the Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans. With the declining power of the Saadi dynasty of Morocco from the early 
seventeenth century, Tangier's English garrison and inhabitants encountered a fluid 
political environment. The colony's promoters and governors well understood that its 
success depended on managing an array of competing dynasties and warlords to expand 
England's commercial and maritime foothold. Yet, even as English governors and 
company factors took advantage of emerging fractures in Asian, American and African 
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polities to establish and legitimize fortified ports, a different process dominated in 
Morocco.  Company factors in Asia and along the African coast navigated a world of 
“composite sovereignties,” legitimating their forts, strongholds and fledgling empires 
through both European and extra-European sources.113 Yet in the face of Moroccan 
expansion, Charles II lacked both the Parliamentary support necessary to preserve the 
city and the political flexibility to hold the city on Moroccan terms. 
 The rise of the new and assertive Alawi dynasty under Moulay al-Rashid and his 
successor, Moulay Ismaïl, fundamentally altered Tangier's position within Morocco. For 
these Moroccan empire-builders, holy war directed against Tangier and other Christian 
settlements on the North African coast legitimized their rule and helped them to unite the 
tribal groups that threatened their efforts to centralize a growing empire.114 In 1673, the 
Earl of Middleton prophetically warned, “if once the Country should be reduced under as 
absolute monarchy as Taffaletta [Moulay al-Rashid] was in prospect and pursuite of, I am 
afraid this part of Barbary might prove very troblesome to other places of Christendome 
as well as to Tanger.”115 The lengthy siege of Tangier by the forces of Moulay Ismaïl in 
1680 demonstrated the new and serious threat posed to Tangier by Moroccan forces.  
Though Tangier was relieved and the siege lifted, the attacks revealed the vulnerability of 
the city before the weight of Moulay Ismaïl's growing threat. 
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 Tangier was thus a site of empire-building for both the Alawi and Stuart 
dynasties.  The colonization of Tangier exemplified the restored monarchy's commitment 
to take a leading role in England's commercial and colonial development. Underlying this 
commitment, though, was the Restoration regime's aim to channel England's overseas 
expansion to solidify its own reputation and prestige. Giovanni Luca Durazzo, Genoa's 
ambassador to the newly restored monarchy, noted in 1662 that Charles II's passion for 
prestige, born of his exile in foreign courts, was further inflamed by the need to 
reestablish the English monarchy in the eyes of its subjects and to show them that “the 
Legitimate government [is] no less glorious than the Popular and tyrannical.”116 Tangier's 
close relationship to the Crown testified to both the overseas expansion of the English 
state and to the insecurity of the Restoration monarchy in the face of domestic opposition. 
In his defense of Charles II's new acquisitions, James Howell had specifically lauded the 
benefits of a garrison at Dunkirk as “a curb to the malcontents, and Factious spiritts” still 
present in England.117 Tellingly, when Tangier's merchants suggested to the Earl of 
Sandwich in 1668 that they would be more confident to invest in the city if it were 
annexed to the Crown, and thus not as easily sold as Dunkirk had been, Sandwich 
thought this, “A greate point of state, How farr it is good in order to Preserve the Crown 
upon the Head of my Master & his family to part with Regalities; & whether emergencies 
                                                
116 “...per far apparire à Popoli il governor Legitimo non men glorioso del Popolare, e tirannico,” 
“Relazione Dell’Ambasciata Straordinaria in Inghilterra al Rè Gran Bretagna Carlo Secondo,” January 
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may not happen wherin it may be of great use to his Majestie to have such a place in his 
owne personall power.”118 
 In itself, the constitutional status of Tangier as described by Sandwich was not 
unique; Sir Matthew Hale noted that overseas possessions could be acquired by the king 
either in the “capacity of king of England...or Charles Stewart.”119 A bill passed by the 
House of Commons in 1661 to unite Dunkirk and Jamaica to “the imperial crown of this 
realm” died in the House of Lords since the formal annexation of the two Cromwellian 
conquests would have provoked the hostility of a Spanish government to which Charles 
II had promised the return of the colonies.120 A similar effort was made in 1679 to annex 
Tangier to the English Crown in order to ensure that the city was not sold to France. 
However, although colonial governance in general stemmed from royal prerogative, the 
large garrison at Tangier and the city's Catholic population made it uniquely vulnerable to 
domestic opposition.   
In the midst of the political crisis that grew up around the Popish Plot and 
Exclusion Bill, Tangier's expense and close association with the Crown focused 
Parliamentary suspicions on the city as an apparent foundation for future Catholic 
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absolutism.121 Although he still held Tangier to be a “Jewell of such inestimable value,” 
John Bland warned the Earl of Shaftesbury in 1680 that Catholics dominated the garrison 
and the civilian government and that both the foreign residents and Irish soldiers were of 
dubious loyalty.122 The inclusive and tolerant environment that integrated Tangier into 
the commercial and social patterns of the Mediterranean world also rendered it politically 
controversial within a Protestant empire. Tangier contained a garrison that comprised a 
large number of Catholic soldiers and officers, which seemed at best superfluous in a 
time of apparent national crisis and at worst appeared to be a threat to English and 
Protestant liberties.123 When Parliament refused to allocate additional funds for Tangier 
in the aftermath of the siege of 1680, unless Charles II excluded the Duke of York from 
the succession, the city's abandonment became all but inevitable. Unable to afford the 
defense of Tangier in the face of the possibility of future Moroccan assaults upon the city, 
Charles II could only evacuate and destroy it. 
 If the acquisition of Tangier pointed to the grand imperial ambitions held by the 
later Stuart monarchs, the colony's failure highlighted the relative weakness of the 
seventeenth-century English state. As the Restoration monarchy poured money into the 
development of Tangier's harbor and fortifications, it anticipated the authoritarian empire 
of the later eighteenth century but also engaged in an endeavor that far exceeded the 
Crown's actual capacity to project its power overseas. Although Charles II and his 
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ministers did not intend Tangier to be a mere garrison, the city was never even remotely 
self-sustaining and left the state to bear the full burden of its costly defense. As early as 
1666, during the financial crisis precipitated by the Dutch raid on the Medway, Hugh 
Cholmley warned Tangier's lieutenant governor, Henry Norwood, that sentiment was 
turning against the city in favor of retrenchments necessary “to preserve our Antient 
Dominions in a flourishing Condition then by Exchausting[sic] our Treasure to 
impoverish our Selves in hopes to make our Posterity more glorious by a Remote 
accession to the Crowne.” For Tangier's skeptics, projects like the transformation of this 
exposed site into a naval and trading center were works “rather of noise and reputation 
then any solid benifitt & therefore sutable to plentifull & larger monarkys,” not those 
struggling to reduce their expenses.124  
 Weakness alone cannot account for Tangier's failure: the East India Company 
found itself badly mauled after it launched its war against the Mughal Empire in 1686 
and, seventy years later, it was the capture of Fort William by the forces of Nawab Siraj 
ud-Daulah that precipitated the Company's conquest of Bengal.125 Moreover, an impetus 
to reconquer European footholds on the African coast was not the only factor that shaped 
Moroccan relations with Tangier. For both the local rulers that the English first 
encountered upon occupying Tangier and the centralizing emperors of the Alawi dynasty, 
                                                
124 Cholmley to Norwood, London, 2 September and 1 November 1667, NYRO ZCG V1/1/2, 70, 111-112. 
125 P.J. Marshall, “Western Arms in Maritime Asia in the Early Phases of Expansion,” Modern Asian 
Studies 14, no. 1 (1980): 13-28; Om Prakash, European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 146-153; Colley, Captives, 38, 255-256; Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam, Explorations in Connected History: Mughals and Franks (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 203. On the place of violence and the threat of force in European relations with the wider 
world in the early modern period, see especially Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Political Economy of 
Commerce: Southern India, 1500-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 5, 
“Europeans and Asians in an Age of Contained Conflict,” passim. 
  79 
! !
the English colony and the remaining Spanish possessions on the Moroccan coast were 
equally valuable as targets for regime legitimizing jihad and as sources of the gunpowder 
and arms upon which their state-building depended.126 The later correspondence from 
Tangier's governors testifies to their appreciation of Tangier's weakness in the face of 
Moulay Ismaïl's empire building. Colonel Percy Kirke well understood that the city's 
peace depended on its value to Moulay Ismaïl as a source for the arms and powder his 
armies needed: “the point of the Contraband is that which makes the Moors sett the 
highest value on our frendship.”127 This complicated relationship belies Nabil Matar's 
conclusion that by 1680 England's “encounter with the Moors had become completely 
grounded in colonial desire and religious difference.”128 In the fractured political 
environment of Morocco in the mid-seventeenth century, these two dimensions of 
Muslim-Christian relations were intertwined and had even encouraged an element of 
interdependence between Tangier and its sometime enemies. 
 A letter that Moulay Ismaïl sent to Charles II in 1682 explained why peace 
depended upon the supply of arms he expected to receive from the English and 
emphasized the changed political circumstances that at once weakened Tangier and 
encouraged him to complete its conquest: 
for the Moors have no words or thoughts but the reducing of Tanger and I cannot 
stop their mouths but by telling them that Tanger is our work-house and that wee 
receive from them whatever wee please of arms, powder and Ammunition and 
that it is many hundred years that it hath belonged to the Christians. In former 
times their neighbours were Rebells whose Government was not above a day or 
two's journey in extent and had no power or concerned themselves for any thing 
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but their own persons and profit. Now that God hath exalted the King in Algarve 
whose Territories do extend to four or six months journey, people would desire 
him if he should leave any of the Christian Garrisons in his neighbour hood or 
connive at Tanger Ceuta or Larache by suffering them to remain which would be 
a great dishonour.129  
 
Willing though he was to maintain and even extend the existing peace so long as he 
received the “gifts and acknowledgements due for its security” and that would “give us 
an occasion of stopping the mouths of the Moors,” Moulay Ismaïl also threatened to 
attack the city if the English did “any damage either by sea or land or so much as to have 
moved a stone that ought not to be.”130 This letter clearly describes the ideological and 
political situation that faced Tangier following the rise of the Alawi empire. It also 
manifests a fundamental, if striking, tension between the importance of the arms and 
powder he obtained from Tangier and the political motives that instead encouraged him 
to seek the city's conquest.  
 The relationship between Tangier and its Moroccan neighbors parallels the 
vulnerability and mutual dependence that defined European fort and factories along the 
African coast and around the Indian Ocean. Ideological factors help to explain the 
divergent histories of Tangier and of the outposts that would become foundations of the 
British Empire. In 1698, the English travel writer John Fryer described the brief French 
occupation of the eastern Indian city of São Tomé between 1672 and 1674.  In the course 
of his account of the city, Fryer posed the question, 'Why Gulconda, being a Potent 
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Prince, should permit Garisons to be in the hands of Aliens'? 131 Fryer's explanation that 
South Asian princes were "weak at sea" and thus preferred to allow foreign allies to bear 
the cost of defending port-cities belies the commercial and even maritime interests of 
those rulers.132 However, Fryer's question remains pertinent, especially considering the 
fate of Tangier. Tribute payments and custom revenues encouraged African and Asian 
polities to permit European forts and factories to be situated upon their lands. More 
broadly, though, these outposts also testified to the willingness and ability of companies 
to accept the sovereign authority of African and Asian rulers in order to develop their 
own political and commercial foundations. Although the construction of fortifications 
reflected a widespread belief that the safety of European communities depended on the 
threat of force, European strongholds generally rested on grants bestowed upon their 
founders by neighboring rulers and were often sustained through judicious 
acknowledgment of indigenous suzerainty.133 
 Parliamentary demands over the funding of Tangier threatened the royal 
prerogative of the Crown; in a similar way, questions of English sovereignty over Tangier 
and how far possession of that city extended bedeviled the garrison's relations with its 
Moroccan neighbors. In 1662, after his negotiations for a six month peace with 
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Fort St. George and the India Office, and from other sources (London: J. Murray, 1913) 1: 318. 
132 For the relationship between south Asian state-building and political economy in this period, see Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam, Penumbral Visions: Making Polities in Early Modern South India (Ann Arbor: University 
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the Ganges (New Delhi, 2005), chap. 3, “Persianization and ‘Mercantilism’ in Bay of Bengal History, 
1400-1700.”  
133 Watson, “Fortifications and the 'Idea' of Force,” passim; Stern, '“A Politie of Civill & Military Power,”' 
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neighboring ruler al-Khadir Ghaylan failed, the Earl of Peterborough complained that 
only “a greate feare, or an exceeding Interest” would bring the Moroccans into good 
relations with “any Strainger, espesially to a Christian, Jealous they are, beyond all 
measure of there Land.”134 Peterborough's successor, the Earl of Teviot, lost his life in 
1664 in the war that followed his decision to resume building fortifications outside the 
walls of Tangier, the Moroccans having refused to maintain a truce “because theyr Law 
would not permitt them to giv libertie to Cristians to fortifye in Africa.”135 Fifteen years 
later, in 1680, Tangier's governor Colonel Edward Sackville warned the commissioners 
for Tangier that any effort to fortify ground outside Tangier without the permission of 
Moulay Ismaïl would only “begett a Religious warr” and bring down the whole power of 
his empire upon Tangier.136 A letter of 1684 from Moulay Ismaïl to Charles II following 
the English evacuation of Tangier is eloquent testimony of the ideological and political 
pressures that acted on both the Moroccan and English empires. The sultan wrote that 
now that the English no longer occupied Tangier, he looked forward to better relations 
with them in the future, since “you have lightened our shame and left the land of the 
Muslims.” Such a peace had been impossible previously for he could not: 
make a treaty with you over Muslim land while you are occupying it by force. 
The Turks would revile me for that if I did it and deride me because of it, for the 
Turks, if they make peace with the Christian, do not do so until they have them 
under a treaty of dhimma, not like you, who had your watchtowers and cannon 
                                                
134 Earl of Peterborough, Tangier, 2 April 1662, TNA CO 279/1, f. 128r. 
135 Earl of Teviot, Tangier, 18 March 1664, TNA CO 279/3, f. 33v. 
136 Colonel Sackville to Lords of the Committee for Tangier, Tangier, 1 January 1680, TNA CO 279/27, f. 
2v. 
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while desiring that I should make peace with you.  God will not consent to our 
doing that. 137 
 
The author of a later defense of Gibraltar hinted at a similar understanding of the limits of 
the English claim to Tangier in Moroccan eyes when he noted in 1720, “we had not the 
same Right to Tangier that we have to Gibraltar; to That we had no other than what the 
Crown of Portugal gave us, which was that of Conquest; to This we have the Right of 
Conquest and of Cession too.”138 
 Questions of sovereignty over Tangier stood at the center of Morocco's relations 
with that English garrison. In 1683, the former Moroccan ambassador to England, 
Muhammad ben Haddu, wrote to Charles II to warn him that Moulay Ismaïl had used the 
promise of holy war to unite those tribal groups that had originally resisted his rule and 
was preparing to attack Tangier.139 The Moroccan diplomat recounted an exchange 
between Moulay Ismaïl and the Ottoman sultan over disputed territory between Morocco 
and Algeria. According to Muhammad ben Haddu, the Ottoman sultan responded to 
Moulay Ismaïl's initial letter regarding this territory by promising that the people of the 
land in question would serve the Moroccan emperor whenever he again engaged in war 
against the Christians, but also asking how the Moroccans could “have patience and 
                                                
137 Letter from (Ismail) to Charles II, 6 (Rabi the First 1095), 26 February 1684 in J. F. P. Hopkins, ed. 
Letters from Barbary, 1576-1774: Arabic Documents in the Public Record Office (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), 31.  The original reference is TNA: SP 102/2 #128.   
138 Britannus, A letter to the Independent Whig, Occasioned by his Consideration of the Importance of 
Gibraltar to the British Empire (London, 1720), 19-20. 
139 Moulay Ismaïl dispatched Muhammad ben Haddu in 1682 to London as his ambassador to Charles II.  
The Moroccan emperor refused to ratify the draft treaty he had negotiated in England, though after a period 
in disfavor, Muhammad ben Haddu continued as a go-between with the English, as testified by this letter.  
For the context of this letter, see Bakker, Slaves, Arms, and Holy War, 7-9 and 72-85. 
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endure in your countries four Christian Garrisons.”140 Warning again of the coming 
assault on Tangier, ben Haddu proceeded to suggest how the English might avoid war 
and the expense it would entail. Ben Haddu advised Charles “to open your hands with 
gifts and to have pity on the city of Tanger” and to “make it a Jewry (mallah) and 
storehouse for whatsoever my Master shall demand of powder and armes and whatsoever 
else he shall want and ask from your parts and do you write to him and beg of him his 
grace and Peace.” He went on to reiterate his suggestion that the English turn over 
Tangier, explaining that this would allow Moulay Ismaïl to justify the English presence in 
the city: 
Do you therefore with all diligence behave your self well in my Masters service 
and give him whatever he demands of powder and armes and all other things to 
the end that he may have some excuse to make to the Ottoman Emperour that he 
does not make war on Tanger and may write him in the Letter that he now intends 
to send him that he keeps it as a place in obedience to him and that payes him 
taxes and customes and supplies him with whatsoever he commands.141 
 
Significantly, ben Haddu specifically called on Tangier’s residents to pay the jizya, or 
poll tax, which would have signified their incorporation into the Moroccan empire as 
non-Muslim subjects.142 Thus, according to ben Haddu, while the Moroccans would no 
                                                
140 Ben Haddu here refers to the cities on the North African coast that remained under Spanish and 
Portuguese control. 
141 The translation here used is the original contained in TNA CO 279/30, f. 353r-356v. Kirke noted the 
difficulties his translators had in rendering this letter into English, “though they are not skillfull enough to 
give the exact meaning of every phrase yet they have bene able to collect the substance of the whole,” 
Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 9 August 1683, TNA CO 279/32, f. 74r.  The letter nonetheless largely parallels 
the modern translation by Hopkins in Letters from Barbary, 23-30, which is derived from the original 
Arabic letter in TNA SP 104/4, #110.  Hopkins provides the letter's date of 11 Sha'ban 1094, or 5 August 
1683.  The translation in CO 279/30 is incorrectly dated to 1682.  Hopkins also gives the original Arabic 
term for “jewry” as mallah, which referred to the Jewish quarters of Moroccan cities.  
142 Hopkins specifies that ben Haddu cited the jizya, or poll-tax, when he referred to Tangier paying taxes to 
Moulay Ismaïl, Letters from Barbary, 28.  For background on the significance of this tax within Islamic 
law and its relationship to subject status, see Edhem Eldem, “Capitulations and Western Trade,” in The 
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longer tolerate an independent garrison at Tangier, the English could remain there on 
condition that they acknowledged Moroccan sovereignty over the city. 
 While Muhammad ben Haddu's letter at least claimed to offer the English a way 
to maintain Tangier under the auspices of Moulay Ismaïl, the response of the city's 
governor, Colonel Percy Kirke, echoed those concerns for the Crown's authority and 
reputation that were central both to prospects for the development of Tangier and to 
Charles II's refusal to fund the city at the cost of his brother's succession.143 Kirke 
reported to the Secretary of State, Leoline Jenkins, that while he had expected to have 
found “some small and harmlesse artifice” in the letter, he was instead “amazed to find 
the highest peice of impudence that could have been imagined.”144 Meanwhile, Kirke 
replied to Muhammad ben Haddu to express, “how much I have been surprised at so 
disrespectfull a manner of address to so great a Prince, and from whom you own to have 
received such heaps of favours,” and then continued, “when I hear you advise my Master 
to make Tanger a tributary place and submit it as a Jewry to the Moors, I cannot consider 
you but as one of his greatest enemies or that some persons who wish you ill have made 
use of your name to affront my Master and ruine your credit with him.”145   
                                                
Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 293-4. 
143 For the ideological basis of opposition to the exclusion bills and to Parliamentary intrusion on royal 
authority, see Tim Harris, Restoration: Charles II and his Kingdoms, 1660-1685 (London: Allen Lane, 
2005), 220-237, 252-258.  See also, Jonathan Scott, England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English 
Political Instability in European Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 435-436. 
144 Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 9 August 1683, TNA CO 279/32, f. 74v. 
145 “Copie of Colonel Kirke's second Letter to the Morocco Embassador,” Tangier, 9 August 1683, TNA 
CO 279/32,  f. 72r. 
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 Ultimately, Moulay Ismaïl was as unwilling to tolerate a fortified English 
settlement on his coast as Tangier's governors were to countenance its submission to 
Moroccan supremacy. As Muhammad ben Haddu's letter suggests, Christian settlements 
along the North African coast were particularly vulnerable within the culture and political 
tradition of religious war that had defined the Mediterranean for centuries. The particular 
ideological context that made jihad central to the creation of Moulay Ismaïl's empire 
differed from that which prevailed in South Asia, where state building tended to be 
religiously and culturally syncretic.146 However, ben Haddu's suggestion that the English 
could remain at Tangier if they would only acknowledge Moroccan sovereignty over the 
city also indicates that the political situation of Tangier was comparable to that of English 
outposts in India. Kirke's steadfast refusal to consider a proposal that he saw as 
demeaning to the honor of the English Crown is thus all the more striking when we 
consider that the East India Company was simultaneously building its legitimacy in the 
political economy of the Indian Ocean through the grants awarded it by Mughal emperors 
and other Asian sovereigns.147 The politics of England's relations with Morocco thus 
offer a striking contrast to those which marked European interaction with local rulers 
around the Indian Ocean or on the west African coast. Crown sovereignty over Tangier 
deprived its governors of the political flexibility that East India Company factors 
                                                
146 C.A. Bayly, Origins of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of 
Modern India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 37-49, 214-219. 
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skillfully deployed to expand company power and authority under the aegis of the 
Mughal Empire and other Asian polities.   
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 At a time when European military power still wielded limited influence on 
powerful Asian and African polities, the ideological framework that guided relations 
between England and Morocco over Tangier provided one of the most subtle but critical 
distinctions between the histories of that colony and Bombay. The conceptions of political 
economy and Crown authority that underlay the colonization of Tangier contributed to the 
wider process whereby even as the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and Mediterranean became 
more intertwined, the political and commercial organization of these seas also diverged.  
Charles II's massive investment in Tangier testifies to perceptions of the centrality of the 
Mediterranean for the development of the English empire. However, if Tangier could 
appear to be an integral part of an English empire based upon naval and commercial 
dominance, it also represents a unique aspect of England's overseas expansion, responding 
to the political economy of the Mediterranean and resting upon an approach to trade that 
starkly differentiated it from England's Atlantic Empire.   
 The abandonment of Tangier by no means suggested that the Mediterranean 
occupied a less significant place in English commercial, strategic or even imperial 
thinking. Though the Crown abandoned Tangier after it was no longer able to maintain the 
hard-pressed city without Parliamentary support, Tangier had already proved to be neither 
  88 
! !
adequate nor necessary for English naval operations in the Mediterranean.148 While 
designed to offer English ships a secure place to refit, Tangier proved less convenient than 
other Mediterranean ports and did little to support or extend the reach of the English navy 
into the Mediterranean. The failure of Tangier, though, did not eliminate the conviction 
that England needed a port in the Mediterranean. Indeed, the decision to destroy Tangier 
stemmed in part from fears that the French or Moroccans might succeed where Charles II 
had failed, to the detriment of English trade.149 The Tuscan resident in London, Franco 
Terriesi, reported hearing rumors from the opponents of the city's evacuation that the 
English would “go on to take possession of some other place more proper for them, and of 
less expense, and these persuade themselves, that it is of too much consequence for them, 
to have a port in those parts, to wish to be totally excluded from them.”150 Henry 
Rumbold, who denigrated the value of the North African city, thought Gibraltar would be 
“worth ten Tangers.”151 
 After the conquests of Gibraltar and Minorca during the War of the Spanish 
Succession, officials and pamphleteers argued for their importance in terms that echoed 
earlier defenses of Tangier. Both of these new colonies inspired visions of commercial 
                                                
148 Sari Hornstein, The Restoration Navy, pp. 205-208. 
149 See the comments of William Temple advocating the destruction of Tangier in Debates of the House of 
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and maritime empire that paralleled those that had surrounded Tangier.152 James 
Stanhope, who led the British forces that seized Minorca in 1708, thought the island could 
become an entrepôt to rival Livorno.153 In 1725, a pamphlet similarly echoed the imperial 
vision that encompassed Tangier when it declared that Gibraltar was “a Key to the 
Mediterranean, and entitles us to the Sovereignty of that Sea.”154 Tangier also served as a 
model for the administration of Gibraltar. In 1728, the Board of Trade presented the Privy 
Council with plans for instituting a civil government in Gibraltar. The members of the 
Board explained that they had examined the plans of government for Barbados and the 
Leeward Islands, but thought Tangier to be the most appropriate model since it too had 
been “a Single Town, without any Considerable Territory” and thus “best Adapted to the 
Circumstances of Gibraltar.” Nevertheless, the Board’s recommendations for a civic 
government at Gibraltar differed in crucial respects from the charter that incorporated the 
town of Tangier in 1668. Significantly, the Board proposed that “the Freedom of this City 
should be Confined to Protestant Inhabitants only,” whereas Catholics had been allowed 
to participate in Tangier’s town government.155 Charles II and his ministers had opened 
                                                
152 In 1718, the Colonel Richard Kane, the lieutenant governor of Minorca, made a report of his 
recommendations for the development of the island and noted that Port Mahon had been made a free port in 
order to attract merchants and make it “a Magazine from whence they might disperse their Goods to all 
parts about the Mediterranean,” see “Freedom of the Ports, Commerce & Quarantine in the Island of 
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commercial potential and their disappointment, see Desmond Gregory, Minorca, the Illusory Prize: A 
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153 Sunderland to Stanhope, Whitehall, 10 December 1708, BL Add. MS 61651, f. 141v; Gregory, Minorca, 
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154 A Gentleman of the Navy, Gibraltar a Bulwark of Great Britain (London, 1725). For a similar 
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the Advantage of Gibraltar to the Trade of Great-Britain (London, 1720), p. 5. 
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Tangier’s trade and government to foreign participation in an effort to promote the city’s 
development within the religiously and culturally diverse environment of the 
Mediterranean. Such civic tolerance was out of place, however, within the self-
consciously Protestant British Empire of the early eighteenth century.156   
 The eventual abandonment of plans to create a civil government in Gibraltar 
highlighted the fact that it and Minorca were garrison colonies that never developed into 
significant commercial centers.157 Despite optimism for their mercantile potential, these 
colonies functioned chiefly as military and naval bases to sustain Britain's influence over 
the balance of power in southern Europe.158 A year after the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 
confirmed England’s hold on Minorca and Gibraltar, one pamphlet dismissed the 
suggestion that these possessions were beneficial to English trade, “the Consequences and 
Advantages arising from them are only in Case of War with France, Spain and other 
Nations, a very precarious Security to our Trade into the Levant and Mediterranean.”159  
Popular support for these colonies continued to run high, as illustrated by pamphleteer 
Thomas Gordon when he claimed in 1720 that Gibraltar was “the most important Place in 
the World to the Trade and Naval Empire of England.”160 Yet Gordon’s praise for 
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Gibraltar testified as much to the multiplicity of ideas of English empire in the early 
eighteenth century as to enduring perceptions of the importance of the Mediterranean for 
that empire. Whereas James Howell had imagined Tangier to be one of a global network 
of Crown possessions, neither Gibraltar nor Minorca factored into emerging conceptions 
of a transatlantic British Empire. Only in the aftermath of the Seven Years War did global 
conceptions of the British Empire emerge that unified all British possessions, including 
those in the Mediterranean, into a single imperial vision.161 
  With the occupation of Tangier, the Crown aimed to establish its dominance over 
the Strait of Gibraltar and to develop a trading port that would link the economies of the 
Atlantic and Mediterranean. The subsequent occupation of Gibraltar and Minorca 
illustrated the extent to which English dominance of the Mediterranean continued to 
exercise a strong influence on state policy and popular opinion. However, the history of 
these colonies also highlighted the limited expansion of the early modern English and then 
British Empire into the Mediterranean. From the later half of the seventeenth century 
onwards, the English expanded their initial footholds in North American and the 
Caribbean and fortified trading sites along the Indian Ocean. In the Mediterranean, on the 
other hand, the English failed to establish a viable trading center of their own. Although 
commentators and officials dreamed of establishing English dominance over the Strait of 
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Gibraltar, English claims to maritime and territorial sovereignty in the early modern 
Mediterranean remained extremely limited. As a result, England became a Mediterranean 
power without a Mediterranean empire. Instead, it was the relationship of English state 
authority with that of Mediterranean states that shaped the legal and political frameworks 
within which the English presence in the sea developed.
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Chapter 2 
 
Factories and Consuls in the Western Mediterranean, 1660-1713 
 
 
...the englishmen [at Livorno] want to 
rule, and to be independent: their body 
immediately turns any small private and 
individual business of a British subject 
into a nation or state business involving 
their Consul, minister, government.1 
  
The acquisition and settlement of Tangier highlighted the enduring commercial 
importance of the Mediterranean for seventeenth-century England. Both early modern 
commentators and modern historians have understood that the expansion of English trade 
into the Mediterranean was a vital component to the country’s wider commercial 
expansion. The growth of English commerce in the Mediterranean also raised ideological 
and practical questions for the political organization of overseas trade. In a maritime 
basin where the Crown struggled and initially failed to obtain a territorial foothold, 
English merchants fell under the authority of foreign sovereigns and the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts. During the first half of the seventeenth century, this situation was typical 
of England’s wider expansion, as merchants and travelers adapted to local law and 
customs in regions where the English did not dominate.2 Yet, as the Crown increasingly 
                                                
1 “...gli inglesi vogliono dominare, ed essere indipendenti: per un più piccolo affare di un privato inglese, il 
loro corpo ne fa subito un negoziato di nazione, di stato; impegnano il loro console, ministro, e la loro 
corte,” Stefano Bertolini, "Del Commercio di Livorno," c. 1758, transcribed in Francesco Mineccia 
"Economia e società a Livorno durante la Guerra dei Sette Anni atttraverso alcune annotazioni inedite di 
Stefano Bertolini," Ricerche storiche 13, no. 1 (Gennaio-Aprile 1983): 227.  The translation of this 
quotation comes from Michela D'Angelo, “The British Factory at Leghorn: A Kind of Chamber of 
Commerce cum Consulate,” in Consolati di Mare and Chambers of Commerce: Proceedings of a 
Conference held at the Foundation for International Studies (Valletta, 1998), ed. Carmel Vassalo (Marsa: 
Malta University Press, 2000), 121.   
2 Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), passim. 
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sought to regulate and protect English trade, its efforts to establish the authority of its 
consuls and diplomats over overseas merchants collided with the jurisdiction of foreign 
princes over their own ports. The relationship between the extraterritorial authority of the 
Crown and the territorial sovereignty of southern European states distinguished the 
trading regime of the western Mediterranean from those of the Levant and the Indian 
Ocean. The Ottoman Empire and Indian Ocean states delegated jurisdiction over 
communities of European merchants to those merchants’ consular and corporate 
representatives. Conversely, southern European princes linked their jurisdictional 
authority over foreign merchants to the territorial sovereignty they exercised over their 
cities. The inability of the Crown to establish the authority of its consuls and diplomats 
over English merchants in foreign ports differentiated the commercial and political 
environment of European port-cities from that found in Levantine and Indian Ocean 
trading centers. 
 During the second half of the seventeenth century, the expansion of imperial and 
corporate sovereignty extended the extraterritorial authority of English institutions and 
English law around the world. Despite the ideological and institutional differences that 
distinguished regulated companies like the Levant Company from join-stock corporations 
like the East India and Royal African Companies, these bodies all regulated English trade 
and administered justice over English merchants in distant cities and foreign ports. In the 
Levant and around the Indian Ocean, consular and corporate authority was central to the 
organization of English trade and coexisted with indigenous sovereignty. In the western 
Mediterranean, on the other hand, the Crown tried and failed to extend its jurisdictional 
authority over English merchants living in foreign ports. The refusal of these foreign 
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states to acknowledge the jurisdictional authority of English officials within their borders 
signaled the gradual ascendance of the territorial state in western Europe. This gradual 
differentiation of jurisdictional regimes over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century helped both to define the commercial and diplomatic relationship between 
European polities and to contrast the political organization of Europe from that of the 
wider world. 
 The experience of English merchants in southern European ports affirmed broader 
seventeenth-century conceptions of the relationship between geography, political 
conditions and commercial organization. According to the jurist Charles Molloy, writing 
in 1677, the corporate organization of trade was preferable wherever “the Places may 
bear it; as that to the Indies, Turkey, Hambourough, and some others.” Conversely, trade 
was best left open where it “will not bear” corporate organization, “as the Canaries, 
France, or any of those Places on this side the Line.”3 At the end of the seventeenth 
century, the commercial writer John Houghton further expanded and clarified this 
geographical distinction between zones of corporate and open trade when he argued that 
corporate regulation was unnecessary for merchants trading to ports in western Europe, 
where princes ruled according to “stated laws” and where merchants enjoyed the 
diplomatic protection of the English state.4 The legal and regulatory differentiation of 
                                                
3 Charles Molloy, De Jure Maritimo et Navali, 2nd ed. (London, 1677), 434. 
4 John Houghton, A Collection for the Improvement of Husbandry and Trade, 4 vols. (London, 1727-28), 2: 
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surrounding corporate trade, see also Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the 
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western Europe from both the Muslim Mediterranean and the wider world was, however, 
a more contested and uncertain process than Molloy and Houghton’s analyses of 
corporate trade would suggest. 
 The institutional evolution of English merchant communities in southern Europe 
at once revealed political and ideological continuities between England’s expansion into 
the Mediterranean and the wider development of the English empire and illustrated how 
those histories diverged. Jurisdictional disputes regarding legal authority over English 
merchant communities in Italian port-cities blurred the line between those communities 
and their counterparts in the Levant. Efforts to establish the jurisdictional authority of 
English courts and officials over English merchants in Italian port promised to substitute 
English adjudication of intranational cases for that of local courts. The extension of 
English jurisdiction into Italian ports would have replicated the layered sovereignties and 
jurisdictions that characterized Levantine and Indian Ocean ports. However, assertions of 
the jurisdiction of English courts and consuls over cases arising in foreign ports raised the 
question of how far the extraterritorial authority of the English state extended over its 
overseas subjects and how that authority intersected with the sovereignty of 
Mediterranean states. Moreover, the efforts of consuls and diplomats to establish their 
control over merchants in foreign ports exemplified the weak political ties between the 
English state and merchant factories. Consequently, even as English corporations and the 
English state expanded their jurisdictional and sovereign authority around the Atlantic 
and Indian Oceans, a different process characterized the western Mediterranean. The 
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failure of the Crown to establish its extraterritorial authority in Italian ports thus helped to 
differentiate the legal and political conditions of Europe from those found elsewhere in 
the wider world. 5 
 
I. Consuls and Factories 
 
 In the second half of the seventeenth century, the growing power of the Crown 
reshaped the relationship between the state and English merchants in the Mediterranean. 
Following the initial Elizabethan forays into the Mediterranean, merchants took up 
residence in ports around that sea. In particular, English merchants gravitated to the 
burgeoning ports of Livorno in Tuscany and of Smyrna on the west coast of Anatolia.6 In 
these commercial centers, merchants contributed to the growth of English trade but also 
integrated themselves into preexisting commercial and cultural patterns. English 
merchants thus entered into close commercial relationships with Italian, Jewish and 
Muslim merchants, turned to local courts to adjudicate their disputes and even held civic 
office in the places where they settled.7 Consequently, although these merchants and their 
                                                
5 Eliga H. Gould, “Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the British Atlantic, circa 
1772,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd. ser., 60, no. 3 (July 2003): 471-510. 
6 Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis, “Il porto di Livorno fra Inghilterra e Oriente,” Nuovi studi livornesi 1 (1993): 
43-87; eadem., English Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Italy, tr. Stephen Parkin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), passim.  On the English community at Livorno see particularly, Michela 
D'Angelo, “The British Factory at Leghorn: A King of Chamber of Commerce cum Consulate,” in Carmel 
Vassalo, ed., Consolati di Mare and Chambers of Commerce: Proceedings of a Conference held at the 
Foundation for International Studies (Valletta, 1998) (Marsa: Malta University Press, 2000), 113-125; 
eadem., “The Scale or Magazin of an Universall English Trade,” in Rapporti diplomatici e scambi 
commerciali nel Mediterraneo moderno, ed. Mirella Mafrici, (Salerno: Rubbettino, 2004): 327-349; 
eadem., Mercanti inglesi a Livorno, 1573-1737: Alle Origini di una “British Factory” (Messina: Istituto di 
Studi Storici “Gaetano Salvemini,” 2004); eadem., “Mercanti Inglesi a Livorno (1573-1796),” in Livorno, 
1606-1806: Luogo di incontro tra popoli e culture, ed. Adriano Prosperi (Turin: U. Allemandi, 2009), 350-
360.  On the English factory at Smyrna, see Daniel Goffman, Britons in the Ottoman Empire 
7 For example, the English consul of the Morea in the 1630s and 1640s, Henry Hyde purchased various 
forms of Ottoman office, see Goffman, Britons in the Ottoman Empire, 52-53. 
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successors organized themselves into national communities, or factories, they did not 
constitute or function as discrete national units.8 In this respect, English merchants in the 
Mediterranean resembled their counterparts around the Atlantic world. Early-modern 
merchants lived in a “largely decentralized world” that was “remarkable for a weak 
implementation of central governments’ directive and a loose adherence to metropolitan 
behavioral and cultural trends.”9 Nevertheless, the early-modern period was also one 
during which trade became an “affair of state.”10 During the reign of Charles II, 
England’s ministers and diplomatic representatives sought to establish a greater degree of 
state control over English merchants in foreign ports. The Crown affirmed its authority to 
appoint consuls to represent English merchant communities and repeatedly attempted to 
subject overseas merchants to the jurisdiction of English courts. This expansion of the 
English state into the Mediterranean world called into question where legal and 
sovereignty authority over merchants in foreign ports lay.   
 The organization of communities of foreign merchants differed between ports and 
regions, but partially self-governing associations of foreign merchants were ubiquitous in 
the early-modern world and were a fundamental response to the challenges of cross-
                                                
8 Molly Greene, “Beyond the Northern Invasion: The Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century,” Past & 
Present, no. 174 (February 2002): 43-44, 57.  See also, Rhoads Murphey, “Merchants, Nations and Free-
Agency: An Attempt at a Qualitative Characterization of Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1620-1640,” 
in Friends and Rivals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant from the Seventeenth to 
the Early Nineteenth Century, ed. Alastair Hamilton, Alexander H. De Groot, and Maurits H. van den 
Boogert (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 25-58. 
9 David Hancock, Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), p. xvii; Gauci, The Politics of Trade, 3-4. 
10 Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), chap. 2, “Free Trade and the 
Economic Limits to National Politics: Neo-Machiavellian Political Economy Reconsidered,” 185-188. 
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cultural trade.11 During the Middle Ages, Italian merchants around the Mediterranean and 
in northern Europe banded together to form “nations” which constituted semi-
autonomous commercial and judicial units, allowing disputes to be resolved according to 
merchants’ native laws and providing them with some measure of mutual support and 
protection.12 By the early seventeenth century, the institutional structure of such merchant 
colonies had weakened considerably in most European cities, as increased commercial 
integration and state centralization of political and legal authority made such autonomous 
national communities increasingly anachronistic. As a result, the seventeenth-century 
English factories that emerged in southern European ports like Livorno and Lisbon were 
highly informal bodies.13  
 In the years immediately following the Restoration, diplomatic correspondence 
both reflected growing official interest in the condition of English trade to foreign 
markets and affirmed the need for firmer governance of overseas merchants. In addition 
to their concern for the vulnerability of merchants in foreign ports, officials also feared 
that disorganization and dissension within English factories would undermine the 
nation’s commercial advantages. In 1668, the English resident at Lisbon, Sir Robert 
                                                
11 Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), 4, 132. 
12 Paola Subacchi, “Italians in Antwerp in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century,” in Hugo Soly and 
Alfons K. L. Thijs, eds., Minderheden in Westeuropese Steden (16de-20ste eeuw) (Brussels and Rome: 
Institute Historique Belge de Rome, 1995), 75-76; Marie-Christine Engels, Merchants, Interlopers, Seamen 
and Corsairs: The 'Flemish' Community in Livorno and Genoa (1615-1635) (Hilversum: Valoren, 1997), 
126. 
13 Michela d'Angelo exaggerates the institutional character of English factories and the extent to which their 
“aim was to form and act as a body,” in “The British Factory at Leghorn: A King of Chamber of Commerce 
cum Consulate,” 113-126. The best description of how factories functioned in the Levant comes in 
Goffman's, Britons in the Ottoman Empire, chap. 3, “Three English Settlements,” and chap. 4, “English 
Traders on the Ottoman Frontier.”  See also Alfred C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1935), 219-228. 
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Southwell, attributed dissension among the merchants there to the pernicious influence of 
civil war and Parliamentary rule: “They are for the most part young men who, having 
been bred up in the Licentious Principles of the late bad Times, have not as yett mended 
their manners nor their Opinions.”14 Conversely, Sir John Finch, the English resident at 
Florence between 1666 and 1672 and subsequently ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, 
thought that legal squabbles and disputes were typical of English merchant communities 
overseas. In 1666, Finch expressed this view in a letter to the Secretary of State, Lord 
Arlington, in which he described the unruly nature of the English merchant community at 
Livorno and commented, “your Lordship do’s very well know the temper of the Nation, 
who have too true a Character from others of never agreeing abroad; and therefore tis 
easily Imaginable that where Interest and Profitt make way for differences, as well as 
Naturall Inclinations, that Divisions cannot probably be wanting.”15 According to Finch, 
dissensions within the factory were a “disease” that “like a Cancer hath devoured the 
whole factory of Livorno.” Few English merchants or factors had brought great “Estates” 
back from that city, for many had squandered their money in Tuscan courts in the course 
of interminable lawsuits and legal cases.16  
                                                
14 Quoted in Violet Barbour, “Consular Service in the Reign of Charles II,” The American Historical 
Review 33, no. 3 (April 1928): 555. 
15 Finch to Arlington, 27 October/6 November 1666, TNA, SP 98/7.  While serving as ambassador to the 
Ottoman Empire, Finch apologized that his reports “afford little of Variety, things running on in One 
Equall Channell; Disputes, Controversy;s, and Novelty's, which are the Divertisement of Men of 
Buissenesse,” Finch to Williamson, Pera, 31 May 1676, TNA SP 97/19, f. 226r. 
16 Finch to Arlington, Florence, 4/14 July 1665, TNA SP 98/6.  See also Finch to [Arlington], Florence, 
3/13 June, 1665, TNA SP 98/5.  M. Jonah Brewer’s analysis of French merchants in the Levant, however, 
illustrates that official complaints about the litigiousness of merchant communities were not necessarily 
reflective of either more typical but mundane interactions between merchants or the commercial health of 
those communities, see M. Jonah Brewer, “Gold, Frankincense, and Myrrh: French Consuls and 
Commercial Diplomacy in the Ottoman Levant, 1600-1699,” (PhD Diss., Georgetown University, 2002), 
205-208. 
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  Behind official criticism of overseas merchants lay the assumption that overseas 
trade required close governance and regulation to ensure that the benefits of commerce 
flowed to the state and to the whole nation and were not simply wasted in merchants’ 
self-interested commercial activity. Finch expounded this view in a letter decrying the 
unfavorable balance of trade between England and Italy. According to Finch, “the 
Merchant as Merchant is no proper Judge for his end being onely gain, so long as he can 
accomplish that End by bringing in forrain Commodityes, tis not onely Impossible there 
should be ready money brought in; but let his Majesties lawes be what they can be, tis as 
impossible that what mony is in England should be kept from being carry’d Out.”17 For 
seventeenth-century officials and commercial thinkers, the effective regulation of trade 
and mercantile activity was vital to ensure that the benefits of commerce accrued to the 
state and political nation. 
 During the first decades of England’s commercial expansion, the belief that trade 
would flourish only if properly governed was an ideological mainstay of arguments for 
the corporate organization of trade.18 Although John Bland, the first mayor of Tangier, 
advocated free trade between the North African colony and England’s American 
plantations in 1669, a decade earlier he had instead recommended that all English trade 
be organized on a corporate basis. In 1659, Bland argued that all trade should “center in 
Companies and Corporations, the only Foundation and Pillar upon which a lasting 
Monument of Trade and Manufactories is to be built and preserved.” According to Bland, 
                                                
17 Finch to Arlington, 6/16 October 1668, TNA SP 98/9,  f. 330v-331r.   See also, Perry Gauci, The Politics 
of Trade, 1-2, 183. 
18 Thomas Leng, “Commercial Conflict and Regulation in the Discourse of Trade in Seventeenth-Century 
England,” The Historical Journal 48, no. 4 (December 2005): 943-944. 
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trade was “more judicially managed, both for Profit and Safety” when conducted by 
companies rather than by particular individuals.19 For the proponents of company trade, 
these bodies ensured that merchants cooperated in the face of foreign competition and 
allowed them to present a united front before foreign governments.  
 In the second half of the seventeenth century, however, both political 
commentators and government officials increasingly called for the state itself to intervene 
more forcefully in the management of trade and to assume responsibilities that it had 
previously delegated to companies. For instance, a memorial, possibly by Finch, warned 
Charles II that the Levant Company had grown rich under the privileges of its charter “as 
if they were a Little Republicque within your Monarchy.” This critique of the Levant 
Company echoed Thomas Hobbes’s 1651 attack on corporate bodies as “lesser 
commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall 
man.”20 According to Hobbes, corporations threatened the absolute and unitary 
sovereignty of the state. The author of the memorial against the Levant Company 
similarly warned that it threatened to usurp the prerogatives of the Crown as it sought to 
secure its right to appoint England’s ambassador to the Ottoman Empire and to keep the 
consulage it collected from non-English merchants who traded under the protection of the 
English flag. If the Company gained such privileges, the memorialist continued, 
England’s ambassadors at Constantinople would become the Company’s “Stipendaries & 
Vassalls, & obliged to serve their Lustes & Pleasures (good or badd) agaynst the Law or 
                                                
19 John Bland, Trade revived (London, 1659), 3. 
20 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common Wealth, Ecclesiastical and 
Civil (London, 1651), pt. 2, chap. 29, 174, quoted in Stern, The Company-State, 8. 
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Crowne.”21 Although Crown interest in Levantine affairs remained limited until the end 
of the seventeenth century, recognition that the Crown should assume a more significant 
role in the regulation of English trade in the Mediterranean illustrated a broader process 
whereby the state took on responsibility for the regulation of England’s overseas trade. 
 During the second half of the seventeenth century, the growth of overseas trade 
generated considerable official concern both for the security of merchants trading to 
foreign ports and for the limited ability of the state to control those merchants. The 
acquisition of Tangier provided one avenue to bring merchants in the Mediterranean 
under the authority of the English government and English laws.22 An anonymous 
account of the advantages of Tangier from 1661 thus favorably compared the prospects 
of English merchants who resided in a factory established “securely under the justice of 
their owne prince” to those of merchants at Algiers who were constantly at risk of ruin 
and of being made hostages in event of war.23 Two decades later, Sir Henry Sheeres 
expanded on this point when he explained the advantages that merchants would receive 
by trading from Tangier instead of Cadiz. According to Sheeres, Tangier was a city 
where “our Estates run no hazard of seizure of Confiscation” and in which “his Majesties 
                                                
21 “Narrative of some of the Levant Companies Proceedings with his Late Majesties & Your Crowne,” 
TNA SP 97/19, f. 266r-v.  See also, Mather, Pashas, 140. 
22 Benjamin Worseley observed that a chief benefit of the plantation trade was that merchants were able to 
carry out their business under their own laws and within a familiar cultural and political environment, see 
Leng, “Commercial Conflict and Regulation,” 950-952. 
23 “Sundry particulars relating to the Towne & roude of Tanger,” BL MS Harl 1595, f. 20v-22r.  This paper 
is anonymous and undated, though a copy appears in Nathaniel Luke's wastebook immediately before a 
memorial by James Wilson, dated 5 October 1661; BL Sloane MS 1956.  The manuscript catalogue most 
likely errs in listing these separate memorials together (as item # 57) and there is no reason to think that the 
“Sundry particulars” was written by Wilson, as the memorials are separate in all other manuscript volumes.  
Luke himself is, of course, a possible author, especially as he had had previous experience of Morocco.  
However, the authorship remains uncertain. 
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Subjects rest under the protection of their own Country Laws and Government, and in the 
liberty of the exercise of their own Religion.”24 Possession of Tangier was one potential 
solution to the threat of apparently arbitrary foreign justice and restrictions on the 
practice of the Protestant religion in foreign states. The failure of Tangier as a 
commercial port or entrepôt meant that the regulation and protection of English 
merchants in the western Mediterranean depended wholly on the ability of the Crown to 
extend its reach into foreign ports.  
 The commitment of the Crown to assuming a larger role in the regulation of 
English merchants was most evident in the evolution of the office of consul during this 
period. Early modern consuls were merchants who acted as representatives of their 
national communities in foreign cities and served as informal arbitrators of disputes that 
arose between members of the nation. They also served as their nation’s advocates and 
acted as linguistic and cultural mediators for merchants and ships’ masters.25 At the start 
of the seventeenth century, consuls were generally selected by merchants themselves or 
appointed by the government of the foreign state itself.26 Accordingly, England’s first 
consuls at Livorno were appointed, first, by the maritime guild of Trinity House and then 
by the Levant Company, as merchants replaced mariners as the foundation of the English 
                                                
24 [Hnery Sheeres], A Discourse Touching Tangier (London, 1680), 12-13.  
25 The best study of a seventeenth-century English consul may be found in Sonya Anderson, An English 
Consul in Turkey: Paul Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667-1678 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).  For a general 
description of the role and responsibilities of consuls, see D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 
1689-1789 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 238-240. 
26 Louis Dermigny, Escales, échelles et ports francs au Moyen Age et aux temps modernes in Les grandes 
escales, 3e partie, Période contemporaine etsynthèses générales, Recueils de la société Jean Bodin, 34 
(Brussels: Éditions de la librarie encyclopédique, 1974), 485-486.   
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community at the Tuscan port.27 As late as 1632, the diplomat and courtier Sir Thomas 
Roe explained to a Tuscan official that it was not customary for consuls to obtain royal 
confirmation, since the power to establish those figures lay with merchants alone.28 
Consuls were thus not state officials. Moreover they tended to be marginal figures who 
were highly integrated into the culture of the port where they resided.  For example, the 
English consul at Livorno between 1634 and 1665, Morgan Read, was a Catholic who 
held positions in the port-city’s civic government.29 The liminal character of such consuls 
allowed them to bridge the cultural and linguistic barriers that separated English 
merchants from foreign societies but made their loyalties suspect as commercial 
competition became intertwined with state politics. 
 Over the course of the second half of the seventeenth century, the informal quality 
of consulships gave way to a more official character. During the 1660s, the Crown 
established its sole authority to appoint diplomatic and consular representatives in the 
Mediterranean. Thomas Clutterbuck was nominated by the members of Trinity House to 
be consul at Livorno and confirmed in that position by the Crown in 1669; however, his 
successor, Thomas Skinner, appears to have received his official appointment as consul 
on the basis of John Finch’s recommendation, leaving the representatives of Trinity 
                                                
27  Paolo Castignoli, “Aspetti sstituzionali della nazione inglese a Livorno,” in Atti del Convegno di Studi 
“Gli Inglesi a Livorno e all'isola dl'Elba” (Sec. XVII-XIX) (Livorno: Bastogi, 1980), 105-106; Stefano 
Villani, “I consoli della nazione inglese a Livorno tra il 1665 e il 1673: Joseph Kent, Thomas Clutterbuck e 
Ephraim Skinner,” Nuovi studi livornesi 11 (2004), 12.   
28 Sir Thomas Roe to Don Pietro di Medici, 3/13 August 1632, TNA SP 98/3, f. 152r. 
29 Horace Albert Hayward, “Gli inglesi a Livorno al tempo dei Medici,” in Atti del Convegno “Livorno e il 
Mediterraneo nell'età Medicea” (Livorno: U. Bastogi Editore, 1978), 270. 
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House to complain that they had not been consulted in the selection process.30 Moreover, 
English ministers appear to have become increasingly reticent in allowing either 
Catholics or foreigners to serve as consuls.31 Although merchants might recommend or 
lobby for a particular candidate, the appointment of consuls rested with the Crown.32 The 
transformation of consuls from private representatives of autonomous merchant 
communities into quasi-public officials highlighted a broader shift whereby states became 
increasingly central to the organization of Mediterranean trade.   
 However, as consuls became representatives of states as well as of factory 
communities, they threatened the authority of local courts and officials over foreign 
merchants residing in their port cities and threatened to turn commercial disputes into 
diplomatic affairs. Consequently, the emergence of dense consular networks over the 
course of the seventeenth century was an uneven and controversial process. In the 1670s, 
French efforts to establish an official consul for the Duke of Savoy’s ports at Nizza 
(Nice) and Villafranca (Villefranche) met with intense opposition from local officials and 
ducal ministers. Officials worried that consular duties might deter French ships from 
stopping at those Savoyard ports and questioned whether French merchants actually 
required the assistance of a consul, since they had long experience trading to Savoy. 33 
                                                
30 Draft Petition of the Master Wardens and Assistants of Trinity House to King and Privy Council and the 
Petition of the Master Wardens and Assistants of Trinity House to the Duke of York, Bodleian Library: 
Rawlison MSS A180, f. 195r-195v, 204r.  The members of Trinity House particularly complained that, as a 
merchant himself, Skinner, “cannot be a competent Judge in determining differences between Merchants 
and Mariners.”  See also, Villani, “I consoli della nazione inglese,” 18. 
31 See also Pagano de Divitiis, English Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Italy, 72-73; D. B. Horn, The 
British Diplomatic Service, 248-249. 
32 Barbour, “Consular Service in the Reign of Charles II,” 560-561. 
33 “ Ne qui vi concorre alcuna delle raggioni, che suole mover l'animo delle nationi straniere alla necessità 
d'un luor Console, cioè lontananza di Paese differenze di linguaggio, e puoca corrispondenza che tutto 
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The author of an anonymous memorial, probably from the mid-1670s, argued that the 
presence of a French consul would harm the trade of Nice and Villefranche before further 
warning that a foreign consul would chiefly aim to favor the interests of his own nation. 
Already the French who took cases before Savoyard officials proved to be insufferable, 
“but how much greater would this disorder grow if a consul for their nation were 
established there, [for] none would ever appear but with his assistance, it would be 
enough to claim to be French to pretend a favorable sentence, and every private maritime 
or mercantile interest would be made a consequence of state.”34  
The growth of English state and commercial power similarly transformed the 
character of England’s commercial presence in foreign ports. In particular, merchants 
began to make stronger and more open demonstrations of their English identity, as when, 
in July 1666, the members of the factory at Livorno went “unanimously” to the governor 
of the city to request that the Dutch not interfere with a celebration of the supposed 
English “victory” at the Four Days’ Battle.35 Merchants also became bolder in displays of 
their Protestantism. During the early decades of the seventeenth century, English 
merchants in Italian ports like Livorno were frequently called before the Inquisition and 
                                                
Cessa nel nostro caso,” in “Memoria de senti del Signore President Truchi circa il ferrando che pretendeva 
il carico di Console in villafranca, e Nizza,” AST Città e Contado di Nizza, Consoli Stranieri, Mazzo 1, 
Fascicolo 7, 138. 
34 “Ma ó quanto Mai crescerebbe questo disordine se si stabilisce il Console della Loro natione, non 
comparirebbe Mai alcuno Senza la sua assistenza, bastarebbe d’esser francese per pretender la Sentenza 
favorevole, & ad ogni pass d’un Interesse privato Martimo ó Mercantile sene farebbe una conseguenze di 
stato,” “Considerationi Sopra Lo Stabilimento di Console della Natione francese nella Cittá di Nizza e nel 
Luogo e Porto di Villafranca nella persona del Signore Franceso Ferrand Pariggiano,” AST Città e Contado 
di Nizza, Consoli Stranieri, Mazzo 1, Fascicolo 8, 167. 
35 Finch to Arlington, Florence, 14/24 July 1666, TNA: SP 98/7.  The Four Days’ Battle was, in fact, a 
defeat for the English at the hands of the combined Franco-Dutch fleet. 
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many abjured the Protestant faith.36 Conversely, during the later half of the century, the 
officers of the Inquisition rarely bothered English merchants at Livorno and England’s 
diplomatic representatives in Tuscany instead lobbied for permission to maintain a 
Protestant preacher there to conduct religious services for the English factory.37 The 
grand dukes refused to allow a Protestant preacher to reside in Livorno until the early 
eighteenth century, but such requests highlight the increasingly assertive attitude of 
merchants and their representatives in the face of local authority.   
During the second half of the seventeenth century, merchants increasingly sought 
and received the assistance of the Crown and of its diplomatic representatives when they 
encountered legal or political difficulties in foreign ports. In Tuscany, John Finch pressed 
for commercial privileges for English merchants and ships that would reduce the time 
ships spent in quarantine, open Tuscany’s internal markets to English goods and improve 
commercial conditions at Livorno.38 English merchants at Genoa requested state support 
to obtain the payment of debts owed to them by members of the Genoese Senate.39 
Meanwhile, in 1676, the Portuguese Ambassador in London echoed Savoyard officials 
                                                
36 Barbara Donati, Tra Inquisizione e Granducato.  Storie di inglesi nella Livorno del primo seicento  
(Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2010), 33-38, 181-185. 
37 Stefano Villani, “ 'Cum scandalo catholicorum...'.  La presenza a Livorno di predicatori protestanti 
inglesi tra il 1644 e il 1670,” Nuovi studi livornesi 7 (1999): 9-58.  In comparison, English residents in 
Lisbon was permitted to worship privately by the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1654 and the consul at Lisbon 
was allowed to maintain a chaplain after 1657, see L. M. E. Shaw, The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and the 
English Merchants in Portugal, 1654-1810 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 170-172. 
38 For instance, see Finch to Arlington, Livorno, 9/19 March 1668, TNA SP 98/9, f. 107r; Finch to 
Arlington, Florence, 2/12 July 1668, TNA SP 98/9. f. 220v; Finch, “My Memoriall delivered to the Great 
Duke, November the 2nd, 1670,” TNA SP 98/12, f. 83r-84v;” Cipolla, Il burocrate e il marinaio, 95-98, 
105-109. 
39 “Memorial of my Lord Ambassador [Lord Fauconberg] to the Republic of Genoa touching monies due 
from great men to several English marchants [sic],” Genoa, May 1675, TNA SP 79/2; Finch to Arlington, 
Genoa, 19/29 August 1673, TNA SP 79/2; “The Humble Petition of severall merchants your Majesties 
subjects tradeing for Genova,” TNA SP 79/2. See also, Grendi, “Gli inglesi a Genova,” 252-253. 
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when he complained of a report made to the king by the Council of Trade, based on the 
complaints of an English merchant at Lisbon. According to the ambassador, the English 
had not only been badly informed regarding the case, “but the interested parties wish to 
make an affair of state of a private case, and a purely judicial matter.”40   
Yet merchants could also object to official intervention in their affairs when they 
thought such intervention was not in their own interest. The merchant Thomas Dethick 
petitioned Arlington in 1669 to request that he intercede with Finch, after the resident 
intervened in a lawsuit between Dethick and another member of the English factory at 
Livorno. Dethick complained that Finch had carried the matter “so farre as to make the 
Interest of State engaged in a private Quarrell of Merchants.”41 Conversely, Finch 
complained regularly that merchants put their private interests ahead of those of the wider 
nation. For example, during the First Anglo-Dutch War, he reported that the members of 
the factory had failed to support his endeavors to obtain the restitution of an English 
merchantman seized by a Dutch privateer that had violated the neutrality of the port of 
Livorno, “all the English factory abbandoning here his Majesties Interest because they 
had Secur’d their own and concluding they had a better prospect from the Assurance 
Office then from the release of the ship.”42 
 Accusations that merchants were more concerned with their personal interest than 
with the national good further suggest the looseness of the political and institutional 
                                                
40 “Mais que les Interesses veulent faire une affaire d'Estat d'une cause particuliere, et purement de Justice,” 
“The Portugall Embassadors Answer to the Memoriall deliverd him the 27th of November concerning 
Samuel Maddox &c,” 19/29 December 1676, TNA SP 98/13, f. 210r. 
41 “To the Right Honorable Hnery Lord Arlington One of his Majesties Principall Secretary's of State.  The 
humble petition of Thomas Dethick of Livorne Merchant,” TNA SP 98/10, f. 621r. 
42 Finch to Arlington, Florence, 15 September 1665, TNA SP 98/6. 
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bonds that linked overseas merchants both to their home state and to one another. The 
events that followed a diplomatic incident at Livorno late in 1670 illustrate the limited 
authority that consuls possessed over merchants. In October 1670, the English merchant 
Slaughter Lee sought to prevent his debtor, the bankrupted Portuguese merchant 
Francesco Mendes, from leaving Livorno onboard a papal galley. After asking Livorno’s 
governor, Antonio Serristori, to stop Mendes from leaving the city, Lee went to the 
consul Thomas Clutterbuck for assistance and the two subsequently turned to Sir John 
Harman, the captain of an English man-of-war in port, to prevent the galley from sailing.  
Harman wrote to Serristori to request that Lee’s pretensions against Mendes be 
considered or he “would do that which appears to me appropriate for the honor of the 
King of Great Britain and the Justice of his Subjects living in this city.”43 Serristori had 
already ordered Mendes to provide further security for his creditors, so confrontation 
between the English warship and papal galley was avoided.44 Nevertheless, Tuscan 
officials viewed Harman’s threatening actions as a breach of the security of the port and 
blamed Lee for adopting a course of action that would have forced the Livornese garrison 
to defend the galley against the English ship.45 Serristori recommended that Lee be 
                                                
43 “...altrimenté mi dichiaro di metter in essecutione quel che mi para conveniente per l’honor del Ré della 
Grand Britagnai Mio Signore e Giustitia elli suoi Suditi habitanti in Cotesta Citta,” “Sir John Harman’s 
letter to the Governor of Legorn in Mr. Lee’s Case,” 22 October 1670, TNA SP 98/10, f. 26r. 
44 A Tuscan account of the case of Lee, in the English translation, is contained in “An account of Mr. Lee’s 
Case as they relate it,” October 1670, TNA SP 98/12, 29r-32v;  Lee’s own account of the matter may be 
found in his “The Relation of Mr. Lee’s Case with Mendes & the Governour of Legorn,” October 4/14 
1670, ibid., f. 33r-36v.  The events of the case are also recounted in “Negozio del Lee in conto del credito 
con il Mendes,” ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1804, #27. 
45 Serristori to Bardi, Livorno 13 October 1670, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1804, “Negozio del Lee in 
conto del credito con il Mendes.”   
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punished for calling upon Harman’s assistance in a matter of Tuscan justice. 46 Lee was 
subsequently arrested and imprisoned at the order of the Grand Duke, but released shortly 
thereafter at the request of Finch and the English nation at Livorno.47 
 The merchants at Livorno were unwilling to support Clutterbuck’s efforts to turn 
the controversy surrounding Lee and Mendes into a political and national matter. 
Following Lee’s arrest, Clutterbuck wrote to Finch to warn him that if the English did not 
protest this action, “Its insecure for Any of the Kings, our Masters Subject, to Continue in 
this State.”48 Many of the merchants at Livorno were similarly concerned by the arrest of 
Lee, particularly because Tuscan officials refused to specify any particular reason for his 
imprisonment.49 Yet, although the merchants “unanimously agreed” in a national meeting 
to draw up a petition to the king for redress for the treatment of Lee, most were unwilling 
to sign in.50 Clutterbuck explained that “too much of Faction, hindred theyr Subscribing 
the Same.”51 Few of the merchants appear to have supported Lee in his claims against 
Mendes or his decision to appeal to English officials for help rather than continuing to 
                                                
46 Serristori to Bardi, Livorno 13 October 1670, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1804, “Negozio del Lee in 
conto del credito con il Mendes.” 
47 “Relazione mandata dall'Governatore di Livorno sopra il fatto del Lee,” ASF Mediceo del Principato, 
1824, #11; Finch to Arlington, Florence, 11/21 October 1670 and 4 November 1670, TNA SP 98/12, f. 
48v-49v, 79r. 
48 Clutterbuck to Finch, Pisa, 10/20 October 1670, TNA SP 98/12, f. 42r. 
49 Isaac Lawrence to [Clutterbuck], Livorno, 19 October 1670, TNA SP 98/12, f. 43r.  Lawrence’s letter to 
Finch was undersigned by six other prominent merchants including Charles Longland, Thomas Dethick and 
David Sidney.  Finch to Arlington, Florence, 11/21 October 1670, TNA SP 98/12, f. 48r-v. 
50 Finch to Arlington, Florence, 18/28 October 1670, TNA SP 98/12, f. 67r.  The petition appears at f. 87r. 
51 Clutterbuck to Williamson, Livorno, 12/22 December 1670, TNA SP 98/12, f. 134r. 
  112 
! !
pursue the matter through Livorno’s courts.52 In particular, Clutterbuck suspected that 
one merchant did not have “soe publicque a spirrit As Hee pretends to have” on account 
of the settlement he had previously reached with Mendes. Only two merchants signed the 
document and Clutterbuck was left to wish, “wee could once fynde the way (which I 
feare my eyes will never see on this place) to bee truer englishmen then now we are.”53  
Clutterbuck further commented that he intended to concern himself less with “publique 
affaires” until he found “more Constancy, & Sweetenesse Amongst the members of our 
Nation.”54 Meanwhile, Charles II requested that Lee be compensated for his sufferings, 
but Tuscan ministers supported Serristori and the necessity of punishing Lee for actions 
that threatened the peace of Livorno and the dignity of Tuscan courts.55 
 During the second half of the seventeenth century, the growing power of the 
English state changed the politics of merchant factories. Consuls and diplomats took an 
increasingly active role in the affairs of communities of overseas merchants. In the 
process, they sought both to advance the commercial interests of merchants and to 
regulate their conduct in accordance to what they perceived to be the interest of the 
nation and state. Yet the idea of English factories as unified, national communities was an 
aspiration rather than a reflection of the usual behavior of the merchants. Clutterbuck’s 
complaints against the factory following Lee’s arrest echoed those previously made by 
                                                
52 “An account of Mr. Lee’s Case as they relate it,” October 1670, TNA SP 98/12, 31v; Serristori to Bardi, 
Livorno, 18 October 1670, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1804, “Negozio del Lee in conto del credito con il 
Mendes.” 
53 Copy of a letter from Clutterbuck to Finch, Livorno, October 19/29 1670, TNA SP 98/12, f. 70r. 
54 Clutterbuck to Finch, 31 October 1670, TNA SP 98/12, f. 71r. 
55 King in Council, Whitehall, 25 November 1670, TNA SP 98/1,2 f. 121r; “Great duke's answer to the 
Complaints,” TNA SP 98/13, f. 138v-139r; Grand Duke’s letter to Charles II, 24 April 1671, ASF Mediceo 
del Principato, 1824, #11. 
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Finch and Southwell regarding the factiousness of the factories at Livorno and Lisbon.  
Clutterbuck described his negotiations with Tuscan officials and the factory in political 
terms as “publique affaires,” but the English merchants at Livorno declined to support his 
interpretation of their interest. These merchants refused to endanger their own 
commercial position and were unwilling to support a consul who they thought was more 
concerned with his personal advancement than with theirs.56 Since consuls and 
diplomatic representatives lacked coercive power over merchants, their authority 
depended almost entirely on their ability to convince merchants to follow a particular 
course of action and to develop a consensus among them. Even as national communities 
in foreign ports were drawn into a closer relationship with the English state, the actual 
authority of the state over those communities remained highly limited.  
 
II. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Italian States 
 The Crown’s efforts to extend state authority over English merchants in the 
Mediterranean found their most expansive expression in attempts to grant English 
consuls and courts jurisdiction over legal cases arising between English subjects in Italian 
port-cities. The jurisdictional authority of consuls was well established in the Levant and 
North Africa, where England’s capitulations with the Ottoman Empire and subsequent 
treaties with the North African regencies gave English consuls and ambassadors the 
authority to adjudicate civil and criminal cases arising between members of the English 
                                                
56 On relations between Clutterbuck and the members of the factory at Livorno, see Finch to Arlington, 
Florence 20/20 September 1670, TNA: SP 98/12 19r; Finch to Arlington, Florence, 4/14 April 1671, TNA 
SP 98/13, f. 7r-v; Villani, “I consoli della nazione inglese a Livorno,” 16-17. 
  114 
! !
nation.57 Conversely, debates over the right of consuls to adjudicate cases involving 
members of their nation in Italian ports set the authority of the sovereign over his or her 
subjects against the territorial sovereignty of Italian states. Italian opposition to consular 
jurisdictions ultimately limited English state authority over merchant factories and 
highlighted the political differentiation of European states from the imperial and 
provincial polities of North Africa and the Levant.58  
 Debates over the right of consuls to adjudicate cases between members of their 
own nations underscored the existence of rival conceptions of state sovereignty in the 
early modern world. Even with the rise of the territorial state as a central unit of 
European political organization, sovereignty remained largely jurisdictional and personal 
in nature as jurists continued to define royal authority in terms of the allegiance that 
subjects owed their sovereign and the jurisdiction that he or she exercised over them.59 
The relationship between territorial and jurisdictional sovereignty proved to be a pressing 
legal and political problem through the early modern period.60 In a report to the Privy 
Council regarding whether jurisdiction over a disputed Norwegian prize lay with English 
or Scottish courts, the English civil lawyer and secretary of state, Sir Leoline Jenkins, 
identified the coterminous bounds of these different forms of sovereignty as a defining 
                                                
57 Maurits van den Boogert, “Consular jurisdiction in the Ottoman legal system in the eighteenth century,” 
Oriente Moderno 22, no. 3 (2003), 613-634. 
58 Biagi, “I Consoli delle Nazioni a Livorno,” 362; Christian Windler, “Representing a State in a 
Segmentary Society: French Consuls in Tunis from the Ancien Régime to the Restoration,” The Journal of 
Modern History 73, no. 2 (June 2001): 233-274. 
59 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989), 6-7; Paul Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 140-147. 
60 de Luca, “Beyond the sea: extraterritorial jurisdiction and English law,” 333-337. 
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feature of the European state system, “From the usage of the Western World; each 
Soveraignty avoiding, as much as may be, to break in upon, or interrupt one the other in 
their Judicial Proceedings; as appears first by the modern Treaties, which do most of 
them provide, that Persons wronged shall seek and pursue their Remedies in Law, (not at 
their own Homes, but) in those Countries where they Wrongs have been done them.”61   
 In ports around the Mediterranean, consular jurisdictions revealed the complicated 
relationship between territorial sovereignty and legal authority in the early-modern world.  
Commentators on the law of nations generally understood consuls to be judges for the 
national communities they represented.62 However, the form of legal authority possessed 
by consuls varied widely around the Mediterranean. The extraterritorial jurisdiction of 
consuls was most fully established in the Levant, where the capitulatory agreements 
between the Ottoman Empire and European nations delegated jurisdictional authority 
over civil and criminal matters arising among foreign merchant communities to their 
respective consuls and ambassadors. In theory, these agreements did not compromise 
Ottoman sovereignty, since they incorporated foreign merchants and their representatives 
into the legal institutions of the Ottoman state.63 Yet Europeans tended to see the 
                                                
61 William Wynne, The Life of Sir Leoline Jenkins, Judges of the High-Court of Admiralty (London, 1724), 
2: 762. 
62 Abraham de Wicquefort, The Embassador and his Functions, tr. John Digby (London, 1716), 40; 
Cornelis van Bynkershoek, De foro legatorum liber singularis, a monograph on the jurisdiction over 
ambassadors in both civil and criminal cases, tr. Gordon J. Laing (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 53. 
Informal arbitration of commercial disputes was not limited to consuls and was a widespread device by 
which early-modern merchants avoided formal and expensive litigation, see Francesca Trivellato, The 
Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern 
Period  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 159. 
63 C. R. Pennel, “The origins of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act and the extension of British Sovereignty,” 
Historical Research 83, no. 221(August 2010): 470-471; van den Boogert, “Consular jurisdiction in the 
Ottoman legal system,” 621.  
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capitulations differently. The views of the Secretary of State, Henry Coventry, regarding 
Ottoman interference in national disputes aptly reflected the sense that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction was essential to preserving the Crown’s authority over subjects living under 
the sovereignty of another prince. Following reports of Ottoman intervention in a dispute 
within the French nation, Coventry warned of the harmful effect that would follow, 
“when the Turkish Officers shall decide Controversies between the Ambassadors and the 
Merchants, and that once obtained it will undeniably follow they will do the same betwixt 
the Merchants themselves who by that means will insensibly become more the Grand 
Visiers Subjects then their own Christian Soveraigns.”64    
 In European ports, consuls generally acted as informal arbiters of intra-national 
disputes. However, medieval or Levantine conceptions of consular authority still proved 
resilient. For example, John Bland proposed the establishment of consular courts in 
overseas ports to regulate English trade. Bland recommended that consuls be appointed to 
all of England’s American plantations and to foreign cities where a merchant factory was 
present, where they, together with assistants chosen from among the local English 
merchant community, would resolve cases arising between members of the English 
nation overseas.65 A few years later, in 1663, Charles Henshaw, the English consul at 
Genoa, lamented the limits of his authority when he complained that Genoese courts 
adjudicated legal cases between English mariners and masters, cases which “doth belong 
to the english Consull in which indeed my pattent from his majesty is much defficient itt 
                                                
64 Coventry to Finch, 18/28 March 1677, BL: Add. MS 25121, f. 82v-83r.  The Levant Company's charter 
of 1661 condemned English subjects who appealed to Ottoman courts in defiance of their consuls and 
ambassadors, see Goffman, Britons in the Ottoman Empire, 204. 
65 Bland, Trade revived, 35. 
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giveinge me but rather the authority of a solicitor for the Nation than a Consull.”66 In fact, 
French consuls possessed a delegated jurisdictional authority at Genoa, where their 
decisions in cases between French subjects could be appealed to Genoese magistrates.67 
The jurisdictional authority of consuls also found confirmation in some of England’s 
commercial treaties. An article of the Treaty of Madrid of 1667 between England and 
Spain thus directed merchants, mariners and ships’ masters to take any case that should 
arise among them to their nation’s consul for arbitration or to the courts of the state to 
which they were subject.68   
 With the growth of state power in the seventeenth century, consular and 
extraterritorial jurisdiction shifted from being a matter of communal self-government to a 
means to extend state laws and authority to overseas subjects.69 The English resident to 
Tuscany, John Finch, objected to the sums that English merchants at Livorno expended in 
pursuit of lawsuits against one another. While he lamented the factionalism of the English 
factory, he particularly blamed the organization of Tuscan courts for the legal difficulties 
of English merchants, since parties were able to draw out cases indefinitely through 
                                                
66 Charles Henshaw, Genoa, 27 October/6 November 1663, TNA SP 79/1, f. 173r.  The Dutch diplomat 
Abraham de Wicquefort specifically noted that it was the responsibility of consuls to act as “juge des 
differends, qui peuvent naistre entre ceux de leur nation,” L’ambassadeur et ses fonctions (La Haye, 1681), 
pt. 1, 133.  The consul for the English nation at Genoa appointed in 1635, Filippo Bernardi, possessed 
jurisdiction over intranational cases, but his successors were not granted this authority until the early 
eighteenth century, see Grendi, “Gli inglesi a Genova,”  267.    
67 On the nature of French consular authority at Genoa, see Grendi, “Gli inglesi a Genova,” 268 
68 See Article XIX of the Treaty of Madrid, as reproduced in George Chalmers, ed., A Collection of 
Treaties between Great Britain and other Powers (London, 1790), 2: 16. John Finch cited this article in his 
efforts to convince the Grand Duke of Tuscany to accept the jurisdictional authority of the English consul 
at Livorno, see Finch's memorial to the Grand Duke, 4 February 1671, TNA SP 98/12, f. 192v. 
69 Cf. van den Boogert, “Consular jurisdiction in the Ottoman legal system,” 623-625. 
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repeated appeals.70 In response to the apparent inefficiency of Tuscan courts, Finch urged 
that English subjects be required to bring their disputes to “some of their own Nation,” 
with the possibility of appeal to England, such that “his Majesties Subjects might be 
governd by his Majesties Laws so advantagiously to the Interest of the King and the 
Partyes Concernd.”71 Merchants appear to have doubted whether they would receive 
more equitable justice from their own representatives than from local courts.72 Indeed, it 
is possible that merchants found the expedited procedures of the law merchant, which 
was administered in courts at Livorno and Pisa, to be preferable for commercial purposes 
to English common law.73   
 Finch’s desire to turn merchants away from local courts seems to have reflected 
the growing conviction among officials and jurists that English law was not only distinct 
from that practiced elsewhere in Europe, but also superior.74 He thus sought to substitute 
                                                
70 On the workings of Tuscan courts within the wider context of early modern justice, seeTrivellato, The 
Familiarity of Strangers, 158-159.  Foreigners in England equally complained of the propensity of parties 
to move their cases between courts, slowing the pace of justice, see de Luca, “Beyond the Sea: 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and English law,” 134-135. 
71 Finch to Arlington, Florence, 4/14 July 1665, TNA SP 98/6. There is no evidence to confirm that Finch 
borrowed Bland's suggestions for resolving differences between English subjects without recourse to local 
courts, but the similarity of the proposals suggests that Finch adopted Bland's ideas for addressing intra-
factory disputes.   
72 The prospect that Finch might become “umpire” of disputes within the English nation was not pleasing to 
the merchant Thomas Dethick or other members of the nation, who replied “that it would bee requisite then 
that hee kept a Judge Advocate otherwise it would seeme an arbitrary power; not but that a reference in 
most difference may be best, but that the generallitie desired to be governed by knowne lawes wherby 
every man might know how to containe himselfe,” Thomas Dethick to Joseph Williamson, Livorno, 7/17 
July 1665, TNA SP 98/6. 
73 On seventeenth-century calls for the reintroduction of courts in England that ruled according to the 
procedures of the law merchants, see de Luca, “Beyond the sea: extraterritorial jurisdiction and English 
law,” 66-69.  On the administration of the law merchants in early-modern Tuscany, see Trivellato, The 
Familiarity of Strangers, 158-159. 
74 Conceptions of the distinctiveness of English law particularly rested on the dominance of common law.  
For a summary of the ideological significance of common law in early modern England and of the 
problems of associating English law with common law alone, see de Luca, “Beyond the sea: extraterritorial 
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English legal authority for that of local courts in cases between English subjects in Italian 
ports. In the process, he also aimed to establish the English as a distinct national and legal 
community within those cities. While negotiating a commercial treaty with Savoy, Finch 
advised his superiors that he thought the treaty should specify that all disputes between 
Englishmen should “not be admitted into theyr Courts” and should instead be settled by 
representatives chosen by the merchants and the consul and the “Prince be obliged to 
assist them with his Coercive power, for the Execution of the sentence.” The sentence 
would then stand until confirmed in England.75 This proposal apparently had the support 
of the Council of Trade, which submitted a petition that insisted on “Exempting the 
English from the Law of that Country.”76 According to Finch, “This Proposition will not 
be strange to any Prince in Italy, they all allowing the Jews a particular Government 
within themselves.”77 In fact, the only Jewish community in Italy that possessed the right 
to adjudicate intra-communal disputes was that at Livorno. Nevertheless, Finch appears 
to have seen the largely self-governing Jewish nation at Livorno as a model for the 
organization of English factories in Italy. The communal courts of the Jewish nation at 
                                                
jurisdiction and English law,” pp. 36-52.  Finch did not specify to which courts he intended merchants to 
appeal in England, but it seems probable that Finch was not thinking of the common law alone when he 
referred to “his Majesties Laws,” since commercial litigation in England took place in the Court of 
Chancery, which was a court of equity, as well as the common law courts of the King's Bench and 
Common Pleas.  Commercial litigation in early modern England has received relatively little scholarly 
attention, but see Christine Churches, “Business at Law: Retrieving Commercial Disputes from Eighteenth-
Century Chancery,” The Historical Journal 43, no. 4 (December 2000): 937-954. 
75 The Treaty of Florence between England and Savoy ultimately established a judge delegate to hear cases 
involving English subjects, Finch to Arlington, Florence 28 July/7 August 1668, TNA SP 98/9, f. 254r. 
76 Finch to Arlington, Florence, 17/27 August 1669, TNA SP 98/10, f. 303r.  This petition does not apear to 
have surived and does not appear among the surviving documents of the Council regarding the Treaty of 
Florence in “Propositions concerning the trade of Savoy, with the Report of the Councell of Trade,” 20 
January 1669, TNA SP 388/1, f. 65r-66v. 
77 Finch to Arlington, Florence 23 June/3 July 1668, TNA SP 98/9, f. 229v-230r; Trivellato, The 
Familiarity of Strangers, 76. 
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Livorno gave the legal order of the city a composite character that Finch sought to extend 
to the English merchant community.  
 The growth of English trade in the Mediterranean spawned legal cases that 
spanned jurisdictional boundaries and complicated the relationship between territorial 
sovereignty and jurisdictional authority. Sailors and merchants turned to foreign courts to 
dispute contracts signed in English cities and lawsuits expanded to include distant parties 
and transactions. Consequently, and despite Finch’s proposals, English law and English 
courts were not the only legal reference points for English merchants around the 
Mediterranean. A long-running dispute between English merchants at Livorno illustrated 
how merchants crossed jurisdictional and state boundaries in their pursuit of justice and 
favorable verdicts.78 A year before Clutterbuck came to Slaughter Lee’s aid in the case of 
Francesco Mendes, the two had been locked in a series of contentious lawsuits. In 1669, 
John Finch reported that Clutterbuck brought a case in Tuscany against Lee, after Lee 
and another merchant sued Clutterbuck in England over a sum previously awarded him 
by a Florentine court regarding some goods at Livorno.79 Lee was ordered to renounce 
the case he had brought against Clutterbuck in England and to instead bring it before the 
Consoli del Mare at Pisa. Moreover, Lee would be held responsible for any damages that 
Clutterbuck might be ordered to pay in England.80   
                                                
78 For a good summary of the complex structure of the overlapping jurisdictions of Tuscan courts, see 
Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers, 158-162.   
79 Finch to Arlington, May 18/28 1669, TNA SP 98/10, f. 191r-192r; Finch to Arlington, Florence, 6 
August 1669, TNA SP 98/10, f. 269r-271r. 
80 Finch to Arlington, Florence, 24 August/3 September 1669, TNA SP 98/10, f. 309r; Finch to Arlington, 
Florence, 30 August 1669, TNA SP 98/10, f. 311r.  An English copy of the sentence of the Consoli di 
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 Finch objected to Tuscan tribunals denying English subjects recourse to their 
nation’s courts and argued that the case should be left to English justice because it 
involved English subjects alone and had already been heard by English courts. According 
to Finch, “to allow the President for the G. Duke to react upon his Majesties Subjects at 
Legorn, what his Majesty acts upon them by the Law of England, was to admitt the G. 
Duke to an equality of Jurisdiction.” 81 For Finch, the relationship between sovereign and 
subject took precedence over the jurisdictional claims of foreign courts. In a memorial to 
the Grand Duke, Ferdinand II, regarding the case, Finch stated that “in cases that will 
arise between Subject and Subject of His Majesty the King, My Lord with just reason 
would sooner pretend to give laws to others Princes, than to receive any from them.”82 
The case between Clutterbuck and Lee also further affirmed Finch in his belief that 
English courts and representatives ought to have jurisdiction over cases arising between 
subjects overseas.83  
 The Tuscan government was, however, as jealous of the territorial jurisdiction of 
its courts as English representatives were of the Crown’s authority over its overseas 
subjects. According to Tuscan ministers, the dispute between Lee and Clutterbuck fell 
under Tuscan jurisdiction since it had originated at Livorno and in Florentine courts, even 
if it had proceeded to unfold further in England. The jurist and official Ferrante Capponi 
explained to Finch, “His Highnesse had immutably resolv’d never to deny the Execution 
                                                
81 Finch to Arlington, Florence, 27 July/6 August 1669, TNA SP 98/10, f. 270r-v.   
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of any Sentence given in his Tribunals, That his Majesty could not take any cognisance of 
what was done here, so as to hinder the proceeding.”84 Underlying Capponi’s insistence 
that Tuscan courts had the right to adjudicate cases brought to them by English subjects 
at Livorno was the fact that jurisdictional authority was central to early modern 
sovereignty; according to Capponi, jurisdiction was “the essential part of a Prince.”85 
Indeed, Capponi’s defense of Tuscan jurisdiction over English subjects mirrored his 
efforts to preserve or balance the sovereignty of the Grand Duke of Tuscany with Papal 
authority.86 The jurisdictional contest created by the case between Clutterbuck and Lee 
similarly set Tuscan sovereignty against the extraterritorial authority of the English 
Crown.87 When Capponi tried to persuade Finch that the English king had less cause to 
be concerned for his jurisdiction than a minor prince, the English resident instead 
asserted, “it Became Great Princes to be as Jealous of their Jurisdiction and they could 
best maintain it and certainly this was a piece of his Majesties Jurisdiction to distribute 
laws to his Own Subjects, and not to expose them though they were in England, to a 
necessary of being try’d by forreign Tribunalls.”88 Despite Finch’s request that 
Ferdinando II prorogue the sentence of his court while the Privy Council considered the 
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matter, the Grand Duke refused to acknowledge any English legal intervention in the 
case.89 
 Arguments for extraterritorial jurisdiction centered as much on the extension of 
English law into the Mediterranean as they did on preserving the authority of English 
courts. Consequently, these jurisdictional debates reflected the intersection of different 
legal traditions that accompanied the expansion of northern European trade into the 
Mediterranean basin. 90 In early 1671, following his efforts to remove cases between 
English subjects from the jurisdiction of Italian courts, Finch similarly requested that 
Tuscan courts refrain from hearing cases between English masters and mariners. Finch 
again emphasized that the Crown sought only to intervene in matters that were “between 
Subject and Subject,” but he also argued that Tuscan decisions regarding maritime 
matters were inconsistent with those made in England and disadvantageous to English 
navigation. Finch warned that if Tuscan courts continued to hear maritime cases between 
English subjects, the king could not “deny His own Subjects the benefitt of His owne 
Lawes” and the rulings of English courts would invalidate those of their Italian 
counterparts.91  
 Underlying Finch’s efforts to remove these maritime issues from Tuscan courts 
were differences in legal and maritime practice between Mediterranean and northern 
European countries. English and Italian courts differed in the determination of average, 
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or the apportionment of losses suffered in the transportation of goods by ships among the 
various merchants who had freighted a single vessel.92 If part of the cargo carried on 
board a ship had to be jettisoned in order to save the ship on account of a storm or other 
problem at sea, maritime law held that the owners of the surviving cargo were obligated 
to compensate those whose goods were lost. Similarly, merchants could be required to 
pay unexpected but unavoidable expenses incurred by ships’ masters and crews in the 
course of voyages. English courts limited the size of averages far more sharply than their 
Italian counterparts. Consequently, merchants sought to restrict the determination of 
average to English courts, while masters were happy to turn to Italian courts. Similarly, 
northern European maritime customs differed from those prevalent in the Mediterranean. 
While Mediterranean mariners were paid on a monthly basis, English sailors instead 
signed on for full voyages.93 English mariners would turn to Italian courts to demand 
their wages, potentially leaving their ship without an adequate crew to continue its 
voyage. 
 The adjudication of maritime disputes between masters and mariners was a source 
of contention throughout Italian ports during the reign of Charles II. Tuscan ministers 
rejected requests that their courts refrain from hearing cases involving English mariners 
as injurious to Tuscan jurisdiction and to the trade of Livorno. Since English jurisdiction 
would extend only over subjects of that nation, while ships carried cargo and mariners 
                                                
92 “My Memoriall to the Great Duke for the Leaving His Majesties Subjects amongst themselves in 
Maritime Causes to the Laws of England,” Florence, 25 January/4 February 1671, TNA SP 98/12, f. 192v-
193r; Memorial to the English resident at Florence, 2 May 1671, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1824, #24.  
On the place of “averages” in early-modern commercial and maritime law, see Molloy, De Jure Maritimo 
et Navali, 232-238 and Beawes, Lex Mercatoria Rediviva, 122-124. 
93 Grendi, “Gli inglesi a Genova,” 267. 
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pertaining to different nations, cases would potentially have to be heard in multiple 
courts, under different laws. The resulting commercial and legal complexity would drive 
ships away from Livorno.94 Despite the practical difficulties associated with the 
extraterritorial application of English laws, England’s resident at Venice, John 
Doddington, also criticized Venetian courts for intervening in wage disputes between 
English sailors and masters and absolving sailors of their service contracts.95 Similarly, 
the English consuls at Genoa complained that Genoese courts regularly heard cases 
between mariners and their masters. In April 1677, Charles II wrote to the government of 
Genoa to complain that the officers of the city’s Admiralty had taken cognizance of a 
dispute between the master and mariners of an English ship and to request that, for the 
future, Genoese magistrates leave such cases to the English consul at that port.96  
 In response, the Chancellor of the Genoese government maintained that the 
Consoli del Mare had always shown a due regard to English navigation, but also asserted 
that the court had always possessed “a power of hearing & determining marine 
affaires.”97 Carlo Ottone, the Genoese consul in London, similarly defended his 
government’s position by arguing,  “Consuls have never had in the Cittys of Italy the 
                                                
94 Memorial to the English resident at Florence, 2 May 1671, ASF Mediceo del Principato 1824, #24. 
95 “English Memorial presented by Mr. Dodington to the College of Venice,” 10 December 1670, TNA SP 
79/2. 
96 Italian and English copies of the mariners' petition against the master to the Genoese magistrates, dated 
Genoa, 30 June 1677, may be found in Longleat House, Coventry Papers, vol. 55, f. 51r-52r and 53r-54r, 
respectively.  See also, Legatt to John Cooke, Genoa, 14 July 1677, Longleat House, Coventry Papers, vol. 
55, f. 55r-v. 
97 Translation of the letter from Felix Tassorellus to Charles II, Genoa, 25 June 1677, Coventry Papers, vol. 
55, f. 49r-v.  The Latin original is located at f. 47r-v. 
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authority of Judges.”98 Instead, he asserted that “The Court of Admiralty alone hath 
always been Judges of all controversys not onely betwen those of the place, but forainers 
also.”99 The arguments made by the Genoese government and Ottone ultimately 
convinced Charles and his ministers to surrender their jurisdictional claim over English 
mariners and masters.100 Moreover, the Genoese rejection of English consular jurisdiction 
also seems to have brought an end to efforts to establish the extraterritorial legal authority 
of English representatives in Italian ports. Finch’s successor as resident at Florence, 
Thomas Dereham, advised Sir Leoline Jenkins in 1682 that he had “one small 
Negotiation more on foot,” that being to deny English sailors access to Tuscan courts for 
settling disputes with their captains, such that they would instead have to take their cases 
to England “where their customes and agreements are better understood.”101 However, 
the Tuscan envoy to London, Francesco Terriesi, reported that he had heard no word of 
these claims from the English ministers and instead noted that the Genoese consul had 
earlier quashed such claims, “representing to them the absurdity of the pretention.”102  
                                                
98 “L'autorità di Giudice nelle Cità d'Italia li Consoli non l'hanno mai havuta,” ibid, f. 62v; I use the 
contemporary English translation in, ibid., f. 64v. The Genoese consul at Livorno, Giovanni Domenico 
Gavi, affirmed that consuls in that port possessed jurisdiction over neither civil nor criminal cases between 
members of their nations, for which foreign merchants turned instead to the tribunal of the govenor of 
Livorno; maritime cases were heard by the Consoli del Mare at Pisa.  Consuls were even forbidden from 
establishing chancellories to handle legal documents, Gavi to the Serenissimi Collegi, Livorno, 2 June 
1677, ASG Giunta del Trafficov 4.  
99 “Il Solo Tribunale del'Armiralità è sempre stato il giudice di tute le controversie non solo frà Citadini 
come trà forastiere,” Ottone to Charles II, London, 3 August 1677, Longleat House, Coventry Papers, vol. 
55, f. 62v.  The translation here comes from the contemporary English translation, f. 64v. 
100 Carlo Ottone, London, 27 August/6 September 1677, ASG Lettere Consoli 2629, mazzo 2. 
101 Dereham to Jenkins, Florence, 8 December 1682, TNA SP 98/16. 
102 Terriesi to Panciatichi, London, 30 April/10 May, 1683, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4212. 
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 The rejection of English extraterritorial jurisdiction in Italian port-cities 
confirmed that English merchants in the western Mediterranean would fall fully under the 
sovereignty of Italian princes and the authority of Italian laws. Early in the eighteenth 
century, some members of the factory at Livorno complained to the Commissioners for 
Trade and the Plantations that the consolati del mare of the Italian states favored ships’ 
masters and crews over merchants and recommend that cases between English merchants 
and masters be heard by English courts alone.103 However, Robert Balle, a merchant who 
had formerly resided at Livorno, advised that it was best not to interfere with the 
established workings of the Tuscan courts, which operated “in the fairest way, by a Court 
of Merchants, according to the old Law of Barcellona, agreed to long since, & now 
observed by all the severall Princes & States, who have any Trade in the Mediterranean 
as you must know, to desire an alteration of them unlesse all againe agreeed to itt would 
be unreasonable to be asked.”104 According to Balle, English merchants trading to the 
Mediterranean thus had to conform to the legal and commercial traditions of that sea.   
 The Crown’s attempts to establish the jurisdiction of English consuls and courts 
over merchants in Mediterranean ports represented its most extensive effort to project its 
authority over English subjects into foreign ports. Nevertheless, these attempts largely 
failed as Italian governments guarded the jurisdiction of their own courts. The inability of 
                                                
103 “Memorial from the Merchants Trading to Leghorn, Genoa, and Sicily, containing an Account of the 
State of Trade in those parts,” received on 4 April 1712, TNA CO 388/16, #67. 
104 Robert Balle to Sir William Popple, Kensington, 4 December 1711, TNA CO 388/15, f. 75r.   Balle here 
refers to the Consolato del Mare, a compilation of maritime customs from the Mediterranean and southern 
Europe that was first published in Barcelona in the fifteenth century.  For brief discussions of the 
Consolato, see Henry Wager Halleck, Halleck's International Law, or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of 
States in Peace and War, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1893), 1:10; Carl J. 
Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1936), 14-15. 
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the Crown to establish its extraterritorial jurisdiction over merchant factories thus 
revealed the gradual assimilation of territorial and jurisdictional sovereignties in early 
modern Europe. Consequently, Italian princes refused to cede jurisdiction over foreign 
merchants living within their ports even as the Ottoman Empire delegated jurisdictional 
authority over European merchants to their consular representatives. The relative 
autonomy of the Jewish nation at Livorno and ecclesiastical immunities highlighted the 
degree to which jurisdictional authority in Italian states was also layered and composite. 
Even so, the determination of Italian governments to sustain their authority over foreign 
merchants distinguished the status of merchants in Italian cities from that of factory 
communities in Levantine or Indian Ocean ports. 
 
 
III. The Plowman Controversy and the English Factory at Livorno 
 
 Despite the inability of English representatives to secure the jurisdiction of 
English courts over subjects in Mediterranean ports, their attempts to assert greater state 
control over English merchants nevertheless reflected a broader process whereby state 
and subject identity became increasingly important for the organization of trade in the 
Mediterranean.105 Although English merchants were quick to call upon their government 
to advance their interests in foreign ports, the English state was not the only point of legal 
and sovereign reference for merchants who were highly integrated into the political and 
legal environments of their host cities.106 A fierce contest that erupted early in the 
                                                
105 On the position of the state in the seventeenth-century Mediterranean, see Molly Greene, “Beyond the 
Northern Invasion,” passim. 
106 For vivid examples of English merchants turning to foreign authorities in pursuit of their own political 
and legal interests, see Goffman, Britons in the Ottoman Empire, passim. 
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eighteenth century between the English envoy to Tuscany, Sir Lambert Blackwell, and 
the factory at Livorno over the arrest and prosecution of an English privateer highlighted 
the limited control of the English state over its subjects in that port.107 English ministers 
demanded that the Grand Duke, Cosimo III, compensate the English privateer William 
Plowman for the sums he was forced to pay to secure his release. However, when 
Blackwell directed the English factory to prepare to leave the port of Livorno, they 
refused and instead attacked Blackwell for the way in which he had advanced Plowman’s 
claims against the Grand Duke. The resulting rivalry between Blackwell and English 
merchants at Livorno suggests how the politics of merchant factories shaped the 
organization of early modern commerce. As merchants navigated between their 
allegiance to England and the sovereignty of local rulers, they contributed to the 
territorialization of state legal authority in western Europe. 
 As the power and influence of the Crown extended into the Mediterranean, state 
diplomacy increasingly intersected and overlapped relations between local governments 
and English factories. The case of William Plowman and the diplomatic crisis that 
followed it highlight the changing political and legal environment of the western 
Mediterranean. In 1696, Plowman, an English merchant but naturalized Tuscan subject, 
was arrested by Tuscan officers on his return from a privateering cruise, for which he had 
outfitted a vessel at Livorno in violation of the neutrality of that port and in spite of a 
promise to the Grand Duke to refrain from attacking French shipping.108 He was then 
                                                
107 For a summary of this affair, see June Palmer, “Letters from London to Leghorn, 1704-1705.  The 
Correspondence between Arthur Martyn and Francis Arundell,” Nuovi studi livornesi 14 (2007): 59-61. 
108 Giacomo Giusti,  “Il Granducato di Toscana e il ‘caso Plowman’: la difesa della neutralitá e la crisi con 
l’Inghilterra (1696-1707)” (Tesi di Laurea Specialistica, Università degli Studi di Pisa, 2008), 35-51; The 
Case of Sir Alexander Rigby, William Shepard, and William Plowman: Setting forth the Damages they have 
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imprisoned in Florence until he made good the losses sustained by the French, who held 
the Grand Duke responsible for Plowman’s attacks on French ships. English jurists and 
ministers defended Plowman and argued that the Grand Duke did not have jurisdiction 
over English privateers.109 According to English officials, the Grand Duke lacked the 
authority to deny English subjects the right to combat enemies and had acted unjustly 
towards Plowman by standing simultaneously as plaintiff, prosecutor and judge in the 
case.110 The case became more complicated and legally controversial when Plowman’s 
former business partners, Sir Alexander Rigby and William Shepard, went bankrupt after 
goods they purported to own were seized as part of Plowman’s payment of compensation 
to the Grand Duke.111 All three merchants subsequently lobbied the English government 
to condemn the Tuscan proceedings against Plowman and to force Cosimo to compensate 
them for their losses. Their efforts began to bear fruit in 1702, when Blackwell informed 
the Grand Duke that the newly enthroned Queen Anne viewed the damages sustained by 
Plowman, Rigby and Shepard to be a matter of public and national concern.112 Over the 
next two years, Blackwell pressed Tuscan ministers repeatedly for compensation for 
Plowman and his associates. 
                                                
Suffer’d by the Imprisonment of William Plowman; Seizure of their Effects, and other Proceedings of the 
Grand Duke of Tuscany (London, 1701), 7. 
109 Charles Hedges, “Report concerning Mr. Plowman, to the Lords Justices,” 17 or 24 July 1699, BL Add. 
MS 25098, f. 174v. 
110 The Case of Sir Alexander Rigby, and William Shepard, Complainants, As to their Particular Damages 
by the Great Duke of Tuscany’s Proceedings in the Seizure of William Plowman, and of their Effects 
(London, 1704), 5-6. 
111 Ibid., 9. 
112 Giusti, “Il Granducato di Toscana e il 'caso Plowman,” 67. 
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 In response to English demands for compensation, the Tuscan government argued 
that the prosecution of Plowman was a matter of the Grand Duke’s jurisdictional and 
sovereign authority. Tuscan ministers never cited Plowman’s Tuscan subjecthood in their 
arguments for Cosimo’s right to punish the merchant, probably in order to avoid lending 
strength to French arguments that the Grand Duke was responsible for the losses they had 
sustained at Plowman’s hands.113 Instead, they explained that the Grand Duke had 
prosecuted Plowman for the “breach of faith,”  by which he broke his oath to a sovereign 
prince and violated Tuscan neutrality by arming a ship in Livorno.114  According to 
Tuscan officials, Plowman had committed a crime of laesa maiestas by violating the 
honor of the Grand Duke.115 They further denied English arguments that the Grand Duke 
had acted in an arbitrary manner in his prosecution of Plowman. Instead, Tuscan officials 
argued that the Grand Duke had proceeded against Plowman according to the laws of 
Tuscany.116 The Tuscan envoy to London, Giacomo Giraldi, rejected suggestions that the 
prosecution of Plowman had somehow violated the norms of English justice when he 
pointed out “that Laws are fixed in their Countries, and do not follow the 
                                                
113 Giusti, “Il Granducato di Toscana e il 'caso Plowman',” 49.  Tuscan ministers professed to be unable to 
find any evidence of Plowman’s Tuscan subjecthood, see Giraldi to Panciatechi, London, 25 Aug. 1702, 
BL MS Eg. 1696, f. 232r; Panciatechi to Giraldi, Florence, 23 September 1702, ASF Mediceo del 
Principato, 4125. 
114 A copy of the Duke's sentence against Plowman with an English translation is given in the pamphlet 
authored by Plowman's opponents within the English factor at Livorno, The Answer of the Merchants-
Petitioners, and Trustees for the Factory at Legorn, to the Account of Damages, Laid to the Charge of the 
Grand Duke of Tuscany by Sir Alexander Rigby, Mr. Will. Shepard, and Mr. Will. Plowman (London, 
1704), 140-144.  See also Giusti, “Il Granducato di Toscana e il 'caso Plowman',” 44-46, 51-57. 
115 For this point, see the memorial of Ruberto Maria Zefferini, the Grand Duke’s special envoy to London, 
of 29 March 1705, SP TNA 100/29, which was printed as The Grand Duke of Tuscany’s Proceedings 
against William Plowman: with Remarks thereupon (London, 1705), 10-11. 
116 The Tuscan attorney Alessandro Luigi Catelani stressed this point in a defense of the Grand Duke's 
behavior towards Plowman, see “Relazione di Catelani su Plowman,” Livorno, 19 March 1704, ASF 
Mediceo del Principato, 1619. 
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Countrymen.”117 The Tuscan envoy to England, the Conte Zefferini, later echoed this 
point when he defended the Grand Duke’s judgment against Plowman by noting, “Since 
an English Man residing in Florence must be Tryed by, and is subject to the Laws of 
Florence, as much, as a Florentine residing in England is subject to the Laws of 
England.”118  
 Underlying the rivalry between Blackwell and members of the English merchant 
community at Livorno were different conceptions of the proper relationship between 
merchant factories and the state. As the English government and its ministers pressed 
strenuously for restitution of Plowman’s losses, the English merchants at Livorno 
defended the Grand Duke’s conduct towards the unfortunate merchant. Despite the 
official view of English ministers that the case of Plowman was “a National concern,” 
members of the factory feared that the defense of Plowman would endanger their 
commercial position.119 They particularly blamed Blackwell for having pressed 
Plowman’s case too far and accused him of keeping them in the dark as to the state of the 
affair. As Tuscan ministers became increasingly frustrated with Blackwell’s inflexible 
attitude towards the Plowman affair, English merchant sought to distance themselves 
from the envoy.120 During a visit of the Grand Duke to Livorno in March 1704, a group 
of these merchants enraged Blackwell by refusing to accompany him to an audience and   
                                                
117 Giraldi to Panciatechi, London, 25 April 1704 and Panciatechi to Giraldi, Livorno, 7 March 1704, ASF 
Mediceo del Principato, 4216. 
118 Memorial of Conte Zefferini, London, 29 March 1705, TNA SP 100/29.   
119 Blackwell to Nottingham, Pisa, 2 March 1703, TNA SP 98/20. 
120 For a sense of Tuscan opinions of Blackwell's conduct in the negotiations surrounding Plowman's case, 
see Giraldi to Panciatechi, London, 9 October 1703, 1 August 1704, 17 October 1704, BL MS Eg. 1697, f. 
82v-83r, 178r, 196r-v. On Blackwell's strained relations with both the English factory at Livorno and with 
the Tuscan government, see also Villani, “I consoli della nazione inglese a Livorno,” 33, n. 114. 
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by instead meeting with Cosimo separately in order to inform him of their efforts to 
oppose Plowman’s pretensions. Blackwell strongly disapproved of this display of 
“disrespect” and condemned several of the merchants at Livorno for spreading dissension 
through the factory. Blackwell echoed the complaints of his predecessors when he wrote, 
“the Merchants ought as good subjects to vallue their duty to her Majestie more then their 
own private Interests,” and to leave the Queen to order what she thought best.121 Like 
Finch and other diplomats around the Mediterranean, Blackwell thought that merchants 
were in no position to make effective judgments regarding matters of state and should 
thus observe the leadership of the Crown’s representatives. 
  Conversely, the merchants at Livorno distinguished the commercial character of 
the factory from Blackwell’s political position. The merchants explained that they did not 
believe their refusal to accompany Blackwell to his audience with the Grand Duke 
impacted his character as the representative of the Queen.122 Instead, the members of the 
factory emphasized that they were obedient subjects but explained that they saw the 
factory as a body that was in no way connected to the state’s diplomatic representative at 
Livorno. The merchants gave form to this understanding of the factory as a distinct 
commercial association when they organized to refute Plowman’s case and to defend 
Cosimo III’s prosecution of Plowman. Four merchants began to serve as the nation’s 
                                                
121 Blackwell to Nottingham, Livorno, 3 March 1704, TNA SP 98/21.  For the merchants’ own account of 
their refusal to accompany Blackwell to his audience, see their reports of 2 March 1704 and 3 March 1704, 
which accompanied a letter from the Deputies of the factory to Robert Balle, Edward Gould, Robert 
Westerne, and Ralph Lee, Livorno, 5 March 1704, TNA SP 98/21. 
122 The merchants’ account of their proceedings is contained in a paper dated 2 March 1704, contained in a 
letter from Francis Arundell, Thomas Balle, Edward Nelthorpe and John Horsey to Robert Balle, Edward 
Gould, Robert Westerne and Ralph Lee, Livorno, 5 March 1704, TNA SP 98/21. 
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deputies at Livorno and four other merchants acted as its trustees in London.123 Although 
it is unclear whether the deputies acted of their own accord or were selected by their 
fellow merchants, these merchants presented themselves as the representatives of the 
factory and appear to have spoken for the majority of the members of the factory. The 
deputies at Livorno noted that they recorded their transactions in the “National journal,” 
which suggests that they acted on behalf of the factory.124 Moreover, to support the cost 
of publishing a pamphlet directed against Plowman, the deputies of the nation at Livorno 
began to collect a small fee from all cargo brought into that port on English vessels, with 
the connivance of Tuscan officials.125 Francesco Terriesi, the supervisor of the customs at 
Livorno and former Tuscan resident to London, also made sure that the merchants at 
Livorno were informed of the latest dispatches from Tuscan diplomats in London and 
provided them with documents and his personal assistance to produce the pamphlet 
directed against Plowman.126   
 Blackwell and the representatives of the English factory at Livorno articulated 
contrasting models for the organization of English merchant factories. In theory, 
diplomats, consuls and factories worked harmoniously to secure and advance trade to 
different ports. Conversely, tensions between Blackwell and the merchants at Livorno 
                                                
123 The deputies were Francis Arundell, Thomas Balle, Edward Nelthorpe and John Horsey and the trustees 
in London were Robert Balle, Edward Gould, Robert Westerne and Ralph Lee. 
124 See the letter of the factory’s deputies to trustees, Livorno, 5 March 1704, TNA SP 98/21.  The journals 
of the English factory at Livorno have not survived. 
125 The Answer of the Merchants-Petitioners, and Trustees for the Factory at Legorn, to the Account of 
Damages, Laid to the Charge of the Grand Duke of Tuscany by Sir Alexander Rigby, Mr. Will. Shepard, 
and Mr. Will. Plowman..., (London, 1704).  This work was credited to John Horsey, as recorded in an 
anonymous message in Blackwell’s handwriting, dated 5 February 1704 in TNA SP 98/21.  See also 
Blackwell to Hedges, Florence, 5 July 1704, TNA SP 98/21. 
126 Terriesi to Panciatechi, Livorno, 19 May 1704, ASF Mediceo del Principato 2674. 
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called into question the degree to which factories were distinct institutional bodies. An 
anonymous memorial, which may have been authored by Blackwell, thus contrasted the 
independent behavior of the English nation at Livorno with its supposedly traditional 
subservience to England’s “publick Ministers.” The author of this document specified 
that the factory at Livorno had not received any “Letters patent” from England or “any 
particular priveledges[sic] to make them a Company” from the Grand Duke. Instead, the 
merchants relied on the leadership of English envoys or consuls both in their internal 
deliberations and in their interactions with Tuscan officials. The factory thus lacked any 
corporate basis to act independently and was instead wholly dependant on England’s 
diplomatic officers; consequently, in the negotiation that led to a convention for 
guaranteeing the neutrality of Livorno in 1692, “the Consul proceeded by Orders from his 
Sovereign, and not by the irregular sentiments of his Countrymen resideing at Leghorn.” 
The author condemned the behavior of the factory at Livorno and, in particular, the 
merchants’ imposition of a duty to fund the costs of their campaign against Plowman, 
noting that the factory had “no Law, Authority, nor precedent for such a tax.”127   
 The political and legal controversy that followed the actions of Plowman came to 
a head in March of 1704, when Blackwell received orders to demand reparations from the 
Grand Duke for the damages suffered by Plowman and his colleagues and, if Cosimo 
should refuse that demand, to direct the English merchants to wind up their affairs and 
withdraw from Livorno.128 Meanwhile merchants in London wrote their partners and 
                                                
127 “The usuall Methods & present proceedings of the Factory at Leghorne,” TNA SP 98/21. 
128 Blackwell to Nottingham, Pisa, 25 March 1704, TNA SP 98/21.  A copy of Nottingham's letter of 8 
February 1704 to Blackwell containing instructions to demand compensation from the Grand Duke and to 
instruct the factory to prepare to leave Livorno is contained in TNA SP 98/21. 
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correspondents at Livorno to warn them that if the Grand Duke did not pay 
compensation, “the Cittye of Legorne must be Bombed.”129 Although rumors of military 
action against Livorno appear to have been unfounded, they nevertheless reflected 
worries as to how far the English government would go in support of Plowman. In May 
of that year, when the Tuscan government continued to refuse to compensate Plowman, 
Blackwell advised the members of the factory that they should wind up their affairs and 
withdraw from Livorno as quickly as possible.130   
 Members of the factory responded to Blackwell’s intimation by stating that they 
saw no reason to leave Livorno and emphasizing the impossibility of such a move.  
According to one merchant, Samuel Lambert, “they reckon’d themselves as safe att 
Legorne as att Whitehall.” Another thanked Blackwell for his intimation, but protested 
that “’twas as easy for them to fly as remove their Effects from this place” and yet 
another objected that the factory “should be expos’d for such a Man as Plowman.”131 The 
merchants also wrote to the Grand Duke to inform him of this order and to request his 
protection for those who chose to stay at Livorno and his leave for those who wanted to 
depart the city.132 The Grand Duke confirmed Lambert in his confidence in the security 
of Livorno when he directed Terriesi to inform the English that any who wished to leave 
                                                
129 The communication between the merchants in England and their correspondents at Livorno is reported 
in a letter from Blackwell to Notthingam, Livorno, 3 March 1704, TNA SP 98/21. 
130 Blackwell to Nottingham, Florence, 29 April 1704, TNA SP 98/21; Coppy of Sir L. B: intimation to the 
factory of English Merchants att Legorn, Florence, 30 April 1704, TNA SP 98/21. 
131 Blackwell to Nottingham, Florence, 3 May 1704, TNA SP 98/21.  The merchants' replies to Blackwell 
follow the copy of his letter to the factory of 30 April 1704. 
132 A copy of the merchants’ petition to the Grand Duke, dated 6 May 1704, appears in The Answer of the 
Merchants-Petitioners, 100-101. 
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the city with their goods were free to do so and to assure those who stayed that they 
would continue to enjoy the security to which they were accustomed.133   
 Communities of merchants overseas had to balance political and commercial 
connections that linked them at once to their own government and nation and to foreign 
states. The merchants well understood that they stood in between the Tuscan and English 
governments and they consequently sought to maintain good relations between both.134 
They thus presented themselves as loyal subjects to the English Crown who sought to 
mediate its differences with the Grand Duke. They equally supported the Grand Duke’s 
conduct towards Plowman. When the merchants responded to the Grand Duke’s reply to 
their petition, they particularly thanked him for the equal consideration he showed to 
those merchants who intended to withdraw from Livorno and to those who planned to 
remain in the city. The merchants hoped that this show of respect to the Queen’s directive 
would lead her “to inspect the cause which had produced such an order, and to reject the 
advises of such as have or may yet endeavour to fement any misunderstandings with a 
Prince so Graciously disposed towards her Majesty & her Subjects.”135 In this way, the 
merchants sought to cast their opposition to Blackwell’s orders as the behavior of good 
English subjects. 
                                                
133 A printed copy of the letter from the Grand Duke to Terriesi, dated Florence, 10 May 1704 may be 
found in TNA SP 98/21.  Another copy, with an English translation, is contained in the pamphlet, The 
Answer of the Merchant-Petitioners, 102-103. 
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factory’s trustees of 5 March 1704, TNA SP 98/21. 
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 Strategic and commercial interests ultimately served to defuse the diplomatic 
crisis that had flared between England and Tuscany. After Sir Charles Hedges replaced 
the Earl of Nottingham as secretary of state in April 1704, the English government took a 
less strident approach to the Plowman affair. Although the merchants’ memorials and 
pamphlets may have contributed to their decision to take a more moderate approach to 
Plowman’s case, English ministers were well aware of the fact that their merchants and 
fleets depended on the port of Livorno as a neutral harbor within a sea ringed by Bourbon 
powers.136 Livorno’s naval and commercial importance largely precluded England’s 
government from following up on its intimations to use force against Tuscany in order to 
force the Grand Duke to pay restitution to Plowman. Blackwell was thus ultimately 
advised that he “may have been a little too quick” in instructing the merchants to prepare 
to leave Livorno, since the English government had not yet decided what level of 
compensation to demand of the Grand Duke.137 Even after the Crown fixed the amount it 
thought due to Plowman and his colleagues, ministers did not press the demand nearly as 
forcefully as they had formerly done. Blackwell, who had become a major irritant for the 
Tuscan government, was subsequently recalled and replaced by the civil lawyer, Sir 
Henry Newton, who proved to be more diplomatic in his dealings with both the Grand 
Duke and the English factory.138 
                                                
136 For instance, see Giraldi to Panciatechi, London, 23 February 1703, 2 March 1703, and 9 October 1703, 
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  139 
! !
 Meanwhile, the situation in Livorno became a source of concern for 
representatives elsewhere in the Mediterranean. The English consul at Aleppo feared that 
merchants there would grow as factious as their counterparts at Livorno.139 Other 
officials proposed recommendations to secure consular authority over factory 
communities. For example, the consul at Venice, Hugh Broughton, encouraged Hedges to 
have a royal order given to consuls, together with their commissions, exhorting 
merchants “to Unite together in Consultations on advanceing the Interest of Nationall 
Affairs (lett them bee never so much at variance on particular accounts of Differences) 
under Penalty of Forfeiting Her Majesties Protection.” According to Broughton, the 
contest between Blackwell and the factory was of such “Ill consequence” that it was vital 
to avoid such “great inconveniencys & disorders every where for the future.” Broughton 
then went on to lament the fact that there were always some people who were made or 
became “Tooles...out of Interest or Mallice, to the prejudice of their owne proper Native 
Country’s, & Countrymen’s Weale,” and finally expressed his wish that the English 
could be freed from this problem “without some such like Soveraigne remedy” as that 
which he proposed.140   
 Blackwell’s interactions with the English nation at Livorno illustrated how 
difficult it was to extend consular or official authority over merchants in foreign cities.  
Neither consuls nor diplomatic officials possessed legal authority over English merchants 
in European ports. Equally important was the ability of merchants to resist and to oppose 
their consular or diplomatic representatives. Although factories were not corporate 
                                                
139 Palmer, “Letters from London to Leghorn, 1704-1705,” 61. 
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bodies, merchants were nevertheless able to lobby both English and foreign governments.  
Parliament’s ascendancy during the last decade of the seventeenth century opened new 
avenues by which merchants could influence policy makers and changed the rhetorical 
and ideological terms in which merchants related to the state.141 The pamphlets written by 
merchants on both sides of the Plowman affair illustrate how merchants sought to 
influence political opinion in their favor. In their pamphlet in defense of the Grand 
Duke’s conduct toward Plowman, the merchants and their London-based correspondents 
portrayed themselves as the defenders of England’s interests and accused Plowman of 
being a Jacobite and a Catholic.142 The merchants at Livorno argued that it was they who 
had behaved “like true Englishmen and good Subjects” by seeking to preserve the 
English factory and trade at Livorno, which had been jeopardized by Plowman and his 
companions.143  
 The development of English merchant factories depended more on the 
independent actions of the members of those communities than it did on official action.  
In 1711, the Board of Trade ordered consuls to submit annual reports as to the conditions 
of trade in their respective ports.144 Neither consuls nor factories proved responsive to 
this directive; instead, the Board would go for years without considering the state of 
English trade in the Mediterranean or other European markets. Nevertheless, the 
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144 D.B. Horn, “The Board of Trade and Consular Reports, 1696-1782,” The English Historical Review  54, 
no. 215 (July 1939): 476-480. 
  141 
! !
expansion of English state power and the growth of national competition at the end of the 
seventeenth century strengthened ties both among the members of merchant factories and 
placed an emphasis on the common religion and nationality of those merchants: over the 
course of the eighteenth century, the English nation at Livorno increasingly defined itself 
according to the subject status and Protestant religion shared by its members.145  
Although English factories became more tightly organized during the eighteenth century, 
the institutional evolution of merchant communities owed little to state or official 
intervention.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 The inability of the Crown to extend its jurisdictional authority over English 
merchant communities in Italian ports illustrated changes in the political and commercial 
organization of Mediterranean trade that distinguished southern Europe from North 
African and the Levant. During this period, territorial and jurisdictional conceptions of 
sovereignty coexisted and collided as the claims of princes to authority over their subjects 
intersected with the jurisdiction that rulers claimed over their own dominions. Italian 
opposition to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of foreign courts and consuls points at once 
to the gradual ascendancy of the territorial state within Europe and to the endurance of 
models of sovereignty rooted in the relationship between sovereign and subject. French 
attempts to establish the jurisdictional authority of consuls in foreign ports during the 
                                                
145 In 1745, the British merchants at Livorno explicitly excluded Catholics from participation in meetings of 
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eighteenth century further illustrated the coexistence of and competition between 
different ideas regarding the organization of sovereign and juridical authority.146 On 4 
January 1713, the French Crown issued an “Ordonnance de Marine,” which directed 
French subjects in foreign ports to bring intra-national disputes and legal cases to their 
consul, rather than to local courts.147 The efforts of French consuls and diplomats to 
enforce this measure in ports around southern Europe produced several decades of 
disputes that contrasted the territorial sovereignty of Italian princes with “the delegated 
sovereignty of the Most Christian King outside of his dominions and his own personal 
power with respect to the merchants.”148 The ability of Italian princes and rulers of other 
European states to defeat French jurisdictional claims prevented the rise of a consular 
regime in Europe comparable to that in the Ottoman Empire. 
 Contests over the jurisdictional authority of consuls led Italian to distinguish the 
political organization of trade along geographical and cultural lines. In opposition to the 
jurisdictional claims of the French consul at Livorno, Antonio Francesco Montauti, the 
Tuscan Secretary of War, denied that the earlier “Ordonnances de Marine” of 1681 and 
1689, which also established the jurisdictional authority of consuls, were applicable to 
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Livorno because they referred to the ports of the Ottoman Empire. According to 
Montauti, the diversity of laws and customs present in the Levant required that consuls 
adjudicate cases between members of their nation. However, such jurisdiction was 
unnecessary in Christian countries where “justice is well administered.”149 The Tuscan 
Secretary of State, Giovanni Antonio Tornaquinci, in turn, denied the argument of the 
French consul Benoît de Maillet that jurisdictional authority was incumbent in his office 
as consul. Instead, like Montauti, Tornaquinci argued that consuls possessed 
jurisdictional authority only in Muslim countries and not in Christian ones, “because in 
these Justice is administered according to the law, and not barbarously as the Turks 
do.”150 Savoyard officials deployed similar arguments when the new French consul to 
Nice and Villefranche attempted to assert his jurisdictional authority over French 
merchants in those ports. An anonymous memorial, probably from 1713, noted that 
French merchants residing at Genoa appeared before that city’s courts, since the French 
king’s edicts were observed only “in the Scales of the Levant, that is on the Coast of 
Barbary, where, on account of the differences of languages, and of customs, this practice 
is thought necessary.”151 
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 The institutional and legal division between Europe and the wider world and 
between the European and Middle Eastern or North African spheres of the Mediterranean 
was a gradual and inconsistent process. Italian opposition to the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of French consuls explicitly contrasted conditions in southern Europe from 
those in the Levant, while French officials argued that French merchants were 
responsible to their national officers in all foreign ports. Nevertheless, the fact that 
English ministers made few efforts to establish the jurisdictional authority of consuls in 
Italian ports during the eighteenth century illustrated the extent to which they had 
accepted the territorial basis for jurisdiction within Europe. It is not entirely clear why 
English diplomats and ministers gave up on seventeenth-century claims to the 
jurisdictional authority of consuls. However, Robert Balle’s letters in support of the 
efficacy and justice of Tuscan courts suggests that many merchants preferred the 
jurisdiction of foreign courts to that of representatives who might use that authority 
against their fellow merchants. In 1725, the Duke of Newcastle admonished the English 
consul at Messina, John Chamberlain, for insisting upon his jurisdiction over English 
merchants at that city in the face of their opposition. According to Newcastle, “if the 
Merchants, for whose benefit this Court was intended, have any grounds to complain, that 
it does not answer that end, but on the contrary that they are aggrieved by it, it is an 
argument of great weight against the continuance of it.”152 It thus seems that the English 
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government felt little reason to try to establish or enforce the jurisdictional authority of 
consuls when merchants themselves were disinclined to take cases to their consul.  
 Early modern European states, like the Ottoman Empire and the North African 
regencies, were segmented bodies composed of layers of jurisdictional authority.153 With 
regards to legal authority over foreign merchants, however, Italian ministers refused to 
delegate jurisdictional responsibility to foreign officials as their Ottoman counterparts 
did. As a result, the expansion of English sovereign and legal authority took a different 
course in southern Europe than it did elsewhere in the Mediterranean and in the wider 
world. English and French arguments in favor of consular jurisdiction centered on the 
universal authority of the sovereign over his or her subjects. From this perspective, a 
prince’s jurisdictional and sovereign authority followed subjects around the world. The 
refusal of Italian states to concede extraterritorial jurisdiction to English courts and 
consuls illustrated how rulers’ consolidation of sovereignty over their territorial 
dominions sharply limited this vector for the expansion of Crown authority into the 
western Mediterranean.
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Chapter 3 
 
English Navigation and Christian Corsairs, 1660-1688 
 
 
...it is clear that His Majesty will not 
permit of him, that which no other in the 
world seeks to do, and was the only 
cause of the break with the Barbarians 
[North Africans], not wishing to allow 
them to visit his ships.1 
  
 During the later half of the seventeenth century, the expansion of the English state 
into the Mediterranean was most evident at sea. Although the Crown largely failed to 
establish its extraterritorial authority over English merchants in foreign ports, it 
succesfully made its authority felt over its subjects' navigation. The increasingly global 
reach of the Crown was particularly apparent as it sought to secure its subjects' shipping 
and commerce from the effects of the corso, the perennial and religiously inspired naval 
war waged between Christian and Muslim corsairs. The Crown's efforts to exempt its 
subjects' navigation from inspection by corsairs in search of enemy goods contributed to 
a larger process whereby subjecthood and nationality increasingly determined the 
political geography of a sea long defined by religious warfare and rivalry.2  
 The threat of the Muslim corsairs of Morocco and of the Ottoman regencies of 
Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli turned the Mediterranean into a center of English naval and 
military activity. England's need for a reliable Mediterranean port from which fleets 
                                                
1 Ephraim Skinner to Ferdinando Bardi, Livorno, 10 September 1672, TNA SP 98/14, f. 216r. 
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could sail against North African corsairs was a primary motivation for the acquisition of 
Tangier.3 The Earl of Winchilsea particularly thought that colony would aid his 
negotiations with the Ottoman Empire and its dependencies, since “Asia will bee more in 
awe and my presence there more respected, when I can bee seconded by so powerfull and 
dangerous neighbours.”4 Under Charles II, the dispatch of English fleets to North Africa 
became routine and, after the Third Anglo-Dutch War, wars against Tripoli and Algiers 
dominated naval activity and strategy.5 Yet, although the threat of corsairs led the English 
state to go to new lengths to protect its subjects overseas, its interactions with North 
African corsairs remain poorly understood within the wider context of England's early 
modern expansion.   
 In order to recapture and to explore the reasons for England's growing presence in 
the Mediterranean, this chapter shifts focus to the English Crown's response to the threat 
posed by Christian corsairs to English navigation in the later half of the seventeenth 
century.6 While the activity of those corsairs raised fears for the reputation and profit of 
                                                
3 Sir Henry Sheeres gave the most sustained argument for Tangier's role in England's wars against Algiers 
in, A Discourse Touching Tanger: in a Letter to a Person of Quality (London, 1680). For similar statements 
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1991). 
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English navigation, their impact on trade has been largely ignored in studies of England's 
expanding presence in the Mediterranean.7 This is not entirely surprising in so far as 
North African corsairs captured far more English ships than their Christian counterparts 
and elicited a much more violent reaction. On the other hand, England's relationship with 
Christian corsairs highlighted the broader questions that defined the organization of 
English trade in the Mediterranean. The evolution of the trading regime of the 
seventeenth-century Mediterranean did not simply lie in the tension between conceptions 
of the sea as either “a collection of sovereign states bound by treaty obligations to one 
another” or as a political and religious frontier.8 Instead, the corsairs' legitimacy lay 
precisely in the backing they received from states and princes; crucially, corsairs were not 
pirates, since they engaged in legally approved and regulated maritime violence against a 
defined enemy. Opposition to the behavior of Christian corsairs by the new maritime 
powers of northern Europe revealed the degree to which the corso was predicated upon 
the authority and sovereignty of Mediterranean princes. When English ministers and 
diplomats rejected corsairs' claims to search all vessels they encountered (the visità) and 
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to seize enemy goods and passengers found on them, they raised contentious questions as 
to where authority lay in the waters of the Mediterranean. 
 The expanding authority of the English, French and Dutch states certainly 
reshaped the trading world of the Mediterranean, but the limits of this process are as 
important as its extent. Around the early modern world, the definition of what constituted 
piratical behavior extended state sovereignty over oceanic space: when rulers designated 
acts of maritime violence to be piracy and punished offenders, they claimed authority to 
exercise jurisdiction on the high seas.9 Even as purveyors of maritime violence found 
state tolerance of their actions waning in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, treaties and 
sovereign support institutionalized and legitimized the corso in the Mediterranean. The 
English and their northern European counterparts sought to have their ships and subjects 
exempted from search and seizure by corsairs, but it would be more than a century before 
they aimed to stop those corsairs altogether.10 Although the corso declined from the late 
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  150 
! !
seventeenth century in the face of the profits of peaceful trade and the naval and 
commercial dominance of northern Europe's ascendant powers, Christian and Muslim 
corsairs both remained active through the eighteenth century. The survival of the corso 
highlighted the distinct political and legal conditions of the early modern Mediterranean, 
where the ability of Europe's maritime empires to define the terms of trade remained 
limited. 
 England’s response to the threat posed by Christian corsairs revealed how the 
English state and its representatives sought to expand their authority into a maritime 
environment where they rarely dominated. This chapter begins by exploring the political 
and ideological context that shaped the corso and the English reaction to it. The first 
section thus illustrates the centrality of state sovereignty both to the ostensibly religious 
warfare practiced by corsairs and to England’s response to the threat this violence posed 
to navigation. The argument then turns to the related question of whether Christian 
corsairs who preyed upon English vessels were “pirates.” When English representatives 
in the Mediterranean accused corsairs of piracy, they questioned whether those corsairs 
had the legal right to stop or search English vessels. In the process, they also highlighted 
the wider problem of determining where the sovereign authority to define the legal 
organization of trade and navigation lay. The third section then shifts to study how 
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England’s response to the threat of Christian corsairs related to its exchanges with the 
Islamic powers of the Mediterranean. Central to English interactions with both Christian 
and Muslim corsairs was the question of what constituted an “English” ship. The treaties 
England signed with the North African regencies not only established which ships were 
to be reputed as “English” and what privileges they were to enjoy at sea, but also 
confirmed that interstate relations, rather than English sovereignty, defined the political 
foundations of trade in the Mediterranean.  
 
 
I. The Searching of English Ships 
  
 England's relations with both Christian and Muslim corsairs turned less on 
cultural or religious difference than on efforts to shield English navigation and subjects 
from the effects of the corso. In the latter half of the seventeenth century, first the 
Commonwealth and then the restored Crown sought to exempt English ships from 
inspection by corsairs in search of passengers and goods of the enemy religion. The 
commercial advantages of such a privilege were obvious: Spanish, Portuguese and Italian 
merchants, as well as their Ottoman counterparts, would be more likely to freight English 
vessels if they could thereby protect their property from seizure.11 However, ministers, 
merchants and diplomats did not see the visità only in economic terms, but as an affront 
to the reputation of English navigation and to the honor of the English flag. Conversely, 
for Christian corsairs, the right to seize enemy goods and persons onboard neutral vessels 
derived from both the medieval legal traditions upon which the corso rested and from 
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early modern perspectives on the law of nations, which held that belligerents were 
allowed to search neutral ships for enemy goods.12 When the English demanded that their 
ships be freed from the visità, they consequently argued that the Crown's authority over 
its subjects' navigation trumped the sovereign and legal rights of corsairs' state sponsors. 
 Arguments over whether English ships could be searched by corsairs depended 
upon the legal status of those vessels and of the passengers and cargo they carried. The 
diplomatic negotiations that followed Christian corsairs' seizure of Muslim passengers 
from the English ship the Lion in 1671 raised the issue of whether corsairs could seize 
passengers and cargo from English ships. In early November of that year, the Lion, a 
small merchant vessel under the command of Thomas Parker, sailed out of Tunis destined 
for Smyrna, freighted with cargo on the account of Parker and the ship's owners and 
carrying five Muslim passengers and their goods. Two weeks later, a Livornese corsair, 
Domenico Franceschi, approached and boarded the Lion after the English ship had taken 
refuge from bad weather at the island of Delos.13 Over the next two days, the corsairs 
searched the English vessel, seizing both the ship's cargo and its passengers. While 
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Parker protested and exhibited first his flag and then his papers to prove that the ships and 
the goods it carried were English, Franceschi accused him of coloring Muslim goods and 
insisted that “all goods which came from Barbary & Turkey were his lawfull prize.”14  
Eventually released by Franceschi and continuing his voyage to Smyrna, Parker there 
obtained letters from the city's European consuls testifying to the ownership of the Lion's 
cargo and, after sending a boat after Franceschi, he secured the return of the portion of 
the cargo that belonged to him and the ship's owners. However, the passengers and their 
goods remained in captivity.15   
 Assaults on English vesssels threatened their reputation as neutral carriers that 
could pass safely through the violent waters of the Mediterranean, safeguarded by 
England’s navy and treaties with the North African regencies. England's diplomatic and 
                                                
14 Deposition of Thomas Parker before Lionell Jenkins at the High Court of the Admiralty, 14 May 1672, 
TNA HCA 3/52, f. 460r. The exchange between Parker and Franceschi revolved around article #23 of the 
regulations for Livornese corsairs, which prohibited them from molesting English ships sailing between 
England and the Ottoman Empire: “Che non diano impedimento à nessun Vassello Inglese, quando 
haveranno Le solite Lettere d'Ammiralità, che di Turchia navighino per Li stati del Rè della Gran 
Brettagna, e dalli stati del suddetto Rè per Constantinopoli, ò altre parti di Turchia, ancorche portassero 
Persone e robe d'Infedeli; non havendo ma inteso, ne intendendo S.A. d'impedire il dritto commercio di 
traffico, e mercatura frà il Turco, e Li stati del sopra nominato Rè della Gran Bretagna, ma di mostrar 
sempre alla M.S. ogni migliore intelligenza et ossequio,” TNA SP 98/14, f. 49r. Ephraim Skinner, the 
English consul in Livorno, supported Parker, arguing for the release of the prisoners and their goods on the 
grounds that “mentre sotto la bandiera della maesta Brittanica, unito con il tenore delle Capitolationi di S. 
A. S. li vasselli di nostra natione possano assicurare e roba e persone di chi si sia,” Skinner to Conte Bardi, 
8 April 1672, TNA SP 98/14, f. 42v. In response, Franceschi reiterated his argument and accused Parker of 
not carrying any passes: “Dunque non havendo detto vaselo ne letere d'amiralita ne partito della gran 
bertagna ne di torchia per li stati del suddetto Re ma di tunisi e smirne dove a fatto piu viagi con ragione 
poteva eser visitato,” Franceschi to Bardi, 27 April 1672, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1804, #41.  
15 Parker's account of his encounter with Franceschi and the seizure of the goods from the Lion may be 
found in the depositions he made, first, to Paul Rycaut, the English consul at Consul, and then before 
Leoline Jenkins in the High Court of the Admiralty; respectively, TNA SP 97/19, 174r-175r and HCA 3/51, 
f. 459r-461v. Parker testified before the English admiralty court to account for his failure to leave Smyrna 
within the time contracted for by merchants freighting the ship, leading to a suit between them and the 
ship's patrons. Bartolomeo Franceschi, the brother of Domenico, offered a similar account of this incident 
to Bardi; however, Bartolomeo maintained that Domenico had assured Parker that those goods belonging to 
Christians would be restored to them if their ownership could be proved, see B. Franceschi to Bardi, 23 
March 1672, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1804, #41. 
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commercial representatives around the Mediterranean thus feared the effect Franceschi's 
actions would have on English navigation. In 1672 Daniel Harvey, England's ambassador 
to the Ottoman Empire, wrote to London to report the “Insolencies & piracis” inflicted on 
the Lion. Harvey expressed concern that the Ottoman authorities would hold the English 
merchants in the Levant accountable for the seizure of the Muslim passengers and 
warned that if “this action is not taken notis of” it would “be an Incouradgment to him 
[Franceschi] & others to venter on the like.”16 The English consul in Tunis, John 
Earlisman, similarly feared that “if such affronts are putt up not only our Shipping will 
grow in disteeme, but our Reputation amongst the Turks much decline.”17 In Livorno, the 
English consul Ephraim Skinner wrote to warn Lord Arlington, the Secretary of State, 
that if the English recognized Tuscan claims to search English ships, “we shall hereafter 
be as much afraid of them, as of our Enemies & will much discredit our Navigation.”18 
He further advised that “tis more then necessary this should be resented, Else t'wilbe an 
allowance to them do the like in the future, & I beleeve theres nothing if they were prest 
to it, that they would not doe.”19 
 The English reaction to the news of Franceschi's assault on the Lion highlighted 
both real anxiety at the activity of Christian corsairs and a critical shift in the attitude of 
the English state towards the Mediterranean navigation of its subjects. Braudel famously 
                                                
16 Constantinople, 15 March 1671/2 TNA SP 97/19,  f. 176r. 
17 Earlisman, Tunis, 1 July 1672, TNA SP 71/26, f. 203v. 
18 Skinner to Joseph Williamson,  29 March/8 April 1672, TNA SP 98/14, f. 50r. Skinner had further cause 
for concern when another corsair setting out from Livorno under the Grand Duke's colors declared that he 
would follow Franceschi's example and search English ships for Muslim passengers and goods, Skinner to 
Williamson, 20/30 May 1672, TNA SP 98/14, f. 118v. 
19 Skinner to Williamson, 29 April 1672, TNA SP 98/14, f. 68r. 
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labelled the entry of English and other northern European ships into the Mediterranean as 
a “Northern Invasion,” memorably recounting that the “Dutch swarmed into the 
Mediterranean like so many heavy insects crashing against the window panes - for their 
entry was neither gentle nor discreet.”20 However, the national terms in which Braudel 
saw this process are viable only in the most general sense; the English and Dutch ships 
that sailed into Mediterranean at the end of the sixteenth century depended upon 
firepower and obfuscation for protection, not upon the flags they flew or the sovereign 
protection those flags conferred.21 It was only in the second half of the seventeenth 
century that the Crown began to demand that corsairs avoid interfering with English 
navigation and to take effective measures to secure ships and subjects sailing in 
Mediterranean waters.22 In 1655 the English consul in Algiers was instructed to demand 
                                                
20 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, tr. Siân 
Reynolds (London: Collins, 1972), 2: 635.   
21 A petition from English merchants in Livorno that recounted the seizure of English ships and their 
Muslim passengers by Tuscan corsairs since the accession of James I concluded by noting that among the 
captured flags hung up in the church of St. Stephen, “are the English flaggs hangd up, that were taken in 
thes shipps, mixing them with those of Infidells as it were for a Trophe of a victory gotte against us.”  The 
merchants warned that if they did not receive assistance, they would be forced “to protect ourselves under 
the name of other Nations to the great dishonor of his Majesty,” TNA SP 98/2, f. 256r.  For the problems of 
understanding the seventeenth-century Mediterranean in terms of national groups, see especially Molly 
Greene, “Beyond the Northern Invasion,” 43-45. On accommodation as a strategy within England's early 
modern commercial expansion, see Alison Games, Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of 
Expansion, 1560-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), especially chap. 2, “The Mediterranean 
Origins of the British Empire.” 
22 Following the utter failure of Sir Robert Mansell's expedition of 1620, which was the only fleet sent 
against the North African regencies in the first half of the seventeenth century, Sir Thomas Roe negotiated 
a treaty with Algerian and Tunisian commissioners at Constantinople in 1622 that established, “if is shall 
happen after the Conclusion that itt shall be found that any English shippp shall soe carry or protect the 
Goods of our Ennemyes they shall stand to their perill and receave punishment,” see “The Aggreement 
made with the Commissioners of the Grand Signore in behalfe of Algiers. (by Sir Thomas Rowe),” TNA 
SP 103/1, 139. The divan, or ruling council, in Algiers subsequently complained in 1624 that English ships 
were not turning over to Algerian corsairs “the goods of our Ennemyes, being embarked in their shipps, as 
they were used to doe in former times,” see “The Translation of an other Letter from Algier to his 
Majestie,” 15 October 1625, TNA SP 71/1, f. 48v. English violations of Roe's treaty contributed to another 
outbreak of war between England and Algiers in 1629, one in which the English navy mounted no effective 
resistance to the North African corsairs.  See, generally, Fisher, Barbary Legend, 105-209. 
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restitution for “any Goods or Persons (of what Nacion soever)” that were taken from 
English ships by corsairs.23 Following the Restoration, Charles II insisted that Algiers 
confirm the privileges it had extended to the Commonwealth.24 After the Algerians 
refused to confirm the freedom of English ships from search, the Secretary of State, 
Edward Nicholas, advised England’s new ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, the Earl of 
Winchilsea, that a fleet had been dispatched to Algiers and that if the Algerians did not 
agree to maintain the same articles they had with Cromwell, they would be “made to 
repent it.”25 By the 1670s, England's treaties with the North African regencies had 
established that passengers and cargoes onboard English vessels were not subject to 
seizure.26 
                                                
23 Edmund Cason's treaty of 1646 provided that Algerian warships were not to interfere with English ships, 
“nor touch, nor medle with them,” but it was under Cromwell that the English state established its effective 
presence in the Mediterranean. A copy of Edmund Cason's treaty may be found in the Record Office for 
Leicestershire, Leiceter and Rutland (ROLLR) Finch MS DG 7, 1537-1659 and a further copy is in TNA 
SP 103/1, 152-153. For background on Cason, see Fisher, Barbary Legend, 210-214.  Admiral Robert 
Blake confirmed Cason's articles in 1655. 
24 A list of the additional articles proposed by Winchilsea, including that which called for the protection of 
all Algerian and Christian passengers on board English ships is in TNA: SP 103/1, 127. 
25 Edward Nichols to the Earl of Winchilsea, Whitehall, 10 May 1661, TNA: SP 44/1, 1. A year later 
Nichols advised Winchilsea that the Earl of Sandwich had been dispatched with a fleet to Algiers, “with 
instructions to demand their performance of the Articles formerly aggreed on by tem with the English 
Nation, & particularly that according to the Treaty, they should not visitt or search any of his Majestys 
Subjects Ships, nor interrupt them in ther Trade; & in case those of Algiers shall deny to agree to the same, 
then his Lordshipp is to use all hostile meenes to compell them thereto, his Majesty requireing no more 
from them then formerly they accorded to the Usurper here by Treaty,” Whitehall, 27 June 1661, ibid., 5. 
26 The treaties that England made with Tunis and Tripoli both established that corsairs could send one boat, 
with two men on board, to confirm that a ship was English, which was established by carrying a valid pass 
or having a crew that was two-thirds English. All passengers and cargo aboard an English ship were to be 
left undisturbed. Conversely, England's treaty of 10 November 1662 with Algiers allowed Algerian corsairs 
to seize enemy passengers and their goods from English ships, provided that they paid for their freight.  
England's treaty with Algiers of 1672 provided for English ships to carry passengers and goods of any 
nation without impediment, but it was only the ultimately long-enduring treaty of 1682 that clearly 
established that no passengers or goods were to be taken off English ships, Clive Parry, ed., The 
Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 7, 1661-1663 (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1969), 244-246, 253- 
256 and 273-275; Vol. 12, 1671-1673, 85-86; Vol. 16, 1680-1684, 205-211. 
  157 
! !
 The reasons for the particular timing of northern European assertiveness against 
the sponsors of corsairs are unclear. Clearly, the aggression of the English and French 
against the North African regencies reflects the fact that both states emerged from mid-
century political crises far more powerful than they had previously been. More broadly, 
after the notoriously chaotic conditions of the early seventeenth century had settled into a 
decade of relative quiet, the Ottoman invasion of Crete in 1645 unleashed a wave of 
insecurity into the eastern Mediterranean.27 Samuel Boothouse, the English consul at 
Tunis, contended that the seizure of Tunisian passengers from the Goodwill in 1651 was 
the first violation of a Christian ship by Christian corsairs since 1616. 28 In fact, Christian 
corsairs had taken passengers and goods off Christian ships through the first half of the 
century.29 Nevertheless, as the Ottoman campaign to conquer Crete wore on for more 
than two decades, there was a dramatic increase in the activity of corsairs, and 
particularly of Christian corsairs, in the Levant that continued after the fall of Candia in 
1669.30 
                                                
27 Fontenay, “Empire Ottoman et le Risque Corsair,” 188. 
28 Samuel Boothouse, A Brief Remonstrance of Several National Injuries and Indignities perpetrated on the 
Persons and Estates of publick Ministers and Subject of his Common-wealth, by the Dey of Tunis in 
Barbary (London, 1653), A2v. However, Boothouse may have been right when he insisted, “the Visitation 
or Molestation of any English shipping by your Squadron (or any other Arms under your Banner) is 
unwonted and without example,” ibid., 11. When Colbert later complained that French ships were visited 
by the knights of Malta, while the English and Dutch were allowed to sail freely, the grand master assured 
him that the order never failed to visit and capture “les Anglois et holandois, si ce n'est lorsque Nous les 
trouvons les plus forts,” Nicholas de Cotoner to Colbert, 7 March 1666, National Library of Malta (NLM) 
Archives of the Order of Malta (AOM) 1558, 75. It is possible that ships of the Order of Malta rarely 
searched the relatively large English ships that sailed in the Levant until the mid-seventeenth century. 
29 Claude Petiet, Le Roi et le Grand Maître (Paris-Méditerranée: Paris, 2002), 126-127. 
30 Michel Fontenay, “L'Empire Ottoman et le Risque Corsair,” 188; B. J. Slot, Archipelagus Turbatus: Les 
Cyclades Entre Colonisation Latine et Occupation Ottomane, c. 1500-1718 (Istanbul: Nederlands 
Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut Te Istanbul, 1982), 2: 194. 
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 The confluence of the growing state and naval strength of northern Europe's 
maritime powers and an upswell in maritime violence reshaped the Mediterranean trading 
regime in the later half of the seventeenth century. Franceschi himself noted the benefits 
that English shipping would receive if freed from such searches when he warned the 
Conte Ferdinando Bardi, the Tuscan secretary of war, that if the English secured “this 
privilege to traffic from place to place without being subjected to visits, it would redound 
with great prejudice to all the other nations since they alone would be able to traffic and 
trade all the goods and merchandize of the turk without being impeded.”31 More 
importantly, the growing commercial and naval power of England and France 
fundamentally changed the balance of power in the Mediterranean and the political 
context in which the corso operated. Though the corsairs' legitimacy depended on the 
backing they received from states and princes as much as on a crusading ideology, their 
cruises amounted to a perpetual holy war that made religious difference central to 
regulation of Mediterranean commerce and navigation. The English and French instead 
emphasized the primacy of subjecthood and national affiliation in the definition of 
Mediterranean navigation and, in the process, they also undermined the legal and 
ideological basis of the corso. The Algerian divan thus objected to Winchilsea's demands 
that English ships be exempt from inspection by observing that it would be better their 
ships rotted in port, than to sail only to discover that they could find no prizes, “all trade 
                                                
31 “E se la suddetta natione havere questo privilego di potere traficare da luogo a luogo del turcho senza 
essere soto posto a visite ridondarebe con grandisimo perguditio di tutte le altre natione per che loro solo 
potrebero traficare e comerciare tutte le robe e marcantie del turco senza esere inpediti,” Franceschi to 
Bardi, Livorno 27 April 1672, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1804 #41. 
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and richesse of the Christians being amassed, & defended in English vessills, which by 
them are no more to bee touched, then if they were prohibited, & sacred.”32   
 When the English and French Crowns denied corsairs the right to search their 
subjects' ships, they asserted that their sovereign authority defined the organization of 
trade in the Mediterranean. Louis XIV made this point plain after a ship of the crusading 
Order of Malta seized Jewish passengers from a French vessel in 1664, when he called 
for the release of these captives and stressed his intention to “preserve for my subjects the 
liberty of the trade of the Levant which would be entirely ruined if I suffered similar 
infringements on my authority.”33 According to the French king, his flag and passport, 
carried by the ship's captain, should have functioned as the passengers “safe conduct and 
security.”34 Maltese corsairs were required to respect safe-conducts granted by Christian 
princes, but Louis changed the relationship of the sovereign to subjects' navigation when 
he demanded that corsairs treat the flag with the same deference as they did a sovereign's 
letter of safe-conduct.35 In this respect, the commissioners assigned by the Grand Master 
to consider Louis XIV’s letter appear to have missed the point when they warned that the 
king's demands would render meaningless the privilege of sovereigns to grant safe 
                                                
32 “A Narrative of the treaty with Algier by commands & instructions from his Majesties beganne the 23th 
days of November 1660,” ROLLR Finch MS DG 7, Letterbook of the Earl of Winchilsea, 22. Another copy 
of Winchelsea's account of his treaty negotiations is contained in TNA SP 103/1. 
33 “...le desir que J'ay de conserver a mes sujects la libertè du commerce du Levant qui seroit entierement 
ruinè si Je souffrois de pareilles entreprises sur mon authorite,” Louis XIV to the Grand Master, 8 March 
1664, NLM AOM 260, f. 184v. A transcription of this letter, taken from the French archives, appears in 
Petiet, Le Roi et le Grand Maître, 127-129.   
34 “...ils ont deub trouver leur sauf conduit et leur seuretté sous mon pavillon, et mon passeport,” Louis XIV 
to the Grand Master, 8 March 1664, NLM AOM 260, f. 184v. 
35 Greene, Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants, 114. 
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conducts, by giving every ships' master the same authority as princes to grant them.36 
Louis had instead asserted his sovereign protection over all French ships. In 1673, after 
years of debate with the French monarchy, the Order agreed to allow French vessels to 
pass undisturbed.37   
 English and French demands that their ships be freed from search by corsairs 
were about more than either the honor of the flag or commercial advantages. When 
English ministers insisted on the immunity of English ships at sea from interference by 
corsairs, they treated the ship as a legal and sovereign space. As the Crown established 
the immunity of English ships from search or seizure it showed that in the Mediterranean, 
as much as in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, ships were “islands of law” and “vectors of 
crown law thrusting into ocean space” that carried states' legal jurisdiction across 
oceans.38 Questions of sovereignty and state authority thus underlay English concerns 
over the seizure of Muslim passengers and goods from the Lion. In the summer of 1672, 
Charles II requested that Parker's case be resolved without further delay and the Grand 
Duke, Cosimo III, accordingly appointed the jurist and official Ferrante Capponi to 
adjudicate the matter.39 Skinner meanwhile wrote to Bardi to express his confidence in 
                                                
36 “E finalmente dall'importar tanto il venire le robbe sopra un Vassello francese, quanto l'haver salvo 
condotto, ne siegue, che qualsisia Padrone di Barca have la medesima autorità, che un Principe nel dar 
salvo condotto: et anche il privarsi li Prinicipi di dare tali salvi condotti, giache non sarebbero più 
necessari,” 5 May 1664, NLM AOM 260, f. 184v. 
37 On France's demands that the Order exempt its ships from the visità, see Earle, Corsairs of Malta and 
Barbary, 110-112 and Philip McCluskey, “Commerce before Crusade? France, the Ottoman Empire and 
the Barbary pirates, 1661-1669,” French History 23, no. 1 (March 2009): 1-21. 
38 Benton, “Legal Spaces of Empire,” 704. 
39 A partial copy of this letter containing its opening lines is in TNA SP 104/88, f. 21r. I have thus far been 
unable to locate a copy of the letter in full and have drawn this description of its contents from Capponi's 
memorial in TNA SP 98/15, f. 112r. See also the copies of Bardi's letters to Skinner, of 3, 9 and 13 
September 1672, TNA SP 98/14, f. 212r-v. For Capponi's role within the Tuscan government of Cosimo 
  161 
! !
the Grand Duke's disposition to satisfy Charles's request for the restitution of his subjects' 
losses and to ensure “that no one under the flag of His Majesty was to be molested.”40  
Skinner and the English government did not question Tuscan jurisdiction over the case of 
the Lion, but they did make it clear that only one outcome would be acceptable.41 In 
response to Bardi's suggestion that he dispatch any further relevant information to 
Capponi, Skinner gave his opinion as to how the case stood: 
But as for the liberation of the turks and their goods, and the punishment of the 
malefactor, I do not see how, while His Majesty had so clearly expressed himself, 
I can enter into this matter other than to provide information of the act, as I have 
already done, and to note that in my opinion, the only question that remains is 
whether the said Captain had done wrong or no.  If the answer is no, it is clear that 
His Majesty will not permit of him, that which no other in the world dares to do, 
and was the only cause of the break with the North Africans, not wishing to allow 
them to visit his ships.  
 
Conversely, if Franceschi had acted improperly, then he should be summarily sentenced 
and punished. 42   
                                                
III, see Francesco Martelli, “<Nec Spes nec Metus> Ferrante Capponi, giurista ed alto funzionario nella 
Toscana di Cosimo III,” and Franco Angiolini, “Il principe e i cavalieri: l'auditore del Gran Maestro e 
l'Ordine di S. Stefano nell'età di Cosimo III,” in La Toscana nell'età di Cosimo III, ed. Franco Angiolini, 
Vieri Becagli, and Marcello Verga (Firenze: Edifir-Edizioni, 1993), 137-163; 193-197. 
40 “...et che nessuno sotto la bandiera di Sua Maestà habbia di essere molestato,” Skinner to Arlington, 
Livorno, 31 August 1672, TNA SP 98/14, f. 215r. 
41 Following Franceschi's seizure of the Lion's cargo and passengers, Ephraim Skinner and the deputies of 
the English nation at Livorno were initially reluctant to accept Bardi's suggestion that Parker bring his case 
before the Grand Duke's tribunals. Skinner explained that he was unwilling to bring the matter before a 
Tuscan court since a law suit against Franceschi would be time-consuming, costly and probably futile, as 
Parker had given Franceschi a receipt for the goods returned to him that absolved the corsair of further 
repayments. Skinner, did not, however, deny Tuscan jurisdiction over the matter, Skinner to Arlington, 
Livorno, 15 April 1672, TNA SP 98/14, f. 53r. 
42 “...ma per la liberatione delli Turchi con la loro roba, et il gastigare il mal fattore, non vedo, mentre che 
Sua Maestà si sia cosi ben dichiarito, come posso Io altrimente in cio entrare, si non di dare informatione 
del fatto, come gia e seguito, et segno che in mio giuditio, tutto si ristringie se il suddetto Capitano habbia 
fatto male, o, no; se e di no, chiaro e che S. Maestà non permettera in lui, quello che nessun'altro nel mondo 
ardisce di fare, et fu la sola causa della rottura con i Barbari, non volendoli lasciare visitare le sua Nave,” 
Skinner to Bardi, Livorno, 10 September 1672, TNA SP 98/14, f. 216r. Skinner seems to be referring to 
what was then the most recent outbreak of war between England and Algiers, lasting from 1669 to 1672. 
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 Capponi, on the other hand, took care to arrive at a more diplomatic resolution of 
the affair, one that would at once affirm the rights of Tuscan corsairs and satisfy English 
demands. After seeking the consultation of the knights of San Stefano and of Malta and 
other legal scholars, Capponi affirmed that English ships sailing between parts of the 
Ottoman Empire were indeed eligible to be searched by Tuscan corsairs and that 
Franceschi had acted appropriately in stopping the Lion in order to inspect its papers.  
While the grand dukes had ordered Livornese corsairs not to impede English ships 
traveling between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire that carried “the usuall letters 
from the Admiralty,” Capponi noted that this command itself required corsairs to visit 
English ships in order to inspect their papers.43 He echoed the Grand Master of the Order 
of Malta when he further noted that if English ships were to enjoy the privilege of not 
being stopped and their papers inspected, it would create a “most grievious prejudice to 
Christianity, for the Turkes by hiring English ships would enjoy the free commerce of the 
sea,” while Christians remained subject to the attacks of Muslim corsairs. This would 
also put Livornese corsairs in a “worse condition” than those of “Spain, Savoy, Malta, 
and even of Monaco a Prince of much inferior quallity” and other Christian princes 
would follow the English Crown's example, such that Livornese corsairs “Would be 
constrained never after to take your Highnesses flag, but that of other Princes, and soe 
                                                
43 In similar fashion, in a letter of 16 June 1664 to Louis XIV, Nicolas Cotoner warned of the advantages 
that would accrue to Muslims if they were able to proceed without fear of seizure simply on the basis of 
displaying the French flag, “sans même honorés de Son royal passport, et les inconvénients qui naîtront de 
ne pouvoir visiter les vaisseaux et reconnaître leur parenté,” quoted in Petiet, Le Roi et le Grand Maître, 
130.  
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your Highness would deminish the vallue and splendour of your Stendard [e cosi l'A.V. 
diminurebbe lo splendore et il pregio della sua bandiera].”44  
 Mindful of the need to protect the rights of the Grand Duke and to avoid 
establishing any harmful precedents, Capponi nevertheless also sought to resolve the case 
in a manner that would not antagonize the English. In particular, he concluded Franceschi 
had erred when he seized English goods from on board the Lion, which ought to have 
been done “in a good and legall form,” and should thus pay damages. He also suggested a 
compromise that freed the captive passengers and protected the right of the Grand Duke's 
corsairs to search English ships by advising that Franceschi be directed to make a gift of 
the captives to the Duke, who would in turn set them at liberty. This solution would, 
according to Capponi, avoid the problems that would arise if the Duke instead “judicially 
obliged [Franceschi] to a restitution,” since “ther would redound too great a prejudice to 
the methods, and customs practised at Sea even to this day by your Highnesses Vessells, 
and those of others.”45   
 For Capponi as much as for his English counterparts, the issues raised by the Lion 
revolved around the authority of their respective sovereigns and the “vallue and 
splendour” of their flags; indeed, Capponi demonstrated as great a concern for the Grand 
Duke's honor and the reputation of his state as for the principles of religious war that 
                                                
44 Capponi's memorial is dated 2 January 1673. All quotations from this memorial are taken from the 
contemporary translation in TNA SP 98/15, f. 112r-116v. Two separate copies of the Italian original are 
found in the same volume, f. 81r-83r and f. 84r-91v, respectively. 
45 “...che per Giustitia il Capitano Franceschi fosse tenuto alla restitutione ne risulterebbe troppo gran 
pregiuditio alli stili da vaselli di V.A. quanto da tutti gli altri praticati in mare,” TNA SP 98/15, f. 82r.  
Even so, the merchant Charles Longland, who had an ongoing case in Tuscan courts over the seizure of his 
goods by Livornese corsairs in 1659, cited Parker's case to demand restitution for his losses, noting that 
with regards to the Lion, “Dal Comando di S. A. S. fu fatto giustizia senza littigare.” The reference to the 
case of the Lion occurs in an undated and unsigned petition, probably from 1675, contained in ASF 
Auditore dei Benefici Ecclesiastici poi Segretaria del Regio Diritto, 5683. 
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were the ostensible purpose of the corso. Capponi's memorial also showed that questions 
of sovereignty underlay these references to honor and reputation. Drawing on 
conceptions of the law of nations to defend both Franceschi and the visità, Capponi 
explained that any restriction on the ability of Tuscan corsairs to search English ships was 
“not only a restraint of common-rights, but of the Right of People, in virtue wherof 
agaynst Turks, and Infidells (open Ennimys to Christians) so in per est indictum bellum; 
their depredation is allways lawfull, not withstanding they bee upon Vessells of Nations 
in friendship with us.”46 Placing the corso within prevailing views that neutral ships did 
not immunize the goods of belligerents from seizure, Capponi not only put religious war 
into a perspective rooted in the law of nations, but he also appealed to the sovereign 
authority of the state to legitimize the searching of English ships. Similarly, the Grand 
Master of the Order of Malta had earlier written to Louis XIV asking him to allow the 
order to continue to visit French ships, recalling how the ministers of Louis's 
predecessors had always responded to those pleading for restitution of goods seized by 
the Order, “that this Order was a Republic separate and independent from the States of 
France, of which their Majesty did not take any cognizance.”47 
                                                
46 “...non solamente restritive del Ius comune ma anco del'Ius delle genti in virtu del quale con i Turchi et 
infidelis inimici aperti de christianis sempre est indictum bellum, Semper e lecita La Loro depredatione 
etiam che siano sopra vasselli di nationi amiche, come concordemente affermano tutti i dottori e si pratica 
per li stili universali del mare,” TNA SP 98/15, f. 82r. The English jurist Thomas Malloy agreed and 
asserted that under the law of nations, enemy goods could be seized from neutral ships, De Jure Maritime 
et Navale, 2nd ed. (London, 1677), 9. On early modern conceptions of neutral rights, see Jessup and Deák, 
“The Early Development of the Law of Neutral Rights,” and Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral 
Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938): 152-180.  See also, Benton, “Legal Spaces of 
Empire,” 705. 
47 “...que cette Religion estoit une Republique separeé et independante des Estats de la France, de laquelle 
leur Maiestre ne prenoit aucune connoissance,” de Cottoner to Louis XIV, 31 May 1666, AOM 1588, 89-
90. De Cottoner's argument that the Order was a body independent of French authority is separate from the 
later practice of corsairs to sail under the flag of the Grand Master as ruler of Malta, as opposed to under 
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  While the Mediterranean corso ultimately rested on a basis of religious war, the 
interaction of Christian corsairs and English navigation raised a complicated set of 
intersecting questions of sovereignty, royal authority and profit. Of course, it would be 
too simplistic to neglect the role religion continued to play even for the English in the 
seventeenth-century Mediterranean.48 In 1668 at the height of the Ottoman siege of 
Candia, the King's council explained the importance of religion to its decision not to 
grant letters of reprisal to Roger Fowke for a ship previously seized and condemned by 
the Order of Malta. As the council reported, “his Majestie taking into his Consideration 
the present State of Affaires in Christendome, & the encreasing Power of the Comon 
Enemy thereof against whom Maltha is so considerable a Bulwarke” had decided not to 
grant letters of reprisal, “or proceed otherwise for Reparation, as by the Law of Nations, 
he justly might.”49 Moreover, English outrage over the seizure of ships by Livornese or 
Majorcan corsairs never produced outright hostilities, highlighting the fundamentally 
different way in which the English and other Europeans viewed their relations with the 
Muslim powers of North Africa compared to the norms that regulated their interaction 
with “civilized” powers. There is reason to think that attitudes within the regencies 
mirrored those in Europe. England's consul in Tunis in 1675 warned that if the English 
did not obtain redress for the affronts of Majorcan corsairs, “it will prove of ill 
Consequence, and bad Examples to the Privateers of Algier, Tunis and Tripoly, for they 
say it is farr more pardonable for them to take out Jews, and Strangers Goods then for the 
                                                
the banner of the Order, in order to avoid papal jurisdiction over prize appeals. On this practice, see Earle, 
Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, 115-116.  
48 For an especially strong statement of this point, see Greene, “Beyond the Northern Invasion,” passim. 
49 Minute of resolution of the King in Council, Whitehall, 6 April 1668, TNA SP 86/1, f. 10v.   
  166 
! !
People of any Christian Prince that is att Peace and Amity with his Majesty of great 
Brittaine.”50 If England's relationship with North African regencies was not 
fundamentally about religion or cultural difference, both those factors impacted how 
England's commercial and political relations with those polities played out.  
 England's wars with the regencies nevertheless centered on the same concern for 
the privileges and security of navigation as motivated the Crown to press for the 
immunity of English ships from search by Christian corsairs. The ambiguous position of 
the regencies in English policy comes across strongly in a speech made by the earl of 
Clarendon before Parliament in 1665, in which he lauded the Earl of Sandwich's 
expedition against Algiers of 1661 as “a designe of great glory, and equal expence,” 
which had resulted in “an entire submission to the English flag.” Clarendon went on to 
explain that another expedition had been dispatched against that regency, since “the 
faithless people of Argiers, who had so lately submitted to him, had committed new 
insolencis upon some of his Subjects, or rather upon forraigne persons taken by his 
Subjects into their protection, and which the Turks pretended they might doe, without 
violation of the Treaty.”51 Clarendon thus maintained that England would not tolerate any 
foreign interference with its navigation 
 A year after the incident of the Lion, John Finch similarly affirmed that the 
authority of the Crown over English ships precluded Christian corsairs from interfering 
with their passengers or cargoes. When asked by the Grand Duke how his corsairs could 
                                                
50 Francis Baker to Williamson, Tunis, 12/22 February 1675, TNA SP 71/26, f. 231r. 
51 The Lord Chancellor’s Speech to both Houses of Parliament, Oxford, 10 October 1665, BL MS Eg. 
2543, f. 171v-172r. 
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recognize an English ship, considering that Muslim ships might sail under the English 
flag, Finch responded by noting that while English ships sailing into the Mediterranean 
were required to have a pass from the Admiralty, or a crew made up of at least two-thirds 
the King's subjects, he “apprehended the King my Masters pleasure, that His ships should 
be searched or stopped by none.”52 Finch’s insistence that corsairs refrain from searching 
English ships, regardless of the composition of their crew, differs from the response he 
had previously given a Tuscan merchant whose ship was seized by an English man-of-
war during the Second Anglo-Dutch War. Finch advised the merchant that “no flag was 
sufficient sauvegard to any Vessell” and the validity of the prize was thus to be decided 
by a Court of Admiralty.53 As Ephraim Skinner advised Tuscan officials, “the searching 
of shipps as I tell them, be their order what they will, is not to be allowed of but by those 
that cannot right themselves.”54  
 Underlying debates over the legitimacy of the visità were questions of state 
power. Arguments that English ships ought to be immune from search accorded with 
neither seventeenth-century juridical opinions nor with the practice of the English navy 
itself. Instead, as Skinner suggested, the searching of vessels was ultimately a matter that 
depended on the relative power of the states involved. The negotiations that followed 
attacks on English ships revealed the Crown's commitment to preserving the security of 
                                                
52 Finch to Arlington, Livorno, 10 November 1673, TNA SP 98/15, f. 65v. 
53 The Tuscan ship had taken on a French master and French crew before France joined the Dutch Republic 
in its war against England, which explains the uncertainty of whether the vessel was Tuscan or not, Finch 
to Arlington, Livorno, 19 February/1 March 1666 and 26 February/8 March, TNA SP 98/6. The ship was 
judged to be French and condemned by a prize court at Tangier, as the English Admiral Sir Jeremy Smith 
related in a letter from Portsmouth, of 13 May 1666, TNA SP 98/6. 
54 Skinner to Arlington, Livorno, 14 July 1673, TNA SP 98/15, f. 184v.  
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English navigation and its growing ability to protect its subjects' shipping. However, 
these negotiations also gave the sponsors of corsairs the opportunity to defend the legal 
and ideological bases of the corso. The searching of vessels thus set the growth of 
English state authority against the legal and customary rights of corsairs and illustrated 
the changing political conditions of trade in the Mediterranean.  
 
II. Piracy and Sovereign Authority in the Mediterranean  
  
 During the later seventeenth century, the increasingly powerful maritime and 
naval powers of northern Europe reshaped the contours of trade in the Mediterranean. 
The evident commercial advantages that the English and French Crowns sought for their 
navigation by exempting it from the effects of the corso were in fact only part of a larger 
expansion of state authority over the nations' merchants and navigation in the 
Mediterranean. Under the Restoration monarchy, the English Crown and its 
representatives sought to extend their authority over English merchants and sailors, 
aspiring to regulate their trade more closely and to acquire a measure of jurisdiction over 
them even in foreign ports. Moreover, England's diplomats and consuls in the 
Mediterranean took any perceived imposition on English shipping to be an affront to the 
king and to the free commerce of his navigation. After the English reacted angrily when 
the Venetian fleet forced an English frigate to release a Venetian vessel it had claimed as 
a prize, Venice's ambassador to England, Girolamo Alberti, remarked that the “goodness 
and justice” Charles II and his chief ministers was not followed by others at Court who 
“Carried away by their natural heat they permit themselves to say that the king ought to 
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keep a number of war ships in the Mediterranean to enforce his rights. These gentlemen 
are of opinion that might is supreme and may supersede right.”55  
 Alberti was only half correct: England's growing power in the Mediterranean did 
not simply supplant right, but rather also redefined it. As English representatives in the 
Mediterranean protested taxes and restrictions imposed by Mediterranean states on 
English ships in their waters, they implicitly and explicitly questioned the legitimacy of 
duties and rights that those governments argued flowed from their sovereignty. Crown 
authority over English navigation was a key component of the expansion of England's 
maritime empire into the Atlantic and (through the East India Company) the Indian 
Ocean. The Venetian ambassador to England, Pietro Mocenigo, would aptly reflect this 
view in 1671, when he reported to the Senate that England “has the Ocean for its territory 
[ha quel regno per territorio l'Oceano] where by the practice of navigation it carries on 
trade with the world or establishes its dominions by the mobile fortresses of its ships.”56  
However, as “islands of law” that carried state power across oceans, ships were also sites 
where maritime sovereignty was contested.57 Thus, John Finch warned that the seizure of 
an English ship by the farmers of a maritime duty claimed by the Prince of Monaco 
amounted to the “dangerous beginnings of an Honorable Piracy.”58 Finch reminded that 
                                                
55 Girolamo Alberti to Doge and Senate, 13 October 1673, in the Calendar of State Papers and 
Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs in the Archivs of  Venice, vol. 38, 1673-1675, ed. Allen B. Hinds  
(London: Longman, Green, 1947), 139. 
56 Mocenigo to the Senate, 9 June 1671, Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English 
Affairs in the Archivs of  Venice, vol. 37, 1671-1672, ed. Allen B. Hinds (London: Longman, Green, 1939), 
55.   
57 For this point, see especially Anne Pérotin-Dumon, “The Pirate and the Emperor” and Lauren Benton, 
“Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism.” 
58 John Finch to Arlington, Livorno, 3/13 February 1668, TNA SP 98/9.   
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Prince of England's recent wars against the North African corsairs, warning him that his 
king would hardly scruple “to proceed in the same manner with any Christian Prince, 
which on the European coast should pretend any Dutyes upon the ships belonging to his 
Subjects, so much against the Dignity of his Majestie who in this world acknolwedges 
nothing superior to himselfe, but almighty god.”59 While Monaco had long claimed the 
duty in question, Finch questioned the “Legality and Justice of all such Pretensions” and 
further advised Arlington that a single frigate could “Carve out full Satisfaction.”60   
 At the base of Finch's complaint against the Prince of Monaco was the perception 
that impositions on English navigation violated the King's authority over his subjects and 
their shipping overseas. While both the Prince of Monaco and the sponsors of corsairs 
claimed sovereign authority to tax or search English ships under certain conditions, the 
English sought to redefine the legal organization of trade in the Mediterranean. The 
dispute between Finch and the Prince of Monaco mirrors a contemporaneous dispute 
between France and Savoy over the analogous diritto di Villafranca, which was a duty 
collected by the dukes of Savoy on ships passing Villefranche and originally intended to 
fund galleys and fortresses to defend the coast from attack by Muslim corsairs.61 In 1660, 
                                                
59 “Copy of John Finch's Letter in answer to the Prince of Monaco,” Pisa, 1/11 January 1668, TNA SP 98/8, 
f. 1v-2r. For background on the duty, granted by both imperial and French patents, and imposed on small 
ships passing by Monaco's coast in order to fund defences against Muslim corsairs, see Henri Métivier, 
Monaco et ses Princes, 2nd ed. (La Flèche: E. Jourdain, 1865), 320; Michel Bottin, “Le Droit de 
Villefranche” (PhD Diss., Université de Nice, 1974), 13-14. 
60 “Copy of John Finch's Letter in answer to the Prince of Monaco,” Pisa, 1/11 January 1668, TNA SP 98/8, 
f. 2r and Finch to Arlington, Livorno, 3/13 February 1668, ibid, f. 42v. Finch eventually negotiated a 
payment of reparation to the concerned ship's master, which the Committee for Foreign Affairs took to 
settle the matter, since “the point is gott in a reparation” Minute of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, 
Whitehall, 29 November 1668, TNA SP 104/176, f. 89v. 
61 The diritto di Villafranca was granted to the dukes of Savoy by both imperial and papal patents and had 
been confirmed by treaties. On this duty, see Michel Bottin, “Le Droit de Villefranche,” 19-24; Luca Lo 
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the ministers of the Duke of Savoy laid out their advice for his response to the complaints 
of the French ambassador over the seizure of ships for contravening the duty. The 
ambassador demanded that the ship be restored and that the farmers of the duty be 
handed over as prisoners together with their goods, which were assumed to be the loot of 
their “thefts.”62 In response, the ministers of the Duke of Savoy advised that the diritto 
was an “effect, and mark of the sovereignty, that Your Royal Highness justly possesses in 
the maritime tract adjacent to your states.”63 
 When consuls and ministers labeled Mediterranean corsairs as “pirates,” they 
denied that foreign vessels and the sovereigns who granted their commissions had the 
legal authority to interfere with English navigation. Thus, in 1686, after a Savoyard 
corsair, the Marquis de Fleury, sailing under a commission from the king of Poland, 
seized the English ship Jerusalem, which was carrying Ismael Pasha of Tripoli and his 
retinue and took it into Malta, the English accused him not merely of dishonoring English 
navigation, but also of piracy.64 A year later in 1687, Trinity House blamed this “Pyrate,” 
                                                
Basso, In traccia de’ legni nemici: corsari europei nel Mediterraneo del Settecento (Ventimiglia: 
Philobiblon Edizioni, 2002), 65-67. 
62 “...che si restituiscano dette prese, con ogni altra, che si trovarà fatta per il passato, et che si diano 
prigionieri detti Cavallieri con loro robbe, presuponendoli rei di molte rubbarie,” “Copia di parere de 
Ministri de S.A.R. per Le contese del dritto di Villafranca colli Francesi,” 14 June 1660, Archivio di Stato 
di Torino (AST) Contado di Nizza, Diritto di Villafranca, Prima Addizione, Mazzo 1, Fascicolo 7. 
63 “Esser’ il dritto di Villafranca effetto, e marca della sovranità, che V.A.R. giustamente possiede nel tratto 
maritimo coherenti á suoi stati,” ibid.  Savoy would continue to insist on payment of the diritto through the 
eighteenth century; the Comte de Chavannes responded to Dutch objections to the duty by reiterating, “on 
ne peut légitimement disputer l'exaction d'un Droit á un Souverain, qui outre la Possession, la Proprieté et 
le Domaine actuel qu'il se maintient sur les Mers adjacentes á ses Etats, ou il est imposé, se trouve encore 
de plus en possession de le faire exiger de toutes les Nations indistinctement,” Memoire du Comte de 
Chavannes, Ministre du Roi, remis le 31 May 1741, AST Contado di Nizza, Dritto di Villafranca, II 
Addizione, Fascicolo 15.  Both England and France abrogated the duty through lump sum payments in the 
mid-eighteenth century, see Bottin, “Le droit de Villefranche,” 80-82, 156-157. 
64 When Fleury captured a Venetian ship in 1672, the republic dispatched warships to capture him, bringing 
him back to Venice, where he was sentenced to death but released on the request of various Catholic rulers, 
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at least in part, for the difficulties English ships were encountering in finding freights in 
foreign ports, but were confident that the steps James II had taken to prosecute him and 
obtain restitution of the pasha's losses would “advance the credit of our Navigation 
abroad to a greater height than it hath yet been.” 65   
 The Crown's response to Fleury's attack on the Jerusalem illustrated its view of 
the illegality of such actions. When James II failed to secure diplomatically the restitution 
of the pasha's goods from Gregorio Carafa, the Grand Master of the Order of Malta, he 
dispatched three frigates under the command of Henry Killigrew to the Mediterranean to 
hunt down Fleury and to obtain the return of the pasha's goods.66 After Fleury 
subsequently sailed to the Savoyard port of Villefranche, Thomas Kirke, the English 
consul in Genoa, wrote to Victor Amadeus II, the Duke of Savoy, to advise him that 
Fleury's actions were against the law of nations and to warn him that James II would find 
his honor “very interested in this affair, as sovereign of the Marine, that anyone of 
whatsoever Condition, whoever he is, will presume to disturb, or prejudice any of his 
subjects carrying his flag.”67 Departing for Constantinople a year later, William 
                                                
Robert Saulger, Histoire nouvelle des anciens duc et autres souverains de l'Archipel (Paris, 1698), 306-
309; Géraud Poumarède, Pour en finir avec la Croisade: Mythes et réalités de la lutte contra les Turcs aux 
VVIe et XVIIe siècles (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004), 483-484. Skinner may have had this 
incident in mind when he advised Arlington that if the king could not obtain satisfaction from the Grand 
Duke in the affair of the Mediterranean, there would be “noe way like what the Venetians in such like 
cases commonly practise, to give strick & secrett orders to a frigat or 2 to find Signore Dominico 
Franceschi out, & bring him dead or alive into England” to discourage corsairs in the future and “secure the 
honour of our navigation,” Skinner to Arlington, 30 August/9 September 1673, TNA SP 98/15, f. 202v. 
65 “Report of the Trinity House to the King touching the grounds of the present publick evill of soe great 
numbers of his seamen found in the service of foreign states, and the remedies by them proposed thereto,” 
28 July 1687, Bodl. MS Rawl. A 171, f. 162v. 
66 D.F. Allen provides a narrative of these events in “James in Pursuit of a Pirate at Malta,” The British 
Library Journal 16, no. 2 (Autumn 1990), 109-116.  
67 “...qualle Ladromania essendo Contro, Gius gentium sua sacra M[aestà]. ... essendo Informato, e trovano 
il suo honore molto Interessato In questo affare, Come sovrano della Marina, che alcuno di qualsivoglia 
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Trumbull, England's new ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, was entrusted with a letter 
to the Grand Vizier documenting the English Crown's response to Fleury's “Piracy,” and 
assuring the Ottoman minister that “in vindication of Our owne Honor and Justice, and to 
show the detestation We alwais beare to such Enemys of the Common Peace of Mankind, 
We have by Our Ships of Warr now in the Mediterranean Seas, and by Our Ministers at 
the Courts of Christian Princes in those parts prosecuted the Pirates to the utter 
destruction of him and his Ship.”68 
 The letters of Kirke and James II expand on the complaints earlier directed 
against Franceschi by asserting that the violation of English navigation and of England's 
treaty-based trade to the Ottoman Empire constituted an act of piracy. Both the English 
and the French demanded that their free commerce with the Levant take precedence over 
the practices of corsairs. Louis XIV and Colbert argued that ships of the Order of Malta 
should not seize Muslim passengers or goods from French vessels ships, in part, on the 
basis that France's treaty with the Ottomans had established reciprocal free commerce 
between the two powers.69 In the early eighteenth century, French ministers further 
                                                
Conditione, sia chi, si sia, presumerá di desturbare, ó pregiudicare alcuni de suoi suditi portando sua 
Bandiera,” Thomas Kirke to the Duke of Savoy, 11 March 1687, AST Lettere Particolari, mazzo 111.  
68 “Copy of King's Letter to the Vizier Azem,” 9 April 1687, BL Add. MSS 72550.  
69 Baili de Souvre to the Grand Master, Paris, 30 April 1666, NLM AOM 1214, p. 337.  See also 
McCluskey, “Commerce before Crusade?,” 7. When the Estates General of the Dutch Republic wrote the 
Grand Master in 1663 to complain of the seizure of the Empereur Octavian by a Maltese vessel, they noted 
that the ship's owner had believed that he would not be subject to search based on the “Natural advantage of 
Commerce,” as confirmed by the Republic's treaties with both the states of Europe and corsairs of North 
Africa, “Le patron de ce Navire, croiyant se pouvoir servir de l'avantage Naturel du Commerce, confirmé 
pas les traittés, que cet Estat a avec touts les Rois de l'Europe, et mesme par celuij que nous avons conclu 
avec les Corsaires de Barbarie de pouvoir charger toutes sortes de Marchandises, a la reserve de celles de 
Contrebande, Sans estre Subjets a visite,” 1 December 1663, NLM AOM 1201, f. 115r.  Such appeals to 
the reciprocity of the Capitulations contrasts with the Ottoman understanding of these documents as 
unilateral legal grants of protection to foreign residents within that empire.  On this point, see Edhem 
Eldem, “Capitulations and Western Trade,” in The Cambridge Hitory of Turkey, vol. 3, The Later Ottoman 
Empire, 1603-1839, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 294. 
  174 
! !
suggested that the treaties of Europe's maritime power created a body of public law [droit 
public] that even countries that were not party to those treaties ought to observe.70  
Ephraim Skinner similarly argued that the best principle for England to observe with 
regard to Tuscan corsairs would be, “as we will not allow our shipps to be searched by 
the Turks for Christians soe neither the Turks nor their goods to be taken out of them, 
which will alsoe seeme to salve the Grand Duke's honour in giveing out new orders, 
finding that to be the only difficulty.”71 When Fleury brought the Jerusalem into Malta, 
the Chevalier de Bataille, who seems to have acted as an unofficial agent for the English 
at Malta, argued along these lines that the ship, its passengers and cargo should be freed.  
Opinions differed as to whether or not corsairs were permitted to visit English ships. 
According to Bataille, the Spanish, Italians and Germans argued that the English Crown 
had never declared that English ships were not to be seized if carrying Muslims; 
meanwhile, he held that the French view seemed correct on grounds of equity, in as much 
as if the Knights or those of any nation “have enjoyed the privilege, that embarking on 
vessels of France, or of England, the Turks are unable to seize them or do them any 
                                                
70 When the French ambassador to Savoy appealed against the enslavement of Muslim passengers from a 
French ship that sank off the coast of Sicily in 1716, he argued for their release based on, “Les maximes du 
droit Naturel, les Regles du droit des et les dispositions du droit public tel quil est expliqué dan les traittez 
et Observé par les puissance Maritimes de Europe [my italics],” “Memoire remis par Monsieur Le Marquis 
de Prye Ambassadeur de france le 10e Mars 1717 concernant les Turcs arrestés en Sicile,” Parere dell 
Avvocato Generale Zoppi á S.M. delli 15 Marzo 1717, AST Contado di Nizza, Porto di Villafranca, mazzo 
4. On the other hand, an opinion delivered by Savoyard ministers on the matter denied that the French flag 
alone could provide security for those sailing under it, “Se poi s'intende di ricever le prerogative dalla 
Bandiera, si risponde che la sicurezza delle persone e robbe nemiche tutta dipende da Trattati, e senza d'essi 
la bandiera non sarebbe ne pur bastante ad assicurarle ancorche si trovassero sovra la nave,” Parere à Sua 
Maestà delli Presidenti Ricardi, Graneri, et Avvocato Generale Zoppi sovra li Turchi naufragggati sovra le 
spiaggie di Sicilia, 24 May 1717, ibid. 
71 Skinner to Arlington, Livorno, 7/17 July 1673, TNA SP 98/15, f. 177r. 
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wrong; the same privilege ought it seems to be in favor of Turks who put themselves with 
good faith under the said flags.”72  
 These arguments sought to establish that Crown authority over navigation and 
commercial reciprocity between England and the Ottoman Empire invalidated Fleury's 
actions, but they actually did little to help James II to obtain the release of Ismael Pasha's 
goods and fellow passengers. The King of Poland, who had commissioned Fleury and 
was at war with the Ottoman Empire, maintained that Fleury had not committed any 
“piracy” but rather had been engaged in holy war and invited any Englishmen concerned 
in the matter to bring their case before him and his tribunals.73 Meanwhile, Grand Master 
Carafa explained that he was unable to restore the goods left by Fleury since it would not 
be right for him to do so, “much less to use any act of sovranity on ships with Royal 
Flags,” nor could he interfere in the affair, “least I might be said to assume to my Selfe 
too great authority over the absolute and independent Rights of Kings, whom I humbly 
reverence as the Guardians and Protectors of this Order.”74 Apparently, only the arrival of 
Killigrew's flotilla convinced Carafa of the weight of English arguments that Fleury's 
                                                
72 “...et apparemment ciluy des françois est le meilleur et estably sur l'Equité; en ce que; si les Chevaliers de 
Malte, et toutte altre Natione ont et iuiissent du privilege, que s'embarquant sur des vaisseaux de france; ou 
d'angleterre, les Turcs ne  pouvent les arrester ny leur faire aucun tort; le même privilege doit ce semble 
estre aussy en faveur des Turs qui se mettent de bonne foy sous les susdits Pavillons,” 18 January 1687, 
TNA SP 86/2, f. 21r-v.   
73 “...quale sotto il nostro stendardo milita in Mare contro i nemici di Cristianità esercitando non la 
Piractica, mà la Sacra militia,” “Copia di lettera scritta dal Rè di Polonia al Rè d'Inghilterra,” AST Contado 
di Nizza, Magistrato del Consolato di mare, Rappresententanze e Pareri di Magistrato, 1629-1717, f. 41r.  
The folder also contains the Latin copy of this letter, f. 39r (militans non Piracticum, sed militiam sacram) 
and Latin and Italian copies of Fleury's commission from the King of Poland. The Cavaliere Bataille 
reported that the Polish resident in Paris thought the prize “bien fait et que la prise estoit bonne,” TNA SP 
86/2, f. 21r. 
74 Carafa to James II, 29 November 1686, TNA SP 85/12, f. 125r-v. The Latin original of this letter is in 
TNA SP 86/1, f. 69r-v.  
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patent was invalid.75 The Grand Master ordered that Ismael Pasha's goods be turned over 
to the English and subsequently assured Trumbull that he had given orders “that none 
carrying the Banner of Malta should any wayes disturbe the Commerce of his Majeties 
Subjects or search their ships.”76   
 While the Grand Master ultimately gave in to English demands, his earlier 
contention that the matter of the Jerusalem was one best resolved between the kings of 
England and Poland reflected the legal arguments previously put forward by Capponi. As 
in the case of the Lion, early modern jurists generally viewed enemy goods taken off 
friends' ships as a legitimate prize; Kirke's accusation that Fleury had acted against the 
law of nations thus appears either uninformed or based upon the assumption that the 
corsair was acting without legitimate authority. Conversely, when the Consolato del Mare 
of Nice considered whether Fleury's ship was to be confiscated after its arrival at 
Villafranca, it delivered an opinion that echoed the Grand Master. The jurists argued that 
since Fleury had sailed under the standard and in the service the King of Poland, it would 
be no more just to turn the ship over, than “it would be for a Neutral Prince to concede a 
reprisal to the disgust of an Friendly Prince in order to please another.”77 The Duke of 
                                                
75 Carafa to Ambasciatore Sacchetti (in Rome), 25 March 1687, NLM AOM 1454, f. 53r: “che ci hà fatto 
ancora impressione, L'asseverante preteso del S. Ambasciatore circa La falsità delle Patenti di Polonia, 
dandoci à credere, ch'egli non lo dica senza qualche fondamento.” 
76 Trumbull to Sunderland, Malta, 29 June 1687, TNA SP 97/20, f. 91v. 
77 “...trattandosi d'una Nave protetta dal stendardo del Re di Polonia sotto il quale e per il quale militava 
non potrebbe esser piu giusta la remissione d'essa á chi la proseguisse de quello, che sarebbe giusto il 
concedersi una rapresaglia da un Prencipe Neutro, in odio d'un Prencipe Amico per compiacer all'altro,” 6 
February 1688, AST Contado di Nizza, Magistrato del Consolato di Mare, Rappresententanze e Pareri di 
Magistrato, 1629-1717. With regards to neutrals and reprisals, Molloy wrote that ships or goods taken by 
virtue of a letter of reprisal and brought into a neutral state, without having been first made good by the 
courts of the prince who had issued the letters, could there be seized by the original owners, De Jure 
Maritimo et Navali, p. 22 
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Savoy subsequently explained to his envoy to London, the Conte Rovere, that while he 
desired to provide satisfaction to the English king he could not in good conscience and 
with justice return the ship after receiving the opinion of the Consolato.78  
 The English response to Fleury's seizure of the pasha of Tripoli from the 
Jerusalem exposed both the extent and limitations of the power of the English state in the 
Mediterranean. While the English state sought to extend its authority into the 
Mediterranean through privileges it demanded for English navigation and merchants, the 
reaction of Mediterranean princes and their ministers to English demands reveal the 
extent to which they shaped the evolution of the early modern Mediterranean in a 
direction that contrasted with English expectations. The complexity of this situation 
comes across strongly in the negotiations that followed the same Domenico Franceschi's 
seizure of goods and members of the retinue of Ali Pasha of Tunis off the English-
flagged ship Mediterranean in 1673.79 The Levant Company feared that it would be 
forced to pay compensation for the pasha's losses and directed Sir John Finch, England's 
                                                
78 “Istruzione al Conte Rovere mandato in Inghilterra per contrularvisi nella Nascita del Principe di Galles, 
1688,” AST Materie politiche per rapporto all'estero, negoziazioni, negoziazioni coll'Inghilterra, Mazzo 1, 
f. 25. In 1689, Consul Kirke wrote to the Earl of Shrewsbury to report that Fleury's ship was sailing to 
England and to urge that it be seized. Kirke recounted that James “was very much disgusted & exasperated 
& would have had his revenge of said Duke, if hee had remained at the helme, for him slighteing his 
demand's, & the affront putt on our Navigation, as also the great prejudice our Natione received in this 
action, by the Piracy of said Dukes Subject Flury, meriting a most Severe chastisement.” It does not appear 
that anything came of Kirke's letter, especially as the English government would not want to offend an 
important ally in its war against France. Thomas Kirke to Earl of Shrewsbury, Genoa, 10 December 1689, 
TNA SP 79/3, f. 99r. 
79 The Ottoman official is referred to as Ali Pasha in the European sources and, according to the English 
merchant Humphrey Sidney, had left Tunis in anticipation of the power struggle that was waged through 
the summer of 1673 between local and “Turkish” faction, see Sidney, Livorno, 9/19 June, 1673, TNA SP 
98/15, f. 172r. For the political situation of seventeenth century Tunis, see Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, “The 
Beylicate in Seventeenth-Century Tunisia,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, no. 1 (Jan. 
1975): 70-93. 
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new ambassador to the Porte, to obtain the restitution of the pasha's goods.80 Finch 
similarly worried about the effects of Franceschi’s actions and further saw the attack on 
the Mediterranean as an affront to the Crown. He accordingly wrote to Lord Arlington 
that “the Honour of His Majesty is greatly concerned His Navigation of necessity falling 
into a Low esteem in the Mediterranean, when the Ships of His Subjects cannot Protect 
their goods they carry from the Insolency’s of Christian Pirates.”81 Finch proceeded to 
enter into negotiations with the Genoese (as a Corsican, Franceschi was a subject of that 
republic) and with the Grand Duke of Tuscany in order to seek the return of Ali Pasha's 
goods and “to make an exemplary demonstration of him.”82 Skinner further advised his 
superiors that if the Crown could not obtain satisfaction from the Tuscans, it should 
dispatch a frigate to hunt down Franceschi and bring him “dead or alive” to England.83 
 The Genoese response to Finch's demands that Franceschi be punished by his 
native sovereign similarly illustrated the complexities of subjecthood and sovereign 
responsibility in the early modern Mediterranean world. Like its Tuscan counterpart, the 
Genoese government sought to appease an excitable English minister while also 
preserving its own honor and sovereignty. In order to demonstrate to Charles II that “the 
Republic does not miss any occasion to meet his every pleasure,” the Genoese 
government accordingly ordered the Magistrato di Corsica to proceed against Franceschi 
                                                
80 Directors of the Levant Company to Finch, London, 28 July 1673, TNA SP 105/113, 365-366. 
81 Finch to Arlington, Genoa, 6 September 1673, TNA SP 79/2. 
82 “...per farne esemplare dimostrazione,” ASG Archivio Segreto, Trattati con Ministri d’Inghilterra et 
Olanda 1/2758, “Ristretto del Negoziati, e risposte passate coll'Ambasciatore Finch Inglese,” 7 September 
1673. 
83 Skinner to Arlington, 30 August/ 9 September 1673, TNA SP 98/15, f. 202v. 
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on the basis of the Genoese statute “quod nemo piraticam exerceat” of 1556, which 
forbid any Genoese citizen or subject from engaging in piracy, “unless coerced or with 
the permission of the Senate.”84 However, the Magistrato di Corsica responded by noting 
that it had been caused “qualche perplessità” in considering how to carry forward the case 
against Domenico Franceschi. Although Franceschi was a native of Corsica and thus a 
subject of the Genoese republic, he had lived for many years in Livorno and since he had 
sailed under the grand duke's flag “it does not seem possible to say he is a pirate [non si 
possa dire pirata], that is a thief of the sea, when he acted under the authority of a Prince, 
of whom he may be called a subject by reason of his domicile, going in corso as a 
Dependent of that Prince whose flag he has.” 85 In response, the Giunta della Marina 
advised that the case against Franceschi be carried forward, since “Justice obligates the 
subject wherever he is.”86 Moreover, according to the Giunta, since the statute forbade 
Genoese subjects from willingly serving as corsairs under other states, the prosecution of 
Franceschi should go forward in any case. Although Genoa proceeded against Franceschi 
at the insistence of Finch, it did so entirely according to its own laws and regulations. 
                                                
84 “...affinche S. Maestà riconosca non trascurar La Repubblica alcuna occasione d'incontrare ogni sua 
maggiore soddisfazione,” “Ultime risposte dà darsi per mezo degli eccellentissimi Deputati 
all'Ambasciatore del Rè Britannico,” 11 September 1673, ASG Archivio Segreto, Trattati con Ministri 
d’Inghilterra et Olanda 1/2758. The full statute, “quod nemo piraticam exerceat, nec furetur in littore 
maris,” may be found in Jean-Marie Pardessus, Collection de Lois Maritimes Antérieures au XVIIIe. Siècle, 
vol. 4, Droit maritime des Pays-Bas méridionaux et septentrionaux, de l’Angleterre, de la France, de la 
république de Gênes, de Pise et de Florence (Paris, 1837), 524.  The relevant section reads: “qui 
contrafecerit, laqueo suspendatur, et ad ablati restitutionem teneatur, nisi probaverit coactus fecisse, aut 
Serenissimi Senatus permissione.” 
85 “...e che va da corseggiando con stendardo, ò sia bandiera del Gran Duca, per il che pare non si possa 
dire pirata, che è l'istesso che ladro del mare, mentr'egli fà ciò con autorità di Principe, del quale ratione 
domicilij si può dir suddito corseggiando come Dipendente da quel Principe del quale, hà lo stendardo,” 
Magistrato di Corsica to the Serenissimi Collegi, 7 November 1673, ASG Archivio Segreto, Maritimarum 
1671, 1673-1675. 
86 “...è assai Commune l'opinione che la Ratione oblighi il suddito ovunque si trovi,” Giunta della Marina to 
the Serenissimi Collegi, 15 November 1673, ibid. 
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Indeed, in banishing Franceschi for actions he committed while under the commission of 
the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Genoese government reaffirmed its authority over one 
whose subjecthood was ambiguous. 
 While both the Genoese and Tuscans would go to great lengths to satisfy Finch's 
demands, their responses also show similar care that they not infringe upon their own 
dignity or sovereignty. Ferrante Capponi ensured that the resolution of the case of the 
Lion protected the honor and authority of the grand duke and the rights of his subjects.  
When Cosimo III wrote to Charles II to convey the results of the matter, he affirmed that 
the Lion's Muslim passengers were held to be “lawfully taken.”87 However, following 
Franceschi's attack upon the Mediterranean, Conte Bardi assured Skinner that the grand 
duke had received the news with great displeasure, “His Highness intending that whoever 
sails under his flag should proceed with every respect and rectitude according to the 
agreements already established, toward who carries the standard, and Patent, of His 
Britannic Majesty.”88 Sending letters to both the governor of Livorno and to the grand 
master of the Order of Malta, Cosimo III requested that Franceschi's ship and property be 
sequestered in anticipation of any damages he might be obligated to pay. 
 Despite the Grand Duke's readiness to address English requests over the 
Mediterranean, it is clear that the Tuscans approached the matter more carefully than the 
                                                
87 This is from the contemporary English translation of the letter of the Grand Duke to Charles II of 11/21 
January 1673, TNA SP 98/15, f. 121r. The Italian copy reads “eran stati Legittimamente con tutti il loro 
havere predati,” ibid., f. 122r. 
88 “...premendo S.A., che da chi naviga con la sua bandiera, si proceda con ogni rispetto e rettitudine, e 
secondo i concerti gia stabilti verso chi porta stendardo e Patente di S.M.Brittanica,” Bardi to Skinner, 
Florence, 9 July 1673, TNA SP 98/15, f. 179r.  
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English reports would suggest.89 When Capponi turned to the case of the Mediterranean, 
he again sought to confirm the sovereign authority of the grand duke with regards to the 
conduct of his corsairs and to defend him from accusations that he was insufficiently 
attentive to the well being of English navigation. A set of instructions among the papers 
of Capponi advised the recipient that the English now claimed that their vessels should be 
able to carry Muslim passengers and their goods free from the interference of Tuscan 
corsairs, and that while this was a pretension “that can Cause many disorders, and 
prejudices for [our] navigation,” the grand duke did not wish to challenge it as long as the 
ships carried the English flag and letters and patents from the Lord High Admiral. 
However, there were grounds for suspicion with regards to the Mediterranean, since the 
ship had sailed from Livorno and the master, an Englishman named Thomas Chappel, 
was himself a resident in that city and could thus be considered a Tuscan subject. The 
recipient of the letter was instructed, upon the return of the ship to Livorno, to establish 
its provenance and whether it really carried the English flag and necessary papers from 
the Admiralty.90 Upon the subsequent inspection of the vessel, it was indeed found that 
the ship had not been built in England and that the patent from the English Admiralty that 
it claimed to carry had been given to it only after the ship returned to Livorno.91 
                                                
89 In a letter to the Tuscan resident at London, Francesco Terriesi, the Grand Duke complained that the 
English were too quick to complain of his reaction to Franceschi's actions, “le doglianze sopra ogni incerto 
supposto, converrebbe prima à fondar impressione, accertarsi della sussistenza delle cose,” 19/29 August 
1673, TNA, SP 98/16, f. 188r-v. 
90 “Scritture attenenti al Capitano Domenico Franceschi à causa della presa della Nave Mediterraneo,” ASF 
Auditore dei Benefici Ecclesiastici poi Segretaria del Regio Diritto, 5683. This letter is unsigned and 
undated. However, it seems probable that it is a set of draft instructions to Tomasso Cepperelli, secretary to 
the Consoli del Mare of Pisa, who was assigned to make an inquiry into the case of the Mediterranean and 
to inspect the ship and interrogate its crew.  On Cepperelli’s inquiry, see the copy of the letter from Bardi to 
the governor of Livorno, 6 September 1673, TNA SP 98/15, f. 108r-110v. 
91 Capponi to Marucellli, 28 September 1673, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1744. 
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Capponi's report on the affair stressed that, according to the articles for Livornese 
corsairs, Franceschi could legitimately argue that the Mediterranean's Muslim passengers 
and their goods were good prize.92 Meanwhile, Skinner reported rumors that the 
Mediterranean's crew had participated in the pillaging of the cargo and Capponi would 
later find evidence that there were grounds to suspect collusion between Franceschi and 
the captain of the Mediterranean.93 The officers of the Levant Company similarly warned 
Finch of the incriminating news that after Franceschi had removed the Mediterranean's 
cargo the ship had sailed peacefully away in the company of his vessel.   
 Despite the legal grounds to support Franceschi, Cosimo III carried through on his 
promise to restore to Ali Pasha those goods that Franceschi had brought into Livorno and 
left at Malta, though their value was a fraction of that which the pasha and Finch had 
initially claimed were seized. However, English efforts to condemn Franceschi's behavior 
as the straightforward violation of the privileges of English navigation revealed the 
political and legal complexities of the early-modern Mediterranean. Lines of state 
authority overlapped in a sea marked by its sheer array of sovereign entities and by 
merchants and mariners who moved readily from one sovereign to another. When 
                                                
92 “Relazione per mandarsi in Inghilterra dettata dall Illustrissimo signore Auditore li 10 Novembre, 1673,” 
ASF 1824, #12, f. 5r. Capponi here also reaffirms his earlier verdict in the case of the Lion, “poteva 
legittimamente il Capitano Franceschi sostenere essergli stato lecito il predare i Turchi, e le robe di esser, 
che erono sopra da Nave Mediterraneo, non venendo vietato à predetti Corsari di prede i Turchi, e robe 
loro, se non sopra i veri Vascelli Inglesi quando haveranno le solite lettere dell'Ammiraglità, e quando di 
Turchia navigano per li stati della Gran Bertagna, e dalli stati del suddetto Rè per Costantinopoli, ó altre 
parti di Turchia.”   
93 Skinner to Arlington, Livorno, 9 September 1673, TNA SP 98/16, f. 202r; Directors of the Levant 
Company to Finch, London, 28 July 1673, TNA SP 105/113, p. 366; Capponi to Marucelli, Villa 
all'Imperiale, 28 September 1673, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1744. Skinner later reported that upon the 
inspection of the Mediterranean at Livorno, Chappel was found “clear beyond Our owne expectation, 
nothing being found in her but a few trifles taken from the Common Seamen by the Commander himselfe,” 
Skinner to Arlington, Livorno, 23 September 1673, TNA SP 98/16, f. 208r. 
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English representatives claimed that Chappel was a subject in command of an English 
ship, they extended the protection of the English state to him and his ship. Yet, the 
multinational captain and crew of the Mediterranean made it unclear to which nation the 
ship really pertained or which state had responsibility for it. Although Tuscan officials 
decided to treat the ship as English, their attention to the details of its passes and of the 
nationality of its crew highlighted the fact that the benefits of the English flag were 
theoretically limited to ships that were truly “English.” The ambiguity of what constituted 
an English ship provided room to affirm or contest the authority of the English state in 
the Mediterranean. Moreover, while English officials might preoccupy themselves with 
the condition of English navigation, the captains and crews of ships hardly shared this 
concern.94   
 The Crown's efforts to protect English navigation extended its sovereign claims to 
encompass the security of ships in overseas waters, but simultaneously limited its ability 
to regulate subjects' shipping in the Mediterranean. Finch was still able to conclude his 
negotiations in Florence successfully. The Venetian resident at Florence reported Cosimo 
III's desire to satisfy the English demands over the Mediterranean and “to avoid any ill 
feeling which might arise from the warmth with which the ministers of that king conduct 
affairs.”95 Tellingly, in its opinion on the Marquis de Fleury, the Consolato del Mare of 
                                                
94 Thomas Platt, Skinner's successor as the English consul at Livorno, warned in 1676 that the merchant 
David Sidney, the owner of the Mediterranean, had acquired some Venetian vessels that he intended to 
pass off as English, although only English built ships and foreign ships “made free” were eligible for 
Admiralty passes. This suggests that Sidney was continuing to sponsor the same behavior that had led to 
England's difficulties with the Grand Duke three years before, Platt to Williamson, Florence, 25 April/5 
May 1676, TNA SP 98/16, f. 245v. Sidney defended his actions by relating that he had bought these 
foreign ships during the third Anglo-Dutch War when English ships were unavailable in the Mediterranean, 
as he explained in a letter from Livorno of 7/17 October 1676, TNA SP 98/16, f. 285r.  
95 Giovanni Giacomo Corniani to the Doge and Senate, Florence, 7 October 1673, in the Calendar of State 
Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs in the Archivs of  Venice, vol. 38, 1673-1675, 133. 
  184 
! !
Nice noted that its own reasoning on the case rested only on the legal questions of the 
affair, refraining from considering “those more urgent military and political motives that 
might prevail.”96 At a time when Cosimo III was working to encourage trade through the 
port of Livorno, he was naturally disinclined to displease the English, who were vital to 
Livorno's commercial success.97 The Grand Duke's commitment to Livorno's commercial 
development put his sponsorship of the corso in a delicate position.98 Rumors that 
Franceschi planned to surrender the Tuscan flag in order to free himself from orders to 
restore Ali Pasha's goods led that government to weigh the difficulties associated with 
commissioning corsairs. Capponi wrote that it seemed best to order the corsair to 
surrender the flag, “since in that way the restitution [of it] would appear more decorous 
than if it were heard that Franceschi had renounced it,” but it was to be made clear to 
Franceschi that he would remain accountable for the goods seized from the 
Mediterranean.99   
                                                
96 “...rimettendoci a quei piu urgenti motivi militari e politici che potessero prevalere,” 6 February 1688, 
AST Contado di Nizza, Magistrato del Consolato di Mare, Rappresententanze e Pareri di Magistrato, 1629-
1717. 
97 On this point, see especially Carlo M. Cipolla, Il burocrate e il marinaio: La <Sanità> toscana e le 
tribolazioni degli inglesi a Livorno nel XVII secolo (Bologna: il Mulino, 1989), chap. 9, “Sic transit gloria 
mundi.” 
98 There were suggestions that the Grand Duke suspend the activity of Livornese corsairs altogether in 
order to promote peaceful trade with the Levant.  Cosimo III asked also Finch how Tuscany might open 
direct trade relations with the Ottoman Empire while preserving its sponsorship of corsairs, Finch to the 
Grand Duke, Constantinople, 14/24 February 1675, ASF Auditore dei Benefici Ecclesiastici poi Segretaria 
del Regio Diritto, 5683; Romano Canosa, Storia del Mediterraneo nel Seicento (Sapere 2000: Rome, 
1997), 388. 
99 Capponi explained that the government would order Franceschi to surrender the Tuscan flag “perche in 
questa forma la restituzione sarebbe più decorosa, che sentirsi, che dal Franceschi fusse renunziata,” 
Capponi to Panciatechi, Florence, 9 Dec. 1673, ASF: Mediceo del Principato 1744. Skinner reported 
rumors that Franceschi had taken Maltese colors in his letter of 7/17 July 1673, TNA: SP 98/15, f. 177r. 
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 Despite the ability of English diplomats to obtain restitution of goods seized off 
English ships, the fact that these negotiations played out through a language of 
sovereignty and princely authority highlighted the limits to the reach of English power in 
the Mediterranean. Crown claims over English subjects and navigation collided with the 
equally significant arguments of Mediterranean polities to preserve their own rights and 
duties unchecked. While the English could demand satisfaction, their diplomatic and 
commercial leverage proved limited, especially when dealing with European princes.  
Finch and the Crown seem to have seriously considered resorting to force to obtain 
satisification for the ship seized by the customs farmers of the Prince of Monaco. They 
refrained from doing so since such a course of action would have antagonized France.100  
Killigrew's orders forbid him from using force against Fleury or his ship within any 
Christian port.101 It does not appear that a single “pirate of the Mediterranean” was ever 
brought before the High Court of Admiralty. Indeed, despite Skinner's recommendations 
that a frigate be dispatched to hunt down Franceschi, the Venetians appear to have been 
the principle pirate hunters of the Mediterranean, capturing Fleury early in his career and 
                                                
100 Finch's threats do not appear to have been empty rhetoric. Lord Bridgeman wrote to Williamson on July 
19 1668, noting that Sir Thomas Allin had been instructed to “demand reparation” from the Prince of 
Monaco and in care of refusal “to take it.” However, Bridgeman noted that because Monaco was under 
French protection and worried that given these instructions, “I cannot see how a war with France can be 
avoided,” Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles II, vol. 8, 1667-1668, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green 
(London: Longman, Green, 1893), 494. The British ambassador to France, the Earl of St. Albans, was told 
by French ministers that Monaco was under French protection “without any restriction,” but that if the 
prince failed to pay restitution, the Louis XIV “would charge him self with the persuading him to dispatch 
it forthwith,” St. Alban to John Trevor, Collombe, 18 August 1668, TNA SP 78/124, f. 151r-v. 
101 “Journal of G. Wood, clerk to Capt. Henry Killigrew,” BL Add. MS 19306, 155. 
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later apprehending the Genoese corsair Giovanni Maria Isola after he seized the 
Tripolitan passengers of the English ship Unity.102  
 Subjecthood and sovereignty defined the trading regime of the early modern 
Mediterranean. As we have seen, the Crown's efforts to protect English navigation 
extended its sovereign claims to encompass the security of ships in overseas waters. Yet, 
despite the ability of English diplomats to obtain restitution of goods seized off English 
ships, the fact that these negotiations played out through a language of sovereignty and 
princely authority constrained English power in the Mediterranean. Moreover, a ship's 
national identity could be a confused matter and as a result it was often unclear where 
authority lay over a ship and who had responsibility for the actions of its crew and 
captain. This ambiguous situation gave states great flexibility to apply ideas about 
sovereignty and subjecthood as conditions dictated.  Ultimately, the English Crown 
proved as quick to retreat from its claims as to extend them. 
 
III. Corsairs and Anglo-Ottoman Relations  
  
 The early modern Mediterranean was not a sea of pirates, but of corsairs.  The 
case of the Mediterranean revealed the difficulties the English state faced as it sought to 
regulate and protect its subjects' navigation.  If the increasingly aggressive maritime and 
naval powers of northern Europe reshaped the contours of the Mediterranean trading 
                                                
102 Isola's attack on the Unity is mentioned in Piracy and Diplomacy in Seventeenth-Century North Africa: 
The Journal of Thomas Baker, English Consul in Tripoli, 1677-1685, ed. C.R. Pennel (Rutherford, NJ: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1989), 174-175, 184-185.  Rumors that Isola murdered the captured 
passengers appear to be unfounded since there is not mention of them in Anglo-Genoese negotiations over 
reparations.  See, for instance “Fatto di quanto è successo alla Nave Unità Inglese” and “Riassunto della 
prattica in ordine alle domande del Rè d'Inghilterra, o sia del Signore Dereham Inviato di S.M.B circa il 
rifacimento de danni fatti dal Capitano Isola sopra la Nave Unità,” in ASG Archivio Segreto, Trattati con 
Ministri d’Inghilterra et Olanda 1/2758. 
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world, they were unable to define unilaterally the legal and political foundations of a new 
trading regime. As a result, the seventeenth-century “age of piracy” took a different 
course in the Mediterranean than it did in the Atlantic.103 Whereas the prosecution of 
piracy encouraged and legitimized the expansion of the English state in the Atlantic 
world and promoted the growing authority of the East India Company in the Indian 
Ocean, it would be another century before England and its fellow Atlantic and European 
powers brought the corso to a close.104 Indeed, England's efforts to protect its navigation 
depended largely upon the authority of the states that commissioned corsairs. While the 
Crown's ability to secure English navigation from the effects of the corso testified to its 
growing power in the Mediterranean, the rights and status of English shipping were 
substantially regulated by treaties with the North African regencies. These treaties not 
only recognized the regencies as legitimate polities, but also established which ships 
could be considered English and consequently entitled to the privileges accorded in their 
articles. 
 In the mid-seventeenth century, England began to treat the regencies as sovereign 
entities. Winchilsea's negotiations with Ottoman ministers in 1662 to secure English 
ships from Algeriean corsairs turned out to be the final occasion the English government 
would turn to Ottoman authority to regulate the behavior of the North African 
regencies.105 In popular usage, Muslim corsairs remained “pirates,” but this 
                                                
103 On the age of piracy in the Mediterranean, see Greene, Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants, chap. 3, 
“The Age of Piracy.”   
104 On the persistence of the corso, see eadem., 80. 
105 Fisher, Barbary Legend, 236. During the War of the Austrian Succession, a group of Tunisian merchants 
who lost their goods when the French ship they had freighted was taken by an English privateer and turned 
to the acting British representative at Constantinople, Stanhope Aspinwall. The Levant Company 
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characterization was at odds with both official conceptions of the regencies and the 
realities of England's increasingly stable relationships with them.106 Instead, the English 
government recognized that the North African regencies ought to be accorded the rights 
of legitimate powers, as Lionel Jenkins noted after an Algerian ship was wrecked on the 
coast of Ireland in 1679 while England was at war with that regency. In his opinion on 
what the English government should do with the Muslim captives, Jenkins wrote, “since 
the government of algiers is ownd as well by Severall Treaties of peace & Declarations of 
Warr, as by the Establishment of Trade & Even of Consuls & Residents among them, by 
so many Princes & States, & particularly by your Majestie they cannot (as I humbly 
conceive) bee proceeded against as Pirates or Sea Rovers acting without Commission; but 
are to have the Priviledge of Ennemyes in an Open Warre, & must bee received to their 
Ransom by Exchange or otherwise.”107 Critically, treaties not only recognized the 
regencies as distinct polities that were to be accorded rights as such, but also established 
                                                
subsequently advised Aspinwall that the merchants should not expect the British government to take much 
notice of his representations on their behalf, “as it comes not thro' the proper Chanel, there being a British 
Consul at Tunis, and that Government having particular Treatys with and sending Ministers to Ours, they 
ought therefore to take that method to have Justice done them upon their Complaints,” Deputy Governor 
and Company to Aspinwall, London, 18 July 1746, TNA SP 105/118, 16.  
106 The merchant Thomas Dethick reflected popular, though not official, views when he wrote to Sir Joseph 
Williamson in 1669 to recount Algerian violations of their treaty with England and to argue that their 
failure to observe the terms of the treaty meant that the Algerians “are Sea-pirates & may be treated 
accordingly.” On the one hand, the fact that Dethick viewed Algerian seizures of ships to constitute piracy 
rather than acts of war highlights the ambiguous situation of the regencies as dependencies of the Ottoman 
Empire whose economic and governmental systems depended to varying degrees upon the corso. On the 
other hand, Dethick's comments illustrate the confused and inconsistent use of the term “pirate” common in 
popular usage in the early modern world, Thomas Dethick to Williamson, Livorno, 23 April/3 May 1669, 
TNA SP 98/ 10, f. 160r. 
107 “Report for restoring a Bristoll Ship taken by an Alergine and afterwards driven on the Coast of 
Ireland,” 11 February 1680, BL: Add. MS 18206, f. 140v-141r.  This ruling also appears in William 
Wynne, ed., The Life of Sir Leoline Jenkins, 2 vols. (London, 1724), 2: 790-791.   Of course, the need for 
the ruling is itself telling of the fact that the regencies were not automatically viewed as legitimate state 
actors. 
  189 
! !
them as polities in European minds. Charles Molloy thus observed that although some 
commentators did not think the regencies ought to be accorded “the rights of solemnities 
of War,” those “Nests of Pirates” nevertheless carried on diplomatic exchanges with 
England and had “acquired the reputation of a Government” and consequently could not 
“properly be esteemed Pirates but Enemies.”108  
 Equally important is the fact that England's treaties with the regencies did not 
simply confer privileges upon English navigation; instead, these articles also defined 
what constituted an English ship and established regulations that the English were 
committed to follow. When Ephraim Skinner and John Finch asserted that no ship 
carrying the English flag ought to be searched, they implicitly argued that the flag 
conveyed Crown protection to any ship flying it. However, the legal and political bases of 
this view were shaky. In particular, the flag was not a reliable indicator of the nation to 
which a ship pertained. For instance, the grand master of the Order of Malta warned 
Louis XIV that if the French flag alone could protect a ship from search, Ottoman vessels 
would simply run up that banner whenever a Maltese vessel approached, thus securing 
                                                
108 Confusingly, Molloy reiterated his view that the North African corsairs were “indeed Pirates,” even if 
they were to be thought of as legal enemies, see De Jure Maritimo et Navali, 3rd ed. (London, 1682), 54-
55. It seems significant that the first and second editions of De Jure Maritimo et Navali from 1676 and 
1677 do not include this specific discussion of the North African regencies. It is possible that Molloy's 
addition reflects increasing recognition of these polities as at least pseudo-sovereign entities that followed 
sustained diplomatic and treaty negotiations. The jurist Alexander Justice later echoed Molloy, noting “'Tis 
true Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis and some other Towns upon the Coast of Barbary, are only inhabited by 
Miscreants, who subsist by no other mean,” and that at first it was not thought fit “ to allow them the 
Privileges granted to other States or Civil Societies of Men.” However, “they having afterwards modell'd 
themselves into a formal Method of Government & acknowleged the Grand Signor as their Sovereign, the 
Kings of England as well as other States and Princes have concluded solemn Treaties with them, and 
acknowledged them as free states,” A General Treatise of the Dominion and Laws of the Sea (London, 
1705), 469.   
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their commerce and undermining the Order's mission and fiscal well-being.109 Ships not 
only flew flags of convenience, covering themselves with the banner of a neutral power 
in order to evade inspection or capture, and they also took on English captains and 
mariners to disguise themselves more effectively. 
 When Finch and other diplomats demanded that no ship carrying the English flag 
be touched, they imperiled England's treaties with the North African regencies, the 
benefits of which were confined to ships built in England and carrying passes or having 
crews that were at least two-thirds English.110 By the mid-1670's, English consuls in 
North African ports warned that the regencies were losing patience as their corsairs found 
only English-flagged ships at sea or were forced to give up prizes that carried obviously 
fraudulent passes. English ministers meanwhile complained that their consuls issued 
passes to ships that were not built in England or lacked sufficient English 
crewmembers.111 England's consul to Venice was relieved of his post in 1672 after it was 
discovered he had given a pass to a Venetian ship.112 Indeed, at the same time as the 
                                                
109 See the letter of Nicholas Cotoner to Louis XIV of 16 June 1664, transcribed in Petiet, Le Roi et le 
Grand Maître, 130. 
110 For instance, one English consul to Algiers, Francis Baker, attributed England's earlier wars with 
Algiers to the efforts of non-Englishmen to pass their ships off as English by obtaining English passes and 
English crewmembers, Baker to Jenkins, Algiers, 20 March 1683, TNA SP 71/2, f. 274r. 
111 The Admiralty required that a ship be constructed in England or if forreign built “made free” in order to 
qualify for a pass. Resident Francis Parry noted consul John Maynard's lax regulation of passes in Lisbon, 
Parry to Coventry, Lisbon, 9/19 November 1675, TNA SP 89/13, f. 124r-v. John Ward, a consul in Algiers, 
similarly recorded that the English resident in Venice provided passes to ships with less than the required 
two thirds English crew, leading to complaints from Algierian corsairs, Ward to Arlingon, Algier, 18 
December, 1672, TNA SP 71/2, f. 16r. Sir John Narborough, meanwhile, complained of “the undue 
practices of his Majesty's subjects (merchants) abroad in the owning of foreigns ships, and thereupon 
giving them title to the waring his Majesty's colours, to the endangering a breach some time or other with 
the Turks,” quoted in J. R. Tanner, ed., A Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval Manuscripts in the Pepysian 
Library at Magdelene College, Cambridge, vol. 4, Admiralty Journal (Naval Records Society, 1923), xxi. 
112 Fisher, Barbary Legend, p. 256. 
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dispute over the Mediterranean, consul Skinner notified Arlington that the “Mongroll” 
ship Katherine had been taken by the Tripolitans. Skinner had earlier warned Arlington 
that though this ship carried an English pass, it was owned by foreigners and had a Dutch 
master and thus might cause a “breach of our peace with the Turks, when they shall hear 
we Culler other nations Concernes.”113 English ministers repeatedly complained of these 
practices, which extended the benefits of English navigation to foreign merchants and to 
ships built outside of England.  
 The abuse of passes threatened English ships in the Mediterranean because it 
violated the treaties that regulated England's relationship with the North African 
regencies. During the 1670's the English government took steps to define more carefully 
what constituted an English ship and which ships could expect its protection.  On 
December 22, 1675, Charles II issued two proclamations that sought to regulate English 
navigation in the Mediterranean. Noting that English subjects “do take upon them to 
Colour & conceal the Ships of forreiners, with whom the said Government of Algier is in 
Warr, & to that end do either wholy navigate the Ships of such forrainers or otherwise 
serve in the Same as Mariners & Soldiers,” and thus gave the Algerians “Just Cause of 
Complaint” and endangered the security of English navigation, Charles ordered that 
English subjects no longer serve on the ships of states at war with Algiers. Furthermore, 
Charles warned that any subjects captured while in the service of belligerents could 
expect to be excluded from the benefits of England's treaty with Algiers. The second 
proclamation echoed the first, complaining that passes granted to secure English ships 
                                                
113 Skinner to Arlington, Livorno, 1/11 February 1673 and 27 June/7 July 1673, TNA SP 98/5, f. 134r and 
173r. 
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were instead being used to protect foreign vessels “to His Majesty's great dishonor, the 
offence of his Allyes and the prejudice of the trade & navigation of this Kingdom.” The 
king accordingly limited the validity of the current passes and called for the creation of 
new ones that would be more carefully regulated and less prone to forgery.114 
 Merchants and members of Parliament resisted these new rules, complaining both 
of the cost of the passes and of the risks they posed to ships that neglected to obtain or 
renew these documents. However, the official response to this criticism highlighted the 
fact that flawed legal arguments underlay the claims that English ships were naturally 
free to carry any passengers or goods without fear of interference. In 1676, the English 
merchant and member of Parliament Thomas Papillon opposed the introduction of 
Mediterranean passes as called for by England's treaty with Algiers, arguing that 
“Formerly an English ship and Englishmen was security.” In response, the Secretary of 
State Henry Coventry noted, “it is not in the Civil Law, 'that free English ships make free 
goods,' but by virtue of a Treaty.”115 According to the prevailing legal opinions of the 
seventeenth century, Coventry was clearly right: whatever privileges accrued to English 
ships as neutral vessels stemmed purely from the provisions of bilateral treaties.  
                                                
114 Copies of both proclamations are given in TNA CO 389/3, f. 14r-v and f. 14v-15v, respectively. For 
background on these proclamations and the pass system they standardized, see J. R. Tanner, ed., A 
Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval Manuscripts in the Pepysian Library at Magdelene College, 
Cambridge, vol. 3, Admiralty Letters (Naval Records Society, 1923), xviii-xxiv. 
115 Anchitell Grey, ed., Debates of the House of Commons, From the Year 1667 to the Year 1694, vol. 4, 
1675-1677 (London, 1763), 210-211. The recognition that the rights of English navigation with regards to 
North African corsairs depended on treaties provides a different perspective on the maritime customs of the 
regencies than that later offered by Martin Hübner in his defense of neutral shipping during the Seven 
Years' War. Hübner applauded those “Peuples que notre orgueil appelle Barbares” for observing a perfect 
respect for neutral vessels within their perpetual war against Portugal, Spain and other Christian nations.  
While Hübner logically viewed this conduct as a natural outcome of the deficient navigation of the 
regencies, it also rested upon treaties that paralleled those between European states, Martin Hübner, De la 
saisie des bâtiments neutres (La Haye, 1759) 1: 222-225. 
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Implicitly, Coventry thus seconded the opinions that Capponi had offered with regards to 
the actions of Franceschi and confirmed that, in theory, Tuscan corsairs had every right to 
seize Muslim goods found on English ships. Since England had no marine treaties with 
Tuscany, any claim to the immunity of English ships from search rested purely on the 
relative power of the two states.   
  The proclamations regulating the use of passes in the Mediterranean signaled the 
rise of a new treaty regime between England and the North African regencies in which 
official passes rather than the independent assertion of a national identity constituted the 
basis for determining to which country a ship belonged. These reforms were unable to 
halt the war that broke out between England and Algiers in 1677, which lasted until 1682 
and cost the English hundreds of captured ships and thousands of enslaved mariners. 
However, the treaty that ended that war called for all English ships in the Mediterranean 
to carry passes in order to verify their identity, a requirement that the Admiral Arthur 
Herbert, who negotiated the treaty, thought was neither a dishonor to the king nor a 
disadvantage to his subjects and instead “an honour to the office of Lord High 
Admiral.”116 Although Charles II's proclamations and England's new treaty with Algiers 
denied the protection of the English state to Englishmen in the service of foreign powers, 
they also represented an extension of the regulatory power of the English Crown. Though 
these proclamations would be violated and the distribution of passes to non-English 
vessels would proliferate in the late eighteenth century, the use and attempted regulation 
                                                
116 Admiral Herbert, Algier Road, April 12, 1682, TNA SP 91/2, f. 311r. See also Fisher, Barbary Legend, 
264-265. 
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of passes nevertheless established that the foundations of English trade in the 
Mediterranean depended upon a treaty-based commercial and marine system.117   
 English diplomats' arguments in favor of English navigation could, on the other 
hand, be straightforwardly duplicitous. In July 1673 and when Tuscan officials still 
believed the Mediterranean to be English, the directors of the Levant Company had 
already notified Finch that the ship was not English-built and was “sailed by certain loose 
Venetians and French, with some English, whom We are not like to see in England,” 
suggesting that this information “may be of use in Turkey.”118 Thus, while he and 
Skinner pressed the Grand Duke for restitution of the goods seized from the 
Mediterranean, Finch told the pasha's procurator that it “was No English ship,” and that 
since Chappel had become a subject of the Grand Duke, “His Majesty was longer 
concern'd in Him.” Based on this, he induced the agent to write an attestation that he had 
“no Pretension's against the Captain or any English Man” and that Finch's assistance was 
only an act of kindness.119 Finch does seem to have exerted considerable effort to ensure 
the return of the pasha's goods in both Livorno and Malta. However, his negotiations with 
the procurator reflect the Levant Company's general policy to avoid any hint of collective 
responsibility for the independent actions of either its merchants or other Englishmen in 
the Mediterranean.120 
                                                
117 Fisher, Barbary Legend, 299, 326-327; Edoardo Grendi, “Gli inglesi a Genova (Secoli XVII-XVIII),” 
Quaderni Storici 39, no. 1 (April 2004): 255. 
118 Directors of the Levant Company to Finch, London, 28 July 1673, TNA SP 105/113, 366. 
119 Finch, Constantinople, 24 September 1680, TNA SP 97/19, f. 250r. 
120 Sonia P. Anderson, An English Consul in Turkey: Paul Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667-1678 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), 198-199. The directors of the Company accordingly advised Consul Rycaut after 
his efforts in aid of the Lion that while the company approved of his general conduct, it refused to shoulder 
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 Finch's anxiety that Ali Pasha would demand compensation for his losses proved 
well founded when the Ottoman official, in late 1680, brought his case to the empire's 
government.121 In September 1680, John Finch was called before the divan-i hümayun 
(the Ottoman imperial council) by the grand vizier Merzinfonlu Kara Mustapha Pasha to 
answer Ali Pasha's accusations. When Finch invoked the Capitulations to argue that no 
Englishman was to be held responsible for the actions of another, the vizier replied that 
those articles, “were understood in matters of Contract between Merchant & Merchant, 
but not in what related between Prince & Prince.”122 Kara Mustapha explained to him, 
“You & all other Ambassadors are sent hither by your respective Princes, to answer for 
the lives & Estates of all Mussulmen all over the World that are endammag'd or Sufer by 
Your respective Subjects, & You are here a Hostage to answer for all Dammage done by 
English all Over the World.”123 In response, Finch objected that the king could be held 
accountable neither for Chappel, who had become a subject of the Grand Duke of 
                                                
the expences incurred by the affair, “The same being plainly caused by the Ship; which by the Companies 
Rules is only lyable thereto Nor may We on any Termes admit a president of such consequence,” London, 
28 November 1672, TNA SP 105/113, 320. 
121 Finch refers to the pasha's continued requests for the restitution of his remaining goods in a letter to 
Cosimo III, when he records that the discovery that Ali Pasha's procurator had failed to turn over a sum of 
money would serve as a shield, “ogni volta che il Passà fà domande d'altra robba, et appresso il Gran Visir 
parimente mi serviranno di scansar la forza delle sue pretensioni,” Pera, 14/24 February 1675, ASF 
Auditore dei Benefici Ecclesiastici poi Segretaria del Regio Diritto, 5683. On Ali Pasha’s demands for 
compensation, see also Roger North, The Life of the Honourable Sir Dudley North (London, 1744), 94. 
122 Diary entry of John Finch, 1/11 October 1680, ROLLR Finch MS DG 7, Diary of Sir John Finch, f. 
151r. Finch appears to have appealed to Article 8 of the Capitulations that he confirmed in 1675, which 
established, “If it happen that any Englishman absent himself, or fly the country, or turn bankrupt, either on 
accout of his won debts, or for having entered into suretyship, the creditor shall have no redress but from 
the debtor, and not from any other Englishman,” Charles Jenkinson, ed., A Collection of all the Treaties of 
Peace, Alliance, and Commerce, between Great-Britain and Other Powers (London, 1785), 1: 231. 
123 Finch, Constantinople, 25 September 1680, TNA SP 97/19, f. 226r.   
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Tuscany, nor for “Pirates at Sea,” like Franceschi.124 Finch explained that just as “the 
Gran Signore is a great Emperour, & Yett He could not secure His ships from Gran Cairo 
from the Corsaro's, Nor His Caravans by Land from the Arabians both being often 
robb'd,” so neither “could My Master Secure His own subjects or the Gran Signores from 
Pirates; for None but God Almighty could doe it.”125  The Vizier ultimately gave Finch 
six months in which to send for further instructions from England and directed him to 
request that the Grand Duke of Tuscany should dispatch a procurator for Chappel's 
family, that captain himself having died earlier, in order to answer Ali Pasha's charges 
against him.126 
 To Finch and other Europeans in the Ottoman Empire, Ali Pasha's suit was yet 
another example of the tyranny and greed of Kara Mustapha Koprulu, a vizir reviled in 
the contemporary reports of ambassadors and later histories for his efforts to more firmly 
exert Ottoman control over European communities within the empire.127 Yet, there is 
little evidence even from the English records that the Ottoman approached the case in a 
                                                
124 Diary entry of John Finch, 1/11 October 1680, ROLLR Finch MS DG 7, Diary of Sir John Finch, f. 
150r-151r. 
125 idem. For a recent study of questions of Ottoman control over maritime space, see Molly Greene, “The 
Ottomans in the Mediterranean,” in The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire, ed. Virginia H. 
Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 104-116. 
126 When Finch objected that the Grand Duke would probably not “part with his subject,” Kara Mustapha 
asserted, “the King who had made the Grat Duke part with the mony of His subjects could make Him part 
with their Persons also,” Diary entry of John Finch, 1/11 October 1680, ROLLR Finch MS DG 7, Diary of 
Sir John Finch, f. 157r-158r. 
127 The Venetian bailo Civran wrote, “ne si vede sia per terminare si molesta controversia senza qualche 
nuovo incomodo, et aggravio d'esso Signore Ambasciatore [Finch], questa fù la ricompensa, che incontrò la 
cortesia trà Barbari,” Pietro Civran to the Senate, Pera, 29 July 1680, ASV Dispacci degli Ambasciatori al 
Senato da Constantinopoli, 161, f. 203v. For a more balanced perspective on Kara Mustapha Pasha's 
relations with the European ambassadors and communities in the Ottoman Empire, see Merlijn Olnon, “‘A 
Most Agreeable and Pleasant Creature’?  Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasa in the Correspondence of Justinus 
Colyer  (1668-1682),” Oriente Moderno 22, no. 2 (2003): 649-669. 
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notably unjust way, and Kara Mustapha ultimately denied Ali Pasha's charge and freed 
the English from any payment. Ottoman demands for redress for losses sustained at the 
hands of Christian corsairs provide an additional perspective from which to explore the 
questions of sovereignty, authority and interstate relations raised by the corso. Christian 
corsairs were a persistent problem for the Ottoman Empire in the later half of the 
seventeenth century and the letters of the Venetian ambassador testify to Kara Mustapha's 
growing impatience with their activity in the Greek archipelago.128 Like the English and 
most other powers, the Ottomans sought justice for subjects who suffered at the hands of 
corsairs, especially when in many cases it seemed that ships' masters were suspiciously 
ready to turn over their passengers and goods.129  
 Ottoman officials employed a range of arguments when they demanded that the 
English Crown and Levant Company pay reparations for losses sustained onboard 
English vessels. When Ali Pasha wrote to Charles II to ask that the king obtain the 
restitution of his goods, he insisted that John Earlisman, the English consul in Tunis, had 
stood as guarantor for his goods and he subsequently reported to Kara Mustapha Pasha 
that Finch had promised to restore all the goods taken be Franceschi.130 Finch vigorously 
denied that he had been obligated to obtain Ali Pasha's goods and that while he doubted 
Earlisman would have ensured the Pasha's goods, the consul would have to answer for 
                                                
128 Pietro Civran to the Senate, Pera, 4 November 1680, ASV Dispacci degli Ambasciatori al Senato da 
Constantinopoli, 161, f. 262v. See also Michel Fontenay, “L'Empire Ottoman et le risque corsair au XVIIe 
siècle,” passim.  
129 Maurits H. van den Boogert, “Redress for Ottoman Victims of European Privateering: A Case against 
the Dutch in the Divan-i Hümayun (1708-1715),” Turcica 33 (2001), 102.  
130 “A Copy of the Bassas letter to the King,” TNA SP 105/109, f. 255r-v; diary entry of John Finch, 1/11 
October 1680, ROLLR Finch MS DG 7, Diary of Sir John Finch, f. 150r-151r. 
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any such guarantees he may have made.131 Agreements between European consuls and 
Ottoman merchants were private contracts and Finch's response to the Ottoman argument 
that Earlisman had ensured Ali Pasha's goods appears to reflect this view.132  However, 
both Ali Pasha and Kara Mustapha Pasha seem to have assumed that these contracts had 
a public character and bound the entire English nation to provide security for the relevant 
goods. Indeed, in his letter to Charles II, Ali Pasha also referred to the “patti” and 
commands of the Ottoman sultan that provided for the free passage of English vessels 
and argued that the reciprocal friendship and good relations between the states should 
induce the English to honor his request.133 Ali Pasha thus appealed to reciprocity founded 
in the very treaties which Kara Mustapha argued were inapplicable to matters between 
sovereigns. Both he and Kara Mustapha Pasha further emphasized the fact that Chappel 
had refused to defend his ship or its Ottoman cargo when approached by Domenico 
Franceschi.134 Though neither of the Ottoman officials explicitly mentioned England's 
                                                
131 Finch, Constantinople, 24 September 1680, TNA SP 97/19, f. 251v; diary entry of John Finch, 1/11 
October 1680, ROLLR Finch MS DG 7, Diary of Sir John Finch, f. 150r-151r.  Consul Earlisman had 
indeed warned against Muslim passengers embarking on the Lion, John Earlisman, Tunis, 1 July 1672, 
TNA SP 71/26, f. 203v. However, the French chancellery records from Tunis show that Earlisman had 
previously entered into contracts of insurance with Italian merchants and it is possible that he did the same 
with Ali Pasha, Pierre Grandchamp, ed., La France en Tunisie au XVIIe Siècle, vol. 7, 1661-1680 (Tunis: 
Impr. rapide, 1929), 152.  Molly Greene further records instances of French consuls standing as guarantors 
of the goods of Ottoman officials, Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants, 152-153. 
132 Greene, Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants, 153-154. 
133 The language of this Italian letter from the pasha to Charles II is frequently confused, probably as a 
result of translation difficulties, but the sense that agreements existed establishing reciprocal free commerce 
between the Ottomans and the English seems clear, “A Copy of the Bassas letter to the King,” TNA SP 
105/109, f. 255r-v. 
134 Diary entry of John Finch, 1/11 October 1680, ROLLR Finch MS DG 7, Diary of Sir John Finch, f. 
156r. In his letter to Charles II, Ali Pasha recorded that upon the approach of Franceschi “Io subbitamente 
parlò col Capetano del Vasciello Io con questi Legni voglio Combattere, e Lei che cosa dica, e Lui mi 
rispose questi Vascielli sono due non si pole combattare, e anco non stiamo in ordine,” TNA SP 105/109, f. 
255r-v. 
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treaty with Tunis, Chappel's failure to defend his Ottoman passengers and their goods 
constituted a clear violation of those articles.135  
 The Ottoman case for restitution of Ali Pasha's losses rested on the argument that 
Chappel had betrayed his passengers and that Charles II was responsible for the misdeed 
of an English captain.136 Rather less diplomatically, after the Marquis de Fleury seized 
the Jerusalem, the government of Tripoli wrote to James II to complain that Killigrew 
had failed to obtain the vast majority of his goods and to warn that if the remaining goods 
were not returned, “no one Merchant will give to or take lading from your Shipps in the 
Ports belonging to the Countries of Islam, and it is certaine that your name, and 
reputation will altogeather suffer detriment, for in Malta they have no respect to your 
Passport, and they have put your Colours the bottome upwards.”137 Though the letter 
threatened that English merchants in the Ottoman Empire would be forced to pay 
compensation if restitution was not made, it is notable that the Tripolitan divan appealed 
to both English national honor and commercial interest to encourage James to obtain the 
goods still at Malta. 
 Despite such appeals to both the reciprocity of commerce between the Ottoman 
Empire and England and to the authority of the English state, the Crown absolved itself 
of responsibility in the matter of redress for Ottoman passengers and goods seized from 
English ships. A letter from Charles II to Kara Mustapha in response to the suit over the 
                                                
135 On the requirement that English ships defend Tunisian passengers against Christian corsairs, see Greene, 
“Beyond the Northern Invasion,” 54. 
136 Diary entry of John Finch, 1/11 October 1680, ROLLR Finch MS DG 7, Diary of Sir John Finch, f. 
152r. 
137 The Dey and Basha and Government of Tripoli to James II, TNA SP 71/22, f. 66r 
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Mediterranean thus echoed Finch's position: “Nor is it reasonable, That the Grand Signor 
who is a most Potent & Mighty Monarch & yet not able to protect his Ships from the 
Corsairs, should notwithstanding demand from Us those assureances for the Lives & 
Estates of his Mussellmen at Sea, Which we cannot afford to our owne Subjects, & is 
only in the Power of the one great & omnipotent God.”138  James II reiterated these 
arguments following de Fleury's seizure of the Jerusalem.139 Trumbull, meanwhile, 
worried that English participation in the caravane trade between Egypt and other parts of 
the Ottoman Empire would continue to place the Levant Company at risk from further 
assaults by corsairs. He consequently sought and eventually obtained a letter from the 
Grand Vizier stating that English merchants and captains who stood as guarantors for 
Ottoman passengers and goods would be held responsible for any losses suffered at the 
hands of corsairs. However, the English would not be held responsible for those losses if 
no security were promised.140 Trumbull was thus able to deflect the Pasha of Tripoli’s 
attempts to secure restitution for his outstanding losses and he reiterated that the Crown's 
efforts in his behalf were “out of meere grace, & friendship, & not of any obligation.”141 
 In light of the now often cited observation that accusations of piracy served as a 
means to spread and enforce conceptions of legal and imperial sovereignty, the letters of 
Finch and Charles II suggest an admission of the limits of royal authority over English 
                                                
138 Charles II to the Vizier Azem, BL Add. MS 72551, f. 3v. Another copy of this letter appears in TNA SP 
105/109, f. 252r-253r. 
139 Copy of the King's Letter to the Vizier Azem,” 9 April 1687, BL Add. MS 72550, f. 21-22. 
140 Trumbull to the Levant Company, Constantinople, 30 May 1688, BL Add. MS 72590, f. 30v-31r. A 
copy of the Vizier's letter with an English translation is contained in TNA SP 110/88, f. 22v-23v. 
141 Trumbull to Consul Loddington, Constantinople, 1 August 1688, BL Add. MS 72590, f. 71r-v. 
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navigation in the Mediterranean. Of course, it is easy to see this argument as stemming 
from the same disingenuous approach that Finch took in his dealings with Ali Pasha's 
agent and Tuscan officials. It nonetheless contrasts markedly with the more assertive 
claims that emerged from similar situations in the Indian Ocean. It is possible to draw a 
parallel between the Ottoman reaction to the affair of the Mediterranean and the Mughal 
response to European depredations upon their ships returning from the Red Sea. In both 
cases, these imperial authorities used their power over European communities within 
their jurisdiction to enforce their sovereignty over subjects overseas. Kara Mustapha's 
declaration to Finch that he would be held responsible for affronts to Ottoman subjects 
“all Over the World” highlighted the similarities between the Ottoman and Mughal 
responses to the problem of corsairs or pirates.142 However, at least one East India 
Company official thought that the Company could take advantage Mughal demands that 
it to provide protection for Mughal shipping. Samuel Annesley saw Company convoys as 
a means to exert a measure of sovereignty over the waters and trade between western 
India and the Red Sea. 143 Conversely, when Kara Mustapha held the English responsible 
for the losses sustained by Ali Pasha onboard the Mediterranean, the Crown and Levant 
Company professed to be unable to account for the depredations of pirates.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
                                                
142 For the Mughal response to piracy as an exercise in oceanic sovereignty, see Benton, “Legal Spaces of 
Empire,” 714-715; eadem., A Search for Sovereignty, 142-144. 
143 Philip J. Stern, “‘A Politie of Civill & Military Power’: Political Thought and the Late Seventeenth-
Century Foundations of the East India Company-State,” Journal of British Studies 47, no. 2 (April 2008): 
253-254; idem., The Company-State, 136-138. 
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 While the definition and prosecution of piracy expanded the reach of English law 
and empire in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the Crown's reaction to the threat of 
Mediterranean corsairs limited the extent of its authority in that sea to its own subjects 
and their navigation.144 Charles II, James II and their representatives invoked the image 
of a lawless sea to justify their refusal to safeguard Muslim passengers on board English 
vessels. Yet, they actually described an oceanic environment marked by such an array of 
competing and intersecting sovereignties that it was impossible to impose new legal 
regimes upon it as Europe's maritime empires did in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.  
Unlike the cartazes of the Estado da India and East India trading companies, 
Mediterranean passes purported only to identify the nationality of the ship carrying them; 
the protection they conferred rested not in the authority of a commercial or political body 
but rather in the terms of the specific treaty that bound the subjects of the treaty's parties 
to allow each others' vessels to pass freely. Despite the growing disparities of power that 
existed in the early modern Mediterranean, it remained a sea in which local sovereignties 
frequently frustrated the growing power of the English state.
                                                
144 On the East India Company's accusations of piracy against South Asian and Muslim maritime rivals, see 
Patricia Risso, “Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence in the Western Indian Ocean and 
Persian Gulf Region during a Long Eighteenth Century,” Journal of World History 12, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 
293-319; Stern, The Company-State, 187-194. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Privateers and Prize Courts, 1689-1713 
 
 
Our Laws take not much Notice of these 
Privateers, because the Manner of such 
Warring is new, and not very 
honorable...1 
       
 
 Through the seventeenth century, the state-sanctioned religious warfare of the 
corso defined the distinct political and cultural environment of the Mediterranean. At the 
close of that century, however, the Wars of the League of Augsburg and of the Spanish 
Succession transformed the relationship between northern Europe and the 
Mediterranean.2 These wars established France and England as the principal maritime 
powers in a Mediterranean increasingly dominated by Europe’s great power rivalries.3 In 
the process, they changed the dynamics of naval warfare in the Mediterranean. During 
the later half of the seventeenth century, England had established a military presence in 
the Mediterranean and dispatched fleets against the North African regencies in order to 
secure English navigation from attack by corsairs. With the influx of privateers and 
warships into the Mediterranean that followed the outbreak of the War of the League of 
                                                
1 Alexander Justice, A General Treatise of the Dominion and Laws of the Sea (London, 1705), 472.   
2 On the continuities between the military strategy of the Restoration monarchy and that of William III, see 
David Davies, “The Birth of the Imperial Navy? Aspects of Maritime Strategy, c. 1650-90,” Parameters of 
British naval power, 1650-1850, ed. Michael Duffy (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1992), 30-31. 
3 Jeremy Black, “The Mediterranean as a Battleground of the European Powers, 1700-1900,” in The 
Mediterranean in History, ed. David Abulafia (Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Museum, 2003): 251-282. On 
the changing political culture of the Mediterranean in the eighteenth century, see also Molly Greene, A 
Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 206-209. 
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Augsburg, European warfare, rather than the corso, became the primary source of 
maritime violence in the region.4   
 The decades of war that culminated in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 marked the 
ascendance of Britain as an Atlantic empire and confirmed its emergence as a 
Mediterranean power.5 For more than two decades, the Mediterranean was a second front 
in England’s wars against France where English fleets supported Austrian, Savoyard and 
Spanish allies along the Italian and Iberian coasts and suppressed French lines of supply 
and communication.6 The conquest and occupation of Gibraltar and Minorca formalized 
the presence of the British Empire in the Mediterranean and gave Britain experience 
                                                
4 G. N. Glark, The Dutch Alliance and the War against French Trade, 1688-1697 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1923); W. R. Meyer, “English Privateering in the War of 1688 to 1697,” in The Mariner's 
Mirror 67 (1981): 259-272; idem., “English Privateering in the War of the Spanish Succession 1702-1713,” 
in The Mariner's Mirror 69 (1983): 435-446; J. S. Bromley, Corsairs and Navies, 1660-1760 (London and 
Ronceverte: The Hambledon Press, 1987).  For a broader survey of British privateering, see David J. 
Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 
1990). The Mediterranean dimension of privateering has received far less attention, but see the articles of 
Colin Heywood, “The Kapudan Pasha, the English Ambassador and the Blackham Galley: An Episode in 
Anglo-Ottoman Maritime Relations (1697).” The Kapudan Pasha, his Office and his Domain: Halycon 
Days in Crete IV: a Symposium held in Rethymnon, 7-9 January 2000,  ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou 
(Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 2002), 409-438; idem., “Ottoman Territoriality Versus Maritime 
Usage: The Ottoman Islands and English Privateering in the Wars with France, 1689-1714,” in Insularités 
ottomanes, ed. Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein (Maisonneuve & Larose: Institut français d’études 
anatoliennes, 2004), 145-173. 
5 Jonathan I. Israel, “The Emerging Empire: The Continental Perspective, 1650-1713,” in The Oxford 
History of the British Empire, vol. 1, The Origins of Empire, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 444; Jeremy Black, Trade, Empire and British Foreign Policy, 1689-1815 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 121; Julian Hoppit, A Land of Liberty?: England, 1689-1727 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 122-123.  
6 On English naval strategy and operations in the Mediterranean, see Julian Corbett, England in the 
Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power within the Straits, 1603-1713, 2 vols. 
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904), vol. 2, chaps. 26-33 and, more recently, John Ehrman, The 
Navy in the War of William III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), chap. 12, “The Fleet in the 
Mediterranean, July 1694-October 1695;” N. A. M. Rodger,  The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History 
of Britain, 1649-1815 (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 152-156, 164-173. On the economic and commercial 
aspects of England's Continental commitment during the Wars of the League of Augsburg and of the 
Spanish Succession, see, D. W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough 
(Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988). 
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governing garrison colonies whose populations were neither British nor Protestant.7  
Moreover, the regulation of the maritime violence spawned by the wars against Louis 
XIV also established and expanded the legal authority of the English state around the 
Atlantic and Indian Oceans and in the Mediterranean.8  In the Atlantic, campaigns against 
piracy followed both the War of the League of Augsburg and the War of the Spanish 
Succession as Admiralty courts and naval forces sought to enforce peace “beyond the 
line.”9 In the Mediterranean, on the other hand, the adjudication of prize cases called into 
question where legal authority lay to decide whether acts committed at sea were lawful or 
not.  
 Decades of naval warfare made English courts central to the organization and 
regulation of navigation around the world. The adjudication of prize cases linked the 
expansion of English naval power in the Mediterranean and the development of English 
empire around the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The Wars of the League of Augsburg and 
                                                
7 Matthew Prior contended that “our trade in the Mediterranean was not sufficiently assured without 
Gibraltar and Port Mahon.” According to Prior’s French counterpart, the Marquis de Torcy, these two sites 
gave Britain “domination of Spain and of France in the Mediterranean,” “Prior's Negotiations in France,” 
Report on the Manuscripts of His Grace Duke of Portland preserved at Welbeck Abbey, ed. J. J. Cartwright 
(Norwich: H. M. Stationery Office, 1899), 5: 35, 37. On the negotiations between Prior and Torci, see Dale 
Miquelon, “Envisioning the French Empire: Utrecht, 1711-1713,” French Historical Studies 24, no. 4 
(Autumn 2001): 654-655. See also Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, 2:  565-567.  On the British 
experience at Gibraltar and Minorca, see Linda Colley, Captive: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600-
1850 (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 35, 69-72; Desmond Gregory, Minorca, the Illusory Prize: A 
History of the British Occupations of Minorca between 1708 and 1802 (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press), passim. 
8 Philip J. Stern, “British Asia and British Atlantic: Comparison and Connections,” William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd ser., 63, no. 4 (October 2006): 708-712. For a synopsis of the regulatory problems raised by 
free-wheeling privateers in the last decade of the seventeenth century, see G. N. Clark, The Dutch Alliance, 
46-49. 
9 See Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, & Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence 
in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 47-54; Elizabeth Mancke, “Empire 
and State,” in The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, ed. David Armitage and Michael Braddick, 2nd ed. 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 203-204. 
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of the Spanish Succession led the High Court of Admiralty and its surrogates to exercise 
jurisdiction over acts committed in distant waters. During the seventeenth century, prize 
courts and prize law developed to provide an institutional framework to legitimize the 
capture of ships and goods in times of war.10 In theory, prize courts operated on the basis 
of the law of nations and thus had a supranational character.11 Yet at a time when there 
was no settled or fully shared understanding of the law of nations and when governments 
put forward conflicting interpretations of the rights of neutrals, prize courts conveyed the 
legal authority of particular states to the high seas.   
 However, it was less the expanding reach of English courts and of the English 
state that defined the legal framework of English navigation in the Mediterranean than it 
was the interaction of those authorities with their Mediterranean counterparts. Through 
the early-modern era there was no consensus as to where jurisdiction properly lay to 
adjudicate prize cases, particularly when ships were captured within waters claimed by a 
neutral state. English claims that the Admiralty had sole authority to adjudicate prizes 
taken by ships bearing its commission clashed with competing jurisdictions claimed by 
Mediterranean courts. Disputes over the rights of neutral princes to secure their ports and 
coastal waters were central to defining the maritime limits of territorial states.12 These 
                                                
10 R. G. Marsden, “Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England,” pts. 2 and 3, The English Historical 
Review 25, no. 98 (April 1910), 243-263; 26, no. 101 (January 1911), 34-56; Carl J. Kulsrud, Maritime 
Neutrality to 1780 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1936), passim. 
11 Henry Bourguignon's discussion of Sir William Scott's understanding of the supranational character of 
English prize law includes earlier examples of this view, Sir William Scott, Lord Stowell, Judge of the High 
Court of Admiralty, 1798-1828 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 264-273. See also Philip 
C. Jessup and Francis Deák, Neutrality, its History, Economics and Law, vol. 1, The Origins (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1935), 205-206, 210-211; Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 156-157. 
12 Fulton, Sovereignty of the Sea (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1911), 552-553; Wyndham 
Walker, “Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule,” British Yearbook of International Law 22 (1945): 
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disputes contrasted the extraterritorial authority of the English Admiralty over prizes 
taken by English ships with the sovereignty of Mediterranean states over their littoral 
waters. In the process, they raised questions that defined the development of British 
power in the inner sea through the eighteenth century.  
  In a sea where England's territorial possessions were small and of often debatable 
importance, the sovereign authority of the English state was most evident in the 
regulation of navigation. English sovereignty, even over subjects and ships, was 
nevertheless limited in the Mediterranean, where English vessels constantly sailed 
through waters subject to the overlapping and competing jurisdictions of other states and 
empires. Disputes over Admiralty jurisdiction between England and neutral states in the 
Mediterranean established and contested the sovereign authority of the English state in 
that sea. Legal and jurisdictional questions arose when English privateers violated the 
neutrality of Tuscany and the security of Ottoman ports during the wars against Louis 
XIV. Despite the radically different political contexts of a vulnerable Italian principality 
and an empire that dominated the eastern Mediterranean, Ottoman and Tuscan responses 
to Anglo-French warfare were comparable. Ottoman efforts to preserve the security of 
the port of Smyrna paralleled Tuscan policy towards Livorno, as both polities sought to 
preserve the openness of their commercial centers. Moreover, English privateers who 
sailed out of Livorno and cruised in the Levant established concrete connections between 
the ways in which Tuscan and Ottoman officials sought to safeguard their ports and 
waters. A comparison of Tuscan and Ottoman approaches to maritime neutrality 
                                                
210-231; H. S. K. Kent, “The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit,” The American Journal of 
International Law 48, no. 4 (October 1954): 537-553. 
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illustrates how the political and legal contexts of the western and eastern Mediterranean 
shaped the regulation of English privateering in different ways. Conversely, similarities 
in Ottoman and Tuscan responses to the escalation of naval warfare around their ports 
reveal the existence of a maritime legal regime that connected the different parts of the 
Mediterranean and linked them to the wider world.   
 
I. Prize Law and Privateers in the Mediterranean 
  The wars against Louis XIV confirmed and encouraged the expansion of English 
naval power into the Mediterranean that had begun with the seventeenth-century 
campaigns against the corsairs. Although the Wars of the League of Augsburg and of the 
Spanish Succession changed the political and military dynamics of the early modern 
Mediterranean world, their impact on the legal regime of that sea is less clear. As the 
regulation of privateers and the determination of prize cases established the jurisdictional 
authority of English courts in Mediterranean waters, the expansion of European naval 
warfare into the Mediterranean made a state-based system of prize law as important to 
Mediterranean navigation as that of the corso. The growing importance of English courts 
in the Mediterranean did not, however, supplant existing legal authorities there. The High 
Court of Admiralty’s claim to jurisdiction over prizes captured by English vessels carried 
the authority of the English state overseas, but the Admiralty was just one body among 
many that exercised jurisdiction in Mediterranean waters. 
 The growth of privateering and European naval warfare in the Mediterranean 
partially integrated that sea into an Atlantic-based legal regime. During the seventeenth 
century, both the practice of the corso and its institutional foundations distinguished the 
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Mediterranean from other oceanic bodies. As autonomous bodies dedicated to the pursuit 
of religiously-inspired naval warfare, crusading orders and the prize courts which served 
them reflected the Mediterranean environment in which they operated. While prize law in 
the Atlantic evolved within the context of the development of a nation-state system, in 
the Mediterranean prize courts instead responded to the exigencies of a perennial and ill-
defined holy war.13 Yet, despite their different ideological frameworks, the corso and 
privateering actually raised many of the same questions for the legal and sovereign 
organization of navigation and maritime warfare. In particular, the borderline legitimacy 
of corsairs resembled that of privateers who, according to Charles Molloy, were reputed 
to be “but one remove from a Pirat.”14 Both corsairs and privateers depended on the 
support of sovereign and recognized authorities to legitimate their actions. For example, 
Antonio Martin, a Tuscan corsair, appealed to his commission from the Grand Duke to 
escape prosecution in a Venetian court. When the master of an English ship that he had 
previously seized managed to have the corsair brought to court at Candia in 1659, Martin 
brought that litigation to a close by arguing that he was legally responsible only to the 
prince who had issued his commission.15  
 Competition among courts and sovereigns over the jurisdictional authority to hear 
prize cases and to punish unlawful behavior shaped the legal and political organization of 
Mediterranean trade and navigation. The jurisdiction of the Admiralty over prizes taken 
                                                
13 Molly Greene, Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Mediterranean  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 110-111. 
14 Charles Molloy, De Jure Maritimo et Navali, 2nd ed. (London, 1677), 31. 
15 This comes from Charles Longland's account of his extended law suits against Martin and his heirs in an 
undated and unsigned petition, probably from 1675, contained in ASF, Auditore dei Benefici Ecclesiastici 
poi Segretaria del Regio Diritto, 5683. 
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by English ships in the Mediterranean was already well established by the end of the 
seventeenth century. Admiralty courts were notorious for legitimating the Mediterranean 
prizes of English pirates in the late sixteenth century.16 During England's mid-century 
wars with the Dutch and French, England's diplomats had asserted that responsibility for 
determining whether a prize was valid or not lay with the High Court of Admiralty. For 
instance, in 1668, John Finch told a Tuscan merchant who protested that an English 
warship had seized one of his vessels that "no prize was Condemn'd without a Court of 
Admiralty which was ready to hear what he could alledge."17 There had also been 
disputes over whether Mediterranean courts could adjudicate English prize cases.18 The 
Wars against Louis XIV provided numerous opportunities for other states to contest that 
jurisdiction and English jurists repeatedly encountered the problem of determining which 
courts had jurisdiction over prize cases. 
 Jurisdictional authority over prize cases was a sensitive point during the War of 
the League of Augsburg and through the eighteenth century.19 The Act of 1692 for the 
encouragement of privateers, provided guidelines for the adjudication of prizes taken in 
the Mediterranean. According to the Act, ships captured within the Strait of Gibraltar 
were to be taken to Cadiz, Alicante, Messina, or Naples where they were to be turned 
over to prize commissioners until the Court of Admiralty had determined if the prize was 
                                                
16 K. R. Andrews, “Sir Robert Cecil and Mediterranean Plunder,” English Historical Review 87, no. 344 
(July 1972): 513-532. 
17 Finch to Arlington, 26 February/8 March 1668, TNA SP 98/6. 
18 Corbettt, England in the Mediterranean, 1: 227-228. 
19 Examples of disputes over adjudication of prizes may be found in Marsden, “Early Prize Jurisdiction and 
Prize Law in England, Part III,” 47. 
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valid.20 The Parliamentary acts and bills that sought to regulate English privateering 
during the War of the League of Augsburg did not, however, specifically address the 
question of foreign jurisdiction over prize cases. In part, legislative silence on this point 
may have been intentional. In a memorandum to Sir William Trumbull on a bill for the 
encouragement of privateers of 1696, Sir Charles Hedges recorded his reluctance to 
"mention anything more of the Foreign Courts, it being a tender point and in some 
measure provided for by the clauses for the Treaties, and also by the proviso for our 
jurisdiction."21 Indeed, jurists and Admiralty courts were inconsistent in their assertions 
as to where jurisdictional authority over prize cases lay. Shortly after the start of the War 
of the League of Augsburg, disputes arose between English and Dutch ministers as to 
whether English courts could try prizes brought into English ports by Dutch ships.  
Admiralty lawyers firmly opposed proposals that Anglo-Dutch treaties specify that prize 
cases be heard only by the Admiralty which had issued the captor's commission. Instead, 
they maintained that Admiralty courts could take cognizance of any prize brought into 
English ports, in which English property or subjects were involved.22 Nevertheless, 
Admiralty jurists objected when foreign sovereigns interfered with prizes brought into 
their ports by English warships and privateers.  
                                                
20 4 William and Mary, c. 25, “An Act for continuing the Acts For prohibiting all Trade and Commerce 
with France and for the encouragement of Privateers,” in Statutes of the Realm: Printed by Command of 
His Majesty King George the Third..., vol. 6, 1685-1694, ed. John Raithby (London: George Eyre and 
Andrew Strahan, 1819), 419-423. On this legislation see also Clark, The Dutch Alliance and the War 
against French Trade, 57-59; Meyer, “English Privateering in the War of 1688 to 1697,” 260-261. A 
commissioner for prize was subsequently appointed at Livorno, as well. 
21 Hedges to Trumbull, 6 January 1696, in Report on the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire, 
Preserved at Easthampstead Park, Berks., vol 1, The Papers of Sir William Trumbull, ed. E. K. Purnell 
(London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1924), 610-611. 
22 Clark, The Dutch Alliance, 34-36. 
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II. Contested Jurisdictions  
 As diplomats and jurists maintained the Admiralty's claim to sole jurisdiction over 
English privateers, they extended the authority of the English state and challenged the 
ability of Mediterranean states to regulate navigation. Once again, the case of William 
Plowman between 1696 and 1704 highlighted the ambiguity as to where authority lay to 
determine whether privateers had overstepped the bounds of law and the consequent 
regulatory difficulties that were inseparable from early modern privateering.23 This case 
revolved around whether or not the Grand Duke of Tuscany had the right to punish an 
English subject for his attacks on French shipping. 24 In early 1696, Plowman outfitted 
the ship Philip & Mary, under the command of John Broome, ostensibly to make a 
trading voyage to Alexandria but with the intention to cruise against French shipping in 
the Levant. Since the arming of a ship in the port of Livorno violated the neutrality of that 
port, the Grand Duke, Cosimo III, refused to allow the ship to sail until Plowman had 
sworn that he would not attack French shipping. In April of that year, Plowman sailed out 
of Livorno in the company of two other armed merchantmen, the Charles, under Charles 
Pickering, and the Peace.25 This expedition would generate severe diplomatic and legal 
problems for its participants and for the English communities in both Livorno and the 
                                                
23 Giacomo Giusti gives a narrative of Plowman’s actions and of the subsequent diplomatic and legal 
disputes between England and Tuscany in “Il Granducato di Toscana e il ‘caso Plowman’: la difesa della 
neutralitá e la crisi con l’Inghilterra (1696-1707)” (Tesi di Laurea Specialistica, Università degli Studi di 
Pisa, 2008).  
24 Plowman and his supporters recounted their version of his voyage into the Levant and his subsequent 
prosecution by the Grand Duke in a pamphlet published in 1701, The Case of Sir Alexander Rigby, William 
Shepard, and William Plowman: setting for the damages they have suffer’d by the imprisonment of William 
Plowman; seizure of their effects, and other proceedings of the Grand Duke of Toscany (London 1701). 
25 Giusti, “Il Granducato di Toscana e il ‘caso Plowman’,” 35-38. 
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Levant. Despite his oath, Plowman captured and ransomed three French ships and 
unsuccessfully attacked others during his six-month voyage through the eastern 
Mediterranean. 26 Returning to Italy, Plowman was apprehended in Rome at the request 
of the Grand Duke as a subject and pirate. He was transferred to Florence and held in 
prison there until he had made good the losses sustained by the French, who had held the 
Grand Duke responsible for Plowman’s attacks on French ships.27   
 Plowman’s voyage into the Levant was typical of the thin line between 
privateering and piracy in the seventeenth century. When Plowman first sailed from 
Livorno, the English consul in that port, John Burrows, warned of the dubious character 
of the expedition. In particular, Burrows doubted whether Broome's commission from the 
Admiralty was valid, since the Philip & Mary was a French prize that had never been 
formally condemned.28 Burrows also suspected that Plowman and Pickering carried 
commissions only from the Great Duke of Savoy, which would limit English authority 
over them.29 Like other early modern captains and mariners, Plowman employed a 
                                                
26 The practice of ransoming prizes back to their masters or owner was of dubious legality, but widespread 
in the seventeenth and eighteenty century. The practice was forbidden in 1744.  See R. G. Marsden, 
Documents Relating to Law and Custom of the Sea (London: Navy Records Society) 2: 225, 430.  On the 
ransoming of prizes by early modern privateers, see also G. N. Clark, The Dutch Alliance, 124; Douglas A 
Petrie, The Prize Game: Lawful Looting on the High Seas in the Days of Fighting Sail (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1999), 19-24.  
27 Giusti, “Il Granducato di Toscana e il ‘caso Plowman’,” 43-51; The Case of Sir Alexander Rigby, 
William Shepard, and William Plowman, 7. Plowman was accused of having attacked French ships while 
flying the colors of the Grand Duke, but this accusation does not resurface in the ensuing case. 
28 Broome’s commission was for the Lusitania, the ship he commanded before moving to the Philip & 
Mary. Consequently, the commission he carried while sailing under Plowman was technically invalid, The 
Answer of the Merchants-Petitioners, and Trustees for the Factory at Legorn, to the Account of Damages, 
Laid to the Charge of the Grand Duke of Tuscany by Sir Alexander Rigby, Mr. Will. Shepard, and Mr. Will. 
Plowman... (London, 1704), 76-80. 
29 Burrows to Vernon, Livorno, 21 May 1696, TNA SP 98/18. 
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variety of legal arguments to excuse and legitimate his behavior.30 Plowman and his 
supporters emphasized the fact that Broome carried a letter of marque and was thus free 
to attack French shipping, without questioning whether that commission was strictly 
valid.31 Moreover, although records show that he was clearly behind the Philip & Mary’s 
privateering cruise, Plowman nonetheless argued that he was merely a passenger onboard 
the ship and thus in no position to determine whether the ship would attack French 
vessels.  He also later claimed that it was the French ships which had been the aggressors 
and that the Philip & Mary had acted in self-defense.32 
 In response to Cosimo III's prosecution of Plowman, English officials objected 
that the Grand Duke had no right to intervene in the legitimate conduct of an English 
privateer. England’s representatives in Tuscany strongly objected to the Grand Duke’s 
seemingly arbitrary and harsh punishment of an English subject. When the Admiralty 
judge Sir Charles Hedges was asked for his opinion on the case in 1699, he also denied 
that the Grand Duke had any jurisdiction in a case involving the actions of an English 
privateer. Hedges clearly accepted Plowman’s account of his voyage and expressed his 
opinion that "the Grand Duke hath no manner of Jurisdiction or legall authority to order 
the restitution of what his Majestie Subjects have thus taken from the ffrench during the 
war," the Treaty of Ryswick of 1697 having specified that neither French nor English 
were liable for losses sustained during the war.33 Hedges further thought that the English 
                                                
30 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 112-120. 
31 The Case of Sir Alexander Rigby, William Shepard, and William Plowman, 4. 
32 Ibid., 4-7, 52.  
33 Charles Hedges, “Report concerning Mr. Plowman, to the Lords Judges,” 17 or 24 July 1699, BL Add. 
MS 25098, f. 174v. 
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king had every right to demand compensation of the Grand Duke for Plowman's loses, 
since "his rights are diminished and his authority circumscribed ... for an English 
privateer acts by the Kings authority and is accountable to his Majesty alone for the 
prizes he shall take."34 Plowman and his supporters offered a further explanation for why 
the Grand Duke could not exercise jurisdiction over the prizes in question. According to 
Plowman, the Grand Duke of Tuscany "never did nor can pretend to a title of Dominion 
over the Mediterranean Sea." Since the Grand Duke had no authority over the high seas, 
the courts of Tuscany were incompetent to hear a case concerning the actions of the 
subjects of other princes, who were liable in the first instance "to the Sentence of their 
lawful Sovereigns."35 
 English arguments regarding Cosimo III’s jurisdiction over Plowman’s attacks on 
French shipping missed the actual basis of the Grand Duke’s case against the English 
merchant. The Grand Duke and his officials prosecuted Plowman for his “breach of faith, 
” by which he broke his oath to a sovereign prince and violated Tuscan neutrality by 
arming a ship in Livorno. 36 According to Tuscan officials, Plowman had committed a 
crime of laesa maiestas by violating the honor of the Grand Duke.37 An anonymous 
letter, perhaps written by one of the English merchants at Livorno who defended Cosimo 
III’s conduct towards Plowman, thus argued that the Grand Duke’s prosecution of 
                                                
34 Ibid, f. 175r.   
35 The Case of Sir Alexander Rigby, William Shepard, and William Plowman, 37 
36 A copy of the Duke's sentence against Plowman with an English translation is given in the pamphlet 
authored by Plowman's opponents within the English factor at Livorno, The Answer of the Merchants-
Petitioners, 140-144. See also Giusti, “Il Granducato di Toscana e il 'caso Plowman',” 44-46, 51-57. 
37 For this point, see the memorial of Ruberto Maria Zefferini, the Grand Duke’s special envoy to London, 
of 29 March 1705,  TNA SP 100/29, which was printed as The Grand Duke of Tuscany’s Proceedings 
against William Plowman: with Remarks thereupon (London, 1705), 10-11. 
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Plowman did not infringe on the Admiralty’s jurisdiction over prize cases.38 Although 
neither Broome nor the Philip & Mary carried a proper commission and thus risked 
punishment as pirates if encountered by enemies, the Grand Duke had refrained from 
passing judgment on the prizes, Broome and the crew so as not to undermine English 
jurisdiction. Instead, he prosecuted Plowman alone and then, “not as an English subject, 
though he was such by birth, but as a naturalized subject of His Highness."39 Tuscan 
ministers never cited Plowman's Tuscan subjecthood in their arguments for the Grand 
Duke's right to punish the merchant, probably in order to avoid lending strength to French 
arguments that he was responsible for the losses they had sustained at Plowman's hands.40 
Nevertheless, the Grand Duke’s case against Plowman centered on his breach of faith and 
his infraction of Tuscan neutrality, without directly passing judgment on the prizes he had 
taken. Yet, even if the Tuscans refrained from taking cognizance of Plowman’s prizes, 
they did argue that he had behaved unlawfully at sea. 
 Although Plowman was prosecuted by the Grand Duke for breaking his word and 
thus violating Tuscan neutrality, he was apprehended as a pirate. The Livornese attorney 
                                                
38 This anonymous letter is the Italian copy of an English original that was dispatched to a Signore 
Magnolfi on 10 May 1705 and is contained within a substantial collection of documents related to the case 
of Plowman, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 2674. The English resident at Florence, Sir Lambert Blackwell, 
reported that Magnolfi was a minor official of the Grand Duke who corresponded closely with some of the 
English merchants at Livorno. It seems likely that the letter was written by one of the English merchants at 
Livorno or by one of their allies in London since it notes that in their pamphlets the delegates of the English 
nation at Livorno had considered only the amount of damages claimed by Plowman and not the merits of 
the case itself. See Blackwell to Hedges, Florence, 5 July 1704, TNA SP 98/21. 
39 “...ma S. A. per non intaccare la giurisdizione d'Inghilterra non giudicò quest'Azione, come per certo le 
leggi delle Nazioni gli averebbero permesso, ne il Capitano ne gli Uomini, ne il Vassello, ma solamente 
Plowman non puramente come suddito d'Inghilterra benche tale forse per nascita, ma come per atto 
volontario era suddito di S. A,” ASF Mediceo del Principato, 2674. 
40 Giusti, “Il Granducato di Toscana e il 'caso Plowman',” 49.  Tuscan ministers professed to be unable to 
find any evidence of Plowman’s Tuscan subjecthood, see Giraldi to Panciatechi, London, 25 Aug. 1702, 
BL MS Eg. 1696, f. 232r; Panciatechi to Giraldi, Florence, 23 September 1702, ASF Mediceo del 
Principato, 4125. 
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Alessandro Luigi Catelani, who undertook in 1704 to lay out a legal defense of the Grand 
Duke’s proceedings, explained that Plowman had behaved as a pirate and that Tuscan 
officials were accordingly entitled to punish him for his actions at sea.41 Catelani 
reiterated and expanded on earlier arguments that Plowman was guilty of the crime of 
laesa maiestas. However, he also defended the Grand Duke’s prosecution of Plowman by 
highlighting the illegality of the merchant’s actions at sea. Catelani emphasized the fact 
that Plowman had sailed without a commission and that the one carried by Broome had 
not been issued for the Philip & Mary, and was thus invalid. According to Catelani, by 
attacking the French without a patent, Plowman had acted as “an unlawful Pirate” [un 
Pirata arbitrario] and not as an authorized belligerent. Since Plowman had committed 
acts of piracy, it was in the power of the prince in whose domain he was captured to 
punish him and force him to make restitution. Catelani further cited examples from 
English history and from Molloy’s account of maritime law to affirm the right of a 
neutral prince to punish acts of piracy committed on the high sea and to restore goods to 
their rightful owners.42 Plowman’s opponents among the English merchant community at 
Livorno similarly argued that the lack of a valid commission rendered him a pirate.43 
 In the seventeenth century, there was no single, accepted definition of what 
constituted a pirate.44 The term thus appears to have been as prescriptive as it was 
                                                
41 For background on Catelani's arguments on behalf of the Grand Duke, see Giusti, “Il Granducato di 
Toscana e il 'caso Plowman',” 76-77. 
42 “Relazione di Catelani su Plowman,” Livorno, 19 March 1704, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1619. 
43 The Answer of the Merchants-Petitioners, 52-53 
44 Anne Pérotin-Dumon, “The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and the Law on the Seas, 1450-1850,” in The 
Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350-1750, ed. James D. Tracy 
  218 
! !
descriptive. For Catelani and members of the English factory at Livorno, Plowman’s lack 
of a valid commission established him as a pirate and liable to punishment at the hands of 
the Grand Duke.45 The accusation of piracy thus served to reinforce the disputed 
jurisdiction of that sovereign over Plowman. The English advocate-general, Sir John 
Cooke, on the other hand, denied the relevance of Plowman’s supposed piracy to the 
case, since the Grand Duke had punished Plowman only for his “Breach of Promise.”  
Moreover, Cooke argued that “A Subject of England, who, during the time of War, Seizes 
the Ships of a declared Enemy, though non-Commissionated can be no means be reputed 
a Pirate.”46 Cooke here follows in a distinction drawn by jurists that separated the duty of 
all subjects to combat the declared enemy of their sovereign from their right to any 
property taken during that combat, which was contingent upon being licensed by the 
state.47 This argument was, of course, not applicable if Plowman had really cruised the 
Levant in search of French prizes. Nevertheless, Cooke’s denial of Plowman’s piracy 
disputed the Grand Duke’s right to assume jurisdiction over the activities of English 
privateers. 
 English arguments regarding the Plowman affair strongly reflect the account that 
the merchant had given English ministers of his actions. As the full story of Plowman’s 
                                                
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1991), 203-204 and passim. See also Daniel Heller-Roazen, The 
Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations (New York: Zone Books, 2009). 
45 The Admiralty judge Sir Leoline Jenkins offered a similar argument in the late seventeenth century, by 
which he identified the commission as the key distinction between a pirate, who was subject to the 
universal jurisdiction of all princes, and a legitimate captain who had acted inappropriately and was 
answerable to his sovereign alone, see Alfred Rubin, The Law of Piracy (Newport, RI: Naval War College 
Press, 1988), 88-92. 
46 John Cooke to Hedges, Doctors Commons, 30 May 1704, TNA SP 98/83, f. 100r. This opinion was also 
printed in The Answer of the Merchants-Petitioners, 126.   
47 Molloy, De Jure Maritimo et Navali, 20. 
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actions came to light, English jurists appear to have reconsidered the case; one opinion 
solicited from Doctors Commons in 1704 cautiously accepted the Grand Duke's right to 
punish Plowman’s infraction of his neutrality.48 The English government never conceded 
the Tuscan case. Yet they ultimately allowed the case to retreat into the background as 
strategic concerns intersected with England's legal and diplomatic opposition to the 
Grand Duke's treatment of Plowman. Political and strategic considerations limited the 
Crown’s ability to enforce a particular interpretation of the legal foundations of 
privateering in the Mediterranean, but the case of Plowman nevertheless illustrated how 
Admiralty authority over English privateers clashed with jurisdictions that princes 
claimed as integral to their sovereignty. 
 
III. Sovereignty and Neutrality 
 As rulers sought to defend their neutrality and to punish violators of that status, 
they affirmed their ability to shape the commercial conditions of the Mediterranean and 
established limits to the expansion of English Admiralty jurisdiction. The Grand Duke of 
Tuscany punished Plowman for breaking his oath not to attack French ships and for thus 
violating Tuscan neutrality. It was, however, the neutrality of ports and littoral waters that 
most often proved to be the source of contention between opposing jurisdictional and 
sovereign claims. The right of neutral princes to restrict combat between belligerents 
within their ports and harbors was well established by the end of the seventeenth 
                                                
48 See the 8 May 1704 opinion of William Cooper and an anonymous opinion on Plowman’s case of 22 
May 1704, in The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland, ed. S. C. Lomas (London: H. M. 
Stationery Office, 1907), 8:118-120. 
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century.49 The neutrality of ports was directly linked to the fact that they lay under the 
dominion of their sovereign.  As Charles Molloy explained, it was unlawful "to assault, 
kill, or spoil [an enemy] in a Haven or Peacable Port," since those fell within the 
"Empire" of rulers who could determine what was lawful and unlawful within their 
domains.50 Although a convention signed by the French, English, Dutch and Spanish 
consuls at Livorno in 1691 shifted the basis of Livorno’s neutrality from granducal 
sovereignty to interstate treaty, enforcement of the agreement lay with the Grand Duke 
alone.51 
 By the late seventeenth century, it was widely accepted that the distance of a 
cannon-shot defined the extent of a port’s neutrality, since water within that expanse fell 
within the physical protection of castles or fortresses.52 The Grand Duke of Tuscany thus 
regularly reminded the representatives of belligerent parties, that he could only enforce 
the neutrality of the port "by defending all Nations as farre as his Cannon would reach."53 
The threat of physical force did not, however, guarantee that the neutrality of a port 
                                                
49 Jessup and Deák, The Origins, 249-255. 
50 Molloy, De Jure Maritime et Navali, 8.  Alexander Justice reiterated this point when he opined that “No 
Privateer is to attack an Enemy in a neutral Port,” A General Treatise of the Dominion and Laws of the Sea, 
471 
51 The three articles of the convention of 1691 specified that the warring nations would refrain from hostile 
acts within the port and would observe regulations designed to ensure the safe passage of ships into and out 
of the port of Livorno.  The agreement was renegotiated and reconfirmed with minor alterations at the start 
of every major European war through the Seven Years’ War.  On these conventions and their significance 
for the evolution of neutrality, see Addobatti, “La neutralità del porto di Livorno in età medicea,” passim.  
Cf. Jean-Pierre Filippini, “La graduelle affirmation de la souveraineté du Grand-Duc de Toscane sur le port 
de Livourne: les édits de neutralité de la période des Habsbourg-Lorraine,” Nuovi studi livornesi 16 (2009): 
23-24. 
52 H.S.K. Kent, “The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit,” 537-538. 
53 Blackwell to Nottingham, Pisa, 2 March 1703, TNA SP 98/20. For similar statements from the time of 
the War of the League of Augsburg, see Addobatti, “La neutralità del porto di Livorno in età medicea,” 76.   
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would be observed; during the Wars of the League of Augsburg and of the Spanish 
Succession, the commanders of warships and privateers frequently violated the neutrality 
of Livorno and other ports. The cannon-shot itself was also an imprecise gauge, since 
observers frequently disagreed as to whether the shot had reached combatants or not.54  
Seventeenth-century juridical writers like Molloy forbade privateers from preying on 
ships within neutral ports, but they were not specific as to where authority lay to punish 
violations of states’ neutral waters. Neutral princes might demand restitution of a prize 
taken within their ports, but the representatives of belligerent states regularly denied that 
the capture of particular prizes had violated a port’s neutrality or insisted that 
determination of the case lay with the prize courts of the captor’s sovereign.  
 Tuscan efforts to preserve the neutrality of Livorno and to punish those who 
violated it thus raised the question of how different jurisdictional authorities would relate 
at that port. In early December 1703, the English privateer Crowned Nightingale, under 
captain Benjamin Fisher, captured the Genoese ship the Madonna della Guardia, which 
was freighted by Tuscan merchants, off the south coast of Tuscany and brought the prize 
into Livorno. Fisher had, however, violated the convention for the neutrality of Livorno 
when he sailed out of the port without permission and before his appointed time.  Tuscan 
officials consequently arrested the Genoese prize until it could be decided how to proceed 
in the matter. 55 Catelani argued that Fisher’s prize was invalid, basing his account on 
                                                
54 On the problems of the “cannon-shot” as a means of enforcing the neutrality of ports, see Walker, 
“Territorial Waters,” 214-215 and Addobbati, “La Neutralità’ del Porto di Livorno in Età Medicea,” pp. 79-
80. Livorno’s cannon appear to have had some success in maintaining the neutrality of the port: the 
Southwell galley gave up its chase of a Genoese bark in sight of Livorno upon the firing of the harbor’s 
cannon, Blackwell to Nottingham, Livorno, 9 April 1704, TNA SP 98/21. 
55 Tornaquinci to Montauti, Livorno, 8, 10, 12, and 14 December 1703, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 2224; 
Blackwell to Nottingham, Pisa, 2 April 1704, TNA SP 98/21 
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Molloy’s discussion of prize law in De Jure Navali et Maritimo, which the Italian jurist 
believed to record “la costituzione dell’Ammiraltà d’Inghilterra.”56 According to 
Catelani, the Grand Duke was entitled to seize the Genoese ship and return it to its 
owners, because according to the law of nations, a prize only fully entered into the 
possession of the captor after it had been carried “infra Praesidia,” that is, into a port or 
haven of his state.  If the prize was instead brought into a neutral port, the authorities of 
that state had the right to seize it and restore it to its owners.57 Catelani further argued that 
Fisher’s violation of the neutrality of Livorno and seizure of a neutral ship constituted 
piratical actions that deserved to be punished by the English Admiralty.58 Molloy’s 
account of the law of nations with regard to prize law did not, however, reflect Admiralty 
practice. Following a conversation with Lambert Blackwell, the English resident, and 
based on the experience of cases from the War of the League of Augsburg, Catelani 
admitted that adjudication of the prize lay solely with the English Admiralty, which 
ultimately confirmed the validity of the prize.59  
 Although the “cannon-shot rule” demarcated the extent of a state’s neutral waters, 
it was also unclear where authority lay to adjudicate prizes taken in contested waters. 
During the Napoleonic Wars, the Admiralty judge Sir William Scott denied that the High 
                                                
56 Catelani's report on the case of the Crowned Nightingale is undated, but comes between letters of 21 and 
24 Dec. 1703, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1619. 
57 Molloy, De Jure Navali et Maritimo, 5-6; Catelani, undated letter between 21 and 24 December 1703, 
ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1619. 
58 Catelani, undated letter between 21 and 24 December 1703, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1619.   
59 “...essendo io certo, che tocca alla Corte dell'ammiraltá di Londra il dichiarare se quella sia o no buona 
preda, mediante una sentenza formale, senza che resti arbitrio á chi si sia di prevalere coll'autoritá su le 
leggi fondamentali del regno, e le costituzioni statutarie della marina, per sovvertire il Giudicio, che 
secondo le prove fatte in processo deve seguirne,” 24 December 1704, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1619.  
For the condemnation of the Madonna della Guardia as a good prize, see TNA HCA 34/25, #59, 
“Madonna della Guardia.” 
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Court had any jurisdiction over prizes taken within the territorial waters of another state.  
Scott's predecessors did not, however, share the view that the cannon-shot marked the 
limit of Admiralty jurisdiction as well as the extent of a state's territorial and neutral 
waters.60 The jurisdictional difficulties that arose over disputed prizes are apparent in a 
diplomatic exchange precipitated by the behavior of John Broome, again in command of 
a privateering vessel, at the start of the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1704, Broome 
sailed for the Mediterranean as commander of the Southwell Galley but for several weeks 
he cruised off the Portuguese coast. England's ambassador to Portugal, John Methuen, 
complained that Broome had hovered just outside the port of Lisbon, within the range of 
the city's forts, and had there taken multiple prizes, which he then sent into that port.  
When the Portuguese envoy at London pressed for the discharge of the captured ships, 
Sir Charles Hedges, then Secretary of State, explained that it was not in the Crown’s 
power to order the restitution of the prizes without a verdict from the High Court of 
Admiralty but he emphasized the fact that the location of the capture would be taken into 
consideration by the prize court.61  
 The Southwell Galley’s attack on ships within the port of Lisbon raised the 
question of whether English or Portuguese courts had jurisdiction over the resulting prize 
cases. Since Broome had sent his prizes into Lisbon, the Portuguese government was able 
to arrest them and to begin proceedings to determine whether they had been captured 
within the confines of the port.62 In response to opposition in England to Portuguese 
                                                
60 R. G. Marsden, ed., Reports of Cases Determined by the High Court of Admiralty and upon Appeal 
therefrom... (London: W. Clowes and Sons, 1885), 175; Bourguignon, Sir William Scott, 173. 
61 Hedges to Methuen, Whitehall, 7 March 1704, TNA SP 104/108, f. 12v-13v. 
62 Methuen to Nottingham, Lisbon, 30 April 1704, TNA SP 89/18, f. 98r-v. 
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courts assuming jurisdiction over Broome’s prizes, Methuen explained that the 
Portuguese government had taken cognizance of these prize cases only so far as to 
examine whether or not the ships had been taken within a cannon-shot from Lisbon's 
fortifications. Since the prizes had then been brought into that port, such an inquiry 
"seems to be to be so indisputably the right of every Prince to examine that I own all the 
lawyers Opinions in England would very hardly persuade me to change mine."63 He 
further noted that Admiralty jurisdiction over prize cases had never been disputed in 
Portugal except when the prize was taken under a fort's protection. Methuen thought that 
based on "all right & by all Laws" such cases lay in the authority of the prince under 
whose forts the prize had been taken, but he "would be much governed by the English 
Lawyers opinion if they would declare that a Portugal ship taking a Prize in the River 
Thames was to be tryed & determined by this Admiralty of Portugal."64 In response, 
Hedges affirmed the “Right of protection, which that King and all other Princes as you 
observe has a Right to preserve” and expressed his willingness that Portuguese courts 
determine whether the ships had been taken within the port of Lisbon.65  
 The neutrality of ports and the principle of the “cannon-shot” were legal and 
diplomatic principles that were widely observed both in the Mediterranean and in the 
Atlantic world. These customary rules were as applicable in the Levant and in the waters 
adjacent to Muslim polities as they were in the European waters that have dominated 
historians’ study of early modern maritime law. The nearly universal prevalence of these 
principles did not, however, preclude controversy as to where authority lay to enforce 
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64 Methuen to Nottingham, Lisbon, 30 April 1704, TNA SP 89/18, f. 98v. 
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them. States’ dominion over their harbors clashed with the extraterritorial jurisdiction of 
the Admiralty over English privateers and navigation. As a result, it was not only 
regulatory custom and varying interpretations of the law of nations that shaped the legal 
regime of the early modern Mediterranean. Equally important was the fact that the 
application of legal principles depended on the exercise of sovereign authority. 
Competing lines of jurisdictional authority thus shaped the legal environment of the 
Mediterranean, but it was often uncertain how these lines of authority should coexist or 
what would happen when they intersected. 
 
IV.  The Security of the Aegean 
 When European privateers sailed into the eastern Mediterranean, they entered a 
distinct political space. Surrounded by the territories of the Ottoman Empire, those waters 
constituted an Ottoman lake that was noticeably less “international” than the western 
Mediterranean. Despite the growth of the French caravane trade, Ottoman subjects 
provided the bulk of merchant shipping in the Levant; the pass and treaty systems that 
otherwise defined Mediterranean navigation were less noticeable in a region where 
Ottoman navigation predominated than they were where European and North African 
shipping coexisted.66 Nevertheless, the spillover of European naval warfare into the 
Levant at the end of the seventeenth century also revealed the degree to which the eastern 
Mediterranean shared a common regulatory and legal culture with the western 
Mediterranean. Studies of European privateering in the Levant have focused on the 
diplomatic consequences that followed the seizure of Ottoman goods; however, at the 
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base of legal and diplomatic negotiations over the actions of English privateers and of the 
Ottoman response to them was the exercise of state authority at sea.67 The threat of 
European privateering to the safety of Ottoman trade led the ministers of that empire to 
reconceptualize its political authority over Levantine waters. As a result, the imperial 
context of Ottoman dominance in the eastern Mediterranean further called into question 
how the jurisdiction of the English Admiralty would fit into and shape the legal regime of 
that sea.  
 Although Islamic legal theory did not contain a concept of neutrality comparable 
to that propounded by European jurists, Ottoman sovereignty over the ports and harbors 
of the empire turned those sites into effectively neutral spaces with regards to European 
naval warfare in the Levant.68 In this respect, the Islamic legal tradition paralleled 
European thinking on maritime sovereignty. Islamic jurists placed ports, harbors and 
coastal waters under the dominion of the state and based jurisdiction on the ability of a 
ruler to exert force over littoral space from castles, fortresses and watchtowers.69 Ottoman 
officials sought to maintain the security and safety of the empire’s ports within these 
limits and accordingly punished belligerents who committed acts of aggression near or 
within those ports. Thus, in 1652, the pasha of Aleppo ordered the English nation at 
Aleppo to pay reparations after the warships that had accompanied a convoy of English 
                                                
67 Cf. Maurits H. van den Boogert, “Redress for Ottoman Victims of European Privateering: A Case against 
the Dutch in the Divan-i Hümayun (1708-1715),” Turcica 33 (2001): 91-117. 
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merchant vessels acted as "Corsares, Pyratts, Disturberers of the Grand Signores Ports, & 
hinderers of his Profits & the Trade of the place," by preventing French vessels from 
entering or leaving the port of Scanderoon.70 A decade later, when French warships were 
rumored to have sunk an English vessel within sight of the port of Tunis, John Earlisman 
complained that the Tunisian government had taken no action against the French 
merchants in that city. According to Earlisman, if the French had similarly "affronted" 
any port in the Levant, the Ottomans would have punished the entire nation, as they had 
the English at Aleppo.71 
 During earlier European conflicts, the Ottoman response to belligerent acts 
committed in the vicinity of ports, as at Scanderoon, had induced the European nations to 
arrive at temporary truces to avoid violating the security of Ottoman ports or subjects. As 
William Trumbull, the English ambassador to the Ottoman Empire between 1687 and 
1693, recorded, "to the best Information I can have, formerly in times of warr, the 
Publick Ministers have thought it convenient to keepe a good Correspondence, & to send 
their orders to the subjects of each Nation residing in these Countries to avoid quarrels, 
which tended onely to the advantage of the Turkes, who never faild to make both sides 
pay good summes of money upon such occasion."72 Trumbull, however, went on to note 
that this procedure did not seem appropriate for a war in which the French openly 
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challenged the English succession, a matter "of a farr different & much higher Nature."73  
Consequently, Levantine waters became a battleground for French and English vessels. 
 Framing the Levantine dimension of Anglo-French warfare was William III's 
broader diplomatic campaign against France. English and Dutch ambassadors to the 
Ottoman Empire were both instructed to try to make peace between the Ottoman Empire 
and Austria, in order to bring an end to the war between those powers that had waged 
since 1683 and to free Austria to concentrate its military resources against France.74When 
William III dispatched the English fleet into the Mediterranean in 1694, he aimed not 
only to support his allies on the Iberian Peninsula, but also to lend a show of strength to 
his efforts to encourage the Ottoman Empire to make peace with Austria.75 Yet it was the 
actions of English privateers that dominated England’s maritime relations with the 
Ottoman Empire at the turn of the seventeenth century. Carlo Ruzzini, the Venetian bailo 
or ambassador at Constantinople, described the effects of the War of the Spanish 
Succession in the Levant in terms that are equally applicable to the previous conflict. The 
diplomat described how “Even in this distant Part” the effects of European war were felt. 
French, English, and Dutch ships carried the war into the Aegean, where they took prizes 
even in waters adjacent to Ottoman fortresses, and showed no respect for the goods and 
                                                
73 Ibid., f. 31v. 
74 On Anglo-Dutch diplomacy to end the Ottoman Empire's war with Austria, see Colin Heywood, “English 
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persons of Ottoman subjects. Both the Ottoman government’s demands for reparations 
for losses sustained by its subjects and its efforts “to prescribe Laws and limits 
[prescriver Leggi, e termini]” to the navigation of European privateers and warships were 
futile.76 
 The War of the League of Augsburg and its successor conflict thus challenged the 
ability of the Ottoman Empire to maintain the security of its harbors in the face of an 
intense European conflict that spilled over into Levantine waters. Ottoman efforts to 
protect both their ports and their subjects' goods from the effects of European warfare 
broadly mirrored the responses of other neutral states to that conflict. During the early 
years of the European war, efforts to safeguard Ottoman subjects were hampered by 
political turmoil within the empire itself after a series of disastrous defeats at the hands of 
Austria and its allies led to repeated and violent changes of government.77 Nevertheless, 
in response to the outbreak of Anglo-French hostilities in Levantine waters and the influx 
of European privateers and warships into the eastern Mediterranean, Ottoman officials 
repeatedly reiterated their insistence that the belligerents refrain from combat within the 
empire’s ports or harbors and sought to secure the safety of Ottoman passengers and 
goods upon English and French vessels. In 1690, the Caimacam, the Grand Vizir's 
lieutenant, complained to Trumbull that English warships had captured French vessels 
within the port of Smyrna. According to Trumbull, the Ottoman official advised him that 
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"Wee might do what wee pleased with our Enemies in open Sea, but the goods of freinds 
ought to be restored.”78  
 English representatives and Ottoman officials disagreed as to what constituted the 
extent of Ottoman ports. In the case of 1690 that brought the Caimacam to complain to 
Trumbull of the conduct of English ships, he protested that French ships had been seized 
within the gulf of Smyrna, which was held to be part of that city’s port.  Trumbull 
observed that "the Turks will not distinguish so Nicely of ports as our Law does in 
Christendome."79 Since fortresses overlooked the mouth of the long, narrow strait leading 
to that port, the Ottoman government considered the entire bay to constitute a protected 
place.80 During an interview with Trumbull, the Grand Vizir explained that the seizure of 
French vessels from beneath the castle guarding the gulf of Smyrna “was as much as if 
they had taken them out of the port.”81 In fact, the Ottomans were not unique in claiming 
that such protected spaces could extend beyond the “cannon-shot.” During the 
negotiations to establish the convention of neutrality for Livorno in 1691, the Grand 
Duke professed that he could only enforce that port’s neutrality to the distance of a 
cannon shot, but he simultaneously defined Tuscany’s neutral waters to extend beyond 
that range, within an expanse of sea demarcated by the lines of sight between fortified 
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positions.82 Consequently, Ottoman conceptions of the relationship between the 
protection accorded by fortresses and the extent to which the empire could forbid 
belligerent acts around its ports appear to have mirrored European ideas regarding the 
expanse of neutral waters. As at Livorno or other European harbors, the issue of 
determining whether a ship had been taken within the range of a castle’s guns was 
problematic and it was equally difficult to determine which ship had been the aggressor 
when both French and English claimed only to have defended themselves from attack.83 
Further confusing matters was English adherence during the wars against Louis XIV to 
the principle that neutral goods found on board enemy ships were good prize.84 This view 
put English representatives at odds with Ottoman ministers who insisted that the goods of 
Ottoman merchants captured on board French ships were to be returned to their owners.85 
 English diplomats and the directors of the Levant Company nevertheless took the 
neutrality of Ottoman subjects and harbors seriously. Trumbull repeatedly wrote to both 
ministers and the Company's directors to urge that English captains be instructed to take 
care when Ottoman subjects were onboard captured French vessels and to promptly free 
                                                
82 Compare the Ottoman view that the gulf of Smyrna constituted a protected and neutral place to Cosimo 
III’s definition of the waters within sight of Livorno which were to be considered neutral, Addobbati “La 
Neutralità del Porto di Livorno in Età Medicea,” 76-77. 
83 Trumbull to Raye, Constantinople, 16 January 1691, BL Add. MS 72592, f. 21r; Trumbull to 
Nottingham, Constantinople, 3 February 1691, BL Ad. MSS 72592, f. 24r-v; Trumbull to Levant Company, 
Pera, 3 April 1691, BL Add. MS 72592, f. 29v-30v. Both English and French representatives accused their 
counterparts of bribing Ottoman officials to declare that prizes had been taken within or without ports and 
harbors; Trumbull to the Levant Company, Pera, 3 April 1691 and Trumbull to Nottingham, 
Constantinople, 3 April 1691, BL Add. MS 72592, f. 29v, 34v-35r; Chateauneuf to Ponchartrain, Pera, 9 
May 1696, AN (Archives Nationales): AE (Affaires Étrangères)  B/I/382, f. 130r-v. 
84 Trumbull to Nottingham, Constantinople, 22 December 1690, BL Add. MS 72592, f. 7v; Kulsrud, 
Maritime Neutrality to 1780, 142. 
85 van den Boogert, “Redress for Ottoman Victims of European Privateering,” 93. 
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them and their belongings.86 The arrival of warships in the Levant in the company of 
convoys, as well as outbreaks of combat between merchant vessels led, however, to 
frequent violations of Ottoman ports and subjects. For their part, the directors of the 
Levant Company repeatedly advised its representatives in the Ottoman Empire to respect 
the neutrality of Ottoman ports and subjects. 87 In June 1696, the directors reprimanded 
the consul and factors at Smyrna for opposing Ottoman orders to restore a French ship 
captured within that port, since if the ship had been released it “could not have bin lookt 
upon as any dishonour unto us or a condesention to the French, but only as a respect we 
were willing to show the Grand Signor’s Ports.”88 Upon receiving word of William 
Plowman’s privateering expedition into the Levant in 1696, the Company’s directors 
solicited a proclamation from the Lords Justices that forbid privateers from seizing ships 
or goods belonging to “His Majesties Friends and Allies” and from carrying the 
commission of another state, “upon Pain of their being Reputed and Punished as 
Pirates.”89 
 Violations of the security of Ottoman ports produced jurisdictional controversies 
that paralleled those that arose around European ports like Livorno and Lisbon. In July 
1696, Charles Pickering, captain of the privateer Charles, captured the French ship 
                                                
86 Trumbull to Shrewsbury and Trumbull to the Levant Company, Constantinople, 9 December 1689, BL 
Add. MS 72591, f. 60r, 61v; Trumbull to the Levant Company and Trumbull to Nottingham, 
Constantinople, 21 and 22 December 1690, BL Add. MS 72592, f. 6v, 7v. 
87 Heywood, “Ottoman Territoriality,” 147. 
88 Deputy Governor and Directors to Raye, London, 19 June 1696, TNA SP 105/209, f. 37v. 
89 By the Lords Justices, a Proclamation ... whereas it hath been represented unto us by the Levant 
Company (London, 28 May 1696); Deputy Governor and Directors to Raye, London, 19 June 1696, TNA 
SP 105/209, f. 38r. On this incident at Smyrna, see also draft letter from Paget to Vernon, Constantinople, 
28 February 1696, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 3, Bundle 15, f. 50r-v. 
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Madonna de Carmen, commanded by captain Henri Boisson, within the port of Limasol 
on the island of Cyprus and brought the prize to Messina, where he refused to 
acknowledge the English consul’s authority as prize agent.90 Trumbull's successor as 
ambassador, William Paget, initially hoped to clear Pickering, since he had been 
informed that the French ship had been the aggressor.91 Conversely, the French 
ambassador, the Marquis Castagnères de Châteauneuf, pressed the Ottoman government 
to demand restitution of the Madonna di Carmine.92 Paget assured the Grand Vizir, 
Elmas Mehmed Pasha, that the English king “will severely punish the Thieves and 
Corsairs when he has them in hand,” but explained that English warships and privateers 
carrying commissions from the Admiralty were answerable to that body alone for their 
transgressions. 93 As previous ambassadors had done when the Porte sought to hold the 
English nation responsible for the losses suffered by Ottoman subjects at the hands of 
corsairs, Paget sought to absolve himself and the Levant Company from responsibility for 
Pickering’s actions. His arguments also suggested that the High Court of Admiralty was 
                                                
90 John Chamberlayne, Messina, 23 December 1696, TNA SP 98/18; Chateauneuf, Pera, 30 September 
1696, AN AE B/I/382, f. 214r. On Pickering's capture of the Madonna di Carmine and its aftermath, see 
also Heywood, “Ottoman Territoriality versus Maritime Usage,” 156. 
91 Draft letter from Paget to Raye, Constantinople, 11 November 1696, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 3, Bundle 
15, f. 31r; draft letter from Paget to Mavrocordato, Constantinople, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 3, Bundle 16, 
f. 35r-v; Paget to Pelatia Barnardiston, Constantinople, no date, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 4, Bundle 23. 
92 Chateaunuef, Pera, 21 October 1696, AN AE B/I/382, f. 216r. 
93 “...che anche il Rè mio Signore castiera severemente li Ladri e Corsali quando li può haver in mando; sì 
come altri principi et imperatori giusti castigano nello suo Imperial Dominio i ladri, Corsali, e delinquenti 
quando li può haver in mano,” draft letter from Paget to the Grand Vizir, no date, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 
4, Bundle 23; draft letter from Paget to unknown recipient, Constantinople, 13 May 1697, SOAS Paget 
Papers, Box 3, Bundle 16, f. 12r; draft letter from Paget to Mavrocordato, Constantinople, 29 January 1697, 
SOAS Paget Papers Box 3, Bundle 16, f. 35r. On Elmas Mehmed Pasha’s pro-French inclincations, see 
Heywood, “English Diplomacy between Austrian and the Ottoman Empire in the war of the Sacra Liga,” 
241-242. 
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the proper venue to determine whether the Madonna di Carmine was a valid prize and to 
hold Pickering accountable if it was not. 
 Ottoman plans to adjudicate the case of the Madonna di Carmine and to demand 
restitution of the ship and its cargo raised serious legal questions. In the fall of 1696, the 
Caimacam assured Chateauneuf that the case would be brought before the Divan-i 
Hümayun if necessary.94 Meanwhile, the Kapudan Pasha, the chief admiral of the 
Ottoman navy, investigated the case.95 However, Chateauneuf reported that the Mufti 
questioned whether it was legal to hold the English nation responsible for the actions 
committed by a single individual.96 Chateauneuf warned that the English would not 
observe their promise to obtain the return of Boisson’s ship unless ordered to do so by the 
Porte. The Mufti then conceded that it would be lawful to arrest English vessels in 
Ottoman ports until the English government had punished Pickering and paid 
restitution.97 In the spring of 1697, the Grand Vizir wrote to the Kapudan Pasha and to 
Paget to announce that he expected the restitution of Boisson's ship by the time of his 
                                                
94 “...que cette affaire ne pouvoit se finir que par la rigueur de la justice et au Divan du G. Visir,” 
Chateauneuf, Pera 21 October 1696, AN AE B/I/382, f. 216r. Chateauneuf subsequently reported that the 
Kapudan Pasha “m’a promis qu’il me rendroit bonne justice et qu’il feroit payer aux Anglois la valuer des 
prises qu’ils ont faittes,” Chateauneuf to Ponchartrain, 2 January 1697, AN AE B/I/382, f. 243v. See also, 
Paget, Adrianople, 5 June 1697, TNA: SP 97/20, f. 383v-384r.  On the Divan-i Hümayun and its role in 
cases involving European privateers, see van den Boogert, “Redress for Ottoman Victims of European 
Privateering,” passim. 
95 Chateauneuf to Pontchartrain, Constantinople, 8 February 1697, AN: AE B/I/382, f. 250v-252r. 
96 Chateauneuf is presumably referring to the şeyhülislam, or chief religious officer of the Ottoman Empire, 
Feyzullah Efendi, who occupied a position of far reaching influence in the late 1690’s under Sultan 
Mustafa II. For Feyzullah Efendi’s participation in discussioins leading to the peace of Karlowitz, see 
Heywood, “English Diplomacy between Austrian and the Ottoman Empire in the war of the Sacra Liga,” 
258-259. 
97 Chateauneuf to Pontchartrain, Constantinople, 17 March 1697, AN AE B/I/382, f. 257v-258v. 
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return from that year's campaign.98 In response, Paget explained that the English king had 
already ordered his officials and consuls to take steps to hold Pickering accountable for 
his actions and reiterated the fact that he did not have authority to restore Boisson’s ship.  
Consequently, he needed time to request new orders as to how he should proceed in the 
matter.99 
 In contradiction to Chateauneuf’s warnings that the English would not discipline 
Pickering, the High Court of Admiralty’s proceedings against the privateer illustrate the 
extensive measures it could take to regulate the actions of those carrying its commission. 
In the fall of 1696, merchants from the Levant Company appeared before the Admiralty 
Court to testify that they had received reports from their factors that Pickering had 
captured a French ship within the range of Limasol's guns and to warn of the threat this 
action posed to the Company.100 In response to the testimony of the Levant merchants, 
the High Court of Admiralty issued a warrant for the arrest of the Madonna di Carmine 
and caused the Lords of the Admiralty to order Charles Hedges to execute the bond 
Pickering had given in exchange for his letter of marque.101 With the Admiralty initiating 
                                                
98 Chateauneuf to Pontchartrain, Constantinople, 19 April 1697, AN AE B/I/382, f. 269r-v; “Interpretation 
de la Lettre du Grand visir Escritte au Capitan Pacha,” ibid., f. 279r-v; “Traduction des lettres du Grand 
Vizir au Capitan Pacha et a l’ambassadeur d’angleterre au Subject de la prise du vaisseau du capitaine 
Boisson,” ibid., 280r-v. 
99 “Interpretation de la lettre de Monsieur l’ambassadeur d’angleterre au Rais Effendy;” Chateauneuf to 
Pontchartrain, Constantinople, 5 May 1696, AN: AE B/I/382, f. 281r-v, 283r-284r. 
100 Attestation of Sir Thomas Vernon, Thomas Vernon, and George Treadway, 31 October 1696, Madonna 
de Carmine or Caesar, TNA HCA 42/6 
101 Sir William Trumbull to the Lords of the Admiralty, Whitehall, 30 October 1696, in 'William III: 
October 1696', Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of William III, vol. 2, 1696, ed. 
William John Hardy (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1913), 407-428; Marsden, Law and Custom of the 
Sea, 2: 173-174. Trumbull further ordered Lambert Blackwell at Livorno to take security for the goods 
seized by Pickering from the English merchants to whom they had been consigned, and, if necessary, to 
have the Grand Duke compel them to it, “until it shall be determined in the High Court of Admiralty here to 
whom the property belongs,” Trumbull to Blackwell, Whitehall, 19 February 1697, in the Calendar of State 
  236 
! !
proceedings against Pickering, Ottoman and English courts took up the case of the 
Madonna di Carmine in parallel. The English consul at Livorno, John Burrows attempted 
to execute the warrant when Pickering and the Charles arrived outside that port; however, 
Pickering refused to enter the port, so Burrows could only relay the High Court of 
Admiralty’s command that Pickering appear before that body to answer for his actions.102 
Meanwhile, the proctors for the Crown and for the Levant Company brought the case of 
the Madonna di Carmine before the High Court of Admiralty and sought to establish that 
Pickering had forfeited his interest in the prize by seizing it within the port of Limasol 
and failing to have it officially condemned by an Admiralty court.103 Pickering's proctor, 
in response, denied that the ship had been captured within the port and instead asserted 
that it had been taken “upon the high and open sea.”104 Charles Hedges, as Judge of the 
High Court of Admiralty, was not persuaded by Pickering’s arguments and, in March 
1698, he condemned the Madonna di Carmine as a perquisite of the Admiralty, a 
                                                
Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of William III, vol. 3, 1697, ed. William John Hardy (London: H. M. 
Stationery Office, 1927), 39. 
102 See Burrows to Shrewsbury, Livorno, 25 February 1697 and Burrows’s report to Charles Hedges, 
Livorno, 21 February 1697, TNA SP 98/18. The original of Burrows’s report to Hedges appears with the 
prize court papers for the Madonna de Carmine in TNA HCA 42/6. 
103 Allegation of Mr. Franklin, the Crown’s proctor, 13 August 1697, TNA: HCA 46/6, Madonna de 
Carmine or Caesar.  Forfeiture of rights to a prize was the common penalty for privateers who acted 
improperly or illegally. The jurist Joseph Story would later describe this practice, “It is a part of the ancient 
law of the Admiralty, independent of any statute, that captors may, by their misconduct, forfeit the rights of 
prize; and in such cases the property is condemned to the Government generally,” Notes on the Principles 
and Practice of Prize Courts, ed. Thomas Pratt (London: W. Benning, 1854), 32-33.  
104 Allegation of Barrett Smith, Pickering’s proctor, 15 February 1698 and Charles Pickering’s sworn 
account of the capture of the French ship, given on board the Charles in the road of Livorno, dated 20 May 
1697, TNA HCA 42/6, Madonna de Carmine or Caesar.  
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decision that was appealed by Pickering.  The case appears to have dragged on for 
another two years before it lapsed from the English courts.105   
 Although Ottoman efforts to enforce the security of Levantine ports paralleled 
widespread early modern and Mediterranean practices, a further attempt to secure the 
entire Aegean from European privateering instead highlighted the particular political 
environment of the eastern Mediterranean. Despite its recent military setbacks, the 
Ottoman Empire still largely encompassed the Aegean and was thus in a position to treat 
that sea as an Ottoman lake. In June 1696, the Kapudan Pasha, Mezzo Morto Hüseyin 
Pasha, stopped at Smyrna as the Ottoman fleet sailed into the Aegean.106 While anchored 
in the gulf of Smyrna, Mezzo Morto dispatched letters to the kadi and European consuls 
at that port, informing them that he carried a hatt-ı şeriff, or imperial decree, directing 
him “to adjust & Settle the Extent & Limitts of this port.”107 He then proceeded to declare 
that the belligerents were to refrain from hostile acts in Aegean waters within the gulfs of 
Andros and Kos.108 Since these islands sit at opposite sides of the Aegean archipelago, a 
                                                
105 TNA HCA 34/22, # 152; the course of the case is summarized in TNA IND 1/9016, Madonna de 
Carmine or Caesar. As with most prize cases prior to the end of the eighteenth century, Hedges did not 
provide the rationale behind his decision to condemn the Madonna di Carmine as a perquisite of the 
Admiralty. It is probable, though, that the decision turned both on the capture of the ship within a neutral 
port, and Pickering's initial failure to bring the prize before the High Court. For a good discussion this 
evidentiary problem and its significance for eighteenth-century English prize law, see Bourguignon, Sir 
William Scott, 243-245. 
106 Mezzo Morto had been a corsair and Dey of Algiers before becoming an Ottoman admiral, see C. 
Orhonlu, “Hadjdji Husayn Pasha, known as Mezzomorto,” in The Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. 3, H-Iram, 
ed. H. A. R. Gibb and others (Leiden: Brill, 1967), 629. 
107 Consul William Raye to Paget, Smyrna, 19 June 1696, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 5, Bundle 27(iii); Paget 
to Vernon, Constantinople, 14 December 1696, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 2, Bundle 13, f. 26r; Chateauneuf 
to Pontchartrain, Pera, 10 July 1696, AN AE B/I/382, f. 164r. I have been unable to find a copy of the hatt-ı 
şeriff within European archival materials. 
108 The Italian translation of the Mezzo Morto’s order contained in the National Archives reads “Però da 
qui inanzi le Nave Mercantili, ffrancesi, Inglesi, holandesi, Ragusi, et altre Nave che vengono nelle parti di 
Turchia incontrati che saranno, dentro delle Bocche d’Andrò, e Coo, debbano lasciare l’inimicitia che 
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prohibition on combat within a boundary established between them would protect the 
well-traveled waters between Smyrna and Constantinople. As consul William Raye at 
Smyrna described Mezzo Morto’s order, the Kapudan Pasha had declared that, “from 
Andro & Stanchoi hither no Acts of Hostility should be committed,” and specified that 
anyone who violated these limits would be obligated to make restitution to the injured 
party.109  
  The Ottoman proposal to secure the Aegean from the effects of European warfare 
constituted an extension of Ottoman state authority over maritime space.  Recent studies 
on the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire have focused more on the evolution and 
construction of frontier zones than they have on the demarcation of borders or the 
delineation of Ottoman maritime space. 110 It is thus unclear why Mezzo Morto proposed 
to establish “limits in the sea” or “limits on the surface of the sea” (deryada hudud and 
ruy-i deryada hudud), as a later Ottoman document described the delineation of the 
                                                
hanno intra di loro essendo stimato li sopradetti luoghi Casa di Salute e Sicurezza.” Translations of the 
letter from Mezzomorto to the consuls of the European nations in Smyrna are contained in TNA SP 
105/335, f. 49r and AN AE B/I/382, f. 169r. Colin Heywood reproduces the Italian translation from the 
National Archives in “Ottoman Territoriality versus Maritime usage,” 168. 
109 Raye to Paget, Smyrna, 19 June 1696, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 5, Bundle 27(iii). 
110 For instance, the essays in a recent volume on Ottoman frontiers survey the political, economic, and 
cultural histories of  Ottoman frontier regions without considering the formal demarcation of frontiers or 
asking how the delineation of Ottoman borders related to concurrent processes of border-making in Europe, 
see A. C. S. Peacock, ed., The Frontiers of the Ottoman World (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the 
British Academy, 2009). For the demarcation of Ottoman territorial borders and the significance of such 
border-making, see R. A. Abou el-Haj, “The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699-
1703,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 89, no. 3 (July- September 1969), 467-475 and the more 
historically grounded works of Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, (15th-18th 
Century): An Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and Other Documents (Leiden: Brill, 2000) 57-67; Palmira 
Brummett, “Imagining the Early Modern Ottoman Space, from World History to Piri Reis,” in The Early 
Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire, ed. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 24-26. 
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waters in which combat was forbidden, or if the idea for this measure was his own.111 
Efforts to safeguard the Aegean were probably tied to Ottoman military successes in that 
sea in 1695, when Mezzo Morto defeated a Venetian fleet off Chios, allowing the 
Ottomans to retake that island.112 With the fleet active in the Aegean, Ottoman ministers 
may have seen an opportunity not only to protect Ottoman commerce from the effects of 
European war, but also to exert greater control over Aegean waters. Suggestively, when 
Mezzo Morto issued his order prohibiting belligerent activity in the Aegean, he also 
complained that English men of war had given chase to a French vessel within sight of 
his fleet. Relating this incident to the English dragoman, he asked “what pirate ships they 
were,” and when advised that they were English men of war, “He demanded if there was 
war betwixt the King of England & the Grand Signor, that His Ships did Such action in 
his Sight, & as it were in his ports.”113  
  Ottoman efforts to safeguard Aegean waters appear to have been as much an 
extension of as a departure from existing ideas about maritime sovereignty. Molly Greene 
evocatively compares Ottoman domination over the Levant to a hydrographic chart, 
varying in proximity to land.114 In this vein, the Ottomans appear to have concentrated on 
                                                
111 A letter of March 1698 from the grand vezir to the cadi at Smyrna repealing the proposed maritime 
limits speaks of “deryada hudud tayyin olunup” or “constituere limiti in Mare,” TNA SP 105/334, f. 31v, 
32r. A transcription of this document is given in Necmi Ülker, “XVII. Yüzyılın İkinci yarısında İzmir'deki 
İngiliz Tüccarına dair ticari Problemlerle İlgili Belgeler,” Belgeler 14, no. 18 (1989-1992): 298-299. 
Palmira Brummett explains that had (pl. hudud) was the usual Ottoman term for “border” or “boundary,” in 
Brummett, “Imagining the Early Modern Ottoman Space,” 24. 
112 Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 320. 
113 Raye to Paget, Smyrna, 19 June 1696, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 5, Bundle 27(iii). 
114 Molly Greene, “The Ottomans in the Mediterranean,” in The Early Modern Ottomans, 116. According 
to the historian M. Nicolas Vatin, at least for the sixteenth century, “le concept d' ‘eaux territoriales’ était 
inconnu” to the Ottomans, cited in Heywood, “Ottoman Territoriality versus Maritime Usage,” 148, 
especially n. 15. 
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securing particular harbors within the Aegean rather than the sea as a whole. Both Paget 
and Raye reported that the Kapudan Pasha had been directed to establish “the Extent & 
Limitts” of the port of Smyrna. Chateauneuf reported that the Kapudan Pasha was 
ordered to prevent European vessels from fighting “near the ports of the Grand 
Signore.”115 The letter from Mezzo Morto to the consuls at Smyrna similarly tied the 
prohibition on hostile acts in the Aegean to the security of Ottoman ports. The letter thus 
observed that the maritime warfare of Christian nations at peace with the Ottoman 
Empire had been carried into parts of the Ottoman Empire and that the belligerents had 
fought “in front of the Castels and Ports where they arrived.” Consequently, the places 
within the prescribed limits were to be considered “Casa di Salute, e Sicurezza,” within 
which the ships of the belligerent powers were to refrain from acts of violence.116  
Chateauneuf reported that the Kapudan Pasha had “fixed the places at the sight of which 
the French, English and Dutch ought not to fight one another within the States of the 
Sultan.”117 
 Although the extension and demarcation of boundaries within which the European 
powers were forbidden to engage in combat built on existing ideas regarding the security 
                                                
115 William Raye to Paget, Smyrna, 19 June 1696, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 5, Bundle 27(iii); Paget to 
Vernon, Constantinople, 14 December 1696, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 2, Bundle 13, f. 26r. Chateauneuf 
reported that “Le Grand Seigneur a commis le Capitan Pacha pour empecher les Vaisseaux François, 
Anglois et hollandois d’entreprendre rein les uns contres les autres auprez des ports du G. Seigneur,” 
Chateauneuf to Ponchartrain, Pera, 9 May 1696, AN AE B/I/382, f. 129r. 
116 “...avanti li Castelli, e Porti ove arrivano,”  “Traduttione della Lettera Scritta dal Chusein Pasha al 
Signore Console toccante li pretesi Limiti d’Andro, e Coos, ò sia Stancoi,” June 1696, TNA SP 105/334, f. 
49r. A French translation of this document may be found in, “Lettre Du Capitan Pacha au Consul De france 
a Smirne,” AN AE B/I/382, f. 169r. 
117 “...il a même fixé les lieux a le veüe desquels les francois Anglois et Hollandois ne doivent rien 
entreprendre les uns contres les autres dans les Estats du Grand Seigneur,” Chateauneuf to Pontchartrain, 
Pera, 10 July 1696, AN AE B/I/382, f. 164r. 
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of ports, efforts to safeguard the Aegean also extended the empire’s sovereignty over 
waters beyond the control of its ports and fortresses. There is evidence to suggest that the 
Ottomans viewed the confined waters of the Aegean to be under Ottoman sovereignty. 
The Porte's chief dragoman, Alexander Mavrocordatos, wrote Paget that, regarding the 
controversies caused by English attacks on French ships, “the sublime Porte desires its 
seas to be peaceful, so that trade is tranquil and safe, and the benefits [thereof] common 
to all its allies.”118   
 Ottoman declarations which drew a line across the Aegean to establish the 
security of that sea were part of a larger process in which the extent of states' maritime 
sovereignty was contested and negotiated.119 Just as Ottoman concern for the security of 
ports mirrored wider Mediterranean and Atlantic practices, so the delineation of wider 
neutral waters also had European parallels. More particularly, during the wars against 
Louis XIV, the extent of neutral waters was fiercely debated among European states.  In 
1691, Denmark sought to secure the neutrality of the Baltic by claiming sovereignty over 
the seas between the Jutland peninsula and Norway.120 The French ambassador to 
Denmark responded to this declaration by arguing that such territorial limits were usually 
limited to the distance of a cannon shot and that he would concede, at most, three 
                                                
118 “...la felice Porta desidera li suoi mari pacifici, a finche il trafico sia tranquillo, e pacato, e l'utile comune 
alle Nationi sue confederate,” Mavrocordato to Paget, Adrianople, 21 December 1697, SOAS Paget Papers, 
Box 14, Bundle 64(i), f. 15r. For another example of the expression “suoi mari,” see “con intentione di fare 
fiorire il traffico nelli suoi mari,” Mavrocordato to Paget, Adrianople, 4 February 1697, SOAS Paget 
Papers, Box 14, Bundle 64(i), f. 16r. 
119 This proposal also receives brief mention in Clark, The War against French Trade, 118 and Masson, 
Histoire du commerce français dan le Levant au XVIIe Siècle,  290. 
120 Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea, 528-529; Clark, The Dutch Alliance, 118. 
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miles.121 Nevertheless, when English officials responded to Ottoman efforts to bar 
European naval warfare from the Aegean, they cited the cannon-shot as a feature of the 
law of nations that was universally binding. In this respect, the Mediterranean was 
integral to wider debates over how far the sovereignty of territorial state extended out to 
sea. 
 Despite the claims to sovereignty over the British Seas that England had 
historically made, English diplomats and ministers in the seventeenth century showed 
little willingness to accept Ottoman efforts to secure the Aegean against Anglo-French 
warfare. Paget initially advised Raye to tell Mezzo Morto that the English would be 
willing to comply with his orders forbidding combat in the Aegean, provided that the 
French do the same.122 Paget admitted that this initial response was intended mainly “to 
quiet the Captain Pasha.” The capture of a French vessel within the prescribed limits by 
an English warship in the fall of 1696, however, caused Mezzo Morto to press Paget for 
English observance of the Sultan's orders. In response, Paget protested that he had been 
commanded to comply with Ottoman orders “as far as was consistent with the laws & 
Customs practised at Sea.” Since custom determined that “the limits of all Ports” were 
established by the distance of a cannon-shot, he could not consent to the extension of 
Ottoman neutral waters beyond that point.123 In a later letter to Mavrocordatos, Paget 
reiterated this point and further explained why he could not accept any restrictions on 
                                                
121 Kent, “Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit,” 541-542. 
122 Paget, Constantinople, 10 July 1696 and 14 December 1696, TNA SP 97/20, f. 351r, 358r; Paget to 
Vernon, Constantinople, 10/20 July 1696, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 2, Bundle 13, f. 40v. 
123 Paget to Vernon, Constantinople, 14 December 1696, TNA SP 97/20, f. 351r, 358r-v. A copy of this 
later may be found at SOAS Paget Papers, Box 2, Folder 13, f. 26v. 
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English attacks on French shipping outside of Ottoman ports. When Paget argued that 
“Princes, in their own Dominions, can impose what laws they please, but outside those 
precincts other Powers are not constrained to observe them,” he echoed the increasingly 
prevalent juridical argument that the cannon shot established the maximum distance at 
which a state could exercise territorial control over its littoral waters and, in the process, 
denied Ottoman sovereignty over Aegean waters.124 English ministers, meanwhile, 
supported Paget’s opposition to Ottoman efforts to redefine that extent of the empire’s 
ports.125 
 For the Ottomans, the drawing of a line across the Aegean to define it as a secure 
space raised the problem of how to enforce the peace of an expansive sea. Indeed, despite 
its naval successes against Venice, the Ottoman Empire’s control of the Aegean 
archipelago remained tenuous. Paget emphasized the Ottomans’ lack of effective control 
over the Aegean when he observed that, “tho all the tract be cald the Turks,” Venetian 
forces operating in the Peloponnese and the Aegean “take tribute of many of those inward 
Islands without any opposition.”126 The Ottoman government assigned additional frigates 
to patrol the Archipelago in order to control combat between European vessels; however, 
the Ottoman navy was not large enough to enforce the Kapudan Pasha's orders, 
particularly when it was engaged in a war with Venice.127 Consequently, the Porte 
                                                
124 “Li Prencipi, nelli loro Dominij, possono imponere tali Leggi che vorranno, mà fuori di quelli precinti 
non sono altri Potentati costretti ad osservarle,” draft letter from Paget to Mavro Cordato, Constantinople, 
19 February 1697, SOAS: Paget Papers, Box 3, Bundle 16, f. 21r-v; Walker, “Territorial Waters,” 210-212. 
125 "Minutes of the proceedings of the Lords Justices," Whitehall, 7 October 1697 in the Calendar of State 
Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of William III, vol. 3, 1697, 417. 
126 Paget, Adrianople, 5 June 1697, TNA SP 97/20, f. 385r-v. 
127 Heywood, “The Blackham Galley,” 424, esp. n. #53.  On the limits of Ottoman control over the Aegean 
archipelago, see also, Heywood, “Ottoman Territoriality versus Maritime Usage,” 157-159. 
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confined itself to detaining English vessels that were suspected of violating Ottoman 
ports or subjects when they could be arrested in port.  
 Ottoman efforts to forbid belligerents from fighting in the Aegean thus raised the 
persistent question of how law and sovereignty were to be exercised at sea in the early 
modern world. They also led Ottoman officials to claim jurisdiction over acts committed 
on the high seas. Despite Paget's unwillingness to accept the extension of Ottoman 
neutral waters beyond the range of a cannon-shot, the Porte took steps to enforce the 
limits established by the Kapudan Pasha. In the spring of 1697, the Blackham, a well-
armed merchant vessel under the command of Captain Charles Newman, captured a 
French vessel off the island of Tenedos, just outside the Dardanelles.128 Following the 
Blackham's capture of the ship, the officials on Tenedos witnessed the reselling of the 
ship back to its master and confirmed the validity of the prize. Upon learning of 
Newman’s capture of the French vessel, Paget subsequently advised the captain to leave 
Ottoman waters as soon as possible.129 Nevertheless, the Blackham was subsequently 
detained at Smyrna for attacking a French ship “within the Limits;” the ship would 
remain sequestered for the remainder of the year as negotiations ensued over the payment 
of restitution to the French and to an Ottoman pasha whose goods were lost as a result of 
the ship's seizure.130  
                                                
128 Chateauneuf reported that five French vessels were taken near Tenedos in violation of the Kapudan 
Pasha’s order. One of these was taken by the privateer Panther but there is no record of the other three in 
English sources, see Chateauneuf, Pera 15 August 1696, AN AE B/I/382, f. 174r; Heywood, “The 
Blackham Galley,” 422-424. 
129   See also Raye to Paget, Smyrna, 25 May 1697, SOAS Paget Papers, Box 5, Bundle 27(iv). 
130 The history of the Blackham's voyage into the Levant and of the diplomatic controversy that it caused it 
fully analyzed in Heywood, “The Blackham Galley,” pp. 409-438. See also Paget, Pera, September 24 
1697, TNA SP 97/21, f. 32r. 
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 The cases of the Madonna di Carmine and of the Blackham demonstrate the 
willingness and ability of Ottoman officials to assume jurisdiction over maritime affairs. 
In response to accusations from Newman that he had failed to prevent the arrest of the 
Blackham, Paget responded, “I will dispute the lawfullness of your act but I can tel you, 
that the Vizir is not of your mind and you are not in my, but his dominions, and he will it 
seems do what he pleases without reflecting how your owners will like it.”131 Despite the 
relative limits to Ottoman control over the Aegean and Levantine waters in the late 
seventeenth century, these cases revealed the continued ability of the Ottoman Empire to 
shape the legal regime of that sea. 
 Ultimately, it was the emergence of a new Ottoman ministry that brought the case 
of the Madonna di Carmine to a close. Following the death of the francophilic Grand 
Vizir Elmas Mehmed Pasha at the battle of Zenta in September 1697, his successor, 
Amcazade Huseyin Pasha, seems to have had little interest in pursuing the cases against 
English ships.132 In particular, he declined to pursue the case against Pickering and the 
English nation after Paget pointed out that the newly signed Treaty of Ryswick mandated 
that all damages and injuries suffered by the French and English during the war were to 
be ignored. In response to the new Grand Vizir’s suggestion that the French drop their 
dispute with the English over Boisson’s ship, Chateauneuf protested that the Madonna di 
Carmine had been captured “under the guns of the fortresses of the Grand Signor, who 
alone has the right to avenge this injury.” He further argued that the Treaty of Ryswick 
                                                
131 Draft letter from Paget to Newman, Adrianople, 5 June 1697, SOAS: Paget Papers, Box 3, Bundle 16, f. 
44r-v. 
132 On the significance of the battle of Zenta and subsequent changes in the Ottoman ministry for Anglo-
Ottoman relations, see Heywood, “English Diplomacy between Austrian and the Ottoman Empire in the 
war of the Sacra Liga,” 245, 252-254. 
  246 
! !
did not impact the right of the empire to protect the honor of its ports and that the treaty 
postdated orders for the restitution of the Madonna di Carmine.133 Nevertheless, it 
appears that Chateauneuf’s arguments were without effect. The Blackham, meanwhile, 
was released in January 1698, after it was learned that it had actually been arrested for an 
action committed by another privateer.134   
 More significantly, in March 1698, the sultan repealed the limits that had been 
established in the Aegean. The decree recounted that Ottoman ministers had sought to 
establish maritime limits within which the ships and subjects of the belligerent powers 
were to refrain from combat, since established custom allowed ships to fight so long as 
they did so without the range of the cannon of ports and fortresses. This effort, however, 
had been “contrary to ancient customs and to the imperial capitulations” [adet-i qadıme 
ve ahdname-i hümayuna mugayir] and had violated “the rules of merchants” 
[bazergaların nizamına muhill]. Furthermore, the ambassadors of the Christian nations 
had refused to concede to the limits.135 Consequently, the limits were repealed as contrary 
to custom and to the Capitulations. Such attention to “customs” suggests that the Levant 
was part of a larger, Mediterranean regulatory sphere. Nonetheless, Ottoman claims to 
                                                
133  “je luy fis connoistre que cela ne se pouvoit pas parce que le fondement de la demande que Je faisois 
icy aux Anglois estoit qu’ils avoient faits leur prises sous le Canon des forteresses du Grand Seigneur qui 
seul a droit de Vanger cette injure,” Chateauneuf to Ponchartrain, Adrianople, 31 January 1698, AN AE 
B/I/382, f. 334r-336r. See also, Paget, Pera, 24 September 1697, TNA SP 97/21, f. 31r-32r. 
134 “Traduttione del Commandamento del Gran Signore diritto al Caddi di Smirne per la liberatione della 
Nave nominata Blackham ffrigat,” December 1697, TNA SP 105/334, f. 51r. Chateauneuf admitted that the 
Ottoman chancellory had erred in its by attributing the wrong capture to the Blackham, but he insisted that 
this mistake was not important since the English ship had seized another French vessel, Chateauneuf to 
Ponchartrain, Constantinople, 28 December 1697, AN AE B/I/382, f. 328v-329r. 
135 The transcriptions here are derived from Ülker, “XVII. Yüzyılın İkinci yarısında İzmir'deki İngiliz 
Tüccarına dair ticari Problemlerle İlgili Belgeler,” 299. The contemporary Italian translation of this 
document renders these phrases as “essendo contrario all'Imperial Capitolationi, et antica Consuetudine” 
and “dando disturbo alle Regole delli Mercanti,” TNA SP 105/334, f. 32r. 
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sovereignty in the Aegean highlight the distinct political environment of eastern 
Mediterranean waters. 
  
V. Conclusion 
 Despite the expansion of English naval power and empire into the Mediterranean, 
the High Court of Admiralty remained just one source of legal authority in a sea of many.  
Admiralty jurisdiction over privateers and prize cases transmitted the extraterritorial 
authority of the English state throughout the Mediterranean. The cases of William 
Plowman and Charles Pickering raised the question, however, of how the jurisdictional 
claims of English courts would coexist with those of Mediterranean sovereigns. In both 
these cases, Mediterranean governments challenged the jurisdiction of the Admiralty 
court over English ships and demonstrated their ability to shape the legal and regulatory 
environment of that sea.  
 At the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, Ottoman ministers again 
sought to establish the neutrality of the Aegean. Paget’s successor as English ambassador 
to the Ottoman Empire, Sir Robert Sutton, reported in 1704 that Dutch privateers had 
been carrying their prizes into Smyrna and selling them there, leading to complaints that 
they were blocking access to the port. In response, it was suggested to the Grand Vizir 
that he reestablish the “ordinance” from the previous war “for the Neutrality & freedome 
of the Archipelago within the Limits.” The dragoman Mavrocordatos was directed to 
meet with the ambassadors of the belligerent powers, to whom he explained that it was 
harmful to both the Sultan’s “Decorum” and to his revenues that ships should be taken 
“in the very mouth” of his ports. Consequently, “it was the Sultan’s intention to provide 
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for the security of Merchant ships in the Seas near his Ports.” When Sutton inquired as to 
how far the neutrality of Ottoman ports should extend, Mavrocordatos replied that he was 
uncertain, “but hinted at the Limits, which they would have prescribed in the Late 
war.”136 In response, English ministers again objected to a declaration that appeared both 
unenforceable and of greater benefit to the French than the English.  Sutton received 
instructions advising him that, “her Majesty cannot, by such a concession as is now 
proposed debarr herself, contrary to the Laws of Nations and the known practice of Warr, 
of the freedome of destroying her Ennemies in the open Seas, whenever her Ships of 
Warr meet them.”137 Instead, English vessels would continue to forbear attacking French 
ships only when they were under the protection of Ottoman castles and forts.  
 Ottoman efforts to protect the Aegean from European warfare constituted a claim 
to sovereignty over that sea. After an English ship captured a French vessel in the Aegean 
in the spring of 1705, Ottoman ministers demonstrated their jurisdiction over Aegean 
waters by intervening in the case.138 While sailing from Smyrna to Constantinople, the 
King William galley captured a small French merchant vessel in the Aegean, releasing the 
French vessel after its master agreed to leave his purser with the English crew as a pledge 
for payment to ransom his ship. When the English ship arrived in Constantinople, the 
French learned that the purser was being held hostage and demanded his release. Sutton 
defended the actions of the King William’s master, asserted that the French ship had been 
                                                
136 Sutton, Pera, 8 November 1709, TNA SP 97/21, f. 182r-v 
137 To Sutton, 23 January 1705, TNA SP 97/20, f. 181v. These instructions appear to be based on the advice 
the Levant Company offered in a letter to Sir Charles Hedges as to how to proceed in the matter of the 
maritime limits, Levant Company to Hedges, no date, TNA SP 105/145, 313-314 
138 “Sir Robert Suttons account concerning the King William which took a french Prize, & the Purser a 
Hostage for the ransome releasd by the Turks,” 11 May 1705, TNA SP 97/21, f. 194r-199v. 
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taken in a “Lawfull Place” and argued that hostages were commonly carried into neutral 
ports in Europe.139 Conversely, the French ambassador objected that the French ship “was 
taken in the Gr. Signor’s Port, there having been certain Limits settled, within which it 
was not allowed to assault one anothers vessels.” He then carried the matter before the 
Grand Vizir, who took possession of the hostage until the affair could be settled.140 The 
Vizier subsequently ordered the French and English ambassadors to present their cases 
before the kadi-asker of Rumeli, the chief judge of the empire’s European provinces, who 
also passed judgment on cases brought before the Divan-i Hümayun.141 Sutton refused, 
thinking that Ottoman adjudication of the prize case was merely a means to settle “the 
Sea Limits” and “to condemn the Prize as invalid by their Law.”142 In a final effort to 
prevent the case going before an Ottoman court, Sutton denied that the Ottomans could 
take cognizance of that matter, since “the matter in dispute having passed at Sea was not 
cognizable by their Law, which is a stranger to such affairs, there being no Instances 
thereof found therein; But was to be decided by the Law & practice of Nations.”143  
Ottoman ministers released the French purser and advised Sutton that the master of the 
English ship would have his case heard whenever he chose to bring it before the kadi-
asker. 
                                                
139 Ibid., f. 194v-197v (folios 195 and 196 are not included in this document). 
140 Ibid., f. 197r. The French ambassador additionally complained that the King William violated a 
reciprocal agreement the master had made at Smyrna not to assault some French vessels then outside that 
port. Sutton responded that this agreement was valid only for the Gulf of Smyrna and did not extend to 
other ships the King William might meet at sea. 
141 van den Boogert, “Redress for Ottoman Victims of European Privateering,” 94. 
142  “Sir Robert Suttons account concerning the King William which took a french Prize, & the Purser a 
Hostage for the ransome releasd by the Turks,” 11 May 1705, TNA SP 97/21 f. 199r-v. 
143 Ibid., f. 199v. 
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 Sutton’s negotiations with Ottoman officials over the King William turned on the 
question of whether Ottoman courts could assume jurisdiction over a prize taken at sea by 
an English privateer. Significantly, both Ottoman officials and European representatives 
maintained that maritime relations in the Levant were governed by established custom 
and by mutually binding agreements. Sutton and other English officials appealed to the 
law of nations to uphold their interpretation of the rights of belligerents in the Levantine 
waters. Their Ottoman counterparts, meanwhile, argued for the reciprocity of the 
capitulatory agreements with European states in order to defend the property of Ottoman 
subjects seized by European privateers from enemy vessels.144 The case of the King 
William illustrated the extent to which questions of sovereign and jurisdictional authority 
were central to the legal regulation of navigation and privateering in the Levant. Sutton 
was clearly incorrect when he argued that maritime acts had no place in Ottoman law.145 
Yet his attempt to deny the validity of foreign regulations and of foreign law in a case 
involving an English prize was typical of wider debates as to where legal authority at sea 
lay. 
 Sutton's arguments in the case of the King William are thus comparable to those 
made by other English representatives when they denied the authority of other states to 
involve themselves in prize cases. In 1709, Britain’s consul at Naples, John Fleetwood, 
reported that Neapolitan courts had heard cases brought by neutral merchants against 
British privateers who had seized their goods and ships. The privateers had taken the 
neutral vessels as prize for carrying contraband in the form of grain destined for France. 
                                                
144 See also van den Boogert, “Redress for Ottoman Victims of European Privateering,” 91-93. 
145 Kahlilieh, Islamic Maritime Law, passim. 
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The question of whether food commodities were good prize or not was, however, a 
particularly contentious question during the wars against Louis XIV, leading Fleetwood 
to request direction from London, “in case any of them [neutral ships] should be taken & 
brought in here, what to do with the Vessells, for the Captors that take them pretend 
Vessell & all is forfeited, & their Custom here is to returne the Barks to the Captaines.”146 
As with the case of the King William in the Ottoman Empire, at issue was whether 
Neapolitan courts could take cognizance of prizes captured by British ships and whose 
maritime laws should regulate prize cases. Fleetwood advised the government at Naples 
that only the English Admiralty could determine the legitimacy of prizes taken by 
English ships and he requested a message from Lord High Admiral confirming the 
Admiralty’s sole jurisdiction over such prize cases.147 
 Disputes over the adjudication of prizes at Naples led to the most forceful 
declaration of the Admiralty’s jurisdiction over prize cases to emerge out of the wars 
against Louis XIV. In August 1709, Everard Exton, proctor for the Lord High Admiral, 
appeared before the High Court of Admiralty to advise the judges that the government of 
Naples had adjudicated prize cases concerning ships and goods brought into that port by 
British privateers. Exton complained of this “great Incroachment upon the Jurisdiction of 
her Majesties High Court of Admiralty of England” which alone had cognizance of such 
cases and further argued that the Neapolitan government had acted contrary to the “Laws 
of Nations it being a known and established Rule among all trading nations,” that 
                                                
146 Copy of letter from Fleetwood, Naples, 30 April 1709, TNA ADM 1/3667, f. 446r-v. On the issue of 
different interpretations of what constituted contraband during the Wars of the League of Augsburg and of 
the Spanish Succession, see Clark, The Dutch Alliance, 116-118 and on the status of provisions as 
contraband more generally, Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780, 266-280. 
147 Fleetwood, Naples, 4 June 1709, TNA ADM 1/3667, f. 446v-447r. 
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privateers were obliged to bring their prizes before the admiralties that had granted their 
commissions. Consequently, the judge of the High Court declared the British privateers 
were required “to bring all prizes by them taken in the Mediterranean or elsewhere to 
judgment in the high court of Admiralty ... and that by the laws of nations no prince or 
state whatsoever ought to take cognizance of any prizes taken by British privateers.”148 
 Foreign officials did not necessarily accept the Admiralty's claim to jurisdiction 
over all prizes taken by British ships. Fleetwood alerted the Secretary of State, Lord 
Dartmouth, in late 1710 that Austrian officials at Naples continued to pass judgment over 
prizes brought in by British warships and privateers. When Fleetwood objected that the 
Lord High Admiral had established that cognizance of such prize cases rested solely with 
“that high Court from whence the Captains had their commissions,” a Neapolitan 
minister responded that, “he knew neither Queen of great Britain nor lord high Admiral, 
but Charles the 3d & that we were at Naples & must live according to the lawes of 
Naples.”149 Despite Exton’s arguments and the ruling of the High Court of Admiralty, 
there was, in fact, no general agreement as to where jurisdiction over prize cases properly 
lay.150 In the early years of the War of the League of Augsburg, Admiralty judges 
maintained their jurisdiction over the property of English subjects that was in prizes 
brought into English ports by foreign privateers. Similarly, Neapolitan courts appear to 
have claimed the right to adjudicate prizes involving neutral parties. Although the High 
                                                
148 TNA ADM 1/3667, f. 445r. This letter is also printed in Marsden, Law and Custom of the Sea, 2: 213-
214.   
149 Fleetwood to Dartmouth, Naples, 2 December 1719, TNA SP 93/3, f. 82v; see also the copy of 
Fleetwood’s Memorial to the Vice-Roy of Naples, contained in his dispatch of 2 December 1710, TNA SP 
100/29. 
150 Luca lo Basso, In traccia de’ legni nemici: corsari Europei nel Mediterraneo del Settecento 
(Ventimiglia: Philobiblon Edizioni, 2002), 114-115.   
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Court of Admiralty maintained that it possessed a unilateral jurisdiction over prizes taken 
by ships bearing its commission, foreign states and foreign courts were not obligated to 
accept this claim. 
 As in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the interaction of coexisting and potentially 
conflicting sovereign jurisdictions over maritime crimes and causes defined the legal 
organization of navigation in the Mediterranean. Particularly, the regulatory and legal 
requirements of the wars against Louis XIV extended the jurisdictional authority of 
Admiralty courts around the early-modern world. Yet, neither in the Atlantic or Indian 
Oceans nor in the Mediterranean was the expansion of English legal authority a unilateral 
or unidirectional process. While Ottoman efforts to establish the neutrality of the Aegean 
echoed Danish policy in the Baltic, the neutrality of Livorno found an Atlantic parallel in 
the neutrality that the king of the African state of Whydah established at his port of 
Glehue at the start of the War of the Spanish Succession.151 Like the Grand Duke of 
Tuscany, the ruler of Whydah obliged Dutch, English, and French representatives to sign 
a treaty affirming the neutrality of Glehue and agreeing not to commit any hostilities 
within sight of the port.152 In the Mediterranean, as in more distant seas, the pressures of 
naval warfare and state competition led states and empires to take steps to regulate 
maritime violence, both in their ports and on the high seas. In all these oceanic 
environments, English Admiralty courts were becoming increasingly central to the 
                                                
151 On the neutrality of Whydah, see Robin Law, “‘Here is No Resisting the Country’: The Realities of 
Power in Afro-European Relations on the West African ‘Slave Coast’,” Itinerario 18, no. 2 (1994): 62. 
Andrea Addobatti notes the comparability of these neutrality regimes in “Acque territoriali,” 193-194. 
152 Law, “‘Here is No Resisting the Country’,” 62. 
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organization of navigation and commerce. In none of them, though, did English legal 
authority dominate. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Jurisdiction and Sovereignty in the Western Mediterranean, 1713-1744 
 
 
...for it is natural to consider the vessels 
of the nation as portions of its territory, 
especially when they sail in the free 
seas, since the State preserves its 
jurisdiction over those vessels.1 
 
 
 With the growth of British naval power and the corresponding expansion of 
Admiralty authority in the early eighteenth century, the major issues that faced English 
shipping in the Mediterranean shifted from the high seas to coastal waters. Prize cases 
that contrasted the jurisdiction of the British Admiralty with the sovereignty of 
Mediterranean states over their littoral waters raised questions that ultimately defined the 
presence of the British state in the inner sea through the eighteenth century. As consuls 
and diplomats sought to maintain the privileges of British navigation in Mediterranean 
ports and to sustain Admiralty jurisdiction over crimes committed in foreign harbors, 
they raised a critical question: did law follow the ship and the subject, or was it instead 
vested in discrete territorial units? The competition between these coexistent but 
potentially conflicting conceptions of sovereignty was particularly intense in the 
Mediterranean, which was ringed by polities that claimed varying degrees of jurisdiction 
over their coastal waters and where ships generally sailed in sight of land.   
                                                
1 Emerich de Vattel, Le droit des gens, ou principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux 
affaires des nations et des souverains (Amsterdam, 1758), 2:16, quoted in Daniel Heller-Roazen, The 
Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations (New York: Zone Books, 2009), 126. Vattel referred to ships 
as a “portion of territory” in reference to the question of whether children born at sea were to be thought of 
as natural-born subjects like those born in the territory of the nation to which the ship pertained.  Sir Philip 
Meadows had earlier come to the same conclusion as Vattel, “A Child born at Sea in any of the King's 
Ships, or other English Vessel, Navigation by English Master and Crew, is a Native,” in Philip Meadows, 
Observations concerning the Dominion and Sovereignty of the Seas: Being an Abstract of the Marine 
Affairs of England (London, 1689), 13.   
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 Questions as to where authority lay to police navigation and to try crimes 
committed in coastal waters were central to the development of oceanic legal regimes 
around the early modern world. During this period, the expansive extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of the Admiralty incorporated the Mediterranean into the global expansion of 
British legal authority and maritime sovereignty. In that sea, as elsewhere, Crown 
authority and Admiralty jurisdiction followed British ships even into the ports and 
harbors of foreign states. However, histories of the evolution of maritime sovereignty 
tend to distinguish the emergence of “territorial waters” within Europe from the broader 
processes whereby European empires claimed sovereignty over wide swathes of oceanic 
space and established their extraterritorial authority over trade and navigation.2  In part, 
this division mirrors distinctions drawn by early modern jurists, who understood that the 
narrow seas of northern Europe and of the Mediterranean allowed for a degree of 
potential political control that was unattainable in the Atlantic or Indian Oceans.3  Yet, 
despite geographic and political conditions that distinguished the legal and political 
environment of the Mediterranean, debates over the extent and limits of maritime 
sovereignty within that sea largely paralleled those that emerged in other oceanic regions.   
                                                
2 Eliga Gould and Lauren Benton have sought to show how law linked Europe to the wider early modern 
world by, respectively, historizing European conceptions of the Atlantic as a distinct legal space and 
showing the degree to which the expansion of European sovereignty was an uneven and contingent process.  
However, they both continue to operate within a narrative that concentrates on the diffusion of European 
law to the wider world, rather than fully integrating Europe into the global development of legal and 
sovereign regimes. See Gould, “Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the British 
Atlantic, circa 1772,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 60, no. 3 (July 2003): 471-510 and Benton, A 
Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
3 While Grotius denied the legitimacy of any claim to maritime dominium, he also noted that arguments for 
possession of parts of the sea derived from the Mediterranean, whose narrow gulfs were particularly 
susceptible to claims of ownership, see Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, trans. 
Gwladys L. Williams, ed. Martine Julia van Ittersum (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006), 351-352. 
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  In the early modern world, princes' sovereignty was vested not only in the 
dominions over which they ruled, but also in the authority they exercised over their 
subjects. In this respect, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty over crimes 
committed onboard British vessels was as integral to the sovereignty of the British Crown 
as the authority of Tuscan tribunals over cases arising within the port of Livorno was to 
the Grand Duke's. At the same time, the Bartolan legal tradition established conceptions 
of sovereignty over coastal waters that not only collided with those of the Admiralty, but 
also belied the tenuous situation that prevailed in littoral waters where the sovereignty of 
Italian polities rested uneasily with northern European naval power.4  Further 
complicating matters, the definition of what constituted territorial waters was fiercely 
debated throughout the eighteenth century. Thus, it was unclear how the extraterritorial 
authority of the British state would relate to the sovereignty of Mediterranean rulers over 
their coastal waters and harbors. 
 Critical differences that distinguished the Mediterranean's commercial and 
maritime environment from that of other seas lay behind continuities that linked the 
development of English navigation in the Mediterranean to its wider expansion. In 
particular and in stark contrast to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the incorporation of 
Scotland into a British state in 1707 had little impact on the composition of trade from the 
British Isles to the Mediterranean. The acquisition of Gibraltar and Minorca at the end of 
the War of the Spanish Succession brought ships belonging to inhabitants of those places 
under British colors and helped to fuel a further expansion of the use of British 
                                                
4 Michel Bottin, “Frontières et limites maritimes au XVIe siècle,” in La Frontière des origines à nos jours: 
actes Journées de la Sociétée internationale d'histoire du droit tenues à Bayonne,  les 15, 16, 17 Mai 1997, 
ed. Maïté Lafourcade  (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1998), 28-29. 
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Mediterranean passes by non-subjects.5 Yet, while navigation in the Mediterranean thus 
illustrated the increasingly multinational character of the British Empire, Scottish 
merchants were largely absent from that sea. Due to both English competition and to the 
threat of North African corsairs, Scottish merchants never developed a significant 
foothold in Mediterranean ports during the seventeenth century.6 The opening of 
England's American plantations to Scottish trade did little to change this situation, 
probably because Mediterranean trade remained relatively stagnant in comparison to the 
dramatic growth of Atlantic and Indian Ocean commerce.7 A handful of families and 
trading houses thus dominated England's Levant trade generation to generation while the 
expansion of Atlantic trade and of the East India Company provided substantial space for 
Scots to take advantage of the growth of imperial trade.8   
 Despite the different trajectories that characterized the development of the British 
presence in the Mediterranean and Atlantic and Indian Oceans during the first half of the 
eighteenth century, similar debates over maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction linked the 
                                                
5   Desmond Gregory, Minorca, the Illusory Prize: A History of the British Occupations of Minorca 
between 1708 and 1802 (London and Toronto: Associrated University Presses, 1990), 152-153. See also, 
Miquel Àngel Casanovas Camps, “The British Presence in Minorca during the Eighteenth Century,” and 
Tito Benady, “Trade and Contraband in Gibraltar in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries” in Anglo-
Saxons in the Mediterranean, ed. Carmel Vassello and Michela D'Angelo (Msida: Malta University Press, 
2007), 52, 72-73. 
6 T. C. Smout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of the Union 1660-1707 (Edinburgh and London: Oliver & Boyd, 
1963),  28, 97; Eric J. Graham, A Maritime History of Scotland, 1650-1790 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 
2002), 30-31; Colin Heywood, “Ideology and the Profit Motive in the Algerine Corso: The Strange Case of 
the Isabella of Kirkcaldy, 1709-1714,” in Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean: Commerce, Politics and 
Ideas (XVII-XX Centuries), ed. Carmel Vassallo and Michael D'Angelo (Msida: Malta University Press, 
2007), 19-20. 
7 Following the Union, there were expectations for an increase of Scottish trade to the Mediterranean, but 
only a handful of troubled voyages actually took place: see Graham, A Maritime History of Scotland, 154. 
8 Ralph Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square: English Traders in the Levant in the Eighteenth Century 
(London: Macmillan, 1967), 60-74. 
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development of British navigation in all these regions. This chapter examines the legal 
controversies that arose from competing jurisdictional claims to prosecute crimes 
onboard British ships and to regulate British navigation. In the Mediterranean, as in other 
seas, ships transmitted the authority of the British Crown and Admiralty overseas, but 
sailed into waters that fell under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of foreign princes. In the 
Caribbean, disputes over Spanish efforts to regulate navigation and trade in waters over 
which Spain claimed sovereignty led to the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear in 1739. 
The legal status of ships was just as ambiguous in the coastal waters of the Mediterranean 
as it was along the imperial frontiers of the Atlantic. Jurisdictional contests over the 
regulation of British navigation illustrated both the expansion of British state authority 
during the first half of the eighteenth century and the extent to which other powers 
continued to shape the legal and political environments through which British ships 
sailed. 
 
I.  The Jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty 
 Early modern Admiralty courts exercised an expansive jurisdiction over criminal 
and civil cases occurring on British ships that carried the extraterritorial authority of the 
British state into waters around the world. As Richard Zouche noted and other jurists 
confirmed, the Lord High Admiral enjoyed a global jurisdiction over causes arising at 
sea, which “hath no bound, but extends to the Mediterranean, African, and Indian Seas, 
or any other far remote.”9  The institutional expansion of Admiralty authority in the later 
                                                
9 Richard Zouche, The Jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England asserted against Sir Edward Coke's 
Articuli Admiralitatis, in XXII Chapter of his Jurisdiction of Courts (London, 1663), 18. Leoline Jenkins 
echoed this expansive conception of Admiralty jurisdiction when he asserted that the Crown had 
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seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was crucial to the expansion of English 
imperial authority into the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.10 However, the extent of 
Admiralty jurisdiction “beyond the seas,” rather than within British waters, has been only 
partially considered by scholars.11 According to Sir Matthew Hale, probably writing in 
the early 1670's, the Admiralty held jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases that 
occurred on the “Vast Ocean” or upon “those parts thereof that are contiguous to or 
belonging to any Dominions of any other Crown but the Crown of England, as the 
Mediterranean, Adriatick, Spanish Seas &c.”12 Hale did not address whether other states 
should or would acknowledge the jurisdiction of an English court over matters occurring 
within waters over which they claimed sovereignty.13 In the first half of the eighteenth 
                                                
jurisdiction to protect English subjects against piracy in the “even in the remotest Corners of the World,” 
Jenkins, “Charge given to an Admiralty session held at the Old Bailey,” c. 1669-1674, in William Wynne, 
The Life of Sir Leoline Jenkins, Judge of the High-Court of Admiralty (London, 1724), 1: xc-xci, quoted in 
Michael Kempe, “'Even in the remotest corner of the world': globalized piracy and international law, 1500-
1900,” The Journal of Global History 5, no. 3 (October 2010), 370.   
10 See Philip J. Stern, “British Asia and British Atlantic: Comparison and Connections,” William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd ser., 63, no. 4 (October 2006): 708-712. 
11 The extent of Admiralty jurisdiction into foreign waters has received relatively little attention as 
historians have focused on the sustained debates between civil and common lawyers that substantially 
limited the authority of Admiralty courts within England. For a legal analysis of questions of Admiralty 
jurisdiction on the high seas and in foreign waters, see Glanville Williams, “Venue and the Ambit of 
Criminal Law,” The Law Quarterly Review 81, no. 321 (January 1965): 285-286. 
12 Sir Matthew Hale, “A Disquisition touching the Jurisdiction of the Common Law and Courts of 
Admiralty in relation to things done upon or beyond the Sea, and touching Maritime and Merchants 
Contracts,” in Hale and Fleetwood on Admiralty Jurisdiction, ed. M. J. Prichard and D. E. C. Yale 
(London: Selden Society, 1993), 106-107. On the dating of this text, see Prichard and Yale, “Introduction,” 
in ibid., xvii-xviii. 
13 English jurists disagreed on this matter. Charles Molloy asserted that the king of England possessed sole 
jurisdiction over cases of piracy occuring upon the British Seas, since the Crown possessed “istud regimen 
dominium exclusive” of those seas, De Jure Maritimo et Navali, 2nd ed. (London, 1677), 38. Conversely, 
Sir Philip Meadows acknowledged that French and Dutch courts also heard cases arising onboard ships in 
the British Seas and did not acknowledge the sole jurisdiction of the Admiralty over those seas, see 
Meadows, Observations Concerning the Dominion and Sovereignty of the Sea, 28-29. Apparently only a 
handful of cases involving crimes committed on foreign ships within the “British Seas” appeared before the 
Admiralty Sessions, most emerging from the period of the Second Anglo-Dutch War in the context of the 
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century, though, murders and mutinies on board British vessels within the Mediterranean 
repeatedly raised the question of whether the Admiralty had authority over crimes 
committed in the territorial waters of foreign states.   
 The early decades of the eighteenth century marked a notable growth in the legal 
authority of the British state in the Mediterranean. There appear, however, to have been 
few seventeenth-century disputes over the jurisdictional status of British ships in 
Mediterranean ports. While the High Court of Admiralty began proceedings in the case of 
at least one murder that took place within the harbor of Lisbon, seventeenth-century 
diplomatic representatives seem to have accepted the fact that ships in foreign ports fell 
under the jurisdiction of the courts and officers of that state.14 For example, John Finch 
protested the searching of an English ship at Livorno by agents of a farmer of duties on 
tobacco as a discredit to English navigation, but he did not contest the right of Tuscan 
officials to search English ships. Instead, he argued that since the ship in question did not 
carry tobacco as a commodity for sale but only for the use of the sailors onboard, it ought 
to have enjoyed the benefits of the free port and been left undisturbed.15 Two decades of 
war and of disputes over the prize cases appear to have made Britain's representatives 
around the Mediterranean more jealous of Admiralty jurisdiction over cases involving 
British vessels. 
                                                
English Crown's efforts to affirm its sovereignty over the British Seas, Prichard and Yale, “Introduction,” 
cc.   
14 Prichard and Yale, “Introduction,” ccvi. 
15 “Sir John Finch's Memorial to the Great Duke,” Florence, 3 September 1667 and Finch to Arlington, 
Florence, 6 September 1667, TNA SP 98/8. 
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 As the British state and its counterparts asserted their authority over overseas 
subjects and navigation in the early eighteenth century, jurisdictional contests over the 
status of ships in foreign harbors became more common. There were, however, important 
limits to this process. Jurisdictional disputes between the British Admiralty and 
Mediterranean states were largely confined to cases of mutiny and murder that occurred 
within foreign ports and to broader questions as to the legal status of British vessels in 
foreign ports.16 Conversely, whereas the attempts of the French Crown to impose the 
extraterritorial authority of consuls over French navigation produced a steady stream of 
contentious diplomatic exchanges, it appears that neither British diplomats nor jurists 
raised objections to foreign courts adjudicating disputes between masters and mariners.  
Instead, the governor of Livorno, Giuliano Capponi, specifically cited cases brought 
before Tuscan tribunals by British sailors and masters in order to combat the claims of 
French consuls to exclusive jurisdiction over matters occurring between French 
subjects.17 Yet, serious crimes committed in foreign harbors were highly visible affairs 
that drew not only the attention of local officials, but also of British diplomats who 
sought to sustain Admiralty jurisdiction over British navigation. Moreover, the Henrician 
statutes 27 Henry VIII c. 4 and 28 Henry VIII c. 15, which were designed to create a 
                                                
16 Studies of the legal status of ships on the high seas and in port overwhelmingly concentrate upon 
developments from the second half of the nineteenth century, as in Charles Noble Gregory, “Jurisdiction 
over Foreign Ships in Territorial Waters,” Michigan Law Review 2, no.5 (February 1904): 333-357. The 
most thorough discussion of early-modern English Admiralty jurisdiction comes in Prichard and Yale, 
“Introduction,” passim. For further contextualization of Admiralty law as a form of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, see Kelly de Luca, “Beyond the Sea: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and English Law, c. 1575- c. 
1640,” 79-96. 
17 Capponi to Rinuccini, Livorno, 15 October 1738, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1807, #30. John Dick's 
complaint, also discussed in chapter two, that Livorno's auditore heard cases between ships' masters and 
their sailors appears to have been exceptional, John Dick to Sir Henry Fox, Livorno, 25 June 1756, TNA 
SP 98/63, f. 93v-94r. 
  263 
! !
more effective instrument to combat piracy and to prosecute felonies committed at sea, 
affirmed the expansive extraterritorial reach of English justice to encompass acts done 
“upon the seas, or in or upon any other haven, river, or creek.” From 1536, these statutes 
transferred the High Court of Admiralty's criminal jurisdiction to specially appointed 
commissions of oyer and terminer, later referred to as the Justices of the Admiralty, who 
heard cases according to the rules of common law, by which it was easier to obtain a 
conviction than it was adhering to the procedures of the civil law that regulated the High 
Court's proceedings.18 These new courts, referred to as Admiralty Sessions, broadly 
transformed and expanded the criminal jurisdiction of the Admiralty.19 
 The High Court of Admiralty thus claimed jurisdiction over criminal cases that 
arose within littoral waters over which other state’s claimed sovereignty. The Admiralty 
Court judge Sir Henry Penrice confirmed this interpretation of the court's jurisdiction in 
1719.  In that year a sailor who was brought before the court for the murder of a shipmate 
in the harbor of the Ionian island of Zante argued that his crime did not fall within its 
authority, having been committed in “a Porte that belong'd to the State of Venice” and 
within the reach of Zante's cannon. Particularly, the sailor had been advised that if he was 
to be tried in Britain, his case ought to be heard in the court of the High Constable & Earl 
Marshall, which had extraterritorial jurisdiction over cases involving British subjects that 
                                                
18 Prichard and Yale, “Introduction,” cxxxvii.  
19 The Henrician statutes were aimed against “traytors, pirates, thieves, robbers, murtherers, and 
confederates,” ibid. cxlviii-cxlix. The legal difficulties that arose from attempts to apply these statutes to 
the problems of Atlantic piracy led to creation of new anti-piracy statutes after 1700, most notably 11 and 
12 William III c.7, which allowed pirates to be prosecuted without being brought back to England to stand 
trial.  For the development of this legislation within an imperial context, see Robert C. Ritchie, Captain 
Kidd and the War against the Pirates (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 141-144, 152-
154. 
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occurred in foreign countries.20 Penrice and the Court rejected this argument and asserted 
that the case was indeed within the statutes of Henry VIII for the commission of oyer & 
terminer, since it encompassed acts committed in harbors and havens outside the British 
Seas.21 Besides displaying the sometimes surprising skill with which sailors maneuvered 
around the law, this opinion affirmed that the Admiralty possessed jurisdiction over 
matters in distant coastal waters that, around Britain, would fall under the authority of 
common law, territorial courts.22  
 Jurists were circumspect in their discussions of how the jurisdiction of the High 
Court of Admiralty related to the authority of foreign courts and sovereigns. Following a 
mutiny on board the ship Catherine in the port of Genoa in late 1722, George Henshaw, 
the consul in that port, warned that the Genoese government intended to try the mutineers 
and might subsequently claim the right to visit other British ships as well.23 Meanwhile, 
the British resident at Genoa, Henry Davenant, denied that the republic had any “right or 
                                                
20 The Court of the Constable and Marshal was particularly concerned with questions of heraldy and martial 
law, but it also had jurisdiction over fellonies committed in foreign territory. By the eighteenth century the 
court had long fallen into disuse.  See Kelly deLuca, “Beyond the Sea,” 70-74. 
21 The sailor was subsequently tried before the Admiralty Sessions and sentenced to death, Sir Henry 
Penrice, 10 November 1719, TNA ADM 1/3669, f. 427v. This interpretation of the Henrician anti-piracy 
statutes gave the Admiralty a more extensive jurisdiction in foreign waters than that it was generally 
conceded to have in British ports and harbors. Thomas Molloy wrote, “Though a Port is Locus publicus uti 
pars Oceani, yet it hath been resolved more than once that all Ports, not only in the Town, but the Water is 
infra corpus Comitatus, “ and, consequently, crimes committed there were to be tried in common law 
courts, De Jure Maritimo et Navali, 43, 197. For further discussion of the seventeenth century debates that 
limited Admiralty authority in British ports through the eighteenth century, see Prichard and Yale, 
“Introduction,” clxxvi-clxxxv. Common law lawyers, did, however, concede Admiralty jurisdiction over 
murders committed within ports, ibid., clxxxiv. 
22 For pirates and sailors as “lawyers,” see Lauren Benton, “The Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the 
Origins of Ocean Regionalism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 47, no. 4 (October 2005): 706-
713; eadem., A Search for Sovereignty, 112-120. 
23 Henshaw contrasted the republic's conduct with regard to this affair with their previous behavior “when 
one of our Brittish merchants, had apply'd to this Magistrate of the Sea to sequester a Brittish ship here for 
a debt, the Magistrate, as is usuall, would not doe it without my consent, and then I sent my Vice Consul to 
bee present,” Henshaw to Lord Carteret, Genoa 22 December 1722, TNA SP 79/14. 
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pretence to take cognizance of any fact committed on board an British ship.”24 Davenant 
also insisted that officials had made no efforts to visit British ships in either Livorno or 
Genoa for the duration of his office.  Both he and Henshaw feared that the republic's 
claim to jurisdiction over the matter would establish a precedence for officials to visit 
British ships.25 The Judge-Advocate Nathaniel Lloyd, on the other hand, agreed that the 
case should have been tried solely in Britain if it had occurred on board ship as a “private, 
& as it were a Family affair.” However, because shots were fired and the captain's life 
endangered, the mutiny was also a publick outrage “against the Peace and honour of the 
Port.” Consequently, Lloyd thought that the Genoese government was entitled to proceed 
against the mutineers for offending the peace of the port, but that they should then be 
transported back to Britain to be tried for the mutiny they committed.26 The mutineers 
were sentenced to fifteen years banishment by a Genoese court, before being transported 
back to Britain.27   
 As with debates over consular jurisdiction, contests over the jurisdiction of 
criminal cases exposed conflicting and ambiguous conceptions of the reach and limits of 
sovereign authority in the early modern world. Even as jurists accepted that British 
vessels in foreign ports came under the authority of local courts, diplomats and consuls 
regularly argued for the exclusive jurisdiction of Admiralty courts over cases involving 
                                                
24 Davenant to Carteret, Genoa, 22 December 1722, TNA SP 79/14. 
25 “...que le Ser:ma Republique n'a aucun droit d'envoyer des gens armés a bord des vaisseaux anglois sous 
quelque pretexte que ce puisse etre, a moins que le Ministre, ou le Consul de  la Nation ne le demande, et 
qu'en tel  cas ceux qu'on tfait prendre, doivent etre gardéz uniquement a la desposition de Sa Majesté,” 
“Copie de la protestation de M. D'avenant presentée au Secretaire d'Etat a Geneva, le 19e Decembre 1722,” 
TNA SP 79/14. 
26 Nathaniel Lloyd, Cambridge, 1 January 1722, TNA SP 104/98. 
27 Henshaw to Carteret, 26 January 1723 and 2 February 1723, TNA SP 79/13. 
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British vessels. In 1724, when Tuscan authorities opened a criminal investigation of the 
master of the ship Betty for molesting a Portuguese passenger, Brinley Skinner, the 
British consul at Livorno, responded that since the alleged crime had been committed 
under the British flag, it could be “no where tryed but in the High Court of Admiralty of 
Great Britain.”28 Jurisdictional disputes thus emerged not only from the collision of 
different juridical authorities in cases occurring in foreign ports and waters, but also from 
the efforts of state officials to establish the exclusive authority of their respective 
governments over subjects and ships overseas. As a result of these contests, ships became 
sites where diverse territorial and extraterritorial conceptions of sovereignty collided.  
 
II.  Sovereignty and the Flag 
 Although British jurists acknowledged that ships fell under the laws of the rulers 
whose ports they entered, they did not imagine a distinct line at which Crown authority 
ended and foreign sovereignty began. The legal and diplomatic status of ships in coastal 
waters and foreign ports was thus ambiguous. Seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
references to “floating Castles” generally referred to warships, which were customarily 
exempted from the jurisdiction of foreign courts.29 Furthermore, from the mid-eighteenth 
century, British jurists resisted the jurist Martin Hübner's equation of neutral ships and 
                                                
28 Skinner, Livorno, 27 October 1724, TNA SP 98/26.   
29 For instance, in response to an incident in which the captain of an English warship forcibly retrieved 
deserters from an English merchant vessel within the port of Lisbon, the Crown's advocate-general advised 
that “An English Man of Wars Commanding Officer, in a Neutral Port, by the general Laws of Nations, has 
no authority, or coercive Jurisdiction, beyond the Limits of his floting Castle, so long as he remains in 
Port,” George Paul, Doctors Commeons, 19 March 1741, TNA ADM 7/298, f. 26v.   
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neutral territory.30 It was only in the nineteenth century that commentators began to refer 
explicitly to ships as “floating islands” and even this description was a metaphor and 
legal fiction, not intended to suggest that ships were actually pieces of national territory.31  
Instead, ships were under the legal authority of the state whose patents they carried and 
whose subjects owned and crewed them, but they could also move into waters where they 
would fall under the jurisdiction of foreign states. Yet, precisely because ships sailed 
under Crown protection and authority, foreign interference with British navigation was 
potentially controversial. At question was where and whether ships passed from the 
jurisdiction of the English Admiralty and into that of foreign courts and foreign 
sovereigns. 
 As Europe's major powers sought to establish their authority over subjects and 
their ships, they challenged the maritime sovereignty of Italian states. In 1719, the 
Venetian Republic decreed that all vessels entering any of Venice's ports should submit 
to inspection by customs officers to put an end to rampant smuggling. Underlying this 
action were the efforts of the Austrian Emperor, Charles VI, to develop Austrian 
commerce in the Adriatic. In 1717, Charles challenged Venetian supremacy in that sea by 
                                                
30 Martin Hübner, De la saisie des bâtiments neutres ou du droit qu’ont les nations belligérantes d’arrêter 
les navires des peuples amis (La Haye, 1759), vol. I, ch. II, sec. VI, 211-2. Sir William Scott rejected this 
principal outright in a 1820 decision in which he stated “I know of no such right of protection belonging to 
the British flag, and that I think such a pretension is unfounded in point of principle, is injurious to the 
rights of the countries, and is inconsistent with those of our own,” quoted in Henry Wager Halleck, 
Halleck's International Law, or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, 3rd ed. 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1893), 1: 228. 
31 The origins of this analogy were closely related to the reform of Britain's court system through the mid-
nineteenth century, in which the legal fiction that ships were part of the territory of Great Britain allowed 
them to be, William Oake Manning, Commentaries on the Law of Nations (London: S. Sweet, 1839), 209-
211; Francis Taylor Piggott, Nationality: English Law on the High Seas and beyond the Realm (London: 
William Clowes and Sons, 1906), 9-11. See also Daniel Heller-Roazen's summary of the development of 
the idea of the ship as a floating territory in The Enemy of All, 126-131. 
  268 
! !
extending imperial protection to ships sailing to the empire's ports. Subsequently, he 
established free ports at Trieste and Fiume, directly attacking Venice's economic 
positions.32 Within the context of this Austrian threat to Venetian commerce and 
maritime sovereignty, the republic instituted searches to ensure that goods could not be 
smuggled into Venice from Austrian ports and to reassert Venetian authority over 
navigation in the Adriatic. The Venetian edict mandating inspection of ships thus 
contrasted Venetian conceptions of the Adriatic as a closed sea with Austrian declarations 
that it was open.  However, the British response to this Venetian edict centered less on 
the freedom of navigation in the Adriatic than it did on the honor of British navigation. 
 British representatives protested that the mandatory searching of vessels violated 
the privileges of the nation's navigation and the honor of its flag.33 According to the 
British consul at Venice, Neil Brown, this requirement was a violation of the long-
standing practice whereby merchant ships were not visited by customs officials, but only 
by officers of the Magistracy of the Sanità to enforce the ship's quarantine upon its 
coming from the Levant.34 According to Alexander Cunningham, the British resident at 
the city, the real motive behind the decree was not to stop smuggling, since Venetian 
nobles themselves were heavily involved in that abuse, but to “attacque the flags of 
princes in subjecting them to their decrees, only to establish their Sovraintie in the 
                                                
32 Giuseppe Stefani, “Carlo VI e il problema adriatico,” Archivio Veneto 63 (1958): 148-224. For a 
summary of Austrian policy towards the Adriatic during the second decade of the eighteenth century, see 
also Mario Dassovich, L'impero e il golfo: i territori degli Asburgo sull'Adriatico negli anni 1717-1814 
(Udine: Del Bianco, 2002), 18-22 and idem., Navigazione e commerci nell'Adriatico del XVIII secolo: 
l'ultimo secolo del Golfo della Serenissima, una ricerca storiografica (Udine: Del Bianco, 2008), 81-86. 
33 A copy of the republic's decree of 21 January 1719 is contained in TNA SP 99/62, f. 215r-216r. 
34 Brown to James Craggs, Venice, 28 January 1719, TNA SP 99/62, f. 213v.  
  269 
! !
Golf.”35 Since British vessels were generally too large to approach Venice itself, they 
instead unloaded their cargoes at the outlying inlet of Malamocco two miles from the 
city, allowing the goods to be inspected as they were subsequently transported to Venice.  
Underlying Cunningham's objection to the searching of British vessels, there appears to 
be an implicit question as to the extent of the port of Venice and, consequently, of where 
British vessels fell under the jurisdiction of that state.  
 Although this controversy raised questions as to how far Venice's sovereignty still 
reached into the Adriatic, Britain's representatives never explicitly differentiated this 
particular issue from their general concern for the privileges of British navigation.  
Instead, Cunningham later told the Venetian government that he had no objection to the 
republic searching goods for smuggled items, but he would not permit them to do it 
aboard ships over which the “Kings flag” flew.36 In a conversation with the mercenary 
Johann Matthia von der Schulenberg, Cunningham was more explicit and questioned 
whether the proper way for the republic to maintain its own sovereignty was “to invade 
that of others.”37 In similar terms, the resident had previously replied to a Venetian 
                                                
35 Reflecting the degree to which he dismissed Venice's claims to sovereignty over the Adriatick, 
Cunningham continued, “if it that is grant them, I doe not doubt but Constantins donation will be soon 
granted to the Pope,” Cunningham to Craggs, Venice, 11 August 1719, TNA SP 99/62, f. 317v. 
36 Cunningham to Craggs, Venice, 4 August 1719, TNA SP 99/62, f. 307v. Cunningham presumably was 
referring to the “red ensign” used by English merchants ships, not the Union Jack, which was reserved for 
naval vessels. A royal proclamation of 1674 reaffirmed prohibitions on the use of the Union flag by 
merchant ships and specified that they were instead to fly the “red ensign,” William Gordon Perrin, British 
Flags, their Early History, and their Development at Sea; with an Account of the Origin of the Flag as a 
National Device (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 130. French sources are just as unclear 
as to the distinction between the different forms of national flag that were prescribed for navigation as 
English documents, referring only to “la banniere de france” or “le pavillon françois.” Like their English 
counterparts, French merchant vessels were forbidden from flying the “pavillon blanc,” which was reserved 
for the king's ships, though this regulation seems to have been regularly flouted, see René-Josué Valin, 
Nouveau commentaire sur l'ordonnance de la marine, du mois d'août 1681 (La Rochelle, 1760), 68-69. 
37 Cunningham to Craggs, Venice, 4 August 1719, TNA SP 99/62, f. 308v.  
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reminder that, “the Senate here is Master,” by affirming that he did not dispute that, “But 
they were not Masters of the flags of other Soverains.”38  
 British arguments for the immunity of ships from search rested on a precarious set 
of arguments drawn from the real or imagined traditions of a port and on assertions of the 
honor and respect due to the British colors and to the ships that flew them. In his protest 
against the republic's decree of 1719, Cunningham’s successor as resident, Edward 
Burges, advised the Venetian government that the requirement that foreign vessels submit 
to inspections by customs officials was “a thing contrary to the Priviledges which his 
Subjects have always enjoyed here, and in all the Ports of the Mediterranean.”39  
Conversely, in defense of their right to search vessels, Venetian officials pointed out that 
the republic had previously issued orders for the inspection of ships on numerous 
occasions. The Venetian ambassador to Vienna further asked, “in what part of the world 
has a Flag ever been seen to give immunity and freedom from the uncontestable duties of 
the state?”40 
 British claims for the privileges or honor of the flag in the Mediterranean were 
thus a particularly delicate matter, resting neither on the imagined territorial sovereignty 
of the Crown over ships nor on juridical precedent. The importance of the flag lay in its 
representation that the ship flying it was under the authority and protection of the Crown. 
                                                
38 Cunningham to Craggs, Venice, 31 March 1719, TNA SP 99/62, f. 261r. 
39 “...ch'ella non vuole mai sottomettersi ad una Cosa si contraria à gli Privileggi delli quali i Suoi Sudditi 
anno sempre goduti Qui, ed in tutti li Porti del Mediterraneo, e si destruttiva della libertà del loro 
Commercio,” Edward Burges to the Doge and Senate, 13 September 1720, TNA SP 100/31; TNA SP 
99/62, f. 580r-v. 
40 “...in qual luogo del mondo si è mai veduto, che una Bandiera presti impunità, e franchiggia dai diritti 
inconstrastabili del P:npato,” Pietro Grimai to the Senate, Cimerin, 19 August 1719, quoted in Stefani, 
“Carlo Vi e il Problema Adriatico,” 213. 
  271 
! !
Burges carried on the British case against the Venetian decree, but suspected that the 
matter was “taken too high here at first.” Burges noted that the British merchants at 
Venice thought that the controversy over searches was less a matter of trade than one of 
“the Honour of the British Colours,” but he further reported that they would not have 
opposed the decree, had Cunningham not “spirited them up, and persuaded 'em that the 
Honour of the Nation was wounded by it.”41 Indeed, Cunningham related that during a 
conversation he had with the Austrian resident at Venice regarding the privileges 
accorded to flags at the city, he had felt reluctant to engage deeply in “so nice a subject,” 
because they centered on the privileges of the flag within foreign ports. But he noted that 
“it was not permitted to every Master of a ship to use the flag when and where he 
pleased, nor was the flag to [screen] Counterband and running goods, as was done by 
some here.” Moreover, as Cunningham related, the flags of large British and French 
vessels that stopped at Malamocco were respected, but smaller ships that went up to 
Venice were searched. 42 
 The opinions of Cunningham highlight the degree to which apparent rhetorical 
excess about the honor of the flag exposed a conviction that ships carried sovereigns' 
authority and protection into foreign waters. As a result, debates about the privileges of 
British navigation further suggest the sensitive legal and political questions that 
surrounded ships in foreign harbors. British and Venetian diplomats eventually arrived at 
a compromise wherein vessels that unloaded at Malamocco would be exempted from 
                                                
41 Burges, Venice, 10 November 1719, TNA SP 99/62, f. 384r-v.  
42 Cunningham to Craggs, Venice, 28 July 1719, TNA SP 99/62, f. 303v. 
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inspection, but those that proceeded onto Venice proper would be liable for search.43  
This seems to have resolved the controversy of the searching of British vessels. The 
Venetians continued to search ships flying the Austrian flag, probably because the 
Austrians still lacked the naval force or commercial strength to enforce its claim to the 
freedom of Adriatic navigation. Nevertheless, the two states eventually reached an 
accommodation as well.44 
  Arguments that a ship’s flag conferred protection on it wherever it was further 
called into question how the authority of sovereigns over their subjects and ships 
intersected with the jurisdiction of foreign princes within their own ports. The immunity 
that Louis XIV claimed for passengers onboard French ships in the face of corsairs’ 
efforts to enforce the visità was carried even into foreign ports. After Tuscan officials 
seized a suspected murderer from a French vessel within the port of Livorno in 1727, 
French ministers demanded greater respect be shown to the French flag in the future, 
citing the example of the king of Sardinia, who had recently conceded that the French 
flag conferred a right of asylum upon the ships flying it.45 The French Minister of the 
Marine, the Comte de Maurepas, issued a memorial that asserted that the French Crown 
                                                
43 This compromise appears to have been first proposed by the Venetiand in the summer of 1720, as seen in 
the “Memoria presentata à Sua Eccelenza il Signore Craggs Segretario di Stato di Sua Maestà Britannica, 
da me infrascritta Segretario della Serenissima Republica di Venezia,” London, 20 July 1720, TNA SP 
100/31. This proposal was ultimately accepted by the British government as confirmed in a memorial of 
Edward Burges to the Ventian government of 6 April 1721, TNA SP 99/62, f. 580r-v. 
44 Liana de Antonellis Martini, Portofranco e comunità etnico-religiose nella Trieste settecentesca (Milan: 
Giuffrè, 1968), 28-29; Antonio di Vittorio, Gli Austriaci e il Regno di Napoli, 1707-1734 (Naples: Giannini 
Editore, 1973), 282-286. 
45 Memoire de Maurepas, 4 January 1728 and Montemagni to Franchini, Florence, 23 January 1728, both in 
ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4716. Skinner complained of the Tuscan government's pretence to “this very 
unlawfull power of forcing sailers from under the respective Colours,” Skinner to Newcastle, Livorno, 29 
November 1727, BL Add. MS 51504, f. 79v-80r. 
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claimed “an immunity attached to the Banner of France from time immemorial.”46 The 
minister affirmed that the protection of the flag would not be extended to those who had 
committed capital crimes or to deserters. In these cases, though, judicial authorities were 
to turn to the French consul for the arrest of the suspect while still under the flag. This 
memorial suggests a conception of sovereignty wherein authority was not geographically 
bounded; the ship was a sovereign space only in as much as the flag it carried conferred 
the protection of the monarch.   
 As with controversies over Admiralty jurisdiction regarding crimes committed 
onboard British vessels, the extension of the sovereign protection of a ruler into a foreign 
port challenged the sovereignty of that state. Coriolano Montemagni, the secretary of the 
Grand Duke, was not persuaded that every “piccolo Barchereccio” should be entitled to 
the same respect owed to men of war purely on the basis of raising the flag of a prince.47  
Such a privilege would not only be a direct violation of the Grand Duke's jurisdiction, 
since ships in the port of Livorno sat under the guns of the forts that surrounded it. It also 
would give the duke's slaves, if they reached ships even anchored at the shore, a more 
secure claim to asylum than they received in churches.48 While the French were unwilling 
to surrender the principle of the protection of the flag, they would consider following the 
example of the British at Venice and establish a boundary within which ships would 
                                                
46 “...que tous les bâtiments françois, sans en excepter aucun, sont Exemts de toute Visitte, que c'est Une 
Immunité attacheé depuis Un tems Immemorial a la Banniere de france, et que l'on a toujours esté tres 
attentif a Empescher que l'on y donne aucune atteinte,” Memoire di Maurepas, 4 January 1728, ASF 
Mediceo del Principato, 4716.  
47 Montemagni to Franchini, Florence, 23 January 1728, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4716.   
48 Montemagni to Franchini, Florence, 23 January 1728, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4716. 
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lower their flags and submit to searches.49 Implicit within this proposal was the definition 
of the extent of Tuscan and French authority over ships at sea. This further example of 
the uneven development of a Mediterranean regulatory regime failed when word arrived 
that the Austrians had refused Genoese authorities permission to search their vessels. As 
the Tuscan ambassador at Paris related, the French would never agree to any proposal 
that ceded a prerogative claimed by the Austrian emperor.50 
 The idea that the flag symbolized the protection and authority of the state seems 
to explain Cunningham's complaint that the searching of ships violated the sovereignty of 
the prince whose flag the vessels flew. British representatives sided with their French 
counterparts after Tuscan officials used force to remove a suspect from a French vessel in 
1727. Brinley Skinner described the conduct of the sbirri [law enforcement personnel] as 
“an unwarrantable violence” that violated “the sanction of those Colours” and merited the 
French consul's “heavy & just complaints.”51 Skinner had employed similar terms with 
regards to the matter of master Copithorne three years earlier, writing to the British 
consul in Lisbon that he convinced Tuscan officials not to use force to reclaim the 
Portuguese girl from the Betty by demonstrating “the protection the Colours of Crown'd 
heads given in this port to Fugitives in Crimes of the Blackest Nature.”52 Conversely, 
when he first learned of the accusations directed against Copithorne, Skinner had warned 
the master, “your Behaviour in this Affair seeming to me unjustifiable & Inconsistent 
                                                
49 Franchini to Montemagni, Paris, 16 and 23 February 1728, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4716. 
50 Franchini to Montemagni, Paris, 12 April 1728, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4716. 
51 Skinner to Newcastle, Livorno, 29 November 1727, BL Add. MS 51504, f. 79v-80r.  
52 Skinner to Thomas Burnett, Livorno, 25 September 1724, BL Add. MS 41504, f. 8v. 
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with the Priviledges of the English Colours It may not be in my Power to Protect either 
your Person or ship from the Princes just demand.”53 The anxiety displayed in Skinner's 
letter to Copithorne does not conflict with his general concern for the privileges of the 
British flag and navigation, but rather reflects the delicate legal and political situation that 
resulted from the intersection of British and Tuscan claims to authority over vessels in 
Livorno's harbor.  
 Questions as to the privileges that ships enjoyed in particular ports complicated 
the general view among jurists that vessels in foreign harbors fell under the laws and 
authority of those states. In 1734, the British, French and Imperial consuls at Livorno 
attested that the ships of their respective nations could not be visited by Tuscan officials 
for any reason and that no person could be arrested while under the protection of the 
flag.54  Thus, when a Genoese murdered a British sailor in 1737 and then took refuge on a 
French vessel, the British resident at Florence, Sir Charles Fane, demurred at the request 
of Marchese Carlo Rinuccini, the Tuscan Secretary of War, that he ask the French consul 
to turn over the murderer to Tuscan authorities. Although he did not think the murderer 
should be protected, he hesitated to undertake a course that might lessen “any of the 
privileges which the colours of Merchant ships were thought entitled to in that port.”55 In 
a parallel dispute of the same period, both the French and British ambassadors in Naples 
                                                
53 Skinner to Copithorne, Livorno, 8 September 1724, TNA SP 98/26. 
54 Memorials attesting to the priviledges of the English consul, and his counterparts, in the port of Livorno 
were signed on 30 March 1734 by the English and Austrian consuls and on 23 March by the French consul.  
They were then used by the English minister, the earl of Essex, to Savoy to defend the contested immunity 
of the English consul's house in Nice. Essex's letter is dated 15 April 1733, AST Contado di Nizza, Consoli 
Stranieri, Addizioni, Mazzo 1, #2. 
55 Fane to Newcastle, Florence, 25 December 1736, TNA SP 98/36. 
  276 
! !
protested when customs officers began to search their nation's ships in that port in 1737.  
According to Edward Allen's report on the matter, the Neapolitans invoked the treaty of 
Madrid of 1667, which continued to regulate the treatment of English merchants in that 
former Spanish possession, to justify these searches. Conversely, Allen denied that the 
article providing for inspection of ships had ever been put in execution, maintaining that 
all attempts to enforce it had failed, such that the British nation was “in possession of this 
Priviledge and Immunity [from search] from time immemorial.”56 
 Appeals to the privileges of British ships and merchants occupied an ambiguous 
place within the evolution of the British presence in the Mediterranean. The claims of 
consuls and diplomats for the freedom of British vessels from search within foreign ports 
derived from their interpretations of custom and established practice, not from the force 
of treaties or the law of nations. Indeed, as illustrated by Nathaniel Lloyd’s opinion in the 
matter of the attempted mutiny aboard the British vessel in Genoa’s harbor, jurists appear 
to have been more observant of the jurisdictional authority of foreign states than were 
diplomatic representatives. Yet, at a time when maritime legal regimes were uncertain, 
ambiguity surrounding custom provided a means by which Europe’s major powers could 
increase and extend the navigational privileges accorded their subjects’ vessels. British 
and French diplomats and ministers put forward an understanding of the relationship 
between ships and sovereign authority that contrasted markedly with that of smaller 
states. Italian ministers understood that they would be unable to regulate commerce in 
their own ports if maritime powers could free ships from the jurisdiction of local courts 
                                                
56 Allen to Newcastle, Naples, 30 July 1737, TNA SP 93/9, f. 153v.   
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and officers. Contests over the legal status of ships in foreign ports thus became 
opportunities for states to attempt to extend and to defend their sovereignty at sea.  
   
III. The National Duty Acts  
 
 Ships were sites where the extraterritorial authority of the Crown over its subjects 
and their vessels collided with the jurisdiction that foreign states claimed over ports and 
harbors.  In ports where English factories were firmly under the jurisdiction of foreign 
sovereigns, ships also transmitted the legal authority of the British state into foreign 
dominions. During the seventeenth century, consuls frequently encountered difficulties 
when they sought to establish and to levy informal duties on goods freighted on British 
vessels in order to pay factory expenses. In the first half of the eighteenth century, 
Parliament enacted legislation to enforce these customary duties collected at Lisbon, 
Cadiz and Livorno.57 The national duties enacted by Parliamentary statute were of minor 
commercial importance, raising relatively small sums. Nevertheless, through the National 
Duty Acts, the British government extended formal and legislative recognition to the 
British factories at Lisbon and Livorno for the first time.58 Moreover, these Acts raised 
important questions of the reach of British state authority over navigation in foreign 
ports.  In Spain, Irish merchants refused to pay the duty and appealed to the Spanish 
                                                
57 A memorial from the British factory at Lisbon from 1715 included a request for parliamentary legislation 
to mandate payment of the national duty, as foreign merchants refused to pay it, putting British merchants 
at a disadvantage, TNA SP 100/89. An Act of Parliament mandating and regulating the payment of the duty 
on goods carried into Libson by English ships was passed in 1721, L. M. E. Shaw, The Anglo-Portuguese 
Alliance and the English Merchants in Portugal, 1654-1810 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998),  66-68. A similar 
act for the collection of the national duty at Cadiz was passed in 1736, Jean O. McLachlan, Trade and 
Peace with Old Spain, 1667-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 214, n. 121.   
58 Shaw, The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 68. 
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government for relief from it and argued that as naturalized Spanish subjects they could 
not be obligated to pay a duty by an act of Parliament.59 Defense of these duties 
meanwhile invoked extraterritorial conceptions of the state's legal authority that 
paralleled those offered by Maurepas in his memorial on the protection accorded ships by 
the French flag. 
 At Livorno, Parliamentary and Crown authority over British navigation provided 
an avenue through which the state could regulate a British factory over which its 
extraterritorial authority was otherwise limited. Impositions “for Publick and charitable 
Uses” had been levied intermittently on British goods brought into Livorno in the 
seventeenth century and were again collected by members of the factory in 1704 to pay 
for the pamphlets that defended their conduct in the Plowman affair.60 The British 
community at Livorno subsequently retained this duty in order to establish a salary for 
the chaplain who was finally permitted to live among them in 1707 and to pay for the 
living expenses of sailors who found themselves at Livorno without employment.61  
Local officials appear to have had no objection to its collection so long as it appeared to 
be a voluntary collection. However, they vehemently opposed a convention signed by the 
members of the factory to refrain from trading with Filippo Guglielmo Huigens after that 
Flemish merchant and naturalized subject of the Grand Duke refused payment of the duty 
                                                
59 The Spanish government upheld the position of the Irish merchants but the dispute apparently passed 
with the the introduction of a new English consul, McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667-
1750, 140-141.   
60 See above, chapter two.   
61 John Finch to Arlington, Florence, 18/28 June 1667, TNA SP 98/8, f. 169v; Skinner to Newcastle, 
Livorno, 14 September 1725, BL Add. MS 41504, f. 17v-18v; Skinner to Colman, Livorno, 15 May 1726, 
BL Add. MS 41054, f. 37v-38v. Tuscan officials, on the other hand, accused Skinner and other prominent 
members of the factory of abusing the funds raised by the national duty to pay for their own diversions and 
amusements, as in Montemagni to Pucci, Florence, 24 May 1726, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4227. 
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in 1725. Tuscan opposition to the duty focused on the perception that it violated the free 
port of Livorno, but sensitivity to a law that appeared to compromise Tuscan sovereignty 
inflected the Italian reaction.62 Thus, when Rinuccini instructed the governor of Livorno, 
Alessandro del Nero, in May 1726 to attempt to convince Skinner and the rest of the 
English factory at Livorno to drop their convention against Huygens, he pointed out that 
the Tuscan government did not object to the British making regulations for their own 
navigation, but could not permit them to make laws on Tuscan soil; the British could thus 
maintain the duty so long as it remained voluntary, the duke not forbidding the British 
“any Law on their Ships, but not being able to tolerate that they establish any in the 
territory of the High Royal Highness.”63 Montemagni instructed the Tuscan resident in 
London, Vincenzo Pucci, in nearly identical terms that while the grand duke did not 
prescribe the British from making what regulations they pleased on their navigation or 
within their nation, he could not to allow them to make or enforce laws in his own 
country.64 
 In order to sustain the national duty at Livorno, the British transformed the tax 
collected by the factory there into a legal obligation falling on all goods freighted on 
British ships for that port. The British government ordered Brinley Skinner and the 
                                                
62 Montemagni to Pucci, Florence, 17 May 1726, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4227. 
63 “...non prescrivendosi ai Signori Inglesi alcuna Legge sù le loro Navi, mà non potendosi già tolerare, che 
venghino loro a farne nel Territorio di S. A. Reale,” [Rinuccini] to del Nero, Florence, 11 May 1726, ASF 
Mediceo del Principato, 1810, f. 1331r-v. A decade later, when the bill for the national duty was put before 
Parliament again, Rinuccini again noted that it was not in the power of his government “to prevent 
parliament's making what law they pleas'd,” but hoped that they would not proceed in a direction that 
threatened Livorno's trade, Fane to Newcastle, Pisa, 13 May 1737, TNA SP 98/40, 78r. 
64 “...non prescrivendosi a Signori Inglesi alcuna Legge sulle loro Nave e nelle loro Nazione mà non 
potendosi già tollerare, che venghino Loro à farne nel Territorio stesso di S. A. R.,” Montemagni to Pucci, 
Florence, 17 May 1726, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4227. 
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British nation at Livorno to suspend the convention because the factory lacked they 
authority to pass legislation and the convention consequently lacked any legal basis.  
Shortly afterward, however, merchants trading to Italy proposed a Parliamentary bill to 
enforce the collection of a duty on all goods destined for Livorno embarked on English 
ships.65 Juridical opinion further confirmed the right of Parliament to legislate for 
foreigners on board British ships. The advocate Charles Pinfold argued that the proposed 
act contradicted neither “the Laws of Nations” nor any treaty between Britain and 
Tuscany and that the proposed act was “in the Power of the King of England and his 
Parliament, to lay and inforce the Payment of such Dutyes, & is such an Act of 
Sovereignty, as may be safely exercised towards Foreigners, as well as his own 
Subjects.” According to Pinfold, the duty posed no hardship to those who paid it, since 
they freighted British ships out of choice and thus enjoyed the privileges of an English 
subject; in this sense, the duty was no different than the tolls princes charged passing 
ships in order to maintain lighthouses or defenses against pirates. Pinfold concluded by 
noting that it was “too much to say that the Crown and Parliament of Great Brittain, have 
not Power, over their own Shipping, to lay Taxes on them, or the Goods they carry, when 
it is not in contradictions to the Laws of Nations, or any particular Treaty.”66 Pinfold's 
fellow lawyer Exton Sayer agreed and similarly asserted that the king of Great Britain 
“has an undoubted Jurisdiction over the Goods & Ships of his subjects, as well as over 
their persons” and was thus free, with the consent of Parliament, to lay what conditions or 
                                                
65 See the oppinion of the attorney and sollicitor generals, Philip Yorke and Charles Talbot to the Privey 
Council, 18 July 1726 and an unsigned, undated memorandum on the legality of the duty, which observed 
that “there is no Law to make obligatory” payment of the duty, both in TNA PC 1/4/25.  See also 
Townshend to [Colman], Whitehall, 16 August 1726, TNA SP 98/28.  
66 Charles Pinfold, Doctors Commons, 31 January 1727, TNA SP 35/76, f. 194r-195r. 
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restrictions he pleased on their trade to other countries. According to Sayer, the national 
duty was merely “an exercise of the Natural right of Every Prince” and it was irrelevant 
that the duty was collected within the dominions of the Grand Duke of Tuscany since the 
“obligation to such payment arises within the Dominions” of the British king.67 Both 
Pinfold and Sayer rejected Tuscan arguments that the duty would violate Livorno's status 
as a free port, noting that merchants were not obligated to freight British vessels and 
pointing out that it was the customs policy of the Grand Duke that established the port's 
freedom.68 
 Although legal opinions affirmed Parliament's right to enforce the national duty at 
Livorno, political considerations initially doomed the legislation. Despite widespread 
support in the House of Commons for a bill formalizing and regulating the collection of 
the national duty, the legislation died in the House of Lords, where the Duke of 
Newcastle and other politicians opposed it. For Pinfold and Sayer, King and Parliament 
possessed an unbounded authority over the “Goods & Ships” of subjects. Yet, both 
ministerial desire to maintain positive relations with Tuscany and the threat that the 
Grand Duke might rescind his tacit permission for an English chaplain to reside at 
Livorno proved to be of more weight than the confirmation of British extraterritorial 
sovereignty.69 Ten years later, however, another bill for the collection of the national duty 
at Livorno was put before Parliament. As before the bill easily passed the House of 
Commons, but on this occasion it was also approved in the House of Lords by a narrow 
                                                
67 Exton Sayer, Doctors Commons, 4 February 1727, TNA SP 35/76, f. 196r-197r. 
68 Ibid., f. 196v and Pinfold, Doctors Commons 31 January 1727, TNA SP 35/76, f. 194v. 
69 Pucci to Montemagni, London, 10 March 1727, 12 May 1727, and 19 May 1727, ASF Mediceo del 
Principato, 4227. 
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majority. Pucci attributed the passage of the bill to the failure of the Duke of Newcastle 
to oppose it, as he had previously done with the bill of 1727.70  Since the new bill did not 
specifically call for the sums raised to be used to pay for English factory’s chaplain, 
ministers may have thought it less likely to raise Tuscan ire than its predecessor. The 
changing political context that surrounded British relations with Tuscany probably also 
contributed to Newcastle's refusal to oppose this second bill. In 1727, the political future 
of Tuscany remained uncertain. It seems probable that British ministers had no desire to 
aggravate the Tuscan government at a time when settling the succession of Tuscany had 
become important to establishing the balance of power within Europe. Philip V of Spain 
and Charles VI of Austria had agreed that the grand duchy should pass to Philip's son 
Don Carlos upon the death of the elderly and childless Gian Gastone of Tuscany, but the 
precise terms of the succession remained undecided until the Treaties of Seville in 1729 
and of Vienna in 1731. Tuscan ministers, meanwhile, opposed the efforts of Europe's 
major powers to arrange the succession without Tuscan approval and further objected to 
subsequent decisions to establish foreign garrisons in Tuscan cities to secure that 
succession.71 By 1737, the succession of the grand duchy of Tuscany had been settled and 
Tuscan ministers were in no position to take a firm stance against the British legislation.72 
                                                
70 Pucci to Montemagni, London, 13 May 1737, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4231. 
71 Furio Diaz, Il Granducato di Toscana: I Medici (Turin: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1976), 
516-523; Franco Angiolini, “Il lungo seicento (1609-1737): declino o stabilità?” in Storia della civiltà 
toscana, vol. 2, Principato mediceo, ed. Elena Fasano Guarini (Florence: Le Monniera, 1998-2006), 56-59.  
On British participation in the diplomatic negotiations surrounding the succession to the grand duchy of 
Tuscany, see Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-
1783 (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 212-219. 
72 As a result of the War of the Polish Succession, succession to the duchy settled on Francesco Stefano, the 
duke of Lorraine, and husband of Maria Theresa, in 1736. For a summary of the events leading to this 
change in succession, see Diaz, Il Granducato di Toscana, 523. 
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 Nevertheless, both in 1727 and again in 1737, opposition to the bills for the 
national duty reflected the same ministerial caution that in other occasions led British 
ministers to order consuls and diplomats to refrain from exercising jurisdictional 
authority over their nationals. Pucci reported that Lord Carteret had argued that no matter 
how reasonable the cause, the British ought not resort to “Acts of Parliament, 
unrecognized in Foreign Countries, without the favor and permission of the Prince.”73   
The repeated opposition of Carteret and other members of the House of Lords to the bills 
for the enaction of a national duty at Livorno was indicative of an official mentality 
preoccupied with maintaining positive relations with other European states in order to 
promote the balance of power among them.74 The initial defeat of the bill for the national 
duty at Livorno and the strong opposition to it by the politicians most closely involved in 
British foreign policy revealed the political pressures that restrained British claims of 
extraterritorial sovereignty. On the other hand, the National Duty Acts show how 
parliamentary regulation of navigation served to transport British law even into foreign 
ports. The opinions authored by Exton Sayer and Charles Pinfold not only affirmed 
Crown authority over persons and goods onboard British vessels, but also asserted that 
that sovereignty was in no ways altered when those ships sailed into foreign ports.   
 
IV.  The Case of the Dove 
                                                
73 “...che disse che eziando che la Cosa fusse potuta essere in se stessa ragionevole, non dovevasi mai 
venire ad atti di Parlamento non conosciuti ne' Paesi Stranierj, senza il gusto, e la Concorenza del 
Principe,” Pucci to Tornaquinci, London, 13 May 1737, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4231. Pucci's letters 
appear to be the only source for the debates over the bills. 
74 On this point, see Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, passim. 
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  While diplomats claimed expansive privileges for British navigation, the 
extension of the authority of the Admiralty over felonies committed on board British 
ships beyond the high seas and into littoral waters called into question the jurisdiction 
other states exercised over their territorial waters.  Following the murder of the master of 
the Dove in 1736 by his crew in the port of Livorno, both British and Tuscan officials 
claimed jurisdiction over the crime, illustrating how forms of extraterritorial and 
territorial sovereignty collided in the Mediterranean. According to Sir Charles Fane, three 
Irish deserters from a Spanish warship conspired with the crew of the Dove to murder the 
master and then sell the ship at Nantes or Brest. On the night of September 19, 1736, the 
deserters snuck onto the British ship and joined the crew in murdering the master, 
Benjamin Hawes. The mariners then attempted to escape on board the ship, but they were 
apprehended about two miles outside the port by several longboats manned from other 
British merchantmen. The Dove's crew was carried back to port and confined on board 
several British vessels.75 The negotiations that followed the murder of Hawes and the 
recapture of the Dove suggest how contested lines of sovereignty shaped the eighteenth-
century Mediterranean. 
 The case of the Dove set in opposition the respective jurisdictional, and thus 
sovereign, authorities of the Tuscan and British states.76 Following the murder of Hawes 
                                                
75 Fane to Newcastle, Florence, 22 September 1736, TNA SP 98/36. Tuscan reports do not specifically 
identify the Irish deserters as the instigators of the crime, Giuliano Capponi to Carlo Rinuccini, Livorno, 19 
September 1736, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 2262. 
76 When a sailor who committed a murder aboard a French vessel in the port of Genoa escaped to a British 
warship in 1733, the Genoese representative in London complained that the murderer was not immediately 
turned over to Conservatori del Mare since, “C'est un principe inconstestable que le Souverain est le Juge 
unique de tous les Crimes qui se commettent dans le Païs de sa Souveraineté et de sa Jurisdiction, et on ne 
sauroit lui disputer  ce Droit sans vouloir lui ôter en même tems la partie la plus necessaire et essentielle de 
la Souveraineté,” Giovanni Battista Gastaldi, London, 28 August 1733, TNA SP 100/32. 
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and apprehension of his murderers, Giuliano Capponi moved to assume jurisdiction over 
the crime. However, the vice consul for the English nation in Livorno, Pier Francesco 
Blasini, asserted that since the murder had occurred under the British flag, cognizance of 
the crime rested with that nation alone.77 Blasini not only refused to allow Tuscan 
officials to board British ships to investigate the crime but also denied them permission to 
examine Hawes' body after it was taken ashore to be buried at the British cemetery in 
Livorno, even though the corpse was then on the land of the grand duke and not under the 
British flag.78 Charles Fane supported Blasini and opposed the request of the Marchese 
Rinuccini that the British accept the jurisdiction of the Grand Duke over a crime 
“commited in his dominions.” He prefaced his response by noting the many reasons that 
would lead him to object to Tuscan officials exercising jurisdiction on a British vessel 
before remarking that he thought the claim to be particularly weak in the case of the 
Dove, since the murderers had been apprehended “as pyrates on the high seas, even out of 
the reach of the Great Duke's cannon.”79 Faced with British resistance, Rinuccini ordered 
Capponi to proceed in the case, taking the depositions of those persons who were 
available and to arrest the suspects if they should come onto land.80 Capponi raised 
                                                
77 Capponi to Rinuccini, Livorno, 19 September 1736, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 2262. The newly 
appointed consul for Livorno, Barrington Goldsworthy, only arrived in the city at the end of the year and 
none of his surviving dispatches contain information regarding the case of the Dove. 
78 Capponi to Rinuccini, Livorno, 21 September 1736, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 2262 
79 Fane to Newcastle, Florence, 22 September 1736, TNA SP 98/36.  See also Rinuccini to Capponi, 20 
September 1736, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 2262. Notably, Fane and Rinuccini emphasized different 
points in their respective accounts of their conversation regarding the Dove. Fane reported that he objected 
to any Tuscan jurisdiction over British ships, but Rinuccini instead accented the fact that Fane portrayed the 
case of the Dove as unique as it had been retaken at sea. Rinuccini wrote that Fane had argued, “che il caso, 
in cui siamo, è affatto diverso da tutti gli altri, nei quali codesto Tribunale ha proceduto colla consegna 
anche dei Delinquenti stranieri nelle sue forze.” 
80 Rinuccini to Capponi, 20 September 1736, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 2262.   
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further protests from both Blasini and Fane when he had the gate of the British cemetery 
in Livorno broken open so that Hawes's body could be examined.81 
 For the Italians, cognizance of the case was essential to maintaining the grand 
duke's authority in his own domains; Rinuccini specifically ordered Capponi to proceed 
against Hawes's murderers in order to preserve the equal jurisdiction of the governor's 
tribunal over all nations at Livorno.82 Following the exhumation of Hawes's body, Fane 
acknowledged that the Tuscan government claimed jurisdiction over crimes “committed 
within Cannon Shot of Leghorn, on board of Merchants Ships,” but asserted that this 
“pretension” had always been contested.83 Although he highlighted the uncertain legal 
regime that existed in Livorno, the “cannon shot” did not, in fact, straightforwardly 
define the dominion over which the grand duke claimed to exercise jurisdiction. Instead, 
Capponi's defense of his authority over the case of the Dove reflects the ambiguity of 
what constituted “territorial waters.” According to the governor, the fact that Hawes's 
murder had taken place within the reach of Livorno's cannon confirmed the grand duke's 
jurisdiction, since the crime had taken place “nei Mari del Dominio” of the duke.84 As a 
precedent, Capponi cited a case from the previous summer, when the government of 
Naples had requested the extradition of a sailor who had committed a murder on board a 
                                                
81 Capponi to Rinuccini and the letter of Pier Francesco Blasini to Capponi, both of 24 September 1736, 
ASF Mediceo del Principato, 2262; Fane to Newcastle, Florence, 25 September 1736, TNA SP 98/36. 
82 “Si crede dunque, che per cercare di conservare il Diritto, e l'uguaglianza del contegno di codesto 
Tribunale con tutte le Nazioni, debba V.S. Illustrissima far sapere nuovamente a codesto Vice Console 
Blasini, che si contenti senza maggiore indugio di disporre quanto si conviene, perche codesti suoi Ministri 
possino andare senza alcuno ostacolo sulla Nave Inglese a fare la recognizioni, et esami convenienti,” 
Rinuccini to Capponi, Florence, 20 September 1736, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4216. 
83 Fane to Newcastle, Florence, 25 September 1736, TNA SP 98/36.  
84 Capponi to Rinuccini, Livorno, 21 September 1736, ASF Mediceo del Principato 2262. 
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Neapolitan tartan within Livorno's harbor. In response, Capponi had asserted that 
jurisdiction over a crime committed at sea did not depend upon the flag a ship flew, but 
fell to the prince “del Territorio adiacente” or to the ruler into whose port the ship first 
sailed after the commission of the crime.85 The fact that the crime had been committed in 
the port of Livorno put it squarely within the jurisdiction of the grand duke, but the 
theoretical limit of the grand duke's sovereign jurisdiction in this matter extended beyond 
the Tuscan harbor. 
 Capponi's arguments for jurisdiction over Hawes's murder revealed both the 
pervasive uncertainty that surrounded questions of maritime territoriality and the 
particular legal traditions that marked Italian views regarding oceanic sovereignty. The 
dukes of Tuscany did not claim dominion over a clearly defined tract of sea, but rather 
exercised jurisdiction over their coastal waters. Although the enforcement of quarantine 
regulations, the defense of the neutrality of Livorno, and the prosecution of crimes 
committed within that port all established the authority of the duke over coastal waters, 
they did so within different limits.86 Thus, the Tuscan jurist Lorenzo Maria Casaregi 
argued in 1740 that the “cannon shot” established the extent of the protection of a neutral 
prince to those waters immediately surrounding ports or fortified sites, while also arguing 
that princes held jurisdiction over all crimes committed within a distance of a hundred 
                                                
85 Capponi to Rinuccini, Livorno, 22 June 1736, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 2262. Capponi cited 
Vincentius de Franchis's opinion from Decisiones sacri regii consilii neapolitani (Venice, 1616) dec. 142, 
n. 6, that those who committed crimes at sea “debent puniri per eum, qui habet iurisdictione in Territorio 
adiaceti, & propinquiori, tanquam quod delictum fit in eius Territorio commissum.” 
86 On this point, see Andrea Addobbati, “Acque Territoriali: Modelli Dottrinari e Mediazoni Diplomatiche 
tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna,” in Frontiere di terra, frontiere di mare: La Toscana moderna nello spazio 
mediterraneo, ed. Elena Fasano Guarini and Paola Volpini (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2008), 191-192. 
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miles of their shores.87 Both Casaregi's opinion and Capponi's arguments for jurisdiction 
over the Neapolitan ship, and over the Dove, reflect the juridical tradition of the medieval 
jurist Bartolus, who asserted that princes possessed exclusive jurisdiction over waters 
adjacent to their domains up to a distance of one hundred miles.88 Casaregi further 
asserted that these expansive coastal waters constituted part of the territory of the prince 
whose state was adjacent to them.89 Capponi did not explicitly claim this expansive 
jurisdiction in his arguments or define how far the waters of the “Territorio adiacente” 
extended.  However if his own appeal to the “cannon shot” suggests a more limited view 
of Tuscany's territorial waters, he never straightforwardly confined Tuscan jurisdiction to 
                                                
87 Caseregi broadly asserted the jurisdiction of a prince over coastal waters: “Eandem prorsus 
Jurisdictionem, qua Princeps in Terrestri suo Territorio potitur, etiam habet in Mari edim suo Terrestri 
Territorio adjacente; Name totum illud Mare, quo suo Territorio usque ad centum milliaria,” Discursus 
legales de commercio (Venice, 1740), 2: 40, dis. 136. Conversely, with regards to the neutrality of 
territorial waters, “In hac quaestione principaliter ita distinguendum est: aut naves istae reperiuntur in mari 
Principis communis Amici intra centum milliaria, extra tamen illius portus, & praesidia, vel arces militares, 
& loca, in tali distantia, ut illuc tormenta mutalia, seu bellica adigi non valeant, & in isto casu praedictae 
naves hostile navigantes in dicto mari communis amici Principis molestari, & depraedari de Jure possune 
ab aliis navibus hostilibus,” ibid., 2: 171. Reflecting the broad acceptance of this principle among Italian 
states, the President of the Senate of Nice affirmed this claim to jurisdiction over cases occurring within a 
hundred miles of the coast in opposition to the jurisdictional claims of French consul at that port, see 
“Riflessioni del Conte Mellarerde Presidente Capo del Senato di Nizza sovra la Memoria della Corte di 
Francia concernenti i Privilegi, e la Girusidzione che la medesima desidera vengano accordati Console 
stabilito in Nizza,” AST Condato di Nizza, Consoli Stranieri, mazzo 2.   
88 For discussion of Bartolus's arguments regarding oceanic sovereignty and their importance for the 
development of ideas of maritime territoriality, see Percy Thomas Fenn, “Origins of the Theory of 
Territorial Waters,” The American Journal of International Law 20, no. 3 (July 1926), pp. 475-478; 
Addobbati, “Acque territoriali,” 179-180; Bottin, “Frontières et limites maritimes au xvie siècle,” 30-32.  
See also Thomas Wemyss Fulton, Sovereignty of the Seas (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1911), 
558-559; Wyndham Walker, “Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule,” British Yearbook of 
International Law 22 (1945): 224, 228. 
89 According to Casaregi, coastal waters up to a hundred miles from shore, “non minus reputatur suum 
proprium Territorium; quam tota Terra, in qua ipse regit, & dominatur,” Discursus legales de commercio, 
2: 40-41. The grand duke's maritime sovereignty was asserted not only through his jurisdiction over 
criminal matters, but also in his right to levy taxes on ships passing through these waters. Although this 
expansive sovereign claim seems to have lost its practical force by the eighteenth century, the grand dukes 
had exercised it in the previous century when they instituted and defended a tax on ships passing through a 
portion of their coastal waters, Franco Angiolini, “Sovranità sul mare ed acque territoriali. Una contesa tra 
granducato di Toscana, repubblica di Lucca e monarchia spagnola,” in Frontiere di terra, frontiere di mare, 
173-198. 
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that distance either.90 Although the extent of the jurisdictional sovereignty of princes over 
waters adjacent to their lands was thus uncertain, it nevertheless clearly overlapped and 
challenged the authority of the Admiralty over English navigation. 
 British officials responded to Tuscan claims of jurisdiction over the case of the 
Dove by arguing that the apprehension of Hawes's murderers on the high seas put their 
prosecution in the hands of the Admiralty. However, like their Tuscan counterparts, they 
did not accept that the location of Hawes's murder or the place where his murderers were 
intercepted established the limits of Admiralty authority. Instead, Fane and Blasini 
followed in the example of both their predecessors when they broadly contended that 
only the Admiralty ought to have cognizance of acts committed on board British ships.  
 As Capponi and Fane refused to concede that Livorno's harbor defined the limit of 
either Admiralty or grand ducal authority, they highlighted the degree to which claims to 
jurisdiction established rulers' sovereignty in the early-modern world.91 Tuscany's 
territorial waters were defined by the expanse of sea over which the grand dukes 
exercised jurisdiction; conversely, Admiralty jurisdiction over crimes committed upon or 
beyond the high seas extended the authority of the British Crown far beyond its territorial 
dominions.92 Sir Henry Penrice's opinion as to how the British government should 
proceed in the matter of the Dove illustrated the uncertain overlap of these different 
                                                
90 With regards to the murder committed on board the Neapolitan ship in June 1736, Capponi warned that if 
Naples was allowed to claim jurisdiction over the crime, other nations would demand the same prerogative 
over crimes commmitted “sopra tutte le Navi, ed altri Bastimenti, tanto esistenti alla Spiaggia, che dentro il 
Molo, e dentro l'istessa darsena,” Capponi to Rinuccini, Livorno, 22 June 1736, ASF Mediceo del 
Principato, 2262. Capponi appears then to admit that, for all practical purposes, the dukes of Tuscany no 
longer exercised as extensive a maritime sovereignty as they had claimed in the past. 
91 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: the Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989), 7. 
92 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 135-137. 
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avenues of sovereign authority. Penrice first acknowledged that although murder and 
piracy were crimes of universal jurisdiction, when they were committed within the harbor 
of a particular sovereign that ruler had proper authority to punish the offenders. Yet, if 
pirates escaped the port where they committed their offences, all princes and states 
possessed a “Competent Jurisdiction over them, for the good of mankind, & the benefit of 
all Princes & states who have Ships & Subjects at Sea,” since pirates were “Enemies of 
mankind in general.”93 The judge advocate of the Admiralty, George Paul was similarly 
asked whether the mutiny on board the Dove was “to be looked upon as committed on the 
high seas,” and whether, according to the Law of Nations, the guilty sailors ought to be 
tried in Britain. Paul argued that because the ship was apprehended “on the high and open 
Seas, out of the reach of the Great Dukes Cannon, by his Majestys Subjects,” the 
mutineers ought to be tried in Britain.94 Although the jurisdiction of the Admiralty was 
not coterminous with the “high seas,” locating a crime outside littoral waters denied other 
courts a competing claim to cognizance over it.95 It is thus telling that the indictment that 
was ultimately issued against the crew of the Dove for murder and piracy recounted that 
they committed their crimes, “upon the high Sea within the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty 
of England about half a League distant from Leghorn in Italy in parts beyond the Seas.”96 
                                                
93 Sir Henry Penrice, 25 October 1736, TNA ADM 1/3673, f. 469r-v. On the full legal and political 
significance of this understanding of sovereign jurisdiction over cases of piracy, see Heller-Roazen, The 
Enemy of All, passim. 
94 Paul wrote that is was customary for foreign princes to deliver up prisoners, see Paul to the Queen, 
Doctors Commons, 12 October 1736, TNA SP 98/84, f. 327r-329r. 
95 On the enduring ambiguity of what constituted the “high seas” for the purposes of Admiralty jurisdiction, 
see Glanville Williams, “Venue and the Ambit of Criminal Law,” 285-286, esp. n. 35. 
96 TNA HCA 1/19, f. 45r.  
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Two of the sailors onboard the Dove were eventually found guilty for Hawes's murder 
and they and another found guilty of piracy were hung in March 1737.97 
  The case of the Dove illustrated how the Admiralty's jurisdiction over piracy and 
crimes committed at sea carried the sovereign authority of the British state into the 
Mediterranean, just as it did into more distant oceanic bodies. In the process, assertions of 
Admiralty jurisdiction over the case of the Dove appeared to undermine the tenuous, and 
thus jealously guarded, sovereignty of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Italian officials were 
frank that they had little room to maneuver in the face of British power. Following the 
apprehension of Hawes's murderers, officers of the Spanish garrison at Livorno 
demanded that the deserters be returned to them for punishment.98 Rinuccini specifically 
ordered Capponi to refrain from involving the government in the reclamation of the 
deserters, no matter what arguments the Spanish might make to involve Tuscan 
authorities.99 Rinuccini further wrote to Capponi that the Spaniards had little reason to 
complain that the Tuscan government had not proceeded as strongly as they did in the 
earlier case of the Neapolitan tartan, since “the Spaniards themselves, so much stronger 
and more powerful than us, will probably refrain from using force on the English Ship in 
                                                
97 Statements of witnesses to murder of Hawes and seizure of the Dove were transcribed in, Select Trials at 
the Sessions-House in the Old-Bailey (London, 1742), 4: 203-254. The execution of these mariners was 
recorded in March edition of The London Magazine and Monthly Chronologer, vol. 6, 1737 (London: 
1737), 163-164. 
98 A Spanish garrison was installed in Livorno between 1731 in order to guarantee the sucession of the 
Infante Don Carlo to the grand duchy of Tuscany under the terms of the treaties of Seville of 1729 and of 
Vienna of 1731. The garrison remained in the city until 1737, when it was replaced by an Austrian force to 
secure the succession of Francesco Stefano, the duke of Lorraine, to the grand duchy.   
99 Rinuccini to Capponi, Florence, 20 September 1736, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 2262. 
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order to reclaim the aforesaid Deserters from their Ship of War.”100 After the Spanish 
forcibly removed the deserters from the British vessels, the Tuscan secretary of state, 
Giovanni Antonio Tornaquinci, commented that the British could have freed themselves 
and the Tuscans from much of the difficulties that followed the murder of Hawes if they 
had acted more quickly to remove the body and the murderers from Livorno.101   
 Conceptions of sovereignty as either territorially bounded or based on the 
relationship between the sovereign and the subject coexisted in early modern oceanic 
environments. While the apprehension of the Dove outside the port of Livorno allowed 
British jurists to assert Admiralty jurisdiction without concerning themselves with the 
competing claim of the grand duke, the fact that the case was one between subjects 
provided another avenue to assert that state's authority over the matter. When George 
Paul turned to the issue of whether the Spanish had any justification in their seizure of 
these sailors, he asserted that it had indeed been proper that they were detained on board 
British vessels, “being subjects to his Majesty” and having committed a crime “against 
Subject of His Majesty, and not against the Subjects of the Crown of Spain, or the Great 
Duke of Tuscany.”102 The authority of the state over its subjects was an organizing 
                                                
100 “Codesti Signori Spagnoli nel vedere, he si fà quanto si può, non dovrebbero con ragione punto dolersi, 
che non si pratichi in questo caso che fù praticato poco fà nell'altro della Tartana colla Bandiera del Rè 
delle due Sicilie, e non dovrebbero molto rilevare, che si sospende di adoprare la forza per farsi consegnare 
i delinquenti Inglesi, che si  trovano repartiti sopra le loro Navi in codesta spiaggia, poi ch egli stessi Signor 
Spagnoli tanto più grande e forti di noise asterranno probabilmente di usare la forza sulla Navi Inglesi per 
farsi restituire i pretesi Desertori della  loro Nave da Guerra,” Rinuccini to Capponi, Florence, 20 
September 1736, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 2262. 
101 Tornaquinci to Pucci, Florence, 28 September 1736, ASF Mediceo del Principato, 4731.   
102 George Paul to the Queen, Doctors Commons, 12 October 1736, TNA SP 98/84, f. 329r. 
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principle that cut across divisions between Europe and the wider world.103 The questions 
raised by jurisdictional disputes over British ships in coastal waters reveal that the 
Mediterranean was part of a broad process wherein the basis and extent of sovereignty 
was debated.104 
  
V.  The Mediterranean and the Caribbean 
 Jurisdictional disputes over crimes committed onboard British vessels in 
Mediterranean waters reveal the intersecting lines of sovereignty that shaped early 
modern oceanic space. They also illustrate the extent to which problems of legal authority 
at sea remained unresolved within Europe even as they were exported to the wider world. 
Cases like that of the Dove illustrate the temporally and geographically uneven process 
through which jurists defined the relationship between the sovereign rights vested in 
ships and those exercised over territorial waters. However, while problems of maritime 
sovereignty took different forms depending on the political conditions of different 
oceanic bodies, the issue of how rival lines of legal authority converged on board British 
vessels was a global problem. Within this context, rhetoric that linked national honor to 
the status and security of British navigation, most notably displayed in the Parliamentary 
debates leading up to the War of Jenkins' Ear, went beyond political ideology.105 Concern 
for the “honour of the British colours” raised questions as to who could exercise legal 
                                                
103 On this point, see Paul Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 2010), 259-267. 
104 Cf. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 128-129 
105 Cf. Kathleen Wilson, “Empire, Trade, and Popular Politics in Mid-Havonerian Britain: The Case of 
Admiral Vernon,” Past and Present, no. 121 (November 1988): 74-109 and Brendan Simms, Three 
Victories and a Defeat, chap. 10, “The Colonial Mirage, 1737-1739.” 
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authority over British vessels and where they could exercise such jurisdiction. Attempts 
to resolve these questions provide another means to consider how the Mediterranean fit 
within Britain's maritime expansion. 
 The case of the Dove revolved as much around the privileges to be accorded 
British ships in port of Livorno as in upholding Admiralty jurisdiction over those vessels.  
Following the apprehension of the Dove and Hawes's murderers outside the harbor of 
Livorno, officers from the Spanish garrison occupying Livorno under the provisions of 
the Treaty of Seville demanded that the Irish deserters be turned over to them for 
punishment. Two days after the murder of Hawes, troops from the Spanish garrison at 
Livorno boarded the ship holding the prisoners and carried away the deserters.106 Though 
Tuscan officials took care to avoid involving themselves in such a contentious matter, 
Charles Fane reported that the forcible removal of the deserters by Spanish troops was 
looked upon as an “Act of violence” at Livorno, a port where “the Colours even on 
merchant ships” had been “hitherto respected.”107 Both Henry Penrice and George Paul 
denounced the Spanish behavior, though Penrice concentrated on the violation of the 
security of Livorno, rather than on the perceived affront to English navigation.108  
Meanwhile, Capponi's intervention in the case and the exhumation of Hawes's body led 
Fane to complain that Tuscan officials “have not acted with all the moderation, & Regard 
                                                
106 The “status of forces agreement” which regulated this military presence specifically ordered the Spanish 
commander to defend the sovereignty of the grand duke and to refrain from interfering “mai punto del 
Governo Civile, Economico, Politico, e Mercantile della Città, e delle Cose della Sanità,” TNA SP 
108/498. Following a complaint lodged by the English ambassador in Madrid, the sailors were eventually 
turned over to the British, Keene to de la Quadra, Escurial, 16 November 1736, TNA SP 94/126 and Fane 
to Newcastle, Florence, 25 December 1736, TNA SP 98/36. 
107 Fane to Walpole, Florence, 22 September 1736, TNA SP 98/36, also in BL Add. MS 73987, f. 239r-
239v.  
108 Penrice, Doctors Commons, 25 October 1736, TNA ADM 1/3673, f. 469v. 
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due to the most considerable and most to be respected maritime power in the world.”109 
Like his contemporaries who complained of Spanish “depredations” in the Caribbean, 
Fane was sensitive to the treatment accorded British ships and to the particular 
importance of navigation for Britain's strength and reputation. In the Mediterranean, as in 
the Atlantic, the honor of British navigation frequently appeared imperiled by the legal 
and sovereign claims of other states. 
 The status of British navigation on the high seas became even more pressing in 
the eighteenth century in the context of the Anglo-Spanish maritime disputes that led to 
the War of Jenkins' Ear in 1739. Historians have focused on how the search and seizure 
of British vessels by the ships of the guardacosta reflected early modern empires' 
competition to control trade routes and oceanic corridors, but this approach also treats 
both the Anglo-Spanish confrontation and eighteenth-century tensions over British 
navigation within a specifically Caribbean perspective.110 In 1739, William Pulteney 
responded to Sir Robert Walpole's warnings that a war with Spain would disrupt English 
trade to the Mediterranean by noting that in that ocean, “as well as the American seas, the 
Spaniards have of late begun to make more free with the British flag, than ever they, or 
any other nation, durst do in time past.”111 It is not clear which incidents Pulteney had in 
                                                
109 Fane to Walpole, Florence, 29 September 1736, TNA SP 98/36; also in BL Add. MS 73987, f. 243v. 
110 On sea routes and sovereignty Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, p. 152.  See also Richard Pares, War 
and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 23-24, 34-38 and Woodfine, 
Britannia's Glories: The Walpole Ministry and the 1739 War with Spain (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press), 
137-138. 
111 Cobbett, The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803 (London: T. 
C. Hansard, 1806-1820), vol. 10, column 678. Pulteney warned that if the Spanish were allowed to 
continue their “depredations” in the Caribbean, “the same pretences may be set up for searching and seizing 
our ships in the Mediterranean, Bay of Biscay, and African Seas...nay, I am convinced, Spain or some other 
of our neighbours, will soon set up the same pretences for ruining out trade in the East Indies,” in ibid., 
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mind when he spoke of Spanish abuses in the Mediterranean, but the case of the Dove 
was just one that pointed to the vulnerability of British navigation in that sea.  Spanish 
forces at Livorno had previously stopped a British ship freighted with powder from 
leaving Livorno and there were periodic reports that corsairs carrying Spanish 
commissions planned to stop and search British vessels.112 More importantly, underlying 
the rhetoric about the honor of the British flag that surrounded debates on the actions of 
the guardacosta were broader questions about law and sovereignty at sea that illustrated 
the continuities and differences between the trading regimes of the Mediterranean and 
Atlantic.  
 Central to both Anglo-Spanish negotiations over the actions of the guardacostas 
and Parliamentary debates over navigation in the Caribbean was the question of whether 
the Atlantic and Mediterranean occupied the same regulatory sphere. Specifically, it was 
uncertain if the treaties between England and Spain of 1667 and 1670 distinguished 
European and American waters. 113 The treaty of 1667 permitted the Spanish to board 
British vessels at sea in order to ascertain their identity and cargo, a provision intended to 
                                                
column 686. On the Mediterranean dimension of the War of Jenkins' Ear, see Richard Harding, The 
Emergence of Britain's Global Naval Supremacy (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2010), 65-78, 129-139. 
112 A year before the affair of the Dove, an English ship sailing out of Livorno with a load of powder 
freighted by a Dutch merchant was stopped by Spanish officers, in apparent violation of their agreement to 
not interfere with the freedom of the port's trade, Fane to Newcastle, Florence, 14 August 1735, TNA SP 
98/36. Brinley Skinner reported from Livorno in 1724 that a Spanish privateer that sailed into Porto Ferraio 
with a dozen English sailors on board carried commission that called for it to visit ships of all colors to 
search for Jewish goods.  The ship's French prize was restored to its master, but Skinner feared it would 
have proceeded against English shipping as readily as French, Skinner to Carteret, Livorno, 21 January 
1724 and 25 February 1724, BL Add. MS 41504, ff. 1v-2r. In September 1733, it was reported that the 
British vice-consul at Malta had been warned that the commander of a Spanish man-of-war had announced 
he had orders to search ships of all nations for Ottoman passengers and cargo, John Edwards to Charles 
Delafaye, London, 20 September 1733, TNA SP 97/56, f. 197r-v. 
113 Woodfine, Britannia's Glories, 110.  See also Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 29-33. 
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prohibit British trade in contraband goods with the North African regencies. However, 
the articles also established strict guidelines for this procedure and specified that only the 
illegal goods could be seized. The Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1670, on the other hand, 
specifically focused on the Americas and had no provisions for or restrictions on 
searching vessels. Notably, while both ministers and opposition figures insisted on the 
freedom of British navigation on the high seas, they conceded Spanish officials' right to 
search vessels within the ports and harbors of that country's American empire, since these 
were clearly under the dominion of the king of Spain. Even Pulteney agreed that a nation 
might forbid foreign vessels from entering  “the ports, havens, or creeks, within their 
dominions, because in these they may have an absolute property,” though it could not 
pretend to interrupt traffick upon the open seas, where no state held such dominion.114 At 
issue was how far out to sea the British acknowledged foreign sovereignty. 
 The question of whether Spain's enduring claim to sovereignty over American 
waters allowed it to search British vessels for contraband had Mediterranean echoes.  
Although treaties with the North African regencies provided that Admiralty passes 
safeguarded passengers and goods on board ships, the rulers of both Monaco and Savoy 
continued to exact the maritime duties on ships passing their coastlines that English and 
French ministers periodically labeled “piratical.”115 While the close alliance between 
                                                
114 Cobbett, The Parliamentary History, vol. 10, column 683. Newcastle instructed Keene in April 1738 to 
insist on the freedom of navigation of British ships on the high seas and that they were to be searched only 
when in Spanish ports, Philip Woodfine, Britannia's Glories, p. 143. The merchants' petition of 11 October 
1737, which called for the ministry to ensure “That no British Vessels be detained or Searched on the High 
Seas by any Nations, under any pretence whatsoever,” appears in Woodfine, Britannia's Glories, p. 245.  
The Craftsman on 30 Dec. 1738 called for the freedom of ships from search, even if “but a Cable's Length 
from the French or Spanish Ports,” p. 186. 
115 M.S. Anderson's “Britain and the Barbary States in the eighteenth century,” Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical Research, 29, no. 79 (May 1956): 87-107 
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Britain and Savoy during and following the War of the Spanish Succession had resulted 
in a de facto exemption of English vessels from the duty of Villafranca, ships were 
occasionally arrested for non-payment.116 In 1749 and in preparation for negotiations 
with France on the commutation of the duty levied on French vessels, the court of Turin 
sought to improve its bargaining position by insisting on British payment of the duty.  
Following the apprehension of several British vessels in the late 1740's and early 1750's, 
Britain followed France's example and commuted the duty for a one-time payment of 
£4000. Lord Rochford, the ambassador to Savoy, refused to concede British liability for 
the tax, but advised that it appeared worthwhile to settle the whole matter for a “meer 
trifle.”117 By this means, the rulers of Savoy maintained their claim to sovereignty over 
Savoy's coastal waters, but absolved themselves of the political and diplomatic 
controversies that followed on enforcing that claim. Meanwhile, the growth of British 
naval power induced the Prince of Monaco to refrain from interfering with English 
navigation.  In 1766, Horace Mann reported that an agent of the Prince of Monaco 
assured him that no efforts would be made to exact the duty from British, French or 
                                                
116 In the seventeenth century, English vessels enjoyed partial immunity from this duty thanks to the 
privileges extended to that nation by the Savoyard decree of 1627 and by the Treaty of Florence of 1669.  
At the end of the seventeenth century, the farmers of the duty of Villafranca arrested British vessels that 
failed to pay, reflecting the Savoyard view that Finch's Treaty of Florence, which had freed English vessels 
from the duty, had fallen into obsolesence.  In the first half of the eighteenth century, the handful of British 
vessels that were arrested for non-payment were released on the intervention of Britain's representatives, 
Michel Bottin, “Le Droit de Villefranche,” 147-151; G.W. Rice, “British Consuls and Diplomats in the 
Mid-Eighteentcnth Century: An Italian Example,” The English Historical Review 92, no. 365 (October 
1977), 840. 
117 France paid 1,4000,000 livres to settle the duty in 1753, G.W. Rice, “British Consuls and Diplomats in 
the Mid-Eighteentcnth Century,” 842-843.  See also Luca Lo Basso, In traccia de’ legni nemici: corsari 
europei nel Mediterraneo del Settecento (Ventimiglia: Philobiblon Edizioni, 2002), 67. 
  299 
! !
Dutch vessels, “as they were Powers too great to risk offending.”118 The slow and uneven 
process by which even minor principalities surrendered their claims to jurisdiction over 
British vessels passing their coasts nevertheless also revealed the enduring ability of 
foreign states to shape the legal and political environments through which British vessels 
sailed. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 As ships carried the authority of the Crown and of Admiralty courts throughout 
the Mediterranean, they became sites where the expansion of the British state collided 
with the sovereignty of other polities. As a result, ships also became sites where the 
sovereign and legal regimes of the Mediterranean were redefined and negotiated.  By the 
end of the eighteenth century, the status of British vessels in Mediterranean waters 
appears to have become more stable. When the mate of a merchant ship sitting in 
Livorno's harbor was murdered in May 1751, the British consul had the murderer 
immediately transferred to a man of war in the port, in the event the Livornese 
government should decide to take cognizance of the matter.119 Yet, as the states of the 
western Mediterranean surrendered their more expansive claims to maritime sovereignty, 
the British increasingly conceded jurisdiction over crimes committed in territorial waters.  
Following a murder committed on board a British ship in Venice's harbor two decades 
later, Sir James Marriot was asked for his opinion on where authority lay to prosecute 
                                                
118 Mann to the Earl of Shelburne, Florence, 22 November 1766, TNA SP 98/71, f. 258r; John Dick to 
Shelburne, Livorno, 21 November 1766, TNA SP 98/71, f. 255r.   
119 Goldsworthy to Bedford, Livorno, 9 May 1751, TNA SP 98/55, f. 214r-v. 
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such crimes. Marriot argued that felonies committed within “any port, river, creek, or 
haven of the territory of any foreign power, those crimes do then fall under that particular 
local and territorial jurisdiction,” because “the power of punishment is always equal to 
and coincident with and inseparable from the power of protection.”120   
 Marriot's verdict testified to increasing agreement among jurists in the late 
eighteenth century as to where judicial authority lay at sea. However, this growing 
consensus, which would itself be partially upended by revolution and imperial 
competition at the end of the eighteenth century, was not simply part of a larger teleology 
of territorial state formation within Europe.  In 1760, the Lords Commissions for Appeals 
overturned the condemnation of a French ship taken near Hispaniola on account of its 
being seized within a neutral Spanish port.121 The recognition of sovereigns' claims over 
territorial waters was a global process that defied both contemporary and modern ideas 
that distinct legal regimes differentiated Europe from the wider world. As the case of the 
Dove and parallel incidents illustrate, uncertain and uneven sovereignty characterized 
maritime space within Europe as much as it did throughout the Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans. 
                                                
120 Report by Sir James Marriot, undated, in William Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law 
and Various Points of English Jurisprudence... (London: Stevens & Haynes, 1869), 217.  Also quoted in 
Prichard and Yale, “Introduction,” ccvii.  Marriot’s opinion was written in reference to a letter from Sir 
James Wright, who was the English resident at Venice between 1765 and 1773. 
121 Reginald Marsden, ed., Reports of Cases Determined by the High Court of Admiralty and upon Appeal 
therefrom...  (London: W. Clowes and Sons, Limited, 1885), 175. Conversely, in 1812, Sir William Scott 
ruled that the Admiralty had jurisdiction over a crime comitted in a Cuban harbor and parallel decisions 
through the nineteenth century affirmed the Admiralty's authority over crimes committed oboard British 
vessels, see Prichard and Yale, “Introduction,” ccvii-ccviii. 
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Chapter 6: 
 
“The Waters of the Exalted State”: 
 Ottoman Sovereignty and British Jurisdiction in the Levant, 1744-1748 
  
 
Upon the whole, these seem very new & 
lofty Ideas of the Porte, (if they are her 
own), first pretending to shut up her 
Seas, & next in this Scheme of 
preaching up Peace to the any 
contenting Princes of Christendom, 
which seems a Supplement to the other; 
but I much doubt whether they are now 
in any Condition to work Effects 
answerable to such magnificent Settings 
forth.1 
 
 
 Imagined boundaries of maritime sovereignty and diverse avenues of 
jurisdictional authority demarcated and crisscrossed the waters of the early modern 
Mediterranean. The Mediterranean was also a sea whose political and legal geography 
was substantially defined by extra-European polities. Through the eighteenth century, 
Britain depended on Morocco and the North African regencies to provision its garrisons 
at Gibraltar and Minorca and treaties with those Muslim powers shaped the regulation of 
British navigation in that sea.2 Muslim powers were not, however, simply auxiliaries to 
the development of a British empire in the Mediterranean. As the Ottoman government 
sought to secure its subjects and their trade from the effects of the War of the Austrian 
Succession, it affirmed and expanded its claims to sovereignty over Levantine waters. 
                                                
1 Stanhope Aspinwall to the Duke of Newcastle, Constantinople, 1 February 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 171r. 
2 On the importance of Morocco and the regencies for sustaining Britain’s strategic position in the 
Mediterranean, see Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600-1850 (New York: 
Anchor Books, 2004), 70-72 and Nabil Matar, “Islam in Britain, 1689-1750,” Journal of British Studies 47, 
no. 2 (April 2008): 290-293. 
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Moreover, in the face of a conflict that anticipated the global expansion of the British 
Empire in the following decades, Ottoman efforts to protect Levantine trade revealed that 
European empires were not alone in their pretensions towards oceanic sovereignty.3 Yet 
these efforts largely marked the end of an era during which European and Muslim polities 
equally shaped the Mediterranean world.  
 The Ottoman reaction to the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession 
highlighted the extent to which the interaction of various sovereign and jurisdictional 
authorities continued to define the legal and political environment of the Mediterranean. 
It also illustrated the efforts of members of the Ottoman political elite to adapt to 
changing eighteenth-century political conditions, as increasingly powerful and aggressive 
European rivals confronted the Ottoman Empire.4 European warfare that became 
increasingly global in scope in the eighteenth century threatened to disrupt Ottoman trade 
and the commercial arteries that sustained Constantinople.5  In response to the threat that 
Anglo-French naval warfare posed to the Ottoman economy, the Porte forbade belligerent 
vessels from attacking one another in the eastern Mediterranean and subsequently 
                                                
3 For a summary of British naval activity during the 1740’s and an excellent analysis of its political and 
strategic significance, see N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-
1815 (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 236-256.  See also, Richard Harding, The Emergence of Britain's Global 
Naval Supremacy: The War of 1739-1748 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2010). On the impact of 
English corsairs on French navigation in the Levant, see Paul Masson, Histoire du Commerce Français 
dans le Levant au XVIIIe Siècle, (Paris: Librairie Hachette  & Cie, 1911). 
4 On Ottoman adaptation to a changing strategic and geopolitical situation in the later half of the eighteenth 
century, see Virginia Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995) and eadem., Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts (Istanbul: Isis 
Press, 2004). 
5 On British privateering in the Mediterranean in the mid-eighteenth century, see, Jean Pierre Filippini, Il 
porto di Livorno e la Toscana (1676-1814) (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1998), 2: 215-244; 
Daniel Panzac, La caravane maritime: Marins européens et marchands ottomans en Méditerranée (1680-
1830) (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2004), 79-83. 
  303 
! !
proposed to mediate an end to the War of the Austrian Succession. Both these measures 
were significant political and diplomatic innovations for the Ottoman Empire. Although 
the Porte had previously ordered European vessels to refrain from combat in the Aegean, 
in 1744 it dramatically extended the limit of the waters over which it claimed 
sovereignty. Equally, the Ottoman government's effort to bring the War of the Austrian 
Succession to a close revealed the increasingly close connections that were drawing the 
empire deeper into the European diplomatic world. 
 The inability of the Ottoman Empire to enforce its claims to sovereignty over the 
Levant or to secure those waters from the effects of European warfare nevertheless points 
to the changing political conditions of the Mediterranean. As had been the case during the 
wars against Louis XIV, Ottoman efforts to establish the empire’s sovereignty over 
Levantine waters intersected with the Admiralty’s claim to jurisdiction over British 
warships and privateers and over any prizes they might capture. By holding England's 
Levant merchants responsible for the losses its subjects sustained at the hands of British 
privateers, the Ottoman Empire continued to define the legal conditions of trade and 
navigation in the Levant. Yet British naval power and jurisdictional authority in the 
Mediterranean also grew in tandem during this period. British ministers and jurists 
insisted that it was the sole responsibility of the High Court of Admiralty to adjudicate 
Ottoman complaints regarding the actions of privateers. As a result, the Admiralty 
became increasingly central to the legal organization of Levantine navigation. 
 Although the Mediterranean remained a legally pluralistic arena, by the mid-
eighteenth century the balance of power in that sea was in the midst of a profound 
transformation. It would be another fifty years before the Levant factored into Britain’s 
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own imperial ambitions; however, Ottoman defeats at the hands of Russia in the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century began the process that, for European diplomats, reduced 
the empire's significance to “the Eastern Question.”6 The War of the Austrian Succession 
marked a key moment in the history of Britain’s involvement in the early modern 
Mediterranean. In response to this conflict, the Ottoman Empire attempted to reestablish 
its dominance over the eastern Mediterranean. While that empire continued to shape the 
political environment in which British vessels sailed, Europe’s maritime powers 
nonetheless increasingly dominated Mediterranean waters.   
 
I.  Ottoman Maritime Sovereignty in the War of the Austrian Succession 
  Ottoman efforts to maintain the security of Levantine trade in the face of 
European wars led that empire to expand its claims to sovereignty over eastern 
Mediterranean waters. In early 1744, mutual declarations of war between Britain and 
France raised the prospect that British privateers would again descend into the eastern 
Mediterranean and disrupt the French navigation upon which Ottoman maritime trade 
substantially depended. Ottoman ministers responded to the threat that European warfare 
would spill over into the Levant much as their predecessors had done during the wars 
against Louis XIV. As before, the Ottoman government asserted the empire's intention to 
preserve the peace and security of its waters and sought to establish maritime boundaries 
                                                
6 For a summary of Ottoman relations with Europe in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, see 
Christoph K. Neuman, “Political and Diplomatic Developments” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 
3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 57-58. For Britain's relationship to the Ottoman Empire at the end of the eighteenth century, see 
Allan Cunningham, Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution, ed. Edward Ingram (London: 
Frank Cass & Co., 1993). 
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within which belligerents were to refrain from hostile acts.7 The empire's ensuing efforts 
to prevent foreign combat in the eastern Mediterranean revealed the unsustainability of its 
sovereignty over those waters, but also demonstrated its continuing ability to shape the 
legal environment through which British vessels sailed. 
 As the War of the Austrian Succession escalated to incorporate war between 
France and Britain, the Ottoman government moved to limit its effects on Ottoman 
subjects and their trade by forbidding the warring powers from engaging in hostile acts in 
Levantine waters. In May 1744, the various European ambassadors and representatives in 
Istanbul were summoned to meet individually with the Grand Vizir, Seyyid Hasan Pasha, 
the diplomatically experienced Reisülkülttab or “Reis Efendi,” Tavukçubaşı Mustafa 
Efendi, and other senior Ottoman ministers.8 The Venetian ambassador, Zuanne Donado, 
left a detailed account of his meeting with the Ottoman officials. The Grand Vizir opened 
the interview by stating that in order to ensure that the escalation of warfare in Europe did 
not harm either Ottoman subjects trading by sea or the customs revenues of the empire, 
the Ottoman government had decided to forbid belligerents from committing hostile acts 
within Ottoman waters. Then, as Donado related: 
                                                
7 The Ottoman effort to establish the neutrality of Levantine waters in response to the escalation of the War 
of the Austrian Succession has received little attention from scholars and has been approached as a peculiar 
incident within Ottoman-European interactions, without consideration of its legal or ideological 
ramifications.  See Joseph Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, vol. 15, 1739-
1757 (Paris, 1835), 79-80; A. C. Wood, “The English Embassy at Constantinople, 1660-1762,” The English 
Historical Review 40, no. 160 (October 1925), 555; Ismail Hakki Uzunçarsili, Osmanli Tarihi, vol. 4, pt. 2, 
XVIII yüzyil (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1995), 584-585; Virginia Aksan, “Ottoman-French 
Relations, 1739-1768,” in Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History, ed. Sinan Kuneralp (Istanbul: The Isis 
Press, 1987), 50-51; Maria Pia Pedani, Dalla frontiera al confine (Venice: Herder Editrice, 2002), 87  and 
idem, “Some Remarks upon the Ottoman Geo-Political Vision of the Mediterranean in the Period of the 
Cyprus War (1570-1573),” in Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West, ed. Colin Imber, 
Keiko Kiyotaki and Rhoads Murphey (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 2:30. 
8 For background on the Reis Efendi Tavukçubaşı Mustafa, see Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and 
Peace, 25.   
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He [Mustafa Efendi] then revealed two papers, the one a printed map and the 
other a manuscript, which was the minute of the aforesaid project.  On the first 
paper, on which was delineated the Ottoman Empire in Europe with all the seas 
that washed it, he showed me that the Porte wanted to establish limits in the Sea 
itself, within which the belligerent Powers were not to commit hostilities, but to 
navigate freely, and trade without danger.  On the map was a Straight Line, 
indicating the ideal limit, which began at the Gulf of Arta [on the western coast of 
Greece, north of the Peloponnese], and ended on the coast of Africa, somewhat to 
the east of the sands of Barbary.9 
 
The Reis Efendi then presented the ambassador with a copy of a letter given to all the 
European diplomats in Istanbul, which recounted that in previous European wars 
Ottoman merchants had sustained losses when they freighted the ships of belligerents and 
that it was feared that war in Europe would again provide corsairs with an opportunity to 
prey on Ottoman subjects. Consequently, in the face of the outbreak of war in Europe and 
in order to preserve the security of trade, the Ottoman emperor would forbid belligerents 
from engaging in any hostilities “in the waters belonging to his guarded Dominions, & in 
Places under his Jurisdiction,” (memalik-i mahrusa sularında ve tabı olan yerlerde). Any 
ships which engaged in hostile acts within the established boundaries would be seized 
and their crews condemned to the galleys. Moreover, the ambassadors of the different 
nations would be held accountable for any losses inflicted on Ottoman subjects by 
                                                
9 “Sfodrò all'ora due Carte, l'una Geografica à stampa l'altra scritta, ch'era la minuta del progetto predetto.  
Nella prima Carta, in cui stava delineato lo stato Ottomano di Europa con tutti li Mari, che lo bagnano mi 
fece osservare, che dalla Porta volevano stabilirsi confini nel Mare stesso, dentro da quali le Potenze 
belligeranti non potessero commettere ostilità , má navigare liberamente, et esercitare li loro traffici senza 
pericolo.  Stava sopra il dissegno una Linea Retta, indicante l'ideale confine, che aveva il principio alla 
punta del Golfo dell'Arta, et il fine alle spiaggie di Africa, in poca distanza verso l'oriente dalle secche di 
Barbaria,” Zuanne Donado, Pera, 27 May 1744, ASV Dispacci dagli Ambasciatori Veneti da 
Constantinopoli, 199, f. 21r-v.  The British and French representatives at the port reported similar 
interviews, Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 18 May 1744 (OS), contained in letter of 12 May 
1744, TNA SP 97/32, f. 81v-84r and Castellane, Constantinople, 23 May 1744, AN AE B/1/421. 
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privateers of their nation. The ambassadors were then asked to dispatch the letter to their 
respective sovereigns for consideration and ratification.10 
 The project to establish the security of the waters of the eastern Mediterranean 
expanded on a long history of Ottoman claims to a maritime empire. After the conquest 
of Constantinople, Ottoman sultans had styled themselves as “Sovereign of the Two Seas 
[the Mediterranean and the Black Sea],” and the sixteenth-century Ottoman expansion in 
the Mediterranean and into the Indian Ocean led to even broader professions of oceanic 
sovereignty.11 After the expansion of the Ottoman sea-borne empire came to a halt in the 
late sixteenth century, both Ottoman ministers and European observers ascribed to the 
empire sovereignty over the Aegean.12 During the War of the League of Augsburg and 
again during both the Wars of the Spanish Succession and of the Polish Succession, the 
Ottomans exercised that sovereignty when they forbade the belligerents from fighting 
within the Aegean.13 In 1744, the French ambassador, Michel-Ange de Castellane, saw 
                                                
10 A copy of the Ottoman original, together with a French translation, is in AN AE B/1/421.  I use the 
contemporary English translation, which closely follows the Ottoman.  The English translations of the 
Ottoman document, together with an Italian translations, may be found in TNA SP 97/32, f. 89r-92r and 
86r-88r, respectively.   
11 On Ottoman claims to sovereignty over the Mediterranean, see Franz Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror 
and his Time, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 416; Halil Inalcik, The 
Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600, trans. Norman Itzkowtiz and Colin Imber (London: 
Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1973), 29.  On Ottoman control and regulation of trade into and on the Black Sea, 
see Halil Inalcik, “The Question of the Closing of the Black Sea under the Ottomans,” Archeion Pontou 35 
(1979): 74-110.  For sixteenth century assertions of Ottoman oceanic sovereignty, see Giancarlo Casale, 
The Ottoman Age of Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 199. 
12 John Selden, Of the Dominion, or, Owernship of the Sea, trans. Marchamont Nedham (London, 1652), 
119-120.   
13 On Ottoman declarations of the neutrality of the Aegean during the Wars of the League of Augsburg and 
of the Spanish Succession, see above chapter four.  A French translations of a Ottoman order issued at the 
outbreak of the War of the Polish Succession, in 1734, forbidding the French and Austrians from 
commiting any hostilities “dans toute l'etendüe de cette parte de mer qui est en deça du Cerigo,” may be 
found with Castellane's letter of 27 May 1744, AN AE B/I/421. 
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the annual voyage of the Kapudan Pasha to the Aegean islands as a means to prevent 
hostilities between belligerents in those waters, “which the grand signore claims belong 
to him from Constantinople to Cerigo and over which he pretends a right of sovereignty, 
comparable to that which the Venetians wish to claim over the Adriatic Sea.”14   
 Ottoman efforts to establish borders and limits in the eastern Mediterranean 
suggested, however, that their conceptions of maritime sovereignty were at once fluid and 
littoral.15 The limits on European naval warfare established by Ottoman ministers during 
wars of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries ran through the islands of the 
Aegean; in 1704, the English ambassador Sir Robert Sutton described the limit 
established during the War of the League of Augsburg as a “line” drawn “acrosse from 
the Asia shore to Samos, thence to Icaria, & forward to Andros & so to Negropont.”16 It 
was this insular dimension that defined Ottoman sovereignty over the waters of the 
Aegean. In addition, an Ottoman order of 1720 prohibited North African corsairs from 
attacking Venetian ships within a thirty-mile band along the Ottoman coast.17 Although 
the Ottomans thus had a long history of establishing “limits in the sea” or “limits on the 
                                                
14 “...que le grand seiguer pretend luy appartenir de puis Constantinople jusques au Cérigo et dan les quelles 
il affeits un droit de souverainete, semblable a celuy que les Venitiens vouloient s'attribuer dans la mer 
Adriatique, Castellane, Constantinople, 12 May 1744, AN AE B/1/421. Aspinwall reported rumors that the 
Kapudan Pasha's commission included order to the effect of “preserving the Tranquility of the Ottoman 
Seas” in the even of hostilities between English and French vessels, Aspinwall to Newcastle, 12 May 1744, 
TNA SP 97/32, f. 79r-v. 
15 Molly Greene, “The Ottomans in the Mediterranean,” in The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the 
Empire, ed. Daniel Goffman and Virginia Aksen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 104-
116. 
16 Robert Sutton, Pera, 8 November 1704, TNA SP 97/21, f. 182r. 
17 Pedani, Dallan frontiera al confine, 83-84; Andrew C. Hess, “The Forgotten Frontier: The Ottoman 
North African Provinces during the Eighteenth Century,” in Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, 
ed. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1977), 79. 
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surface of the sea” (deryada hudud and ruy-i deryada hudud), these maritime boundaries 
aimed at the control of insular and littoral space.18 Moreover, despite equally extensive 
Ottoman experience in the negotiation and physical demarcation of terrestrial borders, 
cartographers rarely illustrated linear political boundaries in favor of depicting vaguely 
defined frontier zones.19 Drawing a line on a map to create a border in the sea was thus a 
highly innovative way to represent Ottoman maritime sovereignty. 
 When Ottoman ministers drew a straight line through open seas to prohibit 
European vessels from engaging in hostile acts in the Levant, they established a “sea-
border” in what had historically been a frontier space.20 In the process, they 
reconceptualized the empire's relationship to maritime space. The prohibition on 
European naval warfare in the eastern Mediterranean of 1744 appears to be among the 
earliest examples, and perhaps the first, of a specific expression for “Ottoman waters” (in 
the expressions memalik-i mahrusa suları and devlet-i aliyye suları) and consequently 
suggests a more assertive claim to sovereignty over maritime space than the empire had 
                                                
18 The order of March 1698 from the Sultan to the Kapudan Pasha and to the kadi at Smyrna repealing the 
maritime limits of 1696 speaks of “deryada hudud tayyin olunup” or “constituere limiti in Mare,” TNA SP 
105/334, f. 31v, 32r.  
19 In this respect, however, they did not differ entirely from their European counterparts, who often also 
used fortresses, rather than linear boundaries, to define frontiers.  On the representation of political space 
on Ottoman maps, see Brummet, “Imagining the Early Modern Ottoman Space, from World History to Piri 
Reis,” in The Early Modern Ottomans, 50-54; eadem., “The Fortress, Defining and Mapping the Ottoman 
Frontier in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in The Frontiers of the Ottoman World, ed. A. C. S. 
Peacock (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 2009), 31-56.  On the demarcation of 
Ottoman frontiers, see Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, (15th-18th Century): 
An Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and Other Documents (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 57-67; Pedani, Dalla 
frontiera al confine, 42-46;  Palmira Brummett, “Imagining the Early Modern Ottoman Space,” 24-26.   
20 Pedani, “Some Remarks upon the Ottoman Geo-Political Vision of the Mediterranean,” 30. 
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yet made.21 The letter given to the European representatives during their audience with 
the Grand Vizir confirmed the extent of Ottoman sovereignty over Levantine waters 
when it prohibited ships from approaching “the islands which are located in the waters of 
the exalted state to the east of the line or the open seas or the coasts of Rumeli and 
Arabia” (o khatin sharqina vaqi devlet-i aliyye sularında bulunan bilcümle cezirelere ve 
açık enginlere ve rumeli ve arabistan qıyılarına).  Ottoman sovereignty thus did not 
simply cross the sea with ships and imperial orders; instead, it was vested in the sea 
itself.22 European observers certainly thought the Ottoman proposal would expand that 
empire's maritime sovereignty, as when the French Secretary of State for the Marine, the 
Comte de Maurepas, told the Venetian ambassador in Paris that the project appeared to 
be designed to give the Porte “il Dominio del Mare in que' limiti.”23  
 The source of this new conception of Ottoman maritime sovereignty is unclear. 
Both Donado and the acting British agent at Istanbul, Stanhope Aspinwall, suspected that 
the French were behind the Ottoman proposal, which would naturally favor that nation, 
whose ships dominated the rich coastal trade that formed a lifeline between Istanbul and 
the rest of the Ottoman Empire. 24 Their suspicions particularly fell onto the French 
                                                
21 See the copy of the Ottoman document in, AN AE B/1/421.  See also, İdris Bostan, “Osmanlılarda Deniz 
Sınıri ve Karasuları Meselesi,” in Türkler ve Deniz, ed. Özlem Kumrular (Istanbul: Kitap Yayinevi, 2007), 
38-39. Bostan refers to the use of these expressions in documents dated to 1745.  
22 Cf. Brummett, “Imagining the early modern Ottoman space,” 48. 
23 Corner to Senate, Paris, 13 August, 1744, ASV Dispacci dagli Ambasciatori Veneti da Francia, 235, f. 
76r-v. 
24 According to Aspinwall, for every one English ship taken in the Levant, forty French ships would likely 
be captured, Aspinwall to Newcastle, 12 May 1744, TNA SP 97/32, f. 80v. Aspinwall was the chancellor of 
the British embassy at Constantinople and was chargé d'affaires between 1742 and 1746, in the absence of 
the official ambassador, Edward Fawkener. 
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military adventurer turned Ottoman pasha, Claude Alexandre de Bonneval.25  In fact, 
although he acknowledged that it favored the French over other nations, Castellane, the 
French ambassador, opposed the Ottoman proposal.26 Bonneval, however, claimed credit 
for the idea of the divisionary line, though he appears to have subsequently distanced 
himself from the project after he learned that the French disapproved of it.27 Moreover, 
the use of sular to signify Ottoman “waters” is likely a calque, directly translating a 
Europe conception of maritime sovereignty into Ottoman usage.  It is unclear, though, 
whether new expressions for Ottoman waters testify to Bonneval's influence or to 
increased diplomatic contacts that might have exposed Ottoman ministers to European 
conceptions of maritime sovereignty.  
 Efforts to prohibit privateering and naval warfare in eastern Mediterranean waters 
indicated the Ottoman commitment to protect Levant trade and to maintain the empire's 
dominance in the eastern Mediterranean. The presentation of the plan to secure Ottoman 
waters itself seems to illustrate how the Ottomans adopted European technologies in the 
interest of strengthening the empire. Donado recounted that Ottoman ministers used a 
printed map to illustrate the divisionary line they had drawn through the Mediterranean 
                                                
25 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 21 May 1744, TNA SP 97/32, f. 96v; Donado to Senate, 
Constantinople, 27 May 1744, ASV Dispacci degli Ambasciatore Veneti da Constantinople, 199, f. 25r-v.  
26 Castellane objected that French ships would be vulnerable to both European and North African corsairs 
and privateers if warships could not accompany them to Ottoman ports. Experience had shown that the 
Ottoman Empire was itself unable to guarantee the security of vessels even under the guns of its own 
fortresses, Castellane, Constantinople, 27 May 1744, AN AE B/I/421. 
27 Ibid.  For other references to Bonnevale’s authorship of the divisionary line to establish Ottoman neutral 
waters or participation in the development of the idea, see Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire 
Ottoman, 15: 80; Albert Vandal, Le Pacha Bonneval (Paris: Cercle Saint-Simon, 1885), 79; Uzunçarşılı, 
Osmanli Tarihi, vol. 4, pt. 2, 585. 
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and Castellane further described the map as a “carte turque.”28 These descriptions suggest 
that the map used by the Reis Effendi to delineate the extent of Ottoman waters may have 
been one produced by the empire’s first officially sanctioned printing press, which was 
instituted in 1727 by the Hungarian-born Ibrahim Müteferrika.29 If so, the delineation of 
Ottoman waters on a printed map reflects a long history of Ottoman cartographers using 
European sources and charts in their work and further suggests that Ottoman engagement 
with outside ideas helped to define and to extend the empire’s maritime sovereignty.30 
From this perspective, it is significant that both Donado and Aspinwall saw the Ottoman 
proposal as a mixture of indigenous and outside influences. Suggestively, Donado 
speculated that while the idea for the project came from an external source, it was then 
“extended beyond necessity, and also beyond possibility, either on account of the lack of 
experience in such kinds of matters of those who were assigned to conceive it, or perhaps 
on account of the natural prejudice of Ottoman arrogance, which believed it possible to 
                                                
28 Castellane, Constantinople, 23 May 1744, AN AE B/I/421. 
29 On İbrahim Müteferrika and the printing of maps by his press, see Niyazi Berkes, “Ibrahim Müteferrika,” 
in The Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. 3, H-Iram, ed. H. A. R. Gibbs and others (Leiden: Brill, 1967), 996 and 
also Ahmet T. Karamustafa, “Introduction to Ottoman Cartography,” in Cartography in the Traditional 
Islamic and South Asian Societies, ed. J. B. Harley and David Woodward (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 218-226; Maurits van den Boogert, “Ibrahim Müteferrika Printing House in Istanbul,” in The 
Republic of Letters and the Levant, ed. Alastair Hamilton, Maurits H. van den Boogert, and Bart 
Westerweel (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 266-268; Yasemin Gencer, “İbrahim Gencer and the Age of 
the Printed Manuscript,” in The Islamic Manuscript Tradition: Ten Centuries of Book Arts in Indian 
University Collections, ed. Christiane J. Gruber (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 154-193.   
A map of the Mediterranean appeared in three of the books published by Müteferrika's press, Tuhfet el-
Kibar fi Efsar el-Bihar, the Tarih-i Hindi-Garbi and the Cihannuma, although it is not clear if this is the 
map mentioned by Donado. On this map of the Mediterranean basin, see Bülent Özükan, ed., Kitabi-ı 
Cihannüma= The Book of Cihannuma (Istanbul: Boyut Publishing Group, 2008), 72-73. 
30 On the relationship of European and Ottoman cartography in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see 
Jerry Brotton, Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World (London: Reaktion Books, 1997), 
chap. 3, “Disorienting the East: The Geography of the Ottoman Empire.” 
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impose subjection to the greatness of the Empire on all, without having the strength to 
oppose them.”31   
 The proposal to guarantee the peace and tranquility of the eastern Mediterranean 
indeed highlighted Ottoman naval weakness as much as it demonstrated the empire’s 
claims to maritime sovereignty. Donado's account of the Ottoman reaction to early 
attacks by English privateers on French ships in the Levant revealed the extent to which 
that empire's naval weakness limited its ability to regulate the waters over which it 
claimed sovereignty. In August 1744, Robert Saunders of the privateer Ruby captured a 
French ship sailing from North Africa to Athens. Following this attack, rumors circulated 
that British consuls had advised Ottoman subjects that their safety could not be 
guaranteed on board French vessels. According to Donado, Ottoman ministers turned to 
Bonneval for advice as to how the empire could avoid such attacks on its interests and 
dignity.32 Bonneval blamed the government’s inability to secure its waters on the neglect 
of the navy, since “when the Porte did not think to revitalize the state of its navy, its 
subjects and its dignity would be exposed and it would be reduced to depend on the will 
of foreign Nations in matters of the sea.”33   
                                                
31 “Fù poi l'idea stessa estesa oltre il dovere, et anche oltre il possibile ò per diffetto di esperienza in tal 
genere di negozij di quelli, che furono incaricati di concepirla, ò forse per il natural prediudicio 
dell'elatezza Ottomana, che crede forse possibile alla forza e grandezza dell'Impero l'impor soggezione à 
tutti, senza trovar forza sufficiente à contraporvi,” Donado, Pera, 3 December 1744, ASV Dispacci degli 
Ambasciatori Veneti da Constantinopoli, 199, f. 226r-v.  See also, Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 
9 November 1744, TNA SP 97/32, f. 134v-134r. 
32 Donado to Senate, Buyukdere, 26 September 1744, ASV Dispacci degli Ambasciatore Veneti da 
Constantinople, 199, f. 114r; Aspinwall to Newcastle, Belgrade, 16 August 1744, TNA SP 97/32, f. 107r-v. 
33 “La sua esposizione sopra questo à lui non nuovo argomento, fù in sostanza, che quando la Porta non 
pensasse à invigorire lo stato suo di marina sarebbe esposta ne suoi sudditi, e nella sua dignità e riddotta à 
dippendere nelle cose del mare dagli arbitrii delle forestiere Nationi,” Donado to Senate, Buyukdere, 26 
September 1744, ASV Dispacci degli Ambasciatore Veneti da Constantinople, 199, f. 114r. 
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 The Ottoman efforts to protect the eastern Mediterranean from the effects of 
European warfare highlighted the limited degree to which that empire could safeguard the 
security of its subjects within the waters over which it claimed sovereignty. Since the 
Ottoman Empire lacked the naval power to enforce its declared maritime boundaries 
unilaterally, the Porte's proposal was one that depended on the approval and mutual 
agreement of all the belligerent nations.  However, European representatives and 
governments were unwilling to support a proposal that appeared both impracticable and 
unsustainable. The Venetian ambassador in Paris reported that Maurepas doubted 
whether European states would accept a proposal through which “the Turks would 
appropriate the Dominion of the Sea within those limits.” 34 Castellane, meanwhile, 
argued that it was against the law of nations to prohibit the ships of warring nations from 
fighting one another on the high seas.35 Neither Aspinwall nor the other European 
representative at Constantinople explicitly objected to the Ottoman Empire's right to 
exercise sovereignty over the high seas. Instead, they focused on the practical difficulties 
of the plan, as when Aspinwall judged the idea of “a Line to be drawn cross so large a 
Sea is the most Chimerical thing that ever was imagined.” The agent then explained, 
“there are doubtless great difficultys, if not Impossibilitys, to observe a Line, which 
cannot be fixt, or demonstrated, upon the Sea, as upon a Sea Chart;” consequently, it 
would prove impossible to determine precisely whether ships were taken within or 
                                                
34 “Che di questo modo li Turchi si arrogarebbero il Dominio del Mare dentro di que' limit, il quale non 
così facilmente egli credeva verrebbegli acconsentito dalle altre Potenze,” Girolamo Corner to the Senate, 
Parigi, 13 August 1744, ASV Dispacci degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato, Francia, 235, f. 76v.  
35  Castellane, Constantinople, 27 May 1744, AN AE  B/I/421; Maurepas to Castellane, Versailles, 2 
August 1744, AN Marine B/7/180, f. 214r. 
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without the proposed line. 36 Moreover, since British privateers were forbidden to 
interfere with neutral property and persons, the edict seemed directed primarily at pirates, 
for whose behavior the British Crown could not be held accountable.37 The draft of a 
letter from the English government to the Ottoman ministers in response to the proposal 
highlighted the infeasibility the proposal, and, in the process, tacitly rejected the Porte's 
claim to establish the neutrality of the designated expanse of sea.38  
 Following the initial Ottoman proposal to safeguard Levantine waters, Castellane 
had suggested that the empire adopt an approach that was not dependant upon securing 
the agreement of all the belligerent parties.39 The ambassador thought the Porte might 
better take the approach it had previously adopted during the War of the Polish 
Succession, between 1733 and 1738, when it issued an order to officials throughout the 
empire that prohibited maritime combat within the Aegean and forbade Ottoman subjects 
from serving onboard vessels of the belligerents.40 As it became clear that the initial 
proposal would prove unworkable, the Porte issued an order in August 1744 that 
reaffirmed its intention to preserve the security of the previously demarcated Ottoman 
waters, but which sought to provide a means to protect Levantine trade without European 
                                                
36 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 12 May 1744, TNA SP 97/32, f. 83r. 
37 Ibid. 
38 See Sir Everard Fawkener's draft letter, 6 August 1744, TNA SP 97/56, f. 172v-176r (the folios run in 
reverse order in this document).  
39 Castellane, Constantinople, 27 May 1744, 18 June 1744, and 25 July 1744, AN AE B/I/421. 
40 Unlike the later proposal, this command did not call for the arrest of vessels that violated the neutrality of 
Ottoman waters and of their prizes. Instead, it instructed officials to send the captains of ships who violated 
Ottoman neutrality to Constantinople where they were to be reprimanded by the representatives of their 
nation. A French translation of this order of 10 April 1734 accompanied Castellane's letter of 27 May, 
1744, AN AE B/I/421.  
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cooperation.41 Accordingly, European consuls were instructed to make an inventory of all 
goods freighted by Ottoman subjects on their nations' ships, so that effective restitution 
could be made in the event a ship was seized by enemies.42 Aspinwall suspected that this 
new order testified to Ottoman realization that their original decree was impractical, the 
repetition of the original proposal coming, “as it were, by way of Preamble.”43 In fact, 
when Castellane discouraged any mention of the divisionary line, he found that the Reis 
Effendi continued to favor the idea of such a line.44   
 As the War of the Austrian Succession wore on and attacks between British and 
French vessels continued in the Levant, the Porte increasingly emphasized its intention to 
prohibit hostile acts within the ports and harbors of the empire and under the guns of 
fortresses.45 In part, the Ottoman focus on ports and littoral waters reflected the 
geographical conditions of the eastern Mediterranean and the sailing practices of both 
privateers and merchantmen. In the close waters of the Aegean, ships were rarely out of 
sight of land and privateers tended to lie in wait outside of ports and at predictable choke 
points. A firman that paralleled the order of August 1744 was issued a year later at the 
                                                
41 Italian and English copies of this decree of 1 September 1744 may be found in TNA SP 97/32, f. 143r-
144r and 145r-147v. French copies follow Castellane's letter of 16 September 1744, AN AE B/I/421.   
42 Donado and Aspinwall both credited the French with advising the Ottomans on the revised order, 
Donado to the Senate, Constantinople, 3 December 1744, ASV Dispacci degli Ambasciatori Veneti da 
Constantinopoli, 199, f. 226r-v and Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 9 November 1744, TNA SP 
97/32, f. 133r-v. However, Castellane objected to this provision, since it appeared to make the French 
responsible for losses Ottoman subjects sustained onboard their vessels, Castelllane, Constantinople, 16 
September 1744, AN AE B/I/421. 
43 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 9 November 1744, TNA SP 97/32, f. 134r. 
44 Castellane, Constantinople, 16 September 1744, AN AE B/I/421. 
45 A proposed order in 1746, on the other hand, commanded European warships not only to refrain from 
bringing prizes into Ottoman ports, but also to not enter those ports, at all, “Extract of a Letter to the Levant 
Company from Mr. Aspinwall,” Constantinople, 16 April 1746, TNA SP 97/32, f. 315r; Aspinwall to 
Newcastle, Contantinople, 24 June 1746, f. 321v-322v. 
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request of the chief customs officer at Constantinople, upon the seizure of Swedish and 
French ships in proximity to Ottoman ports.46 Nevertheless, the Porte seems to have 
begun to define “the waters of the protected domains” as those in the vicinity of ports and 
harbors and within the range of fortresses' cannon.47 In September 1745, Aspinwall 
reported that the Kapudan Pasha had been directed to determine whether a French prize 
captured by the man-of-war Diamond had been taken within the guns of the castle at 
Candia or not. If the Kapudan Pasha determined that the prize had been seized on the 
open sea, it was to be esteemed a good prize.48   
 Though the project of 1744 extended and reconceptualized Ottoman maritime 
sovereignty, subsequent efforts to safeguard Ottoman trade in the face of European naval 
warfare suggest that sovereignty over oceanic space was secondary to the primary 
Ottoman concern of protecting subjects and their trade.49 In this respect, Ottoman 
attitudes mirrored those prevalent in other early modern empires, as their claims to 
sovereignty over Levantine waters centered on preserving the trade of the empire's 
subjects and its commercial arteries.50 Following an engagement between French and 
                                                
46 Uzunçarşılı records the issuance of a firman in response to the seizure of the French and Swedish ships in 
the summer of 1745 that, like the one of August 1744, forbad combat within Ottoman waters and directed 
the European consulates to provide bail for the transport of Ottomans goods and subjects, Osmanlı Tarihi, 
vol. 4, pt. 2, 584. Aspinwall does not mention the subsequent firman. Italian and English translations of the 
customer’s memorial and of Aspinwall’s reply may be found in, Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 7 
August 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 255r-269v. 
47 Bostan, “Osmanlılarda Deniz Sınırı ve Karasuları Meselesi,” 38. 
48 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 30 August 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 274r-v. See also Bostan, 
“Osmanlılarda Deniz Sınıri ve Karasuları Meselesi,” 45, n. 44. 
49 See also Greene, “The Ottomans in the Mediterranean,” 115-116.  
50 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 149-158. 
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English privateers at Smyrna, Donado wrote that the weak Ottoman response to the 
incident indicated that “the sole object of the Porte is to repair the prejudices, which 
might be inflicted upon its subjects, and its own commerce, and consequently to the royal 
Treasury, and that short of these concerns it will give little thought to the depredations, 
that occur between belligerents, even if they commit them in waters, which following the 
universal laws [le legge universali] ought to be respected.”51  
 In fact, the Ottoman government would seek to maintain the security of its ports 
and harbors through the War of the Austrian Succession. In this respect, the extent of 
Ottoman waters seems to have fallen once more into line with wider Mediterranean 
practice. The inability of the Porte to safeguard Levantine waters should not, however, 
detract from the significance of its assertion of Ottoman sovereignty over them. At a time 
when British conceptions of their maritime empire yet outshone the practical possibilities 
of British naval power, it is significant that Ottoman ministers could still imagine the 
eastern Mediterranean to be an Ottoman lake.  Claims to maritime sovereignty in the 
Mediterranean, as in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, were all but unenforceable, but they 
reflected early modern empires’ efforts to control movement across oceanic space. The 
Porte’s retreat from its initially expansive delineation of Ottoman waters did not signify 
that it was any less committed to promoting the security of its subjects at sea. Instead, as 
ministers increasingly focused on the specific harm done to Ottoman subjects by 
                                                
51 “...che l'unico oggetto della Porta è di riparare alli pregiudicj, che possono essere inferiti à Sudditi suoi, et 
al proprio commercio, et in conseguenze alle reggie Dogane, e che salvi questi riguardi poco pensiero sarà 
per prendersi delle depredazioni, che succeddessero trà le parti belligeranti, tutto che si commettessero in 
acque, che secondo le leggi universali doverebbero essere rispettate,” Donado to the Senate, Pera, 3 
December 1744, ASV Dispacci degli Ambasciatori Veneti da Constantinopoli, 199, f. 228r-v. 
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European naval warfare, it behaved like other early modern polities, which found it more 
practical to protect and regulate subjects than to police expanses of open sea.   
 
II.  An Ottoman Offer of Mediation 
  
 Unable to enforce the security of Ottoman waters, the Porte turned to a more 
radical solution to end the harmful effects of European war on Ottoman trade. In 
February 1745, the various foreign ministers at Constantinople were again brought in turn 
before the Grand Vizir.  According to Aspinwall, the Vizir opened the meeting “with a 
sort of Harangue upon the Calamities of War” and on the negative impact of war upon 
commerce and, in particular, on the increasing price of cloth and other necessaries in the 
capital. The Vizir then stated, “that the Port coud wish, from mere Sentiments of 
Humanity, & Friendship to all, to see such Differences between the Christian Powers 
composed.”52 The English agent, like the other European representatives in the city, was 
then given a letter to forward to his court.53 As Aspinwall noted, the letter was more a 
“Homily upon Peace” than it was a concrete proposal and seemed “to engage the Porte in 
nothing.”54 Yet, despite its imprecise terms, the Ottoman diplomatic intervention into the 
War of the Austrian Succession was nevertheless viewed as an offer of mediation.55 
                                                
52 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 1 February 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 167r-v.  See also the 
account of the Venetian bailo of his meeting with the Grand Vizir, Donado to the Senate, Pera, 9 February 
1745, ASV Dispacci dagli Ambasciatore Veneti da Constantinople, 199, f. 286v-287r. 
53 Aspinwall reported that letters were given to the Austrians, Russian, French, Swedish, Venetian, 
Neapolitan representatives and others were sent to the governments of Prussia and Poland, Aspinwall to 
Newcastle, Constantinople, 1 February 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 167v 
54 Ibid. f. 168r, 171r. 
55 See, for instance, Ibid. f 169r; Aspinwall to Harrington, Belgrade near Constantinople, 19 June 1745, 
TNA SP 97/32, f. 234v, 236r; Porter to Newcastle, Constantinople, 21 February 1747, TNA SP 97/33, f. 
24r. 
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Writing in the years immediately following the events he recorded, Süleyman İzzi, the 
Ottoman vakʿanüvis or court historian, confirmed this interpretation when he explained 
that the Sultan had been motivated by his concern for the security of his subjects and their 
trade, “to reconcile the two sides with the intervention of the exalted state.”56 
 Although political cooperation and diplomatic exchanges with European states 
were an established part of Ottoman statecraft at this time, the Porte's vague offer of 
mediation highlighted a broad transformation in the empire's relationship with Europe 
over the course of the eighteenth century.57 Since the sixteenth century, Ottoman 
interactions with Europe had taken place within an ideological perspective based on the 
centrality of imperial expansion for the advancement of the Ottoman state and of the 
Muslim religion.58 The eighteenth century was a period during which Ottoman ministers 
struggled to balance the ideological foundations of the Ottoman Empire with the realities 
of its declining power relative to European rivals.59 The Porte’s desire to bring an end to 
the War of the Austrian Succession did not translate into a desire to integrate the empire 
into European diplomatic or state systems. Instead, interviews in which the Grand Vizir 
expressed the Ottoman wish that the European states should make peace were in keeping 
with the Ottoman tradition of unilateral diplomacy; the suggestion that Ottoman 
                                                
56 “...devlet-i aliyye-yi ebed-müddetin tavassutiyle islah-ı zatülbeyne,” Süleyman İzzi, Tarih-i İzzi 
(Istanbul, 1786), f. 21r. İzzi was vakʿanüvis from 1745 to 1753, see Feridun Emecen, “İzzi, Süleyman 
Efendi,” in Türk Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansikplopedisi (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988), 23: 565-566. 
57 For a synthetic treatment of this point, see Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around it 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), chap. 2, “On Sovereignty and Subjects: Expanding and Safeguarding the 
Empire.” 
58 For a discussion of the relationship between Ottoman political ideology and its relationship to “reform” 
literature in the eighteenth century, see Virginia Aksan, “Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808,” 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 1 (February 1993): 53-69. 
59 Aksan, An Ottoman Statesmen in War and Peace, passim. 
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diplomats be dispatched to European courts with the letter of peace was rejected. For an 
empire preoccupied by a long-running war with Persia, prohibitions on European 
privateering and offers of mediation were diplomatic strategies to sustain Ottoman 
influence without burdening the empire with further war. However, these measures also 
illustrated the slow process by which the Ottoman Empire was drawn into the orbit of 
European diplomacy and competition. 
 The fact that the letter dispatched to the various European courts appears to have 
been written by one of the most diplomatically experienced of Ottoman ministers 
illustrated the relationship between the Porte’s offer of mediation and its gradually 
strengthening diplomatic and political connections with Europe. The European 
representatives at Constantinople were in agreement that the letter had been written by 
the Reis Efendi, Tavukçubaşı Mustafa.60 Mustafa Efendi had played a role in the 
negotiations leading to the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739 and he seems to have taken an 
interest in European affairs.61 Aspinwall had suspected that Mustafa Efendi, “a great 
Projector,” might have been involved in the planning of the earlier declaration that 
forbade the ships of the belligerent powers from fighting one another in the eastern 
Mediterranean; Aspinwall’s successor at Constantinople, Sir James Porter, described the 
Reis Effendi “the ablest Man at this Court.”62 European diplomats were also unanimous 
                                                
60 The Reisülkülttab, or Reis Efendi, was head of the Ottoman chancery and, from the late seventeenth 
century, had become central to the conduct of foreign relations. On this office and its development through 
the first half of the eighteenth century, see Norman Itzkowitz, “Mehmed Raghib Pasha: The Making of an 
Ottoman Grand Vizier” (PhD Diss., Princeton University, 1959), 110-117; Aksan, An Ottoman Statesmen 
in War and Peace, 18-19.  
61 Aksan, An Ottoman Statesmen in War and Peace, 24-26. 
62 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 19 July 1744, TNA SP 97/32, f. 104r. 
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in the condescending tone in which they described the letter, in which, according to 
Aspinwall, the Reis Effendi had “displayd all his Rhetorick & Pedantry in the 
Composition.” Aspinwall further thought that the Porte’s offer of mediation was the 
result of foreign influences.63 Castellane, meanwhile, reported that the Reis Efendi had 
sought “to display his asiatic eloquence” in the letter and noted that even the most skilled 
of the French dragomans had struggled to translate it.64   
 The letter of peace dispatched to the courts of Europe revealed the changing 
perspective of members of the Ottoman political elite towards the empire’s relationship 
with Europe.65 Significantly, the letter began with a preamble that established peace to be 
the proper and preferred condition for mankind. It recounted that God had created 
mankind as the object of the creation of the universe; subsistence in this life in order to 
attain the next depended on peace and security and the pursuit of commerce and crafts. 
The letter's author then adopted a humoral language to describe wars as the means 
provided by the “Eternal Physician” (hakım-ı lem) to punish those who did not observe 
good laws and to maintain the equilibrium of human society.  Conflict was thus natural to 
society, but it ought to cease once order was restored, since God commanded reciprocal 
friendship and forbade hostility. After establishing that peace was the preferred condition 
for mankind, the letter then turned to the present state of affairs in Europe. Although the 
European sovereigns claimed to have entered into war on the basis of just causes, they 
                                                
63 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 1 February 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 171v. Donado credited the 
letter to the “Grand Cancelliere,” which would have been Mustafa Efendi, see Donado to the Senate, Pera, 
9 February 1745, ASV Dispacci degli Ambasciatore Veneti da Constantinople, 199, f. 287r. 
64 Quoted in Zevort, Le Marquis d’Argenson, 185, n. 3. 
65 Aksan offers a brief discussion of this letter in “Ottoman-French Relations, 1739-1768,” 50, but it still 
awaits a critical study. 
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had prolonged it “without a lawfull and reasonable Cause” (bela-ı mucıb şer'i ve 'aqlı). 
Moreover, the harmful effects of war had spread beyond Europe. The Ottoman 
government warned that war promised to continue into the next year with great 
bloodshed and to the detriment of trade as a result of fighting among the belligerents in 
Ottoman waters. In order to bring a stop to the destruction of war and to preserve the 
security of merchants, the Sultan accordingly commanded that the belligerent sovereigns 
be informed, “how laudable before God and before men, and how desirable is a just and 
reasonable Peace” (sulh u silahın 'indallah ve 'indennas emr-i mergub ve matlub idigi 
dostan). Finally, the recipient of the letter was directed to represent its contents to his 
ruler and to confirm whether the sovereign was inclined to peace and what were his 
directions towards that end. 66    
  Like the offer of mediation itself, the Ottoman letter dispatched to the courts of 
Europe highlighted the changing ideological and political context of the Ottoman 
Empire’s diplomatic relationships with European states. Particularly, the defense of peace 
as the proper and preferred condition for mankind displayed in the preamble anticipates 
arguments that Mustafa Efendi’s protégé, the official and historian Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 
would later make to demonstrate that peace with European countries served the strategic 
interests of the Ottoman Empire.67 In particular, Ahmed Resmi warned against the 
                                                
66 The text of the Ottoman letter is copied in İzzi, Tarih-i İzzi, f. 21v-22v. Italian and English translations of 
the letter, addressed to the Duke of Newcastle, appear in TNA SP 97/32, f. 175r-178r and 179r-183r, 
respectively. Italian and Latin translations of this letter also appear in the Venetian archives, ASV Dispacci 
dagli Ambasciatore Veneti da Constantinople, 199, f. 291r-293v and 295r-298r, respectively. In my 
summary of the letter, I rely on the contemporary European translations to provide a full sense of the text.  
When quoting from the letter, I use the contemporary English translation. 
67 For Ahmed Resmi's writings on the Ottoman Empire's relationship with Europe, see Aksan, An Ottoman 
Statesmen in War and Peace, 195-205. 
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destructive and often self-defeating effects of military expansion and instead emphasized 
the ability of sovereigns to preserve their subjects from the harmful consequences of 
war.68 Unlike Ahmed Resmi Efendi's later work, the letter of 1745 emphasized the 
importance of balance among the states and peoples of the world without launching into 
an explicit discussion of the balance of power. Since the letter was written for European 
rather than Ottoman consumption, it is unclear just how it relates to traditional ideas 
regarding the relationship of the Ottoman Empire to Christian states. Even so, its praise 
for peaceful coexistence suggests ideological changes that were occurring within 
segments of the Ottoman political elite, as ministers adapted to a situation in which the 
Porte relied on European allies and mediators to hold back the advances of its imperial 
rivals.69 
 Like the Porte’s proposal to maintain the security of Ottoman waters, its efforts to 
reestablish peace in Europe responded to the threat that European warfare posed to 
Ottoman commerce. Aspinwall and the Venetian, Austrian and Russian representatives 
nevertheless all doubted that Ottoman ministers would have taken “so formal a Step, & 
so general a one” as to make overtures of peace to all the European states merely because 
cloth was scarce at Constantinople and customs revenues were down.70 Instead, they 
suspected the Porte’s actions stemmed from French or Swedish instigation and from the 
influence of Bonneval. This view, however, reflected the tendency among European 
diplomats to ascribe the Porte’s decisions to outside influence; in fact, food shortages in 
                                                
68 Ibid., 195-198. 
69 Aksan, “Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808,” passim.   
70 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 1 February 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 168r-v. 
  325 
! !
Constantinople were a constant concern to the Ottoman government and Anglo-French 
warfare threatened to disrupt the trade in provisions that flowed through Levantine 
waters.71 The vakʿanüvis, Suleyman İzzi, echoed the Grand Vizir’s explanation for the 
measure when he explained that the Ottoman government decided to intervene peacefully 
in the War of the Austrian Succession after the French and English began to fight one 
another in Ottoman waters, interrupting the empire’s trade, causing prices to rise and 
harming the state’s customs revenues.72 The later English ambassador, Sir James Porter, 
backed away from Aspinwall’s assumption that an outside influence was responsible for 
the Ottoman proposal. When Porter wrote to Newcastle in February 1747 to request a 
formal reply to the Vizir’s offer, he observed that it had been at first assumed that the 
offer was the result of French instigation. However, he reported that it had subsequently 
emerged that the Porte’s actions probably stemmed from the “repeated Complaints” of 
the chief customs officer regarding the decline of revenues as a result of European 
warfare, which had prompted the Reis Effendi to find “this expedient.”73 French records 
further confirm this interpretation.74 
 Although economic motivations prompted the Ottoman desire to see an end to the 
War of the Austrian Succession, the Porte’s diplomatic intervention in the conflict 
illustrated at once the changing political relationship between the Ottoman Empire and 
                                                
71 On concern within the Ottoman government regarding the provisioning of Constantinople in the first half 
of the eighteenth century, see Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 364.  
72 İzzi, Tarih-i İzzi, f. 21r.  See also Aksan, “Ottoman-French Relations,” 50. 
73 Porter to Newcastle, Constantinople, 21 February 1747, TNA SP 97/33, f. 24r-v.   
74 François Rousseau, “L’Ambassade du Comte de Castellane a Constantinople, 1741-1747,” Revue des 
questiones historiques 70 (1901): 434. 
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Europe and noticeable limits to its integration into the world of European politics. In 
early 1745, Donado reported that the issue of how the empire should respond to Anglo-
French warfare in its waters was discussed during a conference of Ottoman ministers, 
presumably a meeting of the Divan-i Hümayun. During this meeting, it was proposed that 
envoys should be distpatched to Austria and especially to France and Britain in order to 
establish some convention for the security of Ottoman commerce. Rumors circulated that 
Mehmed Said Efendi, who had led an Ottoman embassy to Paris three years earlier, had 
been delegated to act again as envoy to that country.75 Meanwhile, other officials who 
Donado described as the “più accreditati del Ministero” warned that this step was 
unlikely to lead to positive results as long as the ability of the empire to back up 
diplomacy with force was limited on account of its war with Persia.76 These ministers 
also worried whether the envoys “would be received or treated in a manner 
corresponding to their character and to the dignity of the Empire,” since European 
governments had previously resisted hosting Ottoman diplomats.77  Consequently, it was 
resolved that the undertaking more suited “to the present system of Europe, and to the 
                                                
75 Donado to the Senate, Pera, 3 February 1745, ASV Dispacci degli Ambasciatore Veneti da 
Constantinople, 199, f. 268r-269v. Aspinwall also mentions the rumor that Mehmed Said Pasha had been 
designated envoy to France, Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 1 February 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 
167v. 
76 Donado to the Senate, Pera, 3 February 1745, ASV Dispacci degli Ambasciatore Veneti da 
Constantinople, 199, f. 269v-270r. 
77 “...posero in vista il dubbio che tali Ministri o non fossero ricevuti o non trattati in modo corrispondente 
al carattere loro, et alla dignità dell’Impero,” Donado to the Senate, Pera, 9 February 1745, ASV Dispacci 
degli Ambasciatore Veneti da Constantinople, 199, f. 285r. For a brief discussion of this point, see G. R. 
Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” in Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or 
Unconventional?, ed. A. Nuri Yurdusev (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 123-124. On the 
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Sublime Porte, 1789-1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 126-132. 
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actual conditions of this Empire” was to limit the Porte’s intervention to the dispatch of 
letters to the European courts.78  
 The diverse reactions of diplomats at Constantinople to the Porte’s offer of 
mediation revealed the degree to which Europeans were equally uncertain as to how to 
understand and manage the evolving relationship between the Ottoman Empire and 
Europe. Aspinwall recorded that following his audience with the Grand Vizir he had a 
conversation with the Swedish envoy at Constantinople, who Aspinwall suspected may 
have influenced the Porte's intervention in European affairs. Aspinwall told the other 
diplomat that it seemed strange for the Ottomans to display suddenly such concern for 
“the Effusion of Christian Blood,” and all the more so since divisions among Christian 
rulers appeared to work in the Porte's interest. The Swedish envoy replied that the 
Ottomans had changed greatly in the preceding hundred years, “that they were now 
civilised, & had more refined way so thinking, & were come off their ancient Ferocity, & 
seemed disposed to imbibe other more Christianlike Maxims.” The Grand Vizir's letters 
to the various powers of Europe were an example of this change, since it was “a thing His 
Highness never condescended to do before.”79 Conversely, Aspinwall thought that 
“however the Turkish Manners may be changed, their Interest in seeing the Christian 
Powers at variance, can never I suppose change, but with their Religion.”80 Donado 
similarly dismissed the Ottoman offer as a means by which that government sought to 
                                                
78 “Più adattato partito al presente sistema di Europea, et alle circostanze attuali di questo Impero si 
sostenne quello di spedir lettere à Prencipi concependole in termini non meno blandi che cauti,” Donado to 
the Senate, Pera, 9 February 1745, ASV Dispacci degli Ambasciatore Veneti da Constantinople, 199, f. 
285r. 
79 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 1 February 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 170r-v. 
80 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 1 February 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 170v-171r. 
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color, with a pretended desire for peace, “quelle massime di predominio, e violenza” that 
were natural to it.81   
 Through the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire increasingly factored into 
European diplomacy and state competition. European attitudes towards increased 
diplomatic integration with the Ottoman Empire were, however, as ambiguous and 
conflicted as those found within the Ottoman government.82 Through the early modern 
period, there was considerable uncertainty among European jurists and theorists as to 
whether the law of nations was universally applicable or only regulated relations between 
the states of Europe.83 Sir James Porter, who was one of the more sympathetic European 
observers of that empire, opined in 1768 that “The Turks have properly no ideas of the 
law of nations: they consider themselves as the only nation on earth, and regulate their 
whole conduct with others on positive compact, spontaneous concessions, or usage and 
custom.”84 While such observations reflected ideological and institutional barriers that 
excluded the Ottoman Empire from an increasingly self-conscious community of 
European states, they also testify to the fact that different legal and diplomatic cultures 
                                                
81 Donado to the Senate, Pera, 26 February 1745, ASV Dispacci dagli Ambasciatore Veneti da 
Constantinople, 199, f. 312r. 
82 For a survey of different eighteenth-century views of the Ottoman Empire, see Aslı Çırakman, From the 
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equally separated the Ottoman Empire from Europe.  
 Like the effort to delineate officially the expanse of the waters of the Ottoman 
Empire, the offer to mediate an end to the War of the Austrian Succession illustrated the 
efforts of Ottoman ministers to adapt to a changing geopolitical situation. Nevertheless, 
the Porte was in neither a diplomatic nor a military position to advance its desire to see 
peace in Europe. Among the European courts to which the Grand Vizir’s proposal of 
mediation was extended, only that of Naples accepted the offer. Others tactfully declined 
and the British government, despite the repeated urgings of its representatives at 
Constantinople, seems to have failed to respond at all.85  Asked whether the Ottomans 
should insist upon their offer of mediation in the event the European powers refused, 
Bonneval supposedly advised against it, “unless they could send 100,000 
Plenipotentiaryes to the Congress.”86 The French foreign minister, the Marquis 
d'Argenson, echoed this opinion when he suggested that as long as the Ottoman Empire 
was preoccupied with war with Persia, it would be unable to influence those states that 
declined its offer of mediation, “they would perhaps carry it out more realistically and 
with more appearance of success if they could march 20 or 30,000 men to Belgrade.”87 
Unable to secure eastern Mediterranean waters or to bring the European conflagration to 
a close, Ottoman merchants were left to pursue legal recourse in Ottoman and British 
                                                
85 Aspinwal to Newcastle, Constantionple, 11 July 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 242v. Porter to Newcastle, 
Constantinople, 21 February 1747, TNA SP 97/33, f. 24v.  For the Neapolitan government’s acceptance of 
the offer and the refusal of other European states, see Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l’Empire ottoman, 15: 
89; Aksan, “Ottoman-French Relations,” 50. 
86 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Belgrade, 19 June 1745, TNA SP 97/32,  f. 236r-v. 
87 Zevort, Le Marquis d'Argenson, 185 
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courts for compensation for the losses they suffered as a result of Anglo-French warfare 
in the Levant. 
  
III.  Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Levant 
 As during previous periods of Anglo-French warfare in the Levant, the capture of 
French vessels by British warships and privateers called into question where legal 
authority lay in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean. Ottoman decrees that asserted an 
intention to restore unlawfully captured ships and goods to their owners rested on that 
empire's sovereign claims over its waters and its subjects, but potentially collided with 
the legal authority of the British Admiralty, which claimed sole jurisdiction over prizes 
taken by British ships. Prize cases consequently became complex affairs with legal 
proceedings taking place simultaneously in Britain and in the Ottoman Empire. 
Moreover, as British courts heard cases that involved Ottoman merchants and subjects, 
they confronted the problem of how to adapt their standard procedures to distinct 
Ottoman legal and commercial practices. Their efforts to take into account customary 
practices that differed between Europe and the Ottoman Empire highlighted their 
recognition that multiple sources of legal authority existed in the Mediterranean. It was, 
however, testimony to the spreading authority of British Admiralty courts that British 
jurists found themselves confronted with the problem of how to take into consideration 
different legal and cultural traditions. 
 Unlike British diplomats during the wars against Louis XIV, neither Aspinwall 
nor Sir James Porter specifically questioned the jurisdiction of Ottoman officials to 
adjudicate prizes taken into Ottoman ports. Aspinwall complained when the pasha of 
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Tripoli, in Syria, ordered a Levant Company ship to return two French prizes it had 
“lawfully taken” on the grounds that they had been seized too close to shore.88 While his 
judgment that the prizes were “lawfully taken” confirms that he did not accept the 
expansion of Ottoman waters beyond ports and harbors, Aspinwall nonetheless did not 
explicitly contest the authority of the Ottoman official to invalidate those captures. 89 
Since the Ottoman pasha had confiscated the disputed ships, he had also removed the 
possibility that English representatives and merchants in the Ottoman Empire would be 
held accountable for their restitution. Consequently, the seizure of the prizes was not a 
matter of great diplomatic concern. 
 Conversely, Admiralty jurisdiction over prize cases opened a second avenue of 
jurisdictional authority in Levantine waters. Ottoman subjects whose goods were on 
board French ships brought before prize courts were instructed to proceed through the 
avenues of British justice in order to obtain restitution of their goods. After Robert 
Saunders, the commander of the Ruby, seized several French ships in 1744 and 1745, the 
Ottoman merchants who had freighted those ships protested that their goods had been 
condemned together with the ships. When called upon to give his opinion on the case, the 
advocate-general of the Admiralty, William Strahan, noted that the Ottoman merchants 
had “just Cause of Complaint,” because they were neutrals and subjects of a power in 
                                                
88 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 11 July 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 240r-v.  Aspinwall warned, 
however, that if such behavior among Ottoman officials continued, British privateers would begin to take 
their prizes directly to Port Mahon, causing further inconveniences for any Ottoman subjects who might be 
aboard the ship, Memorial of Aspinwall to, Constantinople, 2 August 1745, TNA SP 99/32, f. 268v. 
89 Cf. Robert Sutton's declaration that Ottoman courts could not invalidate a French prize taken by an 
English ship because maritime matters fell outside the scope of Ottoman law, “Sir Robert Suttons account 
concerning the King William which took a French Prize, & the Purser a Hostage for the ransom, released 
by the Turks,” TNA SP 97/21, f. 199v.  This issue is discussed in full in chapter 4. 
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amity with Britain. However, since the prize court had declared the ships in question to 
be valid prizes before the Ottoman merchants had lodged their complaints, they had no 
recourse but to appeal to the Lords Commissioners of Appeals.90 Strahan reiterated that 
an appeal to the Lords Commissioners was the only avenue of redress for the Ottomans 
after the members of the Levant Company suggested that Saunders might alternatively be 
prosecuted for breaching the terms of his commission.91 It would be nearly four years 
before the merchants' goods were restored, a resolution which came through an 
agreement between the Levant Company and the owners of the Ruby rather than through 
a verdict of the Commissioners of Appeals, though the Commissioners overturned the 
condemnation of the prize in light of this agreement.92 This long delay came despite the 
urging of the Levant Company that the appeal be rushed, lest the Ottoman government 
decide to compensate its subjects for their losses through the seizure of goods belonging 
to British merchants in the Levant.93 
 Both diplomats and the directors of the Levant Company recognized that the 
requirement that Ottoman merchants seek redress for their losses through the institutions 
of British law raised practical difficulties and problems of the incompatibility of different 
legal traditions. They consequently sought to treat the restitution of Ottoman goods as a 
                                                
90 William Strahan to Corbett, Doctors Commons, 9 October 1745, TNA ADM 7/298, f. 279r-v. 
91 The Lords Justices apparently recommended prosecuting Saunders, but Strahan responded that by the 
terms of the Act of 1744 for the Encouragement of Seamen and Privateers, the Crown had no interest in 
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Governor and Company to Aspinwall, London, 21 June 1745, TNA SP 105/117.  
92 Deputy Governor and Company to Porter, London, 14 April 1749, TNA SP 105/118, 103. 
93 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 9 February 1746, TNA SP 97/32, f. 302r; Governor and 
Company to Aspinwall, London, 4 March 1746, TNA SP 105/118, 6; Governor and Company to Porter, 
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diplomatic, as well as a legal matter. Following the seizure of another French ship 
carrying Ottoman passengers and their goods by a British privateer, Aspinwall advised 
that since the Ottoman subjects had lost their papers when the ship was seized, their 
requests for restitution should be treated “somewhat in a publick Light, & not merely as a 
Lawsuit.”94 The directors of the Levant Company further warned that if effective 
measures were not taken to compensate Ottoman losses, “the Government at 
Constantinople may take some sudden violent Measures, dangerious as well to the 
Persons as the Estates of His Majesty's British Subjects.”95 Yet, despite Aspinwall's 
suggestion for a diplomatic resolution of the Ottoman merchants' case and Newcastle's 
later assurances to Sir James Porter that some method to satisfy Ottoman demands would 
be found, both the Crown and British lawyers saw Ottoman claims in a primarily judicial 
light.96 The correspondence between the Levant Company and Britain's ambassadors to 
the Ottoman Empire is thus an endless litany of requests for documentation and copies in 
order to support the cases of Ottoman claimants.97  
                                                
94 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 9 February 1746, TNA SP 97/32, f. 302r. 
95 Representation of the Levant Company to Newcastle, London, 6 February 1745, TNA SP 97/56, f. 188r. 
96 Newcastle to Porter, Whitehall, 4 November 1746, TNA SP 97/33, f. 13r. For British intentions to 
proceed judicially against those captains who violated the security of Ottoman subjects, see variously, 
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Governor and Company to Porter, London, 14 September 1748, 84. 
  334 
! !
 The legal formalities of prize adjudication made redress for Ottoman merchants 
an even more difficult and time-consuming process than it was for their European 
counterparts. The distance between Britain and the Ottoman Empire made it particularly 
difficult for Ottoman merchants to bring their cases before prize courts, especially when 
they found that British officials were reluctant to assist their efforts. In March 1746, 
Aspinwall reported that three of the merchants whose goods had been aboard the 
captured French ship St. François de Paula had set off for England with a letter of 
attorney but found that British officials at Minorca were unwilling to let them proceed 
and planned to return to the Levant after failing to find a ship to take them to England.98 
Uncooperative behavior by British officials at Minorca does not suggest a more general 
disregard for the judicial claims of Ottoman merchants. In December 1745, the Levant 
Company directors were advised by the advocates at Doctors Commons that Ottoman 
merchants seeking redress should send the Secretary of State a letter of attorney 
empowering someone in Britain to take up their claim in court.99 The Company itself 
approved Porter’s subsequent proposal that aggrieved Ottoman merchants should 
delegate some of their number to come to London in order to pursue their cases.100   
 An appeals process slowed by both geography and procedure was insufficient to 
meet the diplomatic and political situation faced by the Levant Company and Britain's 
representative at Constantinople. Five months after he requested that the case of 
Saunders' victims be addressed diplomatically rather than judicially, Aspinwall was 
                                                
98 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 29 March 1746, TNA SP 97/32, f. 308r-v. 
99 Governor and Company to Aspinwall, London, 10 December 1745, TNA SP 105/118, 1-2 and copy of 
counsel's opinion on how Ottoman subjects should proceed in their appeal, ibid., 4.  
100 Governor and Company to Porter, London, 28 March 1747, TNA SP 105/118, 66. 
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forced to make good the losses from the Company's treasury.101 The Company's directors 
viewed the sums disbursed as advances on the restoration or restitution of Ottoman 
victims' losses and hoped to recoup these and other sums expended following the course 
of the appeals, but they were realistic about the difficulties this entailed.102 In September 
1747, the Company advised Porter that despite new orders to privateers to refrain from 
disturbing Ottoman subjects, it held little hope for reimbursement for its expenses on 
behalf of Ottoman merchants, since “we are referred to the Law, from whence little is to 
be expected, as the Proofs there required are so difficult to be got.”103 Though the 
Company urged that the British government speed the adjudication of prizes, it also 
sought to avoid establishing a precedent whereby Ottoman claimants secured redress 
without pursuing their cases in court.104 The Company reiterated, “it is not the Nation, 
who are obliged, by any Turkish, or Frank Law, to make good their Losses, but the 
Captain, who took their Goods, and sold them at Leghorne.” 105  The Company was thus 
not judicially obligated to redress the losses of the Ottoman subjects; however, it would 
compensate those merchants for two-thirds the value of their goods, out of compassion. 
While this would settle Ottoman complaints, it also meant that the Company would 
                                                
101 Aspinwall to Newcastle, Constantinople, 24 June 1746, TNA SP 97/32, f. 320r-v. 
102 Committee of the Levant Company to Porter, London, 24 December 1747, TNA SP 105/118, 56-58. 
103 Governor and Company to Porter, London, 18 September 1747, TNA SP 105/118, 41. 
104 Company to Porter, London, 14 April 1749, TNA SP 105/118, 103-104. 
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probably never recover the money it expended: once satisfied, the Ottoman merchants 
would not continue their legal appeals.106 
 Complicating redress for Ottoman victims of British privateers were different 
commercial and legal traditions. Early in the War of the Spanish Succession, Sir Robert 
Sutton had protested when the Grand Vizir declared that he expected the goods of the 
empire’s subjects found aboard French ships to be returned to their owners and requested 
restitution of Ottoman goods recently taken from a French vessel. According to Sutton, 
this was an impracticable condition, not only because Ottoman subjects “colored” French 
goods, but also because “the Turks neither using [sic] to take Bills of Lading nor 
Certificates from the Customers of the Ports where they lade their Goods,” it would be 
impossible to determine the true value of the goods.107 This particular problem may have 
been less serious by the middle of the eighteenth century. In 1732, the French 
government had required that Muslim merchants provide written bills of lading, 
encouraging the adoption of written contracts within the primarily oral culture of 
Ottoman merchants. Moreover, in 1744, the Porte directed Ottoman subjects freighting 
European ships to register their inventories and manifests with the appropriate consuls, 
precisely to ensure that appropriate restitution could be obtained.108   
 Nevertheless, the problem of bridging different mercantile cultures continued 
during the War of the Austrian Succession. The Admiralty recognized the need to take 
into account Ottoman customs when it advised the Levant Company and Britain's 
                                                
106 Director and Company to Porter, London, 31 May 1750, TNA SP 105/118, 156. 
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diplomats in the Ottoman Empire that it would accept affidavits from Ottoman subjects 
“sworn upon the Alcoran, or according to their usual Way of Swearing” and 
authenticated by a “Mollah or Caddee.”109 Apparently, this was inadequate, as Porter 
later complained that Ottoman subjects would not take the oaths required by the 
Admiralty to authenticate documents, “so that any Evidence from hence to recover from 
the Captors will be ineffectual without our Laws will conform to theirs, or that our Courts 
of Law will be content with a Declaration that the evidence they require is not 
conformable to that of this Country & consequently not to be obtained.”110 Although his 
letters do not provide enough detail to be certain, it is possible that Porter’s difficulties 
stemmed from the fact that in shariʿa courts oaths were taken more seriously than in their 
European counterparts and were thus administered as a last resort when witnesses and 
notarized documents were insufficient or unavailable.111 The Secretary of State, the Duke 
of Bedford, warned that English courts “will not abate any Part of what is required in 
legal Procedures here;” it appears, however, that the Ottoman merchants who appeared 
before Admiralty courts in London swore oaths to testify to their ownership of the goods 
in question.112  
                                                
109 Governor and Company to Porter, London, 2 December 1746, TNA SP 105/118, 53-54. 
110 Porter to Bedford, Constantinople, 25 April 1748, TNA SP 97/33, f. 316r; Governor and Company to 
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 Despite the difficulties they encountered, the efforts of Aspinwall and Porter to 
balance Ottoman customs with the legal requirements of the prize courts anticipated Sir 
William Scott's assertion early in the nineteenth century that the Admiralty Court should 
not hold Ottoman subjects “to the utmost rigour of that system of public laws, on which 
European States have so long acted, in their intercourse with one another.”113 If this 
attitude partially excluded the Ottoman Empire from a law of nations that was gradually 
but increasingly limited to European states, it also recognized the existence of extra-
European legal systems and the need to make allowances for them.114 In the mid-
eighteenth century, however, considerable uncertainty surrounded the relationship 
between British courts and extra-European legal customs. 
  Compared to earlier Anglo-Ottoman negotiations over the actions of English 
privateers in the Levant, the letters of British diplomats in the period of the War of the 
Austrian Succession suggest a more pronounced sense that distinct legal regimes divided 
the Ottoman Empire from Europe. During the wars against Louis XIV, British diplomats 
had opposed Ottoman prohibitions on naval warfare in the Aegean by asserting that such 
expansive maritime limits were against the law of nations and the universal customs of 
countries.115 French diplomats protested the Ottoman proposal of 1744 along similar 
lines, but British officials appear to have made little use of such arguments at this later 
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time. Like his predecessors, Aspinwall assured Ottoman ministers that British vessels 
would observe the neutrality of Ottoman ports and harbors. Yet as British diplomats dealt 
with Ottoman demands for compensation for goods seized by privateers, they viewed the 
workings of Ottoman justice to be fundamentally different from those that prevailed in 
Europe. In part, this stemmed from different legal structures. An Armenian merchant at 
Livorno who served as procurator for Ottoman merchants pursuing restitution of their 
goods made this point when he expressed his doubts that the merchants he represented 
would agree to further legal efforts for restitution because they “are not accustomed to 
take long in their cases, & they have neither patience, nor knowledge of the Cases & suits 
of Europe, since in all Turkey both Criminal and Civil cases are concluded quickly.”116 
Unwilling to wait on British courts, the merchants would more likely turn to their own 
government for satisfaction. Aspinwall similarly warned of repercussions if he had to tell 
Ottoman merchants that they would need to wait for compensation, “till the Forms can be 
gone through, & Points of Law canvassed.”117  
 More broadly, Ottoman demands for restitution fed into British and European 
conceptions of the Ottoman Empire as one whose government was fundamentally 
unrestrained by law. If British officials recognized Ottoman authority and justice, they 
saw its workings as fundamentally different from those that prevailed in Britain or 
Europe. The directors of the Levant Company wrote to Aspinwall in October 1746 to 
                                                
116 “...mais je ne puis me promettre autant de la part des Turqs, quils ne sont pas accotumès a trainer en 
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117 Aspinwall to Harrington, Belgrade, 19 June 1745, TNA SP 97/32, f. 235r. 
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register their unease that the Porte persisted in holding the British nation responsible for 
the actions of privateers, “contrary to their own Laws, to our Capitulations, and without 
ever considering that every Countrey & Government have Laws and Rules, which it is no 
more in their Power than it is in the Grand Signior's to depart from.”118 Aspinwall himself 
had previously warned Newcastle that Ottoman patience had run thin and “God know 
what Extremitys may follow,” if a speedy reply was not forthcoming from the British 
government regarding the depredations of privateers.119 A year later, the British consul at 
Latakia on the Syrian coast informed Porter that Ottoman officials there had advised him 
that they would not be responsible for what befell him or other British merchants if the 
goods taken by privateers were not recovered.120 Porter observed that a similar situation 
existed throughout the Ottoman Empire and he later described the Ottomans as “a 
Lawless sett of People.”121  
 From a more balanced perspective, we can see that British diplomats confronted 
not a “lawless” Ottoman Empire, but rather the intersection of different legal authorities 
as the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the British state collided with the maritime 
sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. However, Admiralty jurisdiction over privateers and 
their prizes meant that British representatives in the Levant could do little on their own to 
regulate the behavior of British vessels in the Levant. In 1747, George Wakeman, the 
British consul at Cyprus, protested that he could not be held accountable for the actions 
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120 Copy of letter from Edward Purnell to Porter, Latakia, 24 March 1747, TNA SP 97/33, f. 92r-v. 
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of a privateer who carried a commission that made him “entirely independent of my 
Authority.”122 In the same year, Robert Man, commander of the warship Lynn, advised 
Porter that he was unable to force the commanders of privateers to restore goods taken 
from a prize without laying himself open to prosecution.123 At least some goods appear to 
have been left uncondemned at Livorno after the Crown ordered privateers to avoid 
interfering with items belonging to Ottoman subjects.124 Consul Purnell recommended 
that orders also be sent to Britain’s consuls to ensure that no prizes taken in the Levant 
were condemned until it could be confirmed whether they carried French or Ottoman 
goods.125 Porter meanwhile requested Ottoman assistance in the apprehension of a British 
privateer who had taken a French prize in Levantine waters in contravention of royal 
orders.126 On 8 September 1747, the King further ordered the judges of the vice-admiralty 
courts at Gibraltar and Minorca to refrain from condemning ships or goods when a claim 
was made upon them by an Ottoman subject and when depositions suggested that 
Ottoman subjects or their goods might have been on board the ship.127 
                                                
122 Wakeman to Porter, Cyprus, 3 April 1747, TNA  SP 97/33, f. 113v. 
123 Mann to Porter, the Lynnn at Smyrna, 31 March, 1747, TNA SP 97/33, f. 88r. 
124 Governor and Company to Porter, London, 26 January 1747, TNA SP 105/118, p. 60.  The Company 
further congratulated Porter that no new seizures of Ottoman goods had taken place since his arrival at 
Constantinople, Governor and Company to Porter, London, 28 March 1747, TNA SP 105/118, p. 66. 
125 Purnell, Latakia, 24 March 1747, TNA SP 97/33, f. 93r. 
126 “Copy of an Italian Paper given to the Vizir by his Excellency Mr. Porter,” undated, TNA SP 97/33, f. 
38r-v. 
127 Samuel Chalmers to Thomas Corbett, Gibraltar, 25 March 1748, TNA ADM 1/3882; John Edwards to 
Barrington Goldsworthy, London, 26 December 1746, TNA SP 98/55, f. 38r-50v; Governor and Company 
to Aspinwall, London, 20 March 1746, TNA SP 105/118, 3. 
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 The intersection and collision of lines of authority was well illustrated by the 
activities of the privateer Fortunatus Wright, whose seizure of half a dozen French 
vessels in the Levant in 1746 and 1747 angered Ottoman ministers and caused Sir James 
Porter to fear that the Ottomans might seek to proceed against Wright as a pirate, despite 
his commission from the king.128   Meanwhile, the British government issued a warrant 
for Wright's arrest and he was imprisoned at Livorno until he arranged bail to respond to 
the case against him at the High Court of the Admiralty.129 Wright was outraged at this 
treatment. Writing to Horace Mann to request his assistance, the privateer protested that 
he had dutifully observed royal orders not to cruise in the Levant and argued that the 
vice-admiralty court at Port Mahon had legitimized all his prizes. Yet, the Levant 
Company had urged that he be “taken up as a Pyrate” on account of “the clamours of a 
parcel of Barbarous Turks.”130 Wright similarly defended his actions in a letter to 
Barrington Goldsworthy, the English consul at Livorno, in which he again recounted his 
adherence to the rules of prize adjudication and the evidence to support his contention 
that the disputed goods were, in fact, French. He closed his letter by declaring that he 
would accept the judgment of the Admiralty, being responsible to it alone and not to “any 
Agent of the Grand Signiors, to the Grand Signior himself, or to any other Power Seeing I 
am an Englishman and Acted under a Commission from my Prince.”131Although Wright 
                                                
128 Porter to Robert Man, commander of His Majesty's ship the Lynn, Constantinople, 23 March 1747, 
TNA SP 97/33, f. 65v, 79v-80r, 90v; Porter to Newcastle Constantinople, 25 April 1747, TNA SP 97/33 f. 
79v-80r; Porter to Goldsworthy, Constantinople, 2 April 1747, TNA SP 97/33, f. 90v. 
129 To Barrington Goldsworthy, Whitehall, 16 May 1748, TNA SP 98/55, f. 66r; Goldsworthy to the Duke 
of Bedford, Livorno, 10 June 1748, TNA SP 98/55, f. 68r.   
130 Wright to Horace Mann, Livorno, 1 January 1748, TNA SP 98/56, f. 21r.  
131 Wright to Goldsworthy, Livorno, 4 June 1749, TNA SP 98/55, f. 131r. 
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was ultimately ordered to restore the Ottoman goods he had seized, his impassioned 
appeals testify to an avenue of extraterritorial authority that would become increasingly 
prominent in the next century. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 In the Mediterranean, as in the Atlantic, the War of the Austrian Succession 
demonstrated that Britain's oceanic empire was just one of several which claimed and 
conveyed sovereignty over maritime space. Consequently, although the conflict provided 
enough successes to convince Britons that they “ruled the waves,” it also and more 
prosaically confirmed the limits of British naval power.132 The clash of rival claims to 
maritime jurisdiction and oceanic sovereignty was confined neither to the Mediterranean 
nor to the interaction of European and extra-European polities. Ottoman claims to 
sovereignty over Levantine waters broadly paralleled those made by Spain in the 
Caribbean; in both the Levant and the Caribbean, British navigation became central to the 
competition between different conceptions of how sovereign authority operated at sea. 
The legal regime of the Atlantic world was defined by the intersection of the imperial, 
sovereign and jurisdictional claims put forward by Britain, Spain, and other European 
powers.133 In the Mediterranean, avenues of British and Ottoman maritime authority 
continued to coexist uneasily and to create a complex legal environment. From this 
                                                
132 On the significance of the period around 1740 for the emergence of a conception of the British Empire 
as a trans-Atlantic polity, see David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 7, “Empire and Ideology in the Walpolean era.”  Jonathan Scott 
traces the evolution of conceptions of Britain as an insular and maritime power in When the Waves Ruled 
Britannia: Geography and Political Identities, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
133 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, chap. 3, “Sovereignty at Sea: Jurisdiction, Piracy and the Origins of 
Ocean Regionalism.”  
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perspective, the ability of the Ottoman Empire to cause the British government to try, yet 
again, to restrain the behavior of its privateers is as striking as the general failure of its 
attempts to secure its waters from the effects of European warfare. 
 Anglo-Ottoman negotiations over the activity of British privateers in the eastern 
Mediterranean highlighted the legal ambiguity of those waters. Although British 
diplomats disparaged Ottoman justice, they had to admit that the Ottoman state possessed 
the authority to extract the restoration of prizes and payment of compensation. When the 
Admiralty Court judge Sir Henry Penrice was asked in 1747 to consider whether prize 
courts should be established at the East India Company's factories, he warned of “the 
Inconveniences that may arise to his Majesties Subjects trading within the Dominions of 
an Absolute Prince,” who might order the seizure of the Company's property if he 
thought injustices had been done to his subjects. As an example of the risks to which the 
East India Company would be exposed by British privateers operating in the Indian 
Ocean, the judge thought “it may not be amiss just to hint” of the difficulties the British 
had encountered over prizes taken in Levant.134  
 Penrice's comments are indicative of the close of a period when European and 
extra-European empires simultaneously exerted sovereignty over oceanic space. The 
rapidity with which this situation came to a close in the Indian Ocean is suggested by the 
fact that only a decade later three jurists advised that Indian ships taken in the Indian 
Ocean did not have to be formally condemned before a prize court, “neither treaties nor 
                                                
134 Penrice to Thomas Corbett, Doctors Commons, 15 December 1747, TNA ADM 1/3881.  
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usage between the Indians and their enemies requireing it.”135 In contradiction to his 
colleagues who denied that South Asian merchants ought to have recourse to prize courts, 
George Hay instead held that the capture of their ships, as well as those of the French, 
had to be adjudicated before the Court of Admiralty, because, “the maritime law of 
nations universally received requires a judicial determination in the Court of 
Admiralty.136 More significant than the issue of whether the law of nations extended 
beyond European states was, however, the question of how far extra-European polities 
could determine the legal and political environments through which vessels sailed. 
Although Penrice had not commented on the degree to which South Asians were entitled 
to partake in the law of nations, he had had no doubt that Mughal sovereignty shaped the 
legal regime of the Indian Ocean. With the dramatic expansion of the East India 
Company's empire in that arena, the British had less reason to acknowledge ways in 
which Mughal sovereignty could make itself felt at sea. Instead, the East India Company 
mounted campaigns against what it termed to be Indian Ocean pirates at the same time 
that the British state depended on peace with Morocco and the North African regencies to 
sustain its strategic position in the Mediterranean.137 
 In the Mediterranean too the British seem to have been less anxious as to how the 
Ottoman Empire would react to privateering in the Levant during the Seven Years’ War 
than they had been a few years earlier. The Levant Company was thus surprisingly 
                                                
135 C. Pratt, C. York, Jn. Browning, 13 November 1757, in Reports of cases determined by the High court 
of admiralty, 392.  
136  Idem. 
137 Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the 
British Empire in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chap. 9, “ ‘A Sword in One Hand & 
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sanguine when, at the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, the Ottoman Emperor again 
insisted that the belligerents avoid combat in “His Seas.” In November 1756, the 
directors of the Company wrote to Porter and advised him that “We are pretty easy about 
it [the sultan’s command]; knowing that Your Excellency’s Experience will find Ways 
and Means to prove what Prizes shall be made are out of Gun-Shot of any of their Forts 
of Castles.”138 Nevertheless, the Company still assumed that Ottoman officials would 
have jurisdiction to decide whether prizes had been taken within the empire's waters. 
Through the late eighteenth century, British interference with Ottoman trade remained a 
matter of diplomatic contention and the Ottoman government continued to seek to ensure 
the security of Levantine trade. Indeed, during the War of American Independence, the 
Ottomans explicitly referred to their earlier efforts to establish a maritime boundary 
across the eastern Mediterranean when they advised the British and French to avoid 
interfering with Ottoman commerce and committing hostile acts near Ottoman ports.139 
The Porte was unable to assert its sovereignty over Levantine waters in a meaningful 
way, but it continued to insist on the security of Ottoman ports and harbors. In this 
respect, the Ottoman Empire also continued to shape the political conditions of British 
navigation in the eastern Mediterranean.140 
                                                
138 Governor and Company to Porter, London, 26 November 1756, TNA SP 97/18. 
139 See the English translation of the “Declaration of the Ottoman Porte concerning the Neutrality to be 
Observed in Her Seas, submitted to the Ambassadors of France and of Great Britain, 12th February 1780,” 
in Sir Francis Piggott and G. W. T. Omond, Documentary History of the Armed Neutralities, 1780 and 
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 The trajectories of British expansion in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean 
diverged in the last half of the eighteenth century. While the Seven Years’ War saw the 
full emergence of the East India Company’s territorial empire, it also ushered in a nearly 
fifty-year period when the Mediterranean largely ceased to be of strategic importance to 
Britain. Although the loss of Minorca marked, for Britain, the opening of the Seven 
Years’ War, this conflict was the first in half a century in which the Mediterranean was 
not a primary theatre of war. Thanks to the “diplomatic revolution” in Europe that saw 
France and Austria put aside their traditional rivalry, there were no campaigns in southern 
Europe and Italy that required the support of British fleets.141 The different trajectories of 
Britain’s Mediterranean and Indian Ocean presences through most of the second half of 
the eighteenth century should not, however, distract us from the continuities that had 
previously existed between the British positions in these two oceanic basins. Through the 
seventeenth century and well into the eighteenth, the Mediterranean was a sea whose 
political and legal environment was shaped by a variety of states and empires, but 
dominated by none of them.142 In this respect it was not significantly different from other 
early modern oceanic bodies.
                                                
141 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, 269. 
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Conclusion 
The Mediterranean in the Imaginative Geographies of the Early 
Modern World 
 
Widdaw about 190 Leagues below Cape 
Coast is a neutrall port . . . and even 
now in time of war as free a port as 
Leghorn or Genoa.1 
  
 The Mediterranean was a maritime region where English ships sailed into waters 
that were under the sovereignty of foreign polities and where English legal authority 
regularly collided with that of other states. Consequently, the history of the English 
presence in the early modern Mediterranean is one of interactions that shaped the legal 
and political organization of the sea. It is also a history that moves beyond the persistent 
insularity of narratives of British imperial development. In the construction of the legal 
and political regimes of the Mediterranean, this history is intimately connected to and 
intertwined with the histories of other European and extra-European polities.2  
 The evolution of the English presence in the Mediterranean serves as a model for 
understanding early modern English expansion within the context of the multinational 
histories of oceanic regions. Around the early modern world, foreign empires and polities 
shaped the commercial environments in which English merchants worked and the legal 
                                                
1 “Heads of Inquiries relating to the Trade to Africa, with observations thereupon, presented by Mr. 
Harris,” 2 January 1708, TNA CO 388/11, Doc. I13. 
2 On a “connected” approach to early modern history, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Connected Histories: 
Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia,” Modern Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (July 1997): 
735-962. Jorge Canizares-Esguerra similarly argues for integrating the histories of the British and Iberian 
Atlantics in Puritan Conquistadors: Iberianizing the Atlantic, 1550-1700 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2006). 
  349 
! !
and political foundations of the seas through which English vessels sailed.3 While the 
interaction of different sovereign authorities shaped the legal and political organization of 
trade in both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, this situation was most evident in the 
Mediterranean, where the English state possessed only limited territorial and maritime 
sovereignty and where English merchants conducted their business almost entirely under 
the legal authority of foreign states. Rather than excluding the Mediterranean from 
narratives of English expansion, the limits of English sovereignty in that sea instead make 
it vital to understanding how legally and politically pluralistic maritime environments 
shaped the expansion of English trade and state authority. 
  Over the course of the seventeenth century, the place of the Mediterranean within 
English expansion underwent a profound transformation. During the early stages of this 
expansion, it was in the Mediterranean that merchants learned to trade to distant and alien 
regions. They subsequently carried the commercial strategies they learned in that sea into 
the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.4 However, trading techniques rooted in cosmopolitanism 
and the accommodation of cultural difference gave way to colonial settlement and to 
corporate trade backed up by the threat of force. With the colonization of Tangier in 
1661, Charles II and his ministers sought to integrate the Mediterranean into England's 
wider imperial expansion. The failure of that colony illustrated the ideological and 
institutional processes that, from the second half of the seventeenth century onwards, 
excluded that sea from the wider growth of England's colonial empire. Meanwhile, the 
                                                
3 The only study to bring the legal regimes of the Indian Ocean into historical study remains C. H. 
Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies (16th, 17th and 
18th Centuries) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). 
4 Alison Games, Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2008), chap. 2, “The Mediterranean Origins of the British Empire.” 
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rise of oceanic empires further encouraged the division of Europe from the Atlantic world 
as imagined “lines of amity” separated political conditions in Europe from those that 
prevailed among colonial settlements.5 
 Despite the differentiation of Atlantic and Mediterranean oceanic regions, British 
merchants and administrators continued to invoke the Mediterranean as a model for the 
organization of Atlantic trade well into the eighteenth century. Instead of separating the 
inner sea from other oceanic regions, they understood that the pluralistic environment of 
the Mediterranean could represent conditions in parts of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 
Since the legal and conceptual separation of Europe from the wider world was central to 
both the development of European empires and to the ways in which Europeans thought 
about their relationship to other societies, scholars have focused their attention on 
processes of regional and oceanic differentiation.6 Yet Europeans imagined the political 
and commercial geography of the early modern world in diverse and competing ways.  
Divergent views that held the Mediterranean to be comparable to or distinct from other 
oceanic bodies bring the sea back into the wider perspective of global history.   
 For some early modern commentators, the Atlantic Ocean represented a political 
and commercial environment that was totally distinct from that which prevailed in 
Europe and the Mediterranean. An example of this view arose during Genoese debates 
                                                
5 Elizabeth Mancke, “Empire and State,” in The British Atlantic World, ed. David Armitage and Michael J. 
Braddick, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 193. 
6 Carl Schmitt offered one of the more extreme accounts of how early modern conceptions of the Atlantic 
as a lawless space served to separate the state and national communities of Europe from the wider world in 
The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, tr. G. L. Ulmen (New 
York: Telos Press, 2003). More recent studies historicize the construction of legal and political boundaries 
between Europe and the world, as in Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in 
European Empires, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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over a proposal to create a free port at the town of La Spezza at the start of the eighteenth 
century.7 Opponents of this prospective free port argued against it on economic and 
practical grounds, but they also warned that if this new port succeeded, it would attract 
the envy of major powers that would seek to seize it. In response, a supporter of the free 
port asserted that powerful states posed no threat to the development of commercial 
centers in Europe. This anonymous memorialist denied that great princes would declare 
war against a friendly prince purely for commercial gain. Instead, states like France 
already enjoyed commercial prosperity within their borders and their ships ranged around 
the world carrying foreign goods. Great princes deployed their armies to conquer 
provinces, not to promote trade. The memorialist then continued to note that there were 
not “in the Mediterranean, as in the Ocean companies of Merchants, that have the power 
to invade others.” The Scots had recently been able to occupy the Isthmus of Darien 
because that region was “a desert Country” and without defenses to overcome. The 
situation in Italy was, of course, entirely different and there was thus no fear of such an 
occupation of the heavily defended Gulf of Spezza. 8   
                                                
7 On free ports in the Genoese state, see Giulio Giacchero, Origini e sviluppi del portofranco genovese, 11 
Agosto 1590- 9 Ottobre 1778 (Genoa: Sagep Editrice, 1972). Giacchero does not discuss the debate of 1700 
over the free port at La Spezza, but he does briefly mention subsequent proposals to establish a free port 
there, 156-157. 
8 “Ne vi sono nel Mediterraneo, come nell’Oceano, compagnie de Mercanti, che habbino forze da invadere 
l’altrui. Li Scozzosi si sono con pochi Vascelli impadroniti di Darien, perche non havevano da espugnare 
fortezze essendo quello un Paese deserto, e quasi abbandanato,” see “Scritture state presentate in Genova 
all’esame di quella Serenissima Repubblica per la dichiarizione del Porto franco alla Spezie, et sono per la 
negativa et per l’affermativa,” ASF Mediceo del Principato, 1810, f. 1360v-1361r. These memorials for and 
against the proposed free port at La Spezza accompany an anonymous letter dated 21 August 1700, 
describing the rejection of this proposal. I have been unable to locate these memorials in the Genoese 
archives.  The minutes of the debates are contained in the Archivio di Stato di Genova, Archivio Segreto, 
1609. 
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 The distinction between a Europe characterized by power politics and an Atlantic 
environment defined by commercial competition and imperial expansion illustrated the 
early modern perception that Europe was a legal and political space separate from the 
wider world.  Early modern Europeans imagined the extra-European world as a “zone of 
war,” a region where the legal rules and regulations of the European state system did not 
apply.9  The history of the Scottish attempt to settle Darien illustrated this conceptual 
differentiation of European and Atlantic space. The decision of the Company of Scotland 
Trading to Africa and the Indies to attempt to colonize the Isthmus of Panama depended 
on its willingness to contest and to defy Spanish claims to sovereignty over that territory. 
The English government sought to undermine the Scottish company in order to forestall a 
potential competitor of the East India Company and of its own colonial empire, further 
revealing the extent to which colonial and extra-European commerce was a matter of 
imperial and state competition.10 The Spanish, meanwhile, laid siege to the Scottish 
settlement of Darien despite the state of peace that existed between the Scottish and 
Spanish kingdoms.11 The Scottish Darien scheme thus affirmed the Genoese 
memorialist’s argument that the Atlantic was a region where the legal norms of European 
politics did not apply. 
                                                
9 Eliga H. Gould, “Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the British Atlantic, circa 
1772,” The William and Mary Quarterly 60, no. 3 (July 2003): 471-510. 
10 David Armitage, “The Scottish Vision of Empire: Intellectual Origins of the Darien Venure,” in A Union 
for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union of 1707, ed. John Robertson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 97-118. See also Douglas A. Watt, The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the 
Wealth of the Nations (Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2006). 
11 On the Spanish reaction to the Scottish colonization of Darien, see Christopher Storrs, “Disaster at 
Darien (1698-1900)? The Persistence of Spanish Imperial Power on the Even of the Demise of the Spanish 
Habsburgs,” European History Quarterly 29, no. 1 (1999): 5-38.   
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 The absence of major joint-stock corporations in the Mediterranean further 
exemplified and reinforced the distinction between that sea and the Atlantic and Indian 
Ocean regions. Administrators and merchants involved in the settlement of Tangier 
objected to the establishment of a company to trade along the Moroccan coast on the 
basis that corporate trade was inappropriate for North Africa, where the English state 
could protect the trade of its subjects and where polities provided relatively stable 
commercial conditions. Conversely, the perception that parts of the Atlantic world were 
lawless spaces reappeared regularly in on-going debates over the organization of English 
trade along the coast of Africa during the first half of the eighteenth century.12 Agents of 
the Royal African Company defended that corporation’s monopoly on English trade to 
the coast of Africa by arguing, “The way of Trading here is quite Different from the way 
of Trading in Europe, or in Turkey; The Traders there have Towns to Reside in, where 
they are Secure in their Persons and Effects, and all People may go to whom they will, as 
is done in London: But here the Trade must be sent for and Paid for . . . and must be 
Contested for with the Dutch.”13 A defender of the Company later explained that it was 
necessary on the coast of Africa “to traffick and deal with a Barbarous & uncivilized 
People, made up of Severall Petty & Independent Kingdoms & Governments, (if they 
may be so call’d who have no Laws amongst themselves but force).” Only a joint-stock 
company could maintain the “constant force & Strength” to sustain trade under such 
                                                
12 On the debates between the Royal African Company and free traders, see K. G. Davis, The Royal African 
Company (London: Longmans, Green, 1957), 122-152. See also, William Pettigrew, “Free to Enslave: 
Politics and the Escalation of Britain's Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1688-1714,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd ser., 64, no. 1 (January 2007): 3-38. 
13 “Copy of a Letter from Sir Dalby Thomas & others to the Royal African Company, dated at Cabo Corso 
Castlle the 26 of November 1709 relating to the Trade to africa,” TNA CO 388/13. 
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conditions.14 The political environment of Africa thus required that trade be organized 
differently than it was in Europe. 
 Opponents of the Royal African Company put forward a different portrait of 
extra-European political conditions. According to merchants who favored an open trade 
along the African coast, African rulers treated them with adequate justice and provided 
them with sufficient security that they did not need the protection of forts and factories 
supported by a joint stock. The extra-European world was anything but lawless. Instead, 
the layers of sovereignty that regulated African, Asian and Indian Ocean space paralleled 
those which existed within Europe. One merchant thus denied that trade to extra-
European destinations had to be organized differently than European trade, “And as To 
it’s Being one thing to Carry on Trade With an European and another thing to Carry it on 
With the Petty States of Africa I never found any other Difference but that I allways met 
with as good if not much better Quarter from the Latter then I Ever have done for 30 
Years Past with the former.” This merchant suggested it was as absurd to think that forts 
were necessary to maintain the slave trade as it would be for a Frenchman to suggest that 
he would have to build a fort at Southampton to sustain his trade in grain.15    
 The comparison of Mediterranean and Atlantic space contained in attacks on the 
Royal African Company suggest a different perception of the early modern world from 
that put forward by the Company’s supporters. These merchants objected to the idea that 
political and commercial conditions in Africa were decisively alien to those which 
                                                
14 “Anonimous Letter in relation to the African Trade,” London, 21 March 1726, TNA CO 388/25 f. 173v. 
15 “Some Remarks on the Subject matter mentioned by the Companys Councill att the First Hearing,” TNA 
CO 388/25, f. 310r-v. These memorial is contained with others from March 1726. 
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prevailed in Europe and the Mediterranean. Instead, opponents of the Royal African 
Company frequently cited the regulated Levant Company as an alternative model for the 
institutional regulation of English trade along the African coast.16 In the process, they 
implicitly equated the political and commercial conditions of the eastern Mediterranean 
to those in the Atlantic. In this vein, one pamphlet directed against the African Company 
rejected its arguments that it held legal title to the land occupied by its forts. Instead, the 
author insisted, “ 'twould be as monstrous to own or pretend, that this African Company 
have a legal Property to the Lands of the Kings of Morocco, Widda, or of any other 
Prince in Africa, by reason of their having Factories there, as 'twould be to affirm, that the 
Turkey Company have the Property of the Lands of the Grand Seignior in Turkey, 
because they have Factory-Houses in the Turkish Dominions.”17 Conversely, the 
members of the Royal African Company rejected the comparison between the Levant and 
African coast and argued that a regulated company could not succeed there “unless the 
Seperate Traders undertake to reduce the Coast of Guinea to be under the Government of 
one Soveraign Porte & that the Natives become as Civiliz'd as the People of 
Constantinople.”18 
 In the long-running disputes between the Royal African Company and its 
adversaries, both parties turned to the Mediterranean as a point of reference. They 
                                                
16 For instance, see “Answers of Mr. May to Queries,” 15 December 1707, TNA CO 388/11, Doc. I12; 
South Sea Company to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, London, 4 March 1725, TNA 
CO 388/25, f. 139v.   
17 An Answer to a Paper call'd Particulars against the Bill for an Open Trade to Africa: With some 
Presidents touching the laying Open Foreign Trades, by Act of Parliament (n. p. 1713), 1. 
18 “Some General Observations & particular Remarks on the Report of the Lords Commissioners for Trade 
and Plantations dates the 3d of February 1708 upon the Petition of the Royal African Company,” Recieved 
3 January 1709, TNA CO 388/11, Doc. I82. 
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understood that sea to be a maritime region ringed by sovereign polities with the 
authority to regulate and protect trade within their ports. The question was whether this 
model could be accurately applied to the political situation along the coast of Africa.  
Some merchants argued that political and commercial conditions in parts of Africa were 
directly comparable to those that prevailed in Europe and the Mediterranean. One 
anonymous respondent to the arguments of the Royal African Company explained that, 
unlike sparsely populated North America, it was impossible to establish colonies on the 
west coast of Africa in the face of the local resistance of well-armed and sizable 
populations. Moreover, it was also unnecessary since the local polities maintained 
political conditions amenable to trade, “Many Parts have set up free Places of Trade & 
Particularly Widda before mentioned one of Them Maintained as Regular a Neutrality as 
at Leghorn all the Time of the Two French Wars With all European Nations.”19   
 The ideological barriers that separated the Mediterranean from the Atlantic 
following the enaction of the Navigation Acts and failure of Tangier began to weaken 
during the first half of the eighteenth century. As processes of state formation and 
economic integration regularized political and commercial interactions around the 
Atlantic, merchants and administrators began to question the differentiation of that 
oceanic body from the Mediterranean.20 When free traders emphasized the ability of 
African rulers and state to regulate trade along their coasts, they testified to dramatic 
                                                
19 “Some Remarks on the African Trade, which could not be heard, it being late,” TNA CO 388/25, f. 314v.  
This memorial is contained with others from March 1726. On the neutrality of Whydah, see above, chapter 
4. 
20 Ian K. Steele charts the integration of the western Atlantic and Europe during the early eighteenth 
century in The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: an Exploration of Communication and Community (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 10, “Send Peace and War beyond the Line, 1667-1739.” 
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political and commercial transformation that reshaped the Atlantic world during the 
eighteenth century. With the rise of the Atlantic economy and intensification of Atlantic 
trade, polity and regime formation in Africa and Europe were intertwined.21 The slave 
trade and the rise of plantation complexes enriched European economies and generated 
revenue that contributed to the development of the eighteenth-century fiscal military 
states.  At the same time, the slave trade became an engine driving political centralization 
within the diverse political communities of Africa. 22 In a sense, the Atlantic was 
becoming more like the Mediterranean even as European commentators separated these 
oceanic bodies from one another and differentiated Europe from the wider world. English 
merchants well understood that the balance of power on the African coast favored 
indigenous authority and that it was African rulers and merchants who frequently 
controlled the terms of trade.23 
 Diverse imaginative geographies underlay early modern European conceptions of 
the wider world.24 Europeans distinguished the political and cultural organization of their 
                                                
21 Joseph C. Miller, “The Dynamics of History in Africa and the Atlantic 'Age of Revolutions',” in The Age 
of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840, ed. David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 101-124. 
22 On the importance of political centralization for the pursuit of the slave trade, see Paul E. Lovejoy and 
David Richardson, “‘This Horrid Hole’: Royal Authority, Commerce and Credit at Bonny, 1690-1840,” 
The Journal of African History 45, no. 3 (2004): 363-392. However, forms of political and commercial 
organization varied considerable along the African coast. As a result, informal means to regulate cross-
cultural trade coexisted with the establishment of political authority over trade.  See idem, “Trust, 
Pawnship, and Atlantic History: The Institutional Foundations of the Old Calabar Slave Trade,” The 
American Historical Review 104, no. 2 (April 1999): 333-355. 
23 On the relative balance of political and commercial power between African and Europeans in the conduct 
of the slave trade, see John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Makings of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Eltis, The Rise of African Slavery in the 
Americas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
24 The term “imaginative geographies” comes from Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1978). For a more historically grounded study of the cultural construction of geography, see Martin 
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Eurasian peninsula and set it against visions of African and Asia as barbarous continents. 
It was, however, also possible for merchants to view an African port-city as comparable 
to Livorno and the political conditions of trade along Africa's Atlantic coast as equivalent 
to those which prevailed in Europe or the Mediterranean. Eighteenth-century thinkers 
frequently adopted a universal or cosmopolitan perspective when considering Europe's 
place within the wider world.25 When merchants compared the political and commercial 
conditions of different trading centers, they articulated yet other ways to understand 
Europe's relationship to African or Asian societies. For both supporters of the Royal 
African Company and their adversaries, the characterization of African societies was 
naturally intertwined with their own commercial interests. Nevertheless, it is notable that 
some of the strongest voices for the quality of law and justice in extra-European societies 
were those merchants who themselves had lived among or interacted with them. 
 Even as European empires expanded into the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the 
Mediterranean remained a source of models for interaction with extra-European polities. 
The lessons that commentators drew from the Mediterranean changed during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. If seventeenth-century merchants and travelers 
learned the value of cultural accommodation and cosmopolitanism in the Mediterranean, 
their eighteenth-century successors were more confident in British power. Merchants 
trading to Africa thus emphasized the importance of “the awfull Countenance of Great 
                                                
W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigan, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997). 
25 See, for instance, Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2003); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Liberal Imperialism in Britain and France 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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Britain and her Floating Castles” to secure their trade from European rivals.26 
Nevertheless, these merchants also understood the early modern world to be decentered 
and composed of sovereign polities that exercised legal authority within their borders.27 
As a region where Britain's imperial presence was limited and tenuous, the Mediterranean 
was an ideal example of a maritime environment where merchants depended on foreign 
governments to regulate and to secure trade. Moreover, the English presence in the 
Mediterranean offered a standard by which to understand the conditions of English trade 
along the African coast. 
 The pluralistic and decentralized quality of the Mediterranean and of the early 
modern world more broadly deteriorated rapidly at the close of the eighteenth century. 
While processes of state formation and economic integration bound European and extra-
European polities more closely together, these same processes contributed to Europe's 
imperial ascendancy.28 The efforts of the Ottoman state to expand and to affirm its 
sovereignty over Levantine waters in the face of Anglo-French competition, exemplified 
the enduring ability of that empire to shape the political and legal organization of the 
                                                
26 “Some Remarks on the African Trade, which could not be heard, it being late,” TNA, CO 388/25, f. 322r.  
In similar terms, a group of free traders argued that “Shipps of War, the moveable Forts of this Nation, 
Cruizing along the Coast of Africa, can only be the Security and Protection of this Trade.” See “The 
Memorial of the Merchants of London Trading to the Coast of Africa,” London, 18 March 1726, TNA, CO 
388/25, f. 167v. 
27 On the decentered quality of the early modern world, see David Hancok, Citizens of the World: London 
Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995); idem, Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009). 
28 C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 
chap. 4, “Converging Revolutions, 1780-1820;” idem., “The Age of Revolutions in Global Context: 
Afterword,” in The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840, ed. David Armitage and Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 209-217. See also John Darwin, After 
Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2007), chap. 4, “The Eurasian 
Revolution.” 
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eastern Mediterranean. However, the inability of the Ottoman Empire to enforce its 
sovereignty over the Levant also foreshadowed its declining power in the face of 
European imperial expansion. Russian and then French expansion into the Levant 
subsequently brought Ottoman dominance there to a close. Two decades of imperial 
competition between France and Britain further destroyed the early modern pattern of 
Mediterranean maritime and commercial life. Napoleon expelled the Knights of Malta 
from their island home, which subsequently became a British colony. As a result, an 
island that was indicative of the political and legal ambiguities of the Mediterranean 
became one of a global network of naval bases that underpinned Britain's nineteenth-
century naval dominance. 29 In the place of the relatively equal terms of trade that had 
characterized the sea through the early modern period, like parts of the Indian Ocean and 
of the American continents, the sea was integrated into global patterns of commerce that 
revolved around the industrializing economies of Europe.30 
 Notably, it was an aggressive new North American empire, anxious to establish 
its place in the Atlantic state community, which began the process that ultimately brought 
North African corsairing to a close.31 When the fledgling navy of the United States 
                                                
29 David Abulafia desribes the imperial rivalries that reshaped in the Mediterranean in The Great Sea: A 
Human History of the Mediterranean (London: Allen Lane, 2011), pt. 4, chap. 8, “The View through the 
Russian Prism, 1760-1805.” See also Thomas W. Gallant, Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity and 
Power in the British Mediterranean (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002). 
30 For a comparative overview of the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans during the early modern and 
modern periods, see C. A. Bayly and Leila Fawaz, “Introduction: The Connected World of Empires,” in 
Modernity and Culture, ed. Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C. A. Bayly (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002), 1-27. 
31 The most reliable works on America's wars with the regencies and on the significance of those 
campaigns are Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2005); Frederik C. Leiner, The End of Barbary Terror: America's 1815 War agains 
the Pirates of North Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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launched attacks against the North African regencies, it was of course following in a 
well-established tradition of deploying naval power against those polities and their 
corsairs. However, the ability of the United State to free itself from payment of tribute to 
the regencies helped to set off a process whereby the European powers brought an end to 
the activities of Mediterranean corsairs. American naval success combined with the 
growth of European military power and increasing confidence in Europe's civilizing 
mission to undermine the legitimacy of the corso and its sponsors in European minds.32   
 During the first half of the nineteenth century, imperial expansion and growing 
confidence in European superiority affirmed and intensified earlier conceptual divisions 
between Europe and the wider world. In Africa and in Asia, the sovereign pluralism that 
had characterized the early modern period began to fade in the face of European imperial 
dominance.33 Instead, Europeans increasingly imagined themselves to be at the center of 
a community of states. North Africa was assimilated into extra-European space while the 
Ottoman Empire was formally, but only partially, incorporated into the European state 
community. However, European dominance over Mediterranean waters was complete.  In 
both North Africa and in the Ottoman Empire, nineteenth-century treaties shifted the 
                                                
32 The best account of Europe's changing relationship with the North African regencies in the early 
nineteenth century comes in Gillian Weiss, Captives and Corsairs: France and Slavery in the Early 
Modern Mediterranean (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
33 Christian Windler, “Representing a State in a Segmentary Society: French Consuls in Tunis from the 
Ancient Régime to the Restoration,” The Journal of Modern History 73, no. 2 (June 2001): 233-236. Legal 
pluralism would survive, but within European empires and through the extension of extraterritorial 
jurisdictions into extra-European polities. On this, see Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Culture: Legal 
Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 244-252. 
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foundations of consular jurisdiction from legal pluralism to outright legal 
extraterritoriality.34 
 The dramatic growth of the British Empire from the end of the eighteenth century 
only highlighted the different conditions under which England’s early modern 
commercial and maritime expansion had taken place. Diverse claims to sovereign and 
legal authority over Mediterranean waters defined patterns of trade and navigation around 
that sea. Islamic empires, corsairs and their sponsors, and Italian principalities all claimed 
authority in parts of the Mediterranean and over the trade and navigation that flowed 
through it. The English state was just one of many sources of sovereign and legal 
authority that coexisted in the Mediterranean. The development of the English presence 
in the Mediterranean illustrated how merchants and mariners navigated among the 
diverse sovereign and jurisdictional authorities of that sea.   
 The history of English expansion is more than the history of the extension of 
English imperial authority. The growth of English trade and navigation carried the legal 
and regulatory authority of the state around the world. Even in regions like the 
Mediterranean, where the British Empire had a minimal presence, the expansion of the 
state was nonetheless evident. Yet the history of the early modern Mediterranean is also a 
reminder of the limits of European and British imperial expansion in this period. Indeed, 
the Mediterranean remained a model for understanding commercial organization in the 
Atlantic and Indian Oceans well into the eighteenth century precisely because it was a sea 
where diverse sovereign authorities shaped the contours of trade and navigation. For this 
                                                
34 C. R. Pennel, “The Origins of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act and the Extension of British Sovereignty,” 
Historical Research 83, no. 221(August 2010): 465-485. On the expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
the nineteenth century, see also W. Ross Johnston, Sovereignty and Protection: A Study of British 
Jurisdictional Imperialism in the Late Nineteenth Century (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1973). 
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reason, the Mediterranean is equally a model for understanding how English expansion 
occurred in a decentered and pluralistic world.    
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